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THE
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NUMBER I.

ART. I.—OBJECTIONS TO THE LAWS OF SYMBOLIZATION.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE Episcopal Recorder of March last contained a notice from a correspondent, of the Premium Essay by the Rev. E. Winthrop on the Characteristics and Laws of Prophetic Symbols, the object of which was to present certain objections which the writer entertains to those laws, and indicate his disbelief that they can contribute anything towards the just interpretation of the symbolic Scriptures. As he treats them as originating with us, and exhibits Mr. Winthrop as but restating them in a compact form, it seems properly to belong to us to examine his criticisms, and return such responses to them as the truth demands.

And this task we are far from undertaking with reluctance. That some difficulties, or apparent difficulties, attend the subject, we are not disposed to deny. It would be extraordinary were it otherwise; for what subject is there in the whole circle, not merely of hermeneutics, but of theology; what truth or fact is there in the entire compass of human knowledge, which is not embarrassed with some real or apparent difficulty, or in respect to which not merely a

weak, a sceptical, or a captious spirit, but even a fair-minded inquirer may not raise some showy and perplexing objections? Whatever difficulties, however, there are, whether of much importance or not, we think it desirable that they should be brought forward, that we may have opportunity to consider them; and our regret in this instance is, not that this writer has stated his objections, but that he is so little master of the subject, so inadequately aware even of the import of his own views, and so unprepared to discuss the topics which he touches, with the thoroughness and caution which the office he has undertaken demands. An Essay was some time since placed in our hands, in which his objections and others were stated with greater strength, and argued with far greater acuteness; and we have been in expectation that it would, ere this, have been presented to the public, and given us an opportunity to meet the whole array of criticisms and cavils that has been offered, in the most artful and imposing form they are likely to assume, and show on what mistaken grounds they are founded, and to what fatal results they lead. As that, however, may not see the light, we must content ourselves with dispatching what this writer alleges.

The first objection which he offers is, to the representation that the laws by which the symbols are interpreted, that are explained by the revealing Spirit in the prophecies themselves, are *revealed laws*. He says:

“In reference to the great object of his Essay—‘The Laws of Symbolization’—we have a preliminary objection to the confidence with which it is announced (p. 21), that the laws by which symbols are said to be framed are ‘*revealed laws*.’ ‘These interpretations are to be regarded as a revelation of the principle applicable to all symbols, and the *laws by which they are framed as revealed laws*.’ We protest against anything being called a revealed law, which is not found in Scripture in the form of an express announcement or injunction. This is surely not the case with these so-called laws. There is an ambiguity in the word law, and in the use of it in this connexion, which would lead many to suppose that Mr. Winthrop means to convey the idea that God has given us command to interpret the prophecies only in a certain way. We do not assert, or understand this to be his meaning. But, as in observing the phenomena of nature we notice the *uniform ways* in which they exist or proceed,

and then call them *laws*—so, in observing the inspired interpretations of prophecy, we classify them and observe the methods in which they explain the symbols; and call these methods *laws* of symbolization. But granting for the moment that we could reach such laws—what do we mean by the expression? Do we mean that they are laws which God has laid on us? Clearly not. We only mean that we have discovered the principles or laws *on which God has proceeded*. There is propriety in calling every recorded instance of inspired interpretation a revealed law to us, for the interpretation of the particular prophecy which it unfolds; but when we call those the revealed laws of interpretation or symbolization,—not which God has *announced* to us as such, but which we think *we have found to be such*, it seems to us that the language is unwarranted and presumptuous. If, besides the particular interpretation, God has said—‘These are the *principles* and laws (specifying them) on which these and all prophecies are to be interpreted’—*then* it would have been proper to have called them *revealed laws*. But when God has only given the interpretations and has not announced the principles on which they are made, and we reach those principles by induction, and call them laws—then we arrogate infallibility to our inductions.”

He thus objects to our denominating and treating the laws by which the Spirit of God has interpreted many of the symbols, as laws that are *revealed* by that inspired interpretation, as though it implied that they are specifically and formally announced in the Scriptures, in the same way as the commands are of the decalogue! Not that there is a syllable uttered by ourselves or Mr. Winthrop, that carries such a representation; not that we have not stated, in the most specific manner, that the ground of our denominating them revealed laws is, that they are made known to us through the inspired interpretations that are framed by them, in which they are exemplified; but on the ground that to call laws that are made known to us in that way, revealed laws, is equivalent to declaring that they are presented to us in a wholly different method, like the commands of the decalogue, and is therefore liable to mislead readers into the idea that these laws are formally announced in the prophecies, like precepts and injunctions that relate to dispositions of the heart, external actions, or rites of worship! For if nobody is liable to be misled by such a denomination of

the laws, what harm is likely to result from it? But what sort of readers must they be;—who is there that has the slightest knowledge of the prophetic Scriptures, that is in any danger of being betrayed into such a causeless mistake? This objection, therefore, seems to us not only groundless, but captious; and springs, we apprehend, from the fear which the critic very clearly reveals, that the ascription of that character to those laws, is likely to invest the interpretations which the Spirit of God has given, with *too high an influence*—to lead the student of the prophecies to take them in an unwarrantable measure as his *guide*. The drift, indeed—the undisguised aim of a large share of the critic's objections and reasonings—is to intercept the laws from producing that effect. It is no good omen, we think, that an inquirer into the meaning of the divine word is afraid, in such circumstances, of being led into error by the Spirit of inspiration!

But let us see whether the laws that are thus made known to us, may not justly, and ought not to be, regarded as revealed laws, and denominated such. He says, further, in respect to this:—

“Even if we were persuaded that Mr. Winthrop had successfully verified these seven laws by the recorded interpretations of the symbols, we should not dare to call them *revealed laws*. The data are *revealed*. The laws are *deduced*. The laws are not *given*, but *discovered* by us from other things which are given. This distinction is important in reference to the authority which these laws may justly claim over those who believe them to have been legitimately deduced.

“We can illustrate what we mean by the language of St. Peter. He tells us that ‘no prophecy is of any private interpretation.’ Here is a *revealed law* of interpretation. Had we been told the same thing of the seven specified laws they also would have been revealed laws. But all that we can now say of them is that Mr. Lord infers that they are revealed laws, while many others infer that they are not. The most that can justly be said of them, even by those who admit their truth, is that they are *deduced rules*. The difference between deduced rules and revealed laws is fundamental.”

He thus assumes that nothing can be revealed, except by a direct and categorical announcement; for his proposition is

the acts of the several supreme rulers whom the beasts represented, and the effects produced by those acts as symbolizing the effects that were to be produced by the rulers of whom they were the symbols; and so in every other instance of the interpretation by the Spirit of a symbol of those classes that was presented to the eye of the prophets. But the fact that all the symbols which are interpreted, and they are very numerous, are interpreted according to this law, is a proof that it is the law also of all the other symbols of the same classes that are not interpreted by the Spirit; and as absolute a proof of it as the fact that the interpreted symbols are used as *representatives* is, that those that are not interpreted are used in that relation. How does this critic know that the uninterpreted symbols are used in the relation of representatives, unless it be from the fact that the interpreted symbols are explained as used in that relation? There is no such formal and specific announcement that they are used in that relation as he asserts is essential to constitute a revelation. The whole information given to us in respect to the principle on which symbols are used, is comprised in the interpretations that are given of them by the Spirit. And those interpretations are a revelation of the fact not only that those which are explained by the Spirit are used on that principle, but that all others that are not interpreted are employed on it also: as otherwise we have no proof that they are employed as *representatives*. The objector therefore can no more deny that the revelation that the law that agents represent agents, and acts stand for acts, is the law of the symbols that are interpreted by it—is a revelation that it is the law also of all the other similar symbols that are not interpreted—than he can deny that the revelation that the interpreted symbols are used as representatives, is a revelation that all other symbols are also used as representatives.

2. The law that agents symbolize agents, acts denote acts, and effects represent effects, is the law universally of symbols of those classes, because it is the law of analogy—that is of a correspondence in nature, office, or relation, between the representative and that which it represents. There is an analogy or correspondence between an agent in one sphere, and an agent in another resembling sphere; between the acts of the one and the acts of the other; and between the effects

produced by the one, and those produced by the other :—the one occupying the place in the sphere to which it belongs, which the other occupies in the sphere to which that belongs, and the nature and relation of the one as cause or effect being the same as the nature and relation of the other is as such. An agent, however, does not bear such an analogy to an act or an effect, nor does an act or effect bear such a resemblance to an agent ; there is no likeness between them, and therefore the one cannot be used as the representative of the other. The very fact that the symbols are used as representatives proves, therefore, that they are used in conformity with that law. To deny it is to deny that symbols are used universally in the relation of representatives. It is to contradict the principle on which allegories and parables are used also, as well as that of symbolization ; for all the allegories and all the parables of the Scriptures—in which agents, acts, and effects in one sphere are employed to represent agents, acts, and effects in another—employ their representatives in the relation of analogy. What then can surpass the presumption and folly of denying the validity of a law in respect to the uninterpreted symbols, which thus holds in regard to the whole system of representatives that are employed in the sacred word ? It is surely ignorance, not knowledge, as this objector would have us believe ; it is captiousness and unbelief, not reverence for the word of God, that would thus set aside without any alleged reason whatever, a law that has its ground in the very nature of symbols as representatives, and is recognised and ratified in every part of the Scriptures in which symbols, types, or representatives of any kind are used.

8. The denial that this law of agents, acts, and effects, is the law of the uninterpreted as well as the interpreted symbols, implies that the Spirit, in revealing it as the law of the interpreted symbols, has pursued a course that must naturally and inevitably mislead us in the exposition of the symbols that are not interpreted by him. For our nature leads us instinctively and irresistibly to regard a law which we find is the law of certain agents or events, as the law of all other agents or events that are of the same class ; and this disposition to generalize or assume that what is true of one or many things of a class, is true also of all others of

that class, is itself a law of our nature, and one of its most important ones ; and is the medium of all the knowledge we possess that distinguishes us from brutes. Without it, we could not reason, we could not classify, we could not systematize. All the sciences, accordingly, all branches of theoretical and practical knowledge, are founded on it. A system of philosophy could not be constructed, nor a theory of the motions of the earth and heavenly bodies ; a voyage could not be made across the ocean ; a crop of grain could not be raised ; the grain after being made into bread could not be eaten ; not a solitary act of moment in any department of life in which there is an intelligent aim at an end, could be exerted, except on the ground of the generalization, that a law that governs particular causes and events, governs also all other causes and events that are of the same classes. To generalize thus is, therefore, the very law of our nature, and cannot be set aside, except by a denial or a perversion of a most essential element of our constitution. To assume then, as the objector would have us, that the fact that the Spirit has interpreted all the symbols of which he has given an explanation, on the law that agents symbolize agents, acts acts, and effects effects, is no proof whatever that all the uninterpreted symbols of those classes are used according to the same law, but that they may nevertheless be used on a wholly different principle, is to assume that he has pursued a course in his interpretations that must naturally and inevitably mislead us. For the reason with which we are endowed, and which prompts us irresistibly to generalize the facts and truths with which we become acquainted, necessarily leads us to regard the laws that govern the symbols which the Spirit has interpreted, as governing all the others also of the same classes. So instinctively is this felt to be true, so clear is its self-evidence, that he who denies it, offers as gross a contradiction to our reason, as he could in denying any other indisputable axiom, or contradicting any other emphatic testimony of our consciousness. For there is no more reason that this law of symbols should not be thus generalized, than there is that any other law should not, such as that of gravity, the reciprocal action of bodies, and a thousand others in the worlds of matter and mind. But what can transcend the presumption of thus

implying—that the Spirit of God has pursued a course that must naturally mislead all who understand the principles on which the interpretations he has given are framed, to a misconstruction of all the other symbols that are left uninterpreted; and thereby to a total misunderstanding of the revelation that is made through them! What can equal it, unless it be the senselessness of offering such an impeachment of his rectitude and wisdom, on such a preposterous ground! Our critic thinks it very bold and daring to represent that the laws of symbolization that are revealed by the Spirit in the interpretations he has given, are *revealed* laws. He sees nothing presumptuous and unbecoming a creature in implying that the Spirit pursues a course so inconsistent with his truth and benignity, so treacherous and deceptive towards those whom the revelation he makes is designed to instruct! How much to be regretted is it, that in his ambition to overthrow a law of interpretation, which, we hold, the Spirit has revealed, he did not take the precaution not merely not to assail the revelation, but not to impeach the truth and wisdom also of the great Revealer! Had he scanned the position which he advances sufficiently to comprehend its import, he would never have ventured to offer so extraordinary an objection.

4. His denial that the interpretations given by the Spirit in accordance with this law, prove that it is the law, also, of all the other prophetic symbols, is equivalent to a denial that they are used on any settled principle, or that there is any law by which they can be truly interpreted. This law is unquestionably the law of symbols universally, if they are used on the ground of resemblance; as the correspondences which it specifies are those of a general and an exact likeness. It is plain, therefore, that if it is not the law of the uninterpreted symbols, as well as of those that are interpreted, they cannot be used on the ground of a resemblance between them and that which they represent, and thence that there can be no law by which they can be interpreted. For if they are employed on the ground of mere diversity or contrariety, inasmuch as diversities and contraries are infinite, there can be no means by which it can be ascertained what the particular difference or contrariety is, that distinguishes that which they are severally

used to symbolize. Any one out of a countless number of things, may with as much probability be held to be that which is represented, as any other. The real question between the objector and ourselves, thus is:—Whether the uninterpreted symbols are to be explained by this law, or whether they are wholly inexplicable, and the revelations that are made through them are to be considered as mere blanks. And to reduce them to this inexplicableness,—to make out that there is no method whatever of determining their meaning; that the events which they portend are wrapt in impenetrable darkness from our eyes,—is, as we shall hereafter see, the very aim of the critic in his objections. And is there nothing “unwarranted and presumptuous” in thus impeaching the rectitude and wisdom of the Revealer, by exhibiting him as professing to make a revelation to men by instruments, that cannot possibly be the medium of a revelation; and requiring them to study, discern, and believe that which he professes to reveal to them in that deceptive way?

So much for his objection to our denominating the laws on which the Spirit has interpreted many of the symbols, *revealed laws*. That those interpretations are framed by these laws, no one who is candid and competent to judge will dispute. It is as incontrovertible and clear as the import is of the interpretations themselves, or the fact that they are given; and as it is through those interpretations, not by formal announcements, that we learn that the symbols are used in the relations which these laws express, and that they are their laws; they are *revealed* to us through those interpretations, as absolutely as the meaning of the symbols themselves is; and thence are with propriety called their *revealed laws*, and held to be as obligatory on expositors, as the interpretations in which they are revealed and exemplified are.

He proceeds:—

“We see no reason why it would not be just as legitimate to subject the metaphors of the Scripture to this process, and from the inspired interpretation of metaphorical prophecy deduce certain ‘revealed laws’ of metaphors, or of explaining metaphors. Why not! *Symbolical* and *metaphorical* are the two species of repre-

sentative prophecy in Scripture; and if in the case of the *symbolical*, we find certain revealed laws of interpretation, why not also in the case of the *metaphorical*? We do not know but that in some of Mr. Lord's numerous papers on the subject he may have taken this ground. If he has, he is consistent."

How slight the consideration is he has given to the subject, and how imperfect his acquaintance is with the principles on which the question turns, is indicated by this unfortunate passage. Metaphors are not a species of *representatives*. They lie in a peculiar use of *words* for illustration, not in a use of agents, acts, effects, conditions, or anything else as representatives of others or themselves. The hypocatastasis, the allegory, and the parable are the only figures in which things are used as representatives; and typification and symbolization are the only other forms in which persons or things are used representatively.

The critic is equally unaware, it seems, that while metaphors are all framed on the same principle, and are to be interpreted by fixed laws, there are no formal interpretations given of them by the revealing Spirit, as there are of symbols. He is unaware, doubtless, that there is no need of such interpretations, any more than there is of the signification with which literal terms are used; as the sense in which metaphorical words are used, is always their literal sense, and the metaphor lies—not in changing their meaning—but in applying them to subjects of which that meaning is not literally true, and for the purpose of strongly expressing a resemblance: as, when a hero is called a *lion*, the word lion means a lion, not a hero, and the object of applying it to the hero is simply to indicate that he is *like* a lion in courage, nobleness, strength, or some other characteristic. We regret that this writer had not taken care, before entering on his critical task, to gain such knowledge of the subject as to have escaped the discredit of penning such a blundering paragraph, and us the trouble of pointing out its errors, and the superficiality which it bespeaks.

How far he is from a thorough comprehension of the subject is seen from a second objection which he offers to our denominating the laws of symbols *revealed laws*.—

"There is still another preliminary objection to making these (sup-

posed) deduced rules, revealed laws. It does not follow, even if it should be proved that these are the seven laws on which the interpreted prophecies are found to have been framed, that they, and no other, are to be applied to prophecies yet unfulfilled or unexplained. It does not follow that, when all symbolical prophecies shall be fulfilled, it shall not be seen that other rules or laws are to be added to the series. *All the facts which are necessary for a complete induction are not before us.* What is the state of the case? There is no Scriptural direction to this effect—‘All symbolical prophecies yet unfulfilled or unexplained must be interpreted in the same manner as those that already are divinely interpreted.’ There is no such direction or assertion. We have, in the place of this direction, only an *inference* from Mr. Lord and Mr. Winthrop that this should be our guide. It is by no means certain that this is a just inference or a sound opinion. All that has been done (supposing this to have been rightly done) is simply this. A large number of the various kinds of prophecy which have received inspired interpretations have been classified; and the principles or rules or laws (as we may variously choose to call them after we have found them out) upon which they have been interpreted have been discovered. Now at this point the question arises—‘Is it the design of God, or is it a necessity, logical or natural, that these same rules or laws of interpretation should be applied to the symbols yet unexplained?’ If it is the design or will of God, where is it intimated or expressed? We do not find it. If there is a logical or natural necessity that they should be thus applied, let this be shown. We do not perceive it. On the contrary we think we can see, in the very nature of prophecy, some reasons which make it probable that symbolical prophecies yet unfulfilled, may be seen by the events which shall fulfil them (which will be their divine interpretation) to have been interpretable in another way. Prophecy is frequently constructed in such a way that the ingenuity of man cannot discover to what it refers, until the event which it foretells transpires. This may be necessary in order that man may not interpose his agency to defeat or set forward the purposes of God. If a system of *laws* could be deduced which would have the authority and precision of *revealed laws*, the very object of prophecy might be defeated.”

He thus assumes that the fact that the laws revealed in the inspired interpretations, are the laws both of all the interpreted symbols, and of all those that are uninterpreted also that have been fulfilled, is no proof at all that all the other uninterpreted symbols are to be explained by the same laws;

and maintains that it cannot be known that they are to be interpreted by those laws, unless God specifically announces it in the prophecies themselves. "Is it the design of God," he asks, "or is it a necessity, logical or natural, that these same rules or laws of interpretation should be applied to the symbols yet unexplained? If it is the design or will of God, where is it intimated or expressed? We do not find it."

In this he assumes, therefore, that the symbols that are unexplained by the Spirit, are not employed on the ground of either analogy or an exact resemblance, but on some different principle, and the nature of which is wholly unknown; for if he knows any different principle on which any of them is employed, why does he not specify it, and show by its nature that a law differing from any one of the seven is requisite to explain it? In assuming then that the uninterpreted symbols are not explicable by these revealed laws, he assumes that they are not used on the ground of resemblance, and thence that they are not employed on any intelligible principle; and consequently that they are not explicable by any settled law, and therefore that they are not the medium of a revelation; for how can they convey to us any information respecting future agents or events, if there is no law by which their signification can be discovered and unfolded? This critic plainly has not caught a glimpse of the ground on which he is treading. He does not see that all the symbols that are interpreted are employed on the ground of resemblance between themselves and that which they represent; that the resemblance that subsists between a group of symbols consisting of agents, acts, and effects, and that which they represent, subsists between the elements of the two groups that correspond to each other—not those that are not correspondent; that the resemblance accordingly of the agent in the representative group is to the agent in the group that is represented—not to an act in that group or an effect which bears to it no likeness; that the resemblance of the *act* of the representative agent is in like manner to the corresponding act of the agent in the represented group; and so the resemblance of the symbolic effect is to the effect that is symbolized—not to the act or agent that produced it. And consequently he does not see that the revealed laws express these resemblances or correspondences, and thence that if the

uninterpreted symbols are used on the ground of resemblance, they must be interpreted by those laws, because they, and no others, express the relations which a representative employed on the ground of resemblance bears to that which it represents. And finally, not seeing this very palpable truth, he does not see that to deny that the unexplained symbols are to be interpreted by these revealed laws, is to deny that they are used on the ground of resemblance and that to deny that, is equivalent to asserting that they are not used on any intelligible principle whatever, and consequently are not capable of an explanation.

The real point which he would establish by his objection, could he maintain it, thus is, that the principle on which the uninterpreted symbols are used, is wholly unknown; that thence it is equally unknown what the laws are by which they are to be interpreted; and consequently that there are no means of knowing what the revelation is that is made through them; and therefore, finally, that the prophecies in which they are contained are not prophecies but mere blanks, a sham imposed on the awe and credulity of men; a mockery of their faculties and their faith! The critic doubtless does not see this, but the reason is that he has undertaken to write on the subject, and under the impression that he is quite master of it, without having any acquaintance with its first principles; without its having come even within the sphere of his vision.

He reveals this want of comprehension again, in the belief, he intimates, that though the uninterpreted prophecies are by themselves absolutely unintelligible, yet their meaning may be made clear by the events in which they are accomplished. He says, "We think we can see, in the very nature of prophecy, some reasons which make it probable that symbolical prophecies yet unfulfilled may be seen by the events which shall fulfil them (which will be their divine interpretation) to have been interpretable another way. Prophecy is frequently constructed in such a way that the ingenuity of man cannot discover to what it refers until the event which it foretells transpires. This may be necessary that man may not interpose his agency to defeat or set forward the purposes of God. If a system of *laws* could be deduced, which would have the authority and precision of *revealed laws*, the very object of

prophecy might be defeated." But how is it to be known that a symbolical or any other prophecy is fulfilled in a certain event, if the nature of the event foretold by the prophecy is wholly unknown; if it is wrapped in such impenetrable obscurity "that the ingenuity of man cannot discover to what it refers" even—whether it be an intelligent agent, an act of such an agent, an event of the physical world, or any other thing of the infinite train that appear on the theatre of the universe and pass away? Can anything be more certain than that an attempt to find the fulfilment of such a prediction in any particular event, must proceed wholly on groundless conjecture, as lawless and preposterous as it were to attempt to prove that a portrait is the portrait of a certain individual, whose features, color, expression, name, and existence even, are wholly unknown? The features of a person must be known in order that it may be known that a portrait is a portrait of him; and so the meaning of a prophecy must be understood so far at least as to know that it relates to persons, acts, and events, before it can be known that certain persons, certain acts, and certain events are those that are foreshown in it.

His notion, on the other hand, that the prophecies must be inexplicable in order that man may not interfere with their accomplishment; that if the laws were known by which they are to be interpreted, it might defeat their very object, is equally absurd. Did the predictions to the Israelites of the curses which were to be inflicted on them if they revolted from God, prevent them from revolting from him? Did the prophecies of the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar and removal of the inhabitants to Babylon, prevent its capture and the carrying of the population into captivity? Did the predictions of their restoration from their captivity at the end of seventy years, prevent their restoration? Did the predictions by the prophets or by Christ himself, of his being put to death, prevent his crucifixion? Did his foretelling the conquest and destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, and dispersion of the people for a long series of ages among the nations, prevent those events? Did the revelation to John of the apostasy of the church, of the rise to power of the usurping hierarchies, and their persecuting the true worshippers through a long series of ages, prevent that apostasy

and persecution? The critic's fear is altogether groundless. There is nothing in the course of events hitherto to justify it. It springs manifestly from a misapprehension of the extent of the knowledge of the meaning of symbols that is obtained by these laws. He appears to fancy that if these laws are revealed and authoritative, they must lead us to all the knowledge of the things predicted, which we can possess, when we witness the fulfilment of the prediction itself. The law, however, that agents represent agents, acts denote acts, and effects symbolize effects, only shows that a symbolic agent represents an agent; his act, a corresponding act of the agent he denotes; and the effect produced by his act, a corresponding effect produced by the act of the agent he symbolizes. It does not indicate who the agent is to be, his name, his abode, nor perhaps the exact period when he is to appear. That is not to be discovered until he appears on the stage, and shows that he is the person foreshown by the symbol, by the correspondences which he presents in his nature or sphere, his acts and their effects, with the symbolization. The laws applied to the symbols of the sixth vial for example, simply ascertain that the great river Euphrates denotes peoples and nations that sustain a relation to the symbolic Babylon, like that which the literal river Euphrates bore to the real Babylon that stood on its banks; that Babylon itself symbolizes the hierarchies of the Romish church which exercise authority over the people generally of the ten kingdoms; that the kings of the east, Cyrus and Darius, the conquerors of the real Babylon, are symbols of persons who are to conquer the mystic Babylon; and that the drying of the symbolic Euphrates symbolizes the alienation or withdrawal of the peoples and nations who are subject to the Romish church, from her communion. They do not determine who the individuals whom the river, the city, or the kings symbolize are; their names, their respective residences, the date of their agencies, remain as unknown as they were before. They cannot be known till the vial is poured or pouring, and the persons themselves are seen in whose agency the prophecy is to have its fulfilment. In like manner the laws in their application to the slaying, non-burial, and resurrection of the witnesses, simply ascertain that the witnesses to

be slain are human beings, and the witnesses of Jesus ; that their slaughter is to be a literal one ; that they are to be preserved unburied ; that they are to be literally raised at the end of three years and a half, and are to be taken up into heaven in the sight of their enemies. They do not reveal who the particular persons are to be who are in that manner to be put to death and raised. That cannot be known till the prophecy is in part at least fulfilled. And the knowledge, moreover, of all these great features of the prophecy, so far from preventing its fulfilment, is to be the means of prompting the persecutors to comply with all its great specifications in their putting the witnesses to death, preserving them unburied where they can be inspected by the multitude, and assembling at the end of the three years and a half to witness the issue of the prediction, that they are to be raised ; as there is no conceivable motive for their compliance with these conditions of the prophecy, except that by that compliance they will put it out of the power of the friends of the witnesses to deny, if the witnesses fail to rise, that their failure is a demonstration of the falsehood of the prophecy, and thereby justify the persecutors in putting them to death. This critic's objections to our representing the laws as revealed, and as authoritative and obligatory on interpreters, thus have their ground in ignorance or misconception, and are wholly nugatory.

From these preliminary objections he proceeds to his criticism of the first law of symbolization :—

“ But we turn to the seven laws and enquire whether they have been legitimately deduced ? As it is the first three laws which are most important and which draw the remaining four after them ; it is to these that our attention will be chiefly directed.

THE FIRST LAW.

“ The first of these seven laws is as follows : ‘ The symbol and that which it represents, resemble each other in the station they fill, the relation they sustain, and the agencies which they exert in their respective spheres.’ This law is expanded and explained by Mr. Lord (p. 24) in the following words : ‘ This is true universally whether the symbol is employed on the principle of a partial resemblance or of an exact likeness. Thus an agent symbolizes an agent ;

an object of agency represents an object of agency ; an act denotes an act ; an effect foreshows an effect ; an office, condition, or characteristic of a symbol, an office, condition, or characteristic of the thing symbolized. A living agent denotes a living agent ; a conquering agent denotes a conquering one ; a destroying one represents a destroyer.'

"Here the law as formally announced is stated in very general terms. But as it is expanded and explained it is found to be more definite and restricted in its application. We shall first treat the law as if it were what its explanation announces it to be ; and then treat it as it is expressed in its formal and general announcement. We are authorized, we think, to regard the words of Mr. Lord as part of the law, because the same things are afterwards treated as part of the law by Mr. Winthrop. For instance on pp. 28 and 29 it is said to be a 'general principle,' to be true in all cases, that living agents represent living agents. The same remark is repeated on page 40. 'An agent symbolizing an agent—an object of agency an object of agency—an act, an act—an effect, an effect—an office, condition, or characteristic, an office, condition, or characteristic.' This is the first law.

"In treating of these laws we of course admit that in many or most cases the fact is as stated ; but that it has not the uniformity, the precision, and the force of law.

"The dream of Pharaoh appears to us a palpable confutation of the law as explained by Mr. Lord and adopted by Mr. Winthrop. In that case living agents do *not* represent living agents. If we rightly remember, Mr. Lord dismissed this case, on the ground that it was a heathen's dream, and that therefore it was not to be expected that it would come under the law of inspired symbols. But this principle was so manifestly unsound, and would so sweep away some of the most important symbols of Daniel, that Mr. Winthrop has wisely forborne its use. But his own method of setting this case aside, *as an exception to the law*, is very singular. In the first place, by admitting that it is an exception he gives up the case. General laws have *seeming* exceptions, but no *real* exceptions. '*Exceptio probat regulam*'—not *legem*. There is no exception to a divine law. But! the reason adduced for its being an exception is no less strange. '*Inasmuch as it is explained in Scripture* it presents no real embarrassment.' Why not ? Are not all the other cases which he considers explained in Scripture ? Is it not from the fact that they are explained in Scripture and that they are said to be found, thus explained, to be uniform, that the pretended law is derived ? Mr. Winthrop looks at the symbols explained in Scripture. He finds (he thinks) all but one which are uniform ; and therefore he says that there is a general

principle which he fashions into a law, which controls them all. 'But that one! Does not that one forbid it to be a general law?' 'No!' 'Why?' '*Because it is explained in Scripture!*' But the very fact that it is explained in Scripture makes it one of the cases out of which the general law is to be deduced. It is then the fact that it is explained in Scripture, which makes it present a real and unconquerable embarrassment. For the remark which follows to the effect that the symbol took its form in Pharaoh's mind from Egyptian scenes is of no weight. It is no matter where a symbol came from, so that it is a symbol. Other symbols might be traced to other nations. The local appropriateness of symbols is beautifully shown by Elliott, Vol. i.—392—404. Pharaoh's lean kine swallows *Mr. Lord's seven laws* as well as the seven fat kine."

The following is the dream of Pharaoh, which the critic alleges as confuting the first law of symbolization :—

"And Pharaoh said unto Joseph : I have dreamed a dream, and there is none that can interpret it ; and I have heard say of thee, that thou canst understand a dream, to interpret it. And Joseph answered Pharaoh saying : It is not in me ; God shall give Pharaoh an answer of peace. And Pharaoh said unto Joseph : In my dream behold, I stood upon the bank of the river : And behold, there came up out of the river seven kine, fat-fleshed and well-favored ; and they fed in a meadow ; and behold, seven other kine came up after them, poor, and very ill-favored, and lean-fleshed, such as I never saw in all the land of Egypt for badness. And the lean and the ill-favored kine did eat up the seven fat kine ; and when they had eaten them up, it could not be known that they had eaten them ; but they were still ill-favored, as at the beginning ; so I awoke.

"And I saw in my dream, and behold, seven ears came up in one stalk, full and good : And behold, seven ears, withered, thin, and blasted with the east wind, sprang up after them ; and the thin ears devoured the seven good ears : And I told this unto the magicians ; but there was none that could declare it unto me.

"And Joseph said unto Pharaoh : The dream of Pharaoh is one. God hath showed Pharaoh what he is about to do.

"The seven good kine are seven years, and the seven good ears seven years ; the dream is one. And the seven thin and ill-favored kine that came up after them are seven years ; and the seven empty ears blasted with the east wind shall be seven years of famine. This is the thing which I have spoken unto Pharaoh : what God is about to do, he sheweth unto Pharaoh. Behold, there come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt ; and there shall

arise after them seven years of famine: and all the plenty shall be forgotten in the land of Egypt; and the famine shall consume the land; And the plenty shall not be known in the land, by reason of the famine following; for it shall be very grievous. And for that the dream was doubled unto Pharaoh twice, it is because the thing is established by God, and God will shortly bring it to pass."—Genesis xli. 15–32.

The seven fat kine are thus interpreted as representing the great plenty of seven years, or seven years of great agricultural plenty; and the seven lean kine, the great scarcity of seven years, or seven years of great agricultural scarcity, which seems at first sight a deviation from the laws of *symbols* that agents represent agents, and living agents represent living agents: and we pointed it out as such in our article on Symbolic Representation, in the Journal of October, 1848, and thought it accounted for by the fact that the dream was the dream of a heathen, not of an inspired prophet; that its representatives therefore, were not divine symbols, but arbitrary hieroglyphics framed in accordance with the notions of the Egyptians, who employed the figure of the ox or cow as a representative of husbandry, or agriculture and food—its product. A fat cow feeding in a rich meadow might to them, therefore, denote agriculture prospering and yielding plenty of food. Seven such kine coming up in succession from the river, might denote such an agriculture seven years after the annual flood of the Nile, as the sowing and growth of the crops followed the emergence of the land from the water. The devouring of the fat kine by the lean, and the full ears by the thin, denoted that the scarcity of the seven years of bad crops would cause the devouring of the plenty of the seven years of good crops. And this is foreshown by the eating of the fat kine by the lean, and the devouring of the full ears by the thin, in which there is a deviation from nature; as kine do not eat kine, nor ears devour ears. If the dreams are, as we suppose, mere uninspired dreams, not visions of an inspired prophet, and the representatives are mere Egyptian hieroglyphics, which were used arbitrarily—not inspired symbols; then these deviations from the laws of symbolization are no proofs that those laws are not true universally of symbols.

This writer, however, denies that we are justified in re-

garding these representatives as uninspired hieroglyphics, and asserts that they are "inspired symbols," and alleges them, therefore, as proving that the law of symbolization from which they are supposed to deviate, is not universally true of prophetic symbols. Let us first then try the question, whether he is justified in that allegation or not; and next, whether they are in truth deviations from the laws of symbols. And in the first place, if able to show that these representatives are not mere Egyptian hieroglyphics, but are inspired symbols, why did he not produce the proof of it? If there are any considerations that clearly demonstrate it, he surely should have presented them. Not a shadow of evidence, however, does he offer to support his position. He assumes it as too certain to need any formal demonstration. His statement that the supposition that they are not inspired symbols would sweep away some of the most important symbols of Daniel, is no such proof, and is not correct, for the vision of the great image, chap. ii., was as truly revealed to Daniel as it was to Nebuchadnezzar, though after the latter had beheld and forgotten it. And how is it that the symbols of the vision of the great tree are swept away, if it is supposed that the dream was a natural, instead of a supernatural one? It surely does not follow that the representatives are hieroglyphics instead of symbols, because they were seen in a natural dream instead of an inspired vision. What reason is there to suppose that the Babylonians had any system of hieroglyphics? It does not follow that the representatives are not used on the principles of resemblance, because they were given in a natural dream instead of a miraculous vision. Nor does it follow that they do not signify what the prophet explains them as meaning. They are as indubitably the media of a revelation, and the same revelation, as they would have been had the objects of the dream been beheld by the prophet in vision, instead of Nebuchadnezzar in a dream. He alleges no proof, therefore, that the representatives of Pharaoh's dream were not hieroglyphics, or arbitrary representatives founded on the use to which the Egyptians were accustomed, of the signs of the ox, and ears of grain. His assumption is but an expression of his opinion.

In the next place: Nor does he offer any proof that

Pharaoh, his butler, and his baker, were subjects of inspiration, or were seers of miraculous visions. It surely does not follow that they were inspired from the fact that they dreamed dreams that were representative of future events; as God, whose providence extends to all events, and to dreams as well as others, could as easily cause them by mere natural means to assume a shape that should be representative of the future, as to cause such dreams by an intervention of the inspiring Spirit. That the dreams owed their form, as well as their existence, to his providence, is certain; but it does not thence follow, as we see, that they were inspired, any more than from the fact that it was by God's providence that the Ishmaelites bought Joseph, and carried him into Egypt, it follows that they were inspired to buy him and carry him there. There is not the remotest intimation that Nebuchadnezzar, Pharaoh, the baker, or the butler, regarded themselves as having their dreams by inspiration. So far from it, their whole procedure shows that they were, to their consciousness, mere natural dreams; though they had the impression that they had some peculiar and important significance. It was characteristic, however, of all the prophets of God, that in their inspired dreams, visions, and receptions of revelations in other forms, they were perfectly conscious that their dreams, visions, and the voices they heard, were miraculous, the work of God, and prophetic. Not one instance occurs, in the Old or New Testament, of a prophet's announcing a vision or revelation, that he did not distinctly and formally announce it as conveyed to him as a prophet, and by inspiration. This consideration seems to render it certain, that the dream of Pharaoh is not to be considered as inspired, but only as taking place in a natural way, under the all-directing providence of God.

Such are the reasons, substantially, of the view we presented of the subject in the article we have referred to, in 1848, and which are regarded as a sufficient answer to the objection of our critic. The dream, however, admits of a somewhat different construction, which brings it into harmony with the first law of symbols, and which, had it then occurred to us, we should undoubtedly have presented as its true explanation. The interpretation given by Joseph simply announces the fact, it should be noticed, that the

kine and ears denote seven years of plenty and seven years of famine. It does not indicate the precise way in which they are representatives of those events. "The seven good kine are seven years, and the seven good éars are seven years; the dream is one. And the seven thin and ill-favored kine that came up after them, are seven years; and the seven empty ears blasted by the east wind, shall be seven years of famine. Behold there come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of Egypt; and there shall arise after them seven years of famine." *How* they convey this meaning, is not explained, except that it is as representatives. If, then, there is any natural mode in which they may convey it, that is consistent with all the features of the dream, and in harmony with the law that agents represent agents, and living agents living agents, we are at liberty to assume that that is the mode in which they are employed, and thereby relieve them from the appearance of deviating from the law of inspired symbols. And the supposition that the kine and ears represented kine and ears like themselves, exempts them from inconsistency with that law. The two great classes of food obtained by the culture of the earth were animals and grain. The kine of the dream may have been used as representatives of the real kine of Egypt during the period to which they belonged; the fat kine feeding in the meadow, indicating, therefore, that the real kine of Egypt would, during their period, have abundance to eat, and be fat and well favored; and their advance from the river in succession denoting that each of the seven represented the condition of the kine of the country at a period differing from that denoted by either of the others; while their ascending from the river signified that the period denoted by each, was that of the season that followed the annual inundation, and therefore denoted a year. The lean kine of the dream may have, in like manner, denoted the literal kine of the land during the period they respectively represented, and shown by their leanness that the cattle of their period were to be equally thin and starved from the want of adequate food; and their emergence, successively, out of the waters of the river at the recession of the annual flood, showed that each one represented the kine of a whole year. In like manner, the full ears and thin ears of the dream may

have been used as representatives of the real ears of the land in their respective periods, and shown thereby that the seven years represented by the good ears were to be years of full and plentiful crops; and the thin ears, that their years were to be years of blasted and inadequate crops. The assumption that the kine and ears are used on the principle of exact likeness, is thus perfectly consistent with all the representations of the dream, and the interpretation of it; and exempts it from all inconsistency with the law of symbols, that agents represent agents, and living agents symbolize living agents. It still remains, however, that the act of the lean kine in eating the fat kine, and of the thin ears in devouring the full ears, was unnatural. But though out of the sphere of nature, it was not at all unnatural in a dream, inasmuch as in dreams the laws of nature are not observed, but agents and inanimate things exert a thousand acts and pass through a thousand processes that are wholly unsuited to them, without exciting a feeling of their impossibility or incongruity. And this confirms the assumption on which we have proceeded, that the dream was a merely natural one, not the work of inspiration. Viewed in this manner, then, which is perfectly legitimate, the dream is not inconsistent with the law, that living agents represent living agents: and this writer's objection falls to the ground.

Having thus strenuously denied the truth of that law, he next proceeds to show that, instead of an error, it is "a mere truism," and to depreciate it on that account. He says:—

"This much for the first law, as it is made somewhat definite by its explanation. But when the law is considered, *just as it stands*—what a mere truism it is:—how useless for any practical purposes of interpretation. To elevate the assertion that the symbol and that which it represents resemble each other in the station they fill, the relation they sustain, and the agencies they exert in their respective spheres, into a revealed law, seems to be bringing the authority of revelation to authenticate a mere definition. *Of course* the symbol and the symbolized do, to that extent, resemble each other. The fact is involved in the word symbol. Any one who knows the meaning of the word *symbol* knows as much as that. The first law therefore as it is formally announced (but not as it is explained) is a mere definition of a symbol. It defines what a symbol is, and is

no law for its use or its interpretation. Our objection therefore to the first law is, that as it stands, it is a useless truism, and that as it is *explained*, it is not sustained."

He thus denies that the law is in fact a law, and declares it to be "useless for any practical purposes of interpretation." He, however, could scarcely have made an assertion, we think, betraying a more total inacquaintance with the subject. In the first place, the law is not a definition of a symbol. A definition of a prophetic symbol simply states what belongs to *the symbol*, as that it is a representative of some person or thing that is to be at a future time. It is not a definition of what belongs to that thing which it represents, which is to be at a future time. The two are wholly distinct. But the law, instead of defining the symbol, or that which it represents, states simply what *the correspondences* are that subsist between them. It can be no very sharp eye that cannot see the distinction between these wholly different things. In the next place, there is no such general admission or understanding, as he asserts, that such a correspondence subsists, as the law declares, between the symbol and that which it represents. "Any one," he says, "who knows the meaning of the word *symbol*, knows as much as that." Unfortunately then, this gentleman himself is not aware of the meaning of the word symbol. He has most strenuously denied the truth of this very law, and maintained that there is no certainty but that the uninterpreted symbols are used on a wholly different principle! Can he point to any writer who, anterior to our first publication on the subject, distinctly stated or recognised this law? He will attempt it in vain. One of the most conspicuous characteristics of the interpretation that has prevailed for ages, is, that it has been framed in ignorance and in violation of this law, which our critic, after denouncing it as unsustained and inapplicable perhaps to all uninterpreted symbols, *now* asserts is so self-evident from the very nature of symbols, as to be known to all who know anything on the subject!

In the third place, with these confused and mistaken notions, it is not surprising that he is not aware of the importance or the office of the law. He plainly has no

apprehension of the work it is to perform, which is, on the one hand, to cut off all those expositions in which agents are interpreted as symbolizing—not agents—but acts, effects, conditions, and mere generalizations or abstractions, such as war in place of warriors, conquest instead of conquerors, a kingdom instead of its kings, and a territory instead of its population; and all those expositions also in which acts and effects are interpreted as denoting agents; errors with which the common expositions of Daniel and the Revelation abound. And on the other hand, to cut off all those expositions which proceed on the assumption that, instead of a general correspondence between the symbol and that which it represents, such as this law affirms, symbols are founded on a resemblance in some *single particular*, and often of the slightest and most remote kind; an error of still more frequent occurrence than the other, as we have lately shown by a large number of important examples. The office the law is to fill, is thus of the utmost importance. It overturns more false constructions, it corrects a greater number of errors, and many of them of the greatest moment, than can be set aside by any other principle.

To this sad catalogue of blunders, he adds another. He says:—

“It may be remarked, moreover, that though this law, as explained by Mr. Lord, has the seeming of uniformity and precision, it has not their reality. It appears to put by the side of every symbol a symbolized object or agent or act corresponding to it. An agent for an agent, an act for an act, *a living agent for a living agent*, an object for an object. These are correspondencies which it obtrudes in the law and in its immediate explanation. But as we proceed, we find that this series of correspondencies is sadly broken. We find it stated that ‘while living agents in all such cases never symbolize inanimate objects, it is equally true that inanimate objects that act or exert agencies do represent—on the principle of general resemblance or analogy—living agents.’ Now we should expect to find that if ‘living agents represent living agents’ inanimate agents should *represent inanimate agents*.

“To put it down in the law that living agents represent living agents, and then to admit that inanimate agents also represent living agents—what is this but to admit that the former statement is *no law*, but only *one of two facts*. The fact that a law so loosely

framed as this cannot, by the admission of its discoverers, cover all the cases which are presented, proves the folly of attempting to compress within any system of specific laws of symbolization the vast and varied symbolism of Scripture, which lays hold of all beings and all departments of human life, and all varieties of human productions, which can be made to represent the truths it would foreshadow."

He here attempts to make out that there is an inconsistency between the statement that while living agents always represent living agents, inanimate objects also sometimes represent living agents: that for example, while the wild beast of seven heads and ten horns symbolizes the civil rulers of the western Roman empire, who are human agents; the storm of lightning and bloody rain under the first trumpet, the burning mountain under the second, and the wormwood star under the third—which are inanimate objects, symbolize the Gothic and other hordes of human beings who invaded and wasted the western Roman empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. That there is no inconsistency between them, however, is demonstrated not only by the almost universal concurrence of interpreters of all denominations in putting those constructions on these symbols, but by the fact that the Spirit of God has in several instances explained symbols of both these classes in this manner. Thus the beasts of Daniel vii. and viii. are interpreted as symbols of rulers who are living human beings; while on the other hand, the candlesticks and stars, which are inanimate, are interpreted by Christ as symbols of the churches and of their messengers; and the waters where the woman sat, are explained as denoting "peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues." The statement is indisputably true, therefore, as it is demonstrated by the interpretations given by the revealing Spirit. On what ground now, does this writer deny that inanimate objects can represent living agents? On his own unsupported judgment simply. "Now we should expect to find that if 'living agents represent living agents,' inanimate agents would represent inanimate agents." The fact that the Spirit of God has interpreted several inanimate symbols as representing living agents, is no reason, it seems, that he should abandon that expectation! This is in harmony certainly

with the fear he expressed in a passage we before quoted, in which he intimates that evil consequences must result from taking the interpretations given by inspiration as a guide in the exposition of those that are not divinely interpreted! But his fancy that inanimate agents must denote inanimate agents, is wholly groundless. There is no reason why agents in the physical world should not be employed to symbolize human beings, as well as agents taken from the animal or intelligent world. There are certain agents in the physical world, that in their sphere present a resemblance to certain men in the political and military world, as obvious and striking as the resemblance is which ferocious animals in the brute world present to bloody warriors and conquerors. Thus, destructive storms, a volcanic mountain belching forth its burning lava and destroying animals and ships, and the scorching heat of the sun, may as properly be used to denote bloody and destroying warriors and oppressing rulers, as such wild beasts as the lion, the bear, or a monster brute of seven heads and ten horns. The one is, in the material world, what the other is in the animal world; and both are in their sphere, what bloody conquerors and oppressors are, in theirs. Why then should not those from the inanimate world be used as symbols of men, as well as those that are taken from the animal world? This writer's objections plainly had their origin in his extreme ignorance of the subject. Had he taken care, before assuming the office of a critic, to make himself even in a moderate degree acquainted with the laws of analogy, the teachings of the Scriptures, or even the results to which his own positions lead, he would never have fallen into these extraordinary errors.

He next proceeds, in his second article, to the consideration of the second and third laws:—

“Resuming the examination of the laws of symbolization, we place the second and third laws together, because they contain two consecutive and connected propositions which must stand or fall together. They are stated as follows by Mr. Winthrop, and are somewhat different in form from their original statement by Mr. Lord.

“‘The representative and that which it represents, while the counterpart of each other, are of different species, kinds or ranks, in all

cases where the symbol is of such a nature or used in such a relation that it can properly symbolize something different from itself.

" 'Symbols that are of such a nature, station, or relation, that there is nothing of an analogous kind which they can represent, symbolize agents, objects, acts, or events of their own kind.' "

He indicates in this, as in several previous passages, that he is ignorant of one of the principal articles in the Journal, which was the basis of the Premium Essay; as he supposes, it seems, that the first six laws, instead of being quoted by Mr. Winthrop from the Journal of April, 1851, are framed by himself. Had he taken care to make himself acquainted with the whole series of discussions on the subject, and comprehended the relation of the Essay to the Journal, he would have given quite a different cast to his criticisms, and escaped some of the errors into which he has now fallen. Of the laws he thus quotes, he says:—

" These are the laws. The two following propositions are involved in them.

" 1. The representative and the thing represented are counterparts of each other [in all cases where from the nature of the case the symbol can have a counterpart] and are of *different spheres, kinds, or ranks*.

" 2. There are symbols of such a nature, station, and relation, that there is nothing of an analogous kind which they can represent; and they symbolize agents, objects, acts, or events of their own kind.

" That part of the first proposition which declares that the representative and the represented are of *different spheres, kinds, or ranks*, is considered one of the most important of the 'revealed laws' which Mr. Lord has brought to light. We are far from denying that this is frequently or usually the case. What we deny is that it is always so—that it is a *law*.

In Ezekiel iv. 2, the fort, and mount, and battering ram are *miniature models* of the *same kind of things* that were to be set down before Jerusalem. We are not authorized to say that these symbols *cannot properly* symbolize things of another kind, and therefore must symbolize those of their own kind. We know that a mountain and a camp do elsewhere symbolize other things; and we can conceive of other things which the battering ram and the fort might symbolize.

" So also in the same chapter Ezekiel himself represents the whole Jewish nation—and surely he is of the same *kind* with them.

"So also in chapter xii., when he went forth carrying his staff—he represented the people going into captivity, and *his staff* represented *theirs*.

"So when a wall of a house represents a wall of a city, there is one thing of the same name and kind, which represents another thing of the same name and kind.

"And again when a *knife* represents a *sword* (Ezekiel v. 1), we have a thing of the same kind representing another."

This objection springs from his totally disregarding or misrepresenting the conditions stated in the two laws, that determine whether a symbol can or cannot represent an agent or object like itself. He assumes that if a symbol can in one condition symbolize an agent or object different from itself, it may also in all others; and on the other hand, that if a symbol cannot, in the circumstances in which it is used, be the representative of something differing from itself, then it cannot in any other circumstances. This is a blunder that can only be excused by the dulness and want of attention that characterize this critic; as the language of the laws is very comprehensive and precise, and the fact that symbols are used in these different relations, and the reasons of it, are very amply explained in the articles in the Journal in which the laws are stated and exemplified. The fact that symbols are used in the two relations expressed by these laws, this writer admits; and that they are to be interpreted as used in those relations, for the reasons expressed in the laws, is equally clear. Thus it is certain that the wild beast in the vision, Rev. xix., that is taken and cast alive into the lake of fire, is the symbol of human beings, not only because it is so interpreted in Daniel vii. and Rev. xiii. 7-8 and xvii. 11-12, but because it otherwise must be a symbol of wild beasts like itself, which is impossible. This is an example, therefore, of a symbol that not only can, but must, from the circumstances in which it is used, represent something differing from itself. On the other hand, the flesh "in that vision, of kings, and the flesh of captains, and the flesh of mighty men, and the flesh of horses, and of them that sit on them, and the flesh of all men both free and bond, both small and great," must symbolize the flesh of men and of horses; as in the circumstances of that battle of the great day of God Almighty, they cannot symbolize anything else. What can the

flesh of men then slaughtered, which the fowls of heaven are summoned to devour, represent, if it be not the flesh of men? What can the flesh of horses, on which the birds are also to feed, represent, if it be not the flesh of horses? There are symbols then of such a nature and used in such relations, that they clearly may and must represent something that differs from themselves; and there are symbols also of such a nature and used in such relations, that is in such circumstances, that they must represent agents, objects, acts, or events of their own kind. The two laws, therefore, are indisputably true.

What now does this writer allege to prove that these laws are, as he says, not laws? Nothing whatever; nothing that has the remotest tendency in that direction. So far from it, a number of symbols in Ezekiel that are enumerated by us among those that represent things of their own kind, are referred to by him as in fact used in that relation. He utters not a syllable to demonstrate that in the circumstances in which they are employed, they *could* denote anything else, which is what he professes to prove. He only asserts that there are symbols that are of such a nature that, considered irrespective of the circumstances in which they are used in a particular vision, they might symbolize things that differ from themselves. Thus of the fort, and mount, and battering ram of Ezekiel iv. 2, he says: "We are not authorized to say that these symbols *cannot properly* symbolize things of another kind, and therefore must symbolize those of their own kind. We know that a mountain and a camp do *elsewhere* symbolize other things; and we can conceive of other things which the battering ram and the fort might symbolize." This is admirable perspicacity truly! He completely misses the point he affects to establish, and merely asserts a wholly different proposition which has no connexion with it, and which no one disputes! And this he considers a confutation of the law on which he is animadverting. He proceeds:—

"In the application of this law Mr. Winthrop contends that it is improper to interpret the first four seals of military events. Warriors, he says, must symbolize something different and analogous—something which resembles them in a different sphere. They must symbolize the ministers of God. But we can see no more difficulty in finding a mounted warrior represent the Roman power (and it is not

merely in its *military*, but in its *entire* character, that it is usually supposed to be symbolized), than we do in finding Ezekiel and Jeremiah and Isaiah symbols of the whole Jewish nation—the priests, the rulers, and the people.”

He here betrays again a total misapprehension of the point he is affecting to prove. For what is the relation in which Ezekiel represented the whole Jewish nation? Not in an office or sphere that was peculiar to a class, but in a sphere that was common to all. He lay on his side and bore the iniquity of the whole house of Israel, simply in his character as one of that nation, a sinner against God, and obnoxious to punishment; and in that character which was common to the whole nation, he acted as their representative. But a mounted warrior could not symbolize “the Roman power,” “not merely in its military but in its entire character,” that is the whole Roman people of whatever rank or profession—because a mounted warrior’s office and character were not common to the Roman people. Those of his profession were not one in a thousand of the whole population. He belonged to a special class, and could not therefore, consistently with analogy, symbolize any but an analogous class, that was as distinct from the population generally, and as influential in its sphere, as he was in his. As then he could not represent the nation generally, but must be the symbol of a special class that held office, and acted in a sphere of great influence, he presents no such exception to the law as this critic assumes. In order to establish the point at which he aims, he should have shown that though the warrior must, from his peculiar profession, be the symbol of a peculiar class, not of the Roman people generally, yet he might—in the identical circumstances in which he acted—be the symbol of his own class, instead of another of a different and analogous nature. But he offers not a syllable to that effect, nor could he, had he attempted it; inasmuch as to prove it, he must demonstrate that symbols are not always used on the ground of analogy, that is a general resemblance, instead of identity or exact likeness, and therefore to denote things that differ from themselves, even when they are not of the class in which the agent or event to be represented, cannot be symbolized *in the circumstances in which it is to*

appear, unless by itself or a symbol of its kind. That, however, he cannot prove. It is confuted by every interpreted symbol of the Bible. It is confuted by the consideration that if true, it would make interpretation impossible; as it would make it wholly uncertain whether a symbol was used as a representative of something of its own kind, or something of a different and merely analogous nature. How could that question be decided, if there not only was not anything in the symbol to show that it must be the representative of something differing from itself; but there was nothing in the circumstances in which it was used, to indicate what the relation is in which it is employed? The real aim of the critic's objection in this instance thus is, as in several others, to make out that the prophecies are a chaos of uncertainties and inexplicablenesses, and thereby transfer the task of interpretation from the intellect under the guidance of indubitable laws, to fancy and caprice, that he may continue without obstruction, to maintain certain favorite false and absurd notions of their meaning, which he has adopted.

He proceeds, however, in his endeavor to sustain his view, by the following brilliant display of his critical attainments:

"Moreover inspiration has used the horse as a metaphor of the Jewish nation. 'God hath made the house of Judah as his goodly horse in the battle.' Now if inspiration has sanctioned the use of a horse as a *metaphor* of a nation conquering—why should we not look for it as a *symbol* of a nation conquering? We believe there is just as much freedom in the use of symbols as of metaphors in scripture. They are derived from all sources; and the only law that governs them is that which is involved in their very definition, which is nowhere better expressed than in the (so called) *first law*. They *can properly* (if this phrase means '*with propriety, according to usage and the congruities of things*') represent things as well by the principle of *resemblance* as by that of *analogy*. There is nothing in the nature of things which makes it more difficult or incongruous, if divine wisdom chooses to adopt such a course, in the representation of a *nation of men* by *one man*, than there is in the representation of a year or 365 days by one day. So that when this law announces that the representative and the represented are of different kinds, spheres, or ranks, where the symbol *can properly* symbolize something different from itself, it in fact does but announce that this is true in all cases, *except those in which it is no.*"

He here first falls into the very unfortunate mistake of confounding a comparison with a metaphor. The expression "The Lord of Hosts hath visited his flock, the house of Judah, and hath made them *as* his goodly horse in the battle," is not a metaphor, but a comparison! Exquisite qualifications truly this gentleman reveals for the intricate task he has undertaken! We have seen by a former quotation, that he is not aware of the difference between the definition of a symbol, and a law stating the relation which it sustains to that which it is employed to represent. It here appears that he is not able to distinguish a metaphor from a simile! And these are but specimens of the discreditable ignorance which he betrays on every subject he ventures to touch!

He falls also into the still further error of assuming, that because metaphors are used on the ground of resemblance in a single particular, symbols may also be used on that ground: which bespeaks his total failure to discern the peculiar relation in which they are employed—which is not like metaphors and comparisons, as *illustrations*, but as *representatives*, which requires that a general correspondence should subsist between the symbol and that which it symbolizes, like that which is expressed in the first law; that agents must represent agents, acts acts, and effects effects; and that that which is represented, must be in its sphere what that which represents it is in the different sphere to which it belongs. If a single resemblance were the ground of symbolization, inasmuch as there is not a symbol employed in the Scriptures that does not bear a resemblance in some single particular to innumerable other things, it would be impossible to determine which of those numberless things is the one which it is employed to symbolize, and interpretation would be wholly impossible. This, however, is precisely what suits our critic. He wishes to be at liberty to assign to the symbols whatever meaning he pleases. Nothing inspires him with so much dread as laws that are revealed, that clearly determine the main features of the meaning of that to which they are applied, and that are absolutely obligatory on the interpreter.

The fact then that symbols are used in the two different relations which the second and third laws designate, is indisputable. It is equally indisputable that they are always used

on the ground of analogy, except when there is a necessity from the peculiar nature or circumstances of the thing to be foreshown, that they should be used on the ground of identity or exact likeness. The sneer with which he closes the passage last quoted, is accordingly a sneer at the manner in which God has employed the symbols, as well as against the laws in which the mode is stated in which they are used. He says, "so that when this law announces that the representative and the represented are of different kinds, spheres, or ranks, where the symbol *can properly* symbolize something different from itself, it in fact does but announce that this is true in all cases, *except those in which it is not.*" Is not this quite as effective a sarcasm against the mode in which God employs the symbols, as it is against the laws which state that mode?

He goes on—

"We have been willing to try this law just as it stands, without commenting on its vague phraseology. But the truth is, it is altogether wanting in the precision which is necessary in a law which claims to exclude all individual, arbitrary, and conjectural interpretations. The little phrase '*can properly*' has given play (as we shall see in the examination of the proposition involved in the third law) to the use of the most arbitrary distinctions. It is quite remarkable, too, that immediately on announcing the law, that the symbol must represent something of *another kind* from itself, Mr. Lord declares that the white horse and his rider of the first seal *represent Trajan and his successors* (which is certainly a case of the symbol and the symbolized of the *same* kind, sphere, and rank), and then makes of Trajan so represented by the white horse and his rider, a symbol of the Christian ministry. This double symbolization is at the same time a confutation of his own law, and a demonstration that it is utterly unfit to give precision and certainty to the interpretation of prophetic symbols."

We quote this passage simply to point out the flagrant misrepresentation of the statement that "Mr. Lord declares that *the white horse and his rider of the first seal represent Trajan and his successors.*" No declaration of the sort has ever been made by us. We have never fallen into the error of representing that *a horse and his rider* could be used as a symbol of a man or an emperor simply, or a succession of

emperors. Such blunders are reserved to writers like this critic, who are not able to distinguish a metaphor from a comparison; nor the definition of a symbol from a law that states the correspondences that subsist between it and that which it represents. The passage to which he would refer as authority for his misstatement, is doubtless the following;—it being the only one in which we have made a reference to Trajan in connexion with the first seal.

“The personage on the horse, is a *warrior*, manifestly, from his being armed with a bow, an instrument in chief use in the East, at that period, by cavalry especially, in attacks at a distance. The crown was given him for conquests he had already attained, and denoted that he had gained them for the power from which he drew his authority, and received his crown, not for himself: and that he had conducted his warfare, therefore, conformably to the ends of his office. Otherwise he would not have received a crown. *The office of the horse was simply to exhibit him*, on the one hand, in the attitude in which victorious warriors appeared, when decreed a crown and triumph, and on the other, in the exercise of his profession; a *mere subsidiary* to his exerting a representative agency, as in the vision of the nineteenth chapter, the sword proceeding from the mouth of Christ, is designed merely to indicate the character of the sentence he is to pronounce on his enemies; and the horse on which he is seated, that he is to descend in a manner suitable to his station as a victorious king, to execute that sentence.

“The symbol is thus *drawn from military and civil life in the Roman empire*, in which it was customary to grant a triumphal return to the capital, and a crown to the victorious warrior, which, as it was the act of the senate, was a civil act; and the personage taken as the symbol was doubtless [probably] Trajan, who in the year 96, immediately after the period of the visions, being adopted by Nerva, and declared by the senate his colleague and successor, marched with a powerful army against the Dacians, gained important victories and conquests, and on his return was decreed a triumph. Hadrian and the Antonines who followed him—princes of a similar character, and under whom the empire continued to flourish, may also be considered as embodied in the horseman.”—*Exposition of the Apocalypse*, pp. 66, 67.

Here the representation thus is first, that the symbol being drawn from military and civil life in the Roman empire, the personage taken as the symbol—the horseman—was proba-

bly Trajan : not as this critic asserts, that *the horse and rider symbolized* Trajan ; and next, that instead of being a symbol of Trajan, the office of the horse was merely to exhibit the horseman in the attitude of a victorious warrior ; and was a mere subsidiary to his exerting his representative agency. A very moderate share of understanding and caution, should have withheld our critic from misapprehending and misrepresenting this plain statement, in so flagrant a manner.

He next betrays an equal confusion of mind in charging a vagueness and inaccuracy on the second law, which exists only in his misconception. He says :—

“ We object, again in this instance, as in that of the first and the third law, that the language of the law itself does not correspond to the use and explanation of the law, on the part of those who are its advocates. For instance, challenged by this law we find a case of divinely interpreted symbolization, in which the representative and the represented are not of different *spheres*, but are of the same sphere. Then we are met with the reply that though they are of the same sphere, they are not of the same *rank* or *kind*, and that therefore the law still holds good. In like manner we find cases in which the representative and the represented are of the same *kind*, and are met again with the assertion that though of the same kind they are not of the same *rank* or within the same sphere. Now here the law reads to the effect that symbols and things symbolized are counterparts, and are of different spheres or *kinds*, or *ranks* ; and yet it is used as if it read ‘ different spheres *and* kinds *and* ranks.’ We need not say how great is the advantage which this form of the law on the one hand, and this use of it on the other, gives to its advocates and friends. If this law were split up into three separate laws, its confutation would be palpable and immediate. Let the law stand with the words ‘ kinds or ranks’ stricken out. Then let it stand with the word ‘ spheres’ and the word ‘ ranks’ stricken out. And again let it stand with the words ‘ spheres, kinds’ expunged. Then it would not be difficult to find in each case, symbols and things symbolized of the same sphere, the same kind, and the same rank, and the three laws in succession would be evidently overthrown. We have seen in part, and shall see more fully, that some symbols of the same kinds, and others of the same spheres, and others of the same ranks with the objects which they represent, *are* used in Scripture, even in cases where they could properly symbolize something different from themselves, if divine wisdom had seen fit to make use of them. But to demand that we should show that each symbol

should be at *the same time* of the same sphere and kind and rank, is to insist that we should make symbols run on all fours—a demand which we do not make even in regard to the metaphors, which occupy a narrower sphere, and are subject to much more rigid rules than symbols.”

This is a mere attempt to create a difficulty where none exists. If this writer was able to designate any instance in which the law has misled any one, why did he not specify it? Why did he content himself—as he has indeed throughout nearly his whole article—with uttering accusations without adducing any proof to sustain them? A cheap method of accomplishing his object, to offer objections without showing that there are any just grounds for them; and to frame statements and accusations without taking the trouble to see whether they are not gross misrepresentations. The following is the law, as stated and exemplified in the *Journal*, April, 1851, whence it was quoted by Mr. Winthrop, with the exception that he substituted sphere for species.

“The second law. The representative and that which it represents, while the counterpart of each other, are of different species, kinds, or rank, in all cases, where the symbol is of such a nature, or is used in such a relation, that it can properly symbolize something different from itself.

“Thus the image and tree of Nebuchadnezzar’s dreams, the beasts of Daniel’s visions, the candlesticks, the stars, the incense, the robes, and many others of the *Apocalypse*, represent agents or objects, that while a counterpart to themselves, are yet of a different species or sphere. The image denotes the rulers of the four great empires; the tree symbolizes Nebuchadnezzar as the monarch of the Babylonian empire; the candlesticks denote churches; incense, the prayers of the saints; and robes, their righteousness.”

Can anything be simpler and plainer than this? Are not the examples given, real exemplifications of the law? That some of these symbols are of a different species from that which they represent, such as the beasts of Daniel’s visions and the human rulers whom they symbolize, is surely indisputable; and species is the proper term to express the classes to which they belong, both being living creatures. It is equally clear that the incense and prayers,

the robes, and righteousness, are of different kinds, not different species, nor different ranks; while the horsemen of the first, second, and third seals, which symbolize official persons in the church, are of a different rank from those whom they represent. This writer's statement "that the language of the law itself does not correspond to the use and explanation of the law on the part of its advocates," is thus wholly unfounded. Not a shadow of ground exists for his assertion, that while the law reads that "symbols and the things symbolized are of different spheres, kinds, or ranks, it is used as if it read, "different spheres and kinds and ranks." If he was able to point out any instance of the use of the law by us, or by Mr. Winthrop, in which a symbol is interpreted as not only of a different species or sphere, but also both of a different kind and a different rank from that which it symbolizes, why did he not allege it? He, however, does not produce any such instance, and we seriously doubt indeed, whether he understands what his proposition means.

He now proceeds to offer objections to the third law. He says:—

"But it is the third law made necessary by the exception contained in the first, on which Mr. W. has bestowed the most careful attention. If it is not sustained, the second law cannot stand. It involves this proposition, that 'there are symbols of such a nature, station, and relation, that there is nothing of an analogous kind which they can represent; and they symbolize agents, objects, acts, or events of their own kind.'

"Now the first thing to which we object is, that the author's own affirmations, explanatory of this law, do not agree with the law itself. The law itself, as formally expressed, is *one thing*—according to the explanation, it is *another thing*. The law states, that when there is nothing analogous to the symbol, it symbolizes agents, &c., of its own kind. The explanation affirms, that in this case, the symbol symbolizes itself. For example—the first words explanatory of the law make this assertion. 'Thus in Rev. v. 1, the Lamb, the incarnate Son of God, appears in the vision, as his own representative,'—not the representative of something of his own kind. The explanation of the law does not explain the law, or agree with it, as it stands. The law then should read 'symbols that are,' &c., symbolize themselves, or agents, objects, acts, or events of the same kind."

The whole air of truth and importance which this captious objection wears, results from the critic's disregarding the classification of symbols in the article in the *Journal*, April, 1851, and in the *Essay* which is founded on it, among which one is denominated *Divine*. The language of the *Journal* is:—

“There is little room for discussion respecting the classification of the symbols. It is manifest that there can be no other classes than :— 1, divine, and 2, created; 3, intelligent, and 4, unintelligent; 5, living, and 6, inanimate; 7, natural, and 8, artificial; 9, real, and 10, visionary; 11, proper, and 12, monstrous:—and that there are representatives of each of those classes is easily shown : *as the Ancient of days and the Lamb of the first* : seraphim, living creatures, angels, men, souls, unclean spirits, the risen dead, of the second, third, and fifth.”

In the *Essay*, the following are specified as examples of *divine* symbols:—

“Divine, as God (the Father) Rev. iv. 2, 3; vi. 1; xi. 16, 17; xix. 4, called the Ancient of Days, Dan. vii. 9, 13. The Son of God, called in Rev. vi. 1, 16, the Lamb; and in Rev. xix. 13, the Word of God; and in Dan. vii. 13; Rev. 1, 13, one like a Son of Man.” —p. 17.

There is thus, according to this classification, a kind or class of symbols that are divine; and the law in question is framed in harmony with this classification. To say, therefore, that divine symbols represent their own kind, is as perfectly proper, as intelligible, and as little open to misconstruction or misconception, as it would be to say that they represent themselves, or that when a divine being appears as a symbol, he represents himself. The pretence that the law and the explanation that is given of it, do not agree with each other, is wholly groundless and captious, and would never have been made had not this writer been ambitious of finding fault rather than careful to keep himself within the limits of truth. He goes on:—

“But how singular the idea which pervades the whole of this chapter, *that a thing can be its own representative!* It is converting

into a law of interpretation the line which has been so often quoted as the sublimest of bulls—

‘None but himself can be his parallel.’

The very idea of a symbol is that it is one thing standing in the place of another. When the other is present, it needs nothing to stand in its place, and to stand as its own representative is language to which we can attach no meaning.”

If our critic was unjust and captious in the preceding objection, he certainly is ingenuous here; for he candidly acknowledges that the difficulty with him on this point is, that he has not perspicacity enough to comprehend what the statement, that a symbol represents itself, means! We only regret that he had not discovered that most of his objections had their origin in much the same cause. A clear head, a thorough study of the subject, and a spirit of candor, would have withheld him from the unpardonable misrepresentations and crude blunders of which his articles are so largely made up.

The vision, Rev. xix. 11–21, is representative of Christ’s coming from heaven with his armies, and destroying those who are represented by the wild beast, the false prophet, and the kings and their armies at the great battle of God Almighty. Now, is there any more difficulty in understanding that Christ’s appearance in that vision is symbolical of his literal coming at the great battle there foreshown, than there is that the descending with him of the armies of heaven on white horses, symbolizes the coming with him of those armies at his second advent; and that the appearance of the kings of the earth and their armies symbolizes the real presence of the kings and their armies at that battle? Is there anything in the one that is any more incomprehensible or puzzling than there is in the other? Might not the Word of God appear in the vision to foreshow his appearing in the great scene which the vision represents, with just as much propriety as the risen saints, and the kings and armies in the natural life, might appear to foreshow their literal presence in the scene which the vision symbolizes? It is absurd to pretend that it can be otherwise. It would discredit the intellect of a child to find any difficulty here.

This writer, however, pretends that it is a self-contradiction; that the very word *symbol* shows, by its meaning, that that which it denotes cannot be used in this relation. But where did he ascertain that the word symbol has that signification; "that the very idea of a symbol is, that it is one thing standing in the place of another?" Why, if able, did he not verify this statement? Assertion, however, without proof, is his favorite method of establishing his proposition. There is not a particle of ground for such a narrow definition of a symbol. The definition given in the Journal for April, 1851, is, that "A symbol is an agent or object employed as an instrument of revelation by the Most High, as the representative of an agent or object in respect to *its nature*, state, acts, or the events of which it is to be the subject." The definition given by Mr. Winthrop is, that symbols "are representative agents and objects, with their acts, effects, characteristics, conditions, and relations." These definitions comprehend all that belongs to a symbol simply as such. That by which an agent, object, act, or effect is a symbol, is simply that it is used as a representative of an agent, object, act, or effect. What the relation is in which it is used, does not depend simply on the fact that symbols are representatives; but on its own nature as an agent or object, or the circumstances in which it is employed. The fancy that the word symbol renders it impossible that a divine agent should symbolize himself, is altogether arbitrary and groundless. It is no more inconsistent with the meaning of the word, that the Son of God should symbolize himself in the vision, Rev. xix. 11-21, than it is that the armies of heaven should symbolize the armies of heaven, or that the kings and their armies should symbolize the kings and their armies.

On the paragraphs that follow, the object of which is to make out that the Lamb who appeared in the vision, Rev. v., took the book of seven seals from him who sat on the throne, and received the worship of the living creatures, elders, and angels, was not the Son of God, but a literal lamb, it is not necessary that we should animadvert at large, as the subject was treated by us in the Journal, October, 1853, pp. 251-257. To prove that it was Christ who appeared in the vision, and received the homage of the wor-

shippers, and that the word Lamb is used as *his* denominative—not of the animal of which it is the proper name, it will be sufficient to state: 1, that of the twenty-two instances in which it is used in the Revelation, it indisputably is used as the name of Christ in all except the one in question. Thus, it is used in that sense in the utterance from heaven, chap. xii. 10, 11. "Now is come salvation and strength, and the kingdom of our God, and the power of his Christ, for the accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused them before God day and night. And they overcame him by the blood of the Lamb, and by the word of their testimony." Here the Lamb is indisputably the same personage as Christ, and the blood by which the victors conquered was Christ's blood, not the blood of an animal that had merely existed in vision. But the blood of the Lamb here, is the same blood as that of the Lamb, chap. v., by which the living creatures and elders proclaim that they were redeemed. Christ, by whose blood they were redeemed, is, therefore, the Lamb there as literally and absolutely as he is here. So, also, chap. vii. 14, "the blood of the Lamb," in which they who came out of great tribulation "had washed their robes and made them white," was the blood of Christ, not the blood of an animal. That the Lamb, v. 17, who is in the midst of the throne, who is to feed them, and lead them to the fountains of living waters, is Christ, not an animal, is seen from those acts, which are proper only to an intelligence in a form like his, not to a mere animal who cannot feed, nor guide such an infinite crowd of intelligent and immortal beings. It is a characteristic of symbols, that the acts ascribed to them are in harmony with their nature. If actions are attributed to an animal that are not appropriate to it, as a mere animal, such as speaking—a mouth is given to it, that it may be made competent to the utterance of boasts and blasphemies that are suited to the nature of those whom they represent, as to the wild beast, Rev. xiii. 5. So "the Lamb that stood on Mount Zion, and with him a hundred forty and four thousand, having his Father's name written on their foreheads" was Christ, not an animal, chap. xiv. 1. The Father is the Father of Christ, not of an animal. It is Christ, too, whom the hundred forty and four thousand follow whithersoever he goes, and to whom and to

God they are the first fruits, chap. xiv. 4. It is Christ, also, to whom the song of Moses and the Lamb is addressed, "Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints," chap. xv. 8; and it is he on whom the kings shall make war, and the Lamb shall overcome them; for he is Lord of lords and King of kings, Rev. xvii. 14. And finally, it is Christ whose marriage is the marriage of the Lamb, and whose wife is the risen and glorified saints, who are to be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white, which is the symbol of righteousness. To suppose that in any of these instances the Lamb spoken of was, or is, an animal, is not only without any reason in the text, but is to convert the passages into revolting solecisms, and to detract from the majesty of the Son of God.

2. It is apparent also from the proclamation that was made, that no created being was worthy to take the book, and open its seals. "And I saw a strong angel proclaiming with a loud voice: Who is worthy to open the book and to loose the seals thereof? And no one in heaven, nor on earth, neither under the earth, was able to open the book, neither to look upon it." Can a grosser contradiction be offered to this declaration, than to suppose that notwithstanding no one was able or worthy, the agent who, in fact, immediately took the book and opened its seals, was not merely a creature, but an unintelligent animal!

3. The personage denominated a Lamb, chap. v., is explained, v. 5, as being the Lion of the tribe of Judah, and the Root of David: titles that belong exclusively to Christ. The Lamb, to whom they are applied, must therefore have been the Lord Jesus Christ, not a mere animal.

4. It is clear also from the actions ascribed to him,—receiving the book from the hand of the Father, and opening the seals. How could a mere animal have taken the book, and broken its seals—acts that are proper only to an intelligent being who had hands? That he had seven horns and seven eyes, is no more a proof that he was not in a human form, than that a sword went out of his mouth as he appeared in the visions, chap. i. 16, xix. 15. There not only is no ground for the assumption that the Lamb was a mere animal, not the Lord Jesus Christ; but that supposition cannot be made without the grossest violation of the passage.

And finally, this critic intimates that there are no Divine symbols ; that neither the Father nor the Son ever appeared in the visions in person ; but that they are exhibited in them only by symbols of a different order.

"Int he case mentioned, for instance, on page 45, taken from Rev. xix. 11-21, where a warrior with his sword going out of his mouth symbolizes the Saviour, it is said that Christ appears as *His own representative*. What a confusion of all our ordinary use of language is here! A warrior appears, and his name is called *THE WORD OF GOD* ; and instead of the obvious explanation, that the warrior is a symbol, and that we know who the symbol represents by the title given him, we are told that the Saviour, not in his own form, but in the form of a warrior, is in one form and character a *symbol of himself*, in another form and character !

"And when again it is said, that God the Father symbolizes himself because no created agent could properly represent him, we see not how we are to receive this dictum, when we find that he *is* represented, vaguely indeed but with sublime visibility, in the 4th chapter of Revelation."

But that he who is called Faithful and True, who descended from heaven on the white horse, Rev. xix. 11-21, was the Lord Jesus Christ, and not a human warrior, is clear from his name and the titles given him ; for it is a law of symbols that the names by which they are designated, are their real names. Thus the term candlestick, star, man, horn, beast, locust, crown, bow, waters, earth, linen, robes, incense, horses, kings, and all other names of the symbols of the Apocalypse, are their real proper names, not metaphorical terms, that are inappropriate to their nature. Otherwise there would be no means of knowing what the symbols really were. But the name of this warrior is expressly declared to be the Word of God, and the King of kings, and Lord of lords. He was the Word of God, therefore, not a mere semblance of his person, or a human warrior. In like manner the Lamb, chap. v., who took the book, was the divine and human personage who is designated by that name, the Lamb of God, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David—denominatives that belong exclusively to Jesus Christ, and distinguish him from all other intelligent beings. And so the divine personage beheld by Daniel, chap. vii.,

who judged and destroyed the beast, was the Ancient of days; in other words the self-existent Jehovah.

But that Jehovah appeared in person in the visions in which homage was offered to him, and acts were exerted that are appropriate only to him, is clear from the fact that the prophets expressly declare that they *saw* him. Thus Isaiah in relating the vision, chap. vi., says: "I saw Jehovah sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphims, each one had six wings, with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried unto another, and said: Holy, holy, holy, is Jehovah of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory. Then said I: Woe is me, for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, Jehovah of hosts." Ezekiel also, chap. xliii., represents that he saw "the glory of the God of Israel come from the way of the east; and his voice was like many waters; and the earth shone with his glory; and the glory of Jehovah came into the house by the way of the gate, whose prospect is towards the east; and he heard him speaking unto him out of the house; and he said: Son of man, the place of my throne, and the place of the soles of my feet, where I will dwell in the midst of the children of Israel for ever." A crowd of similar passages might be quoted. Whom now shall we believe;—these prophets who wrote as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, and who thus explicitly declare that they saw Jehovah in their prophetic visions; or our critic, who avers that it was something of a wholly different nature that they beheld; mere spectres, forms, or shadows, that had neither divinity nor life!

That it was Jehovah himself and Christ who appeared in these visions, not spectres or human beings, is seen from the worship that was offered to them. The appearance of Jehovah in the vision beheld by Isaiah, chap. vi., was not symbolic of his visible appearance on a subsequent occasion; it was not prophetic, but was designed simply to apprise Isaiah that it was He that gave him his commission as a prophet; and to impress him with a sense of his majesty; such also was the object of the vision of the glory of God, beheld by Ezekiel, chap. i. and x. Neither was the appear-

ance of God the Father, Rev. iv., nor of the Father and Christ, chap. v., prophetic of their appearance at a subsequent period. They were not representatives of the future, but were designed merely, first to impress the prophet with the majesty of God and his relations to all created beings, and next to show him that it was from him the creator and ruler of the universe, that the Revelation came that was about to be unveiled; and indicate the deity and office of Christ as the Lamb of God, who had made expiation for man, and the King of kings and Lord of lords who reigns over the church, and is at length to complete its redemption. As then these were not prophetic appearances, and the worship that was offered to God and the Lamb was not representative of a worship to be offered by creatures at a future period, it is manifest that if the personages worshipped as divine were not truly those personages, then the homage was not paid to God, but to spectres, mere empty forms, and an animal; which is impossible; as such a homage would be the greatest of all conceivable falsehoods, and would involve a direct and positive denial to Jehovah of his peculiar acts and prerogatives as the creator of the universe. For it is a law of symbols that all the faculties, prerogatives, and acts ascribed to them, are in harmony with their nature. No instance can be pointed out in which powers or acts are ascribed to a symbol, that are altogether inconsistent with its nature. But if these personages that received the homage of the heavenly hosts, were not divine personages, a nature, character, acts, relations, and rights are ascribed to them, that do not belong to them at all, but are wholly peculiar to God the Father and Christ. These ascriptions are therefore wholly false; and they involve a denial to Jehovah and Christ of the corresponding acts, relations, and rights that are peculiar to them, as God the Creator, and Christ the Redeemer: for as there is but one being who has created all things, and is worthy of the homage of all intelligent creatures on that account; and there is but one being who has died for men, and redeemed them by his blood;—to ascribe those acts and rights to others, is to deny that they are the acts and rights of God and Christ, and is thereby to undeify them. Such is the climax of error in which this writer's objections terminate.

He at length closes his discussion with a formal avowal of the belief he has so frequently betrayed, that the prophecies are not in fact a *revelation*, but are essentially unintelligible, and designed far more to puzzle and mock us than to aid us to the knowledge of the great events which they profess to disclose to us. Thus he says :—

“ The result of our examination of this able exposition of Mr. Lord’s seven laws, has been a full conviction that prophecy and symbolization cannot be subjected to any rigid system of interpretation. Looking at the prophecies which have been divinely interpreted, as they stand, unclassified, we find that in a great variety of ways are they conveyed. Representatives of coming events by way of *analogy*, and of *resemblance* ; symbolical creatures and objects which have no existence in nature ; symbolical and literal narratives intermixed ; in short, anything that represents or foreshadows another seems to be freely used by inspiration, and are to be interpreted by the light shed upon them by other interpretations, and by the usual rules which apply to figurative and symbolical representations. But that, as asserted by Mr. Winthrop, this whole subject, instead of being as many suppose, vague, uncertain, and indeterminate, is controlled by *well established laws* ; and God’s word in all its parts, the symbolic as well as the unsymbolic, contains what is properly called a *revelation* or disclosure of the high counsels of heaven, in regard to the condition and prospects of men—that this is a just account of symbolic scripture we do not believe. Prophecy is a light shining in a dark place. The *place is dark* in which it shines. It *shines* in the dark place—and yet all the darkness is by no means dissipated. There is not a full *revelation* of that dark place, the future, in which it shines. He who has stood in the midst of an immense and wondrous cave, and seen a single light or torch within, can well comprehend the office and effect of prophecy. It rather reveals the darkness—makes the darkness visible—than dissipates the darkness and reveals the things which it envelopes. As he holds up the torch within the cavern, he may catch vague outlines of the outjutting prominences, and from some pendant stalactite, or diamond-pointed rock, he may catch gleams which intimate to him the glories by which he is surrounded. And the longer he remains in the cave, and strains his eyes to discover the objects there, the more defined will the general outlines and prominent features become. And so the devout student of the word of God who enters into the future with the torch of prophecy in his hand, will be able to see some prominent features of the future and catch some rays of the enveloped glories that surround him ; but

the longer he gazes, and the more he sees, the more fully will he be persuaded that prophecy is not a *revelation*, but a dim *intimation*, of the things which lie in the future. Not until our Lord comes in the blaze of glory, will all that is in that dark place be revealed."

He thus expresses, as the result of his inquiries, a full conviction that prophecy is not interpretable by "any well established laws;" and if it is not interpretable by such laws, it most assuredly is not by any; and he discards without reserve the belief that "the Word of God in all its parts, the symbolic as well as the unsymbolic, contains what is properly called a *revelation*, or disclosure of the high counsels of heaven in regard to the conditions and prospects of men." What a pity that this gentleman had not stood by the apostle John when he penned the Apocalypse, and informed him that he was mistaken in imagining that God had made a *Revelation* to him of things that were shortly to come to pass! How unfortunate that he could not have intercepted the prophet from penning the encouraging assurance that "Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things which are written therein!" For what blessing can be derived from reading, hearing, and keeping them, if they convey no information respecting the great events which they profess to foreshow? Instead of that benediction, had he been called to frame a blessing in accordance with his disbelief of the intelligibility of the prophecy, he would have written "Blessed is he that lives after all the words of this prophecy have been accomplished; for he alone—so utterly impossible is it to know by what law they are to be interpreted—can have any chance of understanding their meaning! His whole aim thus is to depreciate the prophetic portions of the Bible, to discredit them as unintelligible, and to dissuade the people of God from looking to them for a knowledge of the future. There is nothing he so much dreads as that clear and authoritative laws should be discovered by which they are to be interpreted; there is nothing from which he shrinks with deeper alarm than from the thought that the Spirit of God should be regarded as revealing such laws in the interpretations he has given of the symbols, and thence that they should be taken as a guide in interpretation! Hence it is that he has

striven with all the arts of which he is master, to confute, embarrass, and set aside the laws as we have stated and advocated them of symbolization ; but with what slender powers, however, with what a sad betrayal of ignorance, with what captiousness, with what a reliance on assertion in place of proof, and with how little success, our readers will now judge. Having noticed all his objections and cavils, and given we think to each of the long series a simple, scriptural, and irrefutable answer, we dismiss him with friendly wishes, and an earnest recommendation to study the subject before he again attempts to discuss it, and especially to take better care not to make his assault on the views we advocate, an attack on the word of God.

ART. II.—THE ORIGIN OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUITS.

IGNATIUS LOYOLA, the patriarch and founder of this society, was born in Spain. In early life he was a soldier. He abandoned himself to his passions, and his biographers remark, that vanity and ambition were his ruling propensities. In 1521, when he was thirty years of age, he was at Pampeluna, a city of Spain, which the French were at that time besieging. During the siege, his thigh was broken, and having been badly set, he had it broken again and re-set ; but finding after this second operation that a bone projected, so as to detract in some degree from the beauty of his personal appearance, he had the part cut off, and then applied, during several days, a machine of iron to extend the limb, in the hope of restoring his former gait and exterior.

To amuse himself while in this condition, he asked to be supplied with romances ; but not being able to procure such books, he fell upon a life of the Saints written in a romantic style. This book made an impression on his mind. From that time the Jesuits date his conversion ; and they pretend that within the same year he received from heaven abundant favors, visions, raptures, and ecstasies, from which he seemed to receive new light (Baillet, § 6). His followers say, that God made him comprehend the mystery of the Trinity as clearly as men see and know each other ; and that without

any religious instruction or study, he composed upon this mystery a very ample, and, as they account it, an admirable treatise, which they pretend has been lost. He had also, according to the same authors, another vision, which, to the Jesuits, is much more interesting. During an ecstasy or trance, which continued eight days, God revealed to him—so they say—the plan and the astonishing progress of the society he was one day to establish. This assertion is contained, not in particular authors only, but in the Directory, which is a work of the whole society. (See *Directorium in Exercitia Spiritualia S.P.N. Ignatii Præm.* 3.)

If Ignatius formed immediately the plan of his society, the remark of Pasquier, who saw the origin of it, is probably not unfounded, namely:—"That he was one of the most wise and consistent worldlings of the age." An analysis of the government, privileges, and statutes of the society will tend to confirm this opinion. However this may be, it was during his first solitude he composed his *Spiritual Exercises*,—a book which afterwards occasioned him much opposition. As his mind was yet full of military exercises, he composed the work according to his ideas of a war. Such ideas too were, with him, not merely theoretical; for having had a dispute with a Moor concerning Mary, the Mother of Our Lord, he regretted afterwards that he allowed the blasphemer to escape, and pursued him with the intention to kill him. Happily he missed the way the Moor had taken, and thus failed of committing the crime which blind and fanatical zeal had suggested. (Baillet.)

The first years after his conversion (such as it was) were spent in frequent pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other places, in affected mortifications, which exposed him to ridicule. His desire to form a body of disciples influenced him to commence the study of the Latin language at the age of thirty-three; but he made no progress in it, as well for want of taste, as on account of his propensity to lead a wandering life. Yet in 1526 he went to Alcalá, to study philosophy; and notwithstanding he made great efforts to acquire a knowledge of the subject, his mind became confused, and all his toil was abortive. Notwithstanding his ill success in learning, he had already some followers, and undertook to teach and direct their consciences. This

enterprise raised many complaints; that a man without science and without character, should intermeddle with such matters. He was imprisoned, but afterwards set at liberty, although by a public decree made June 1st, 1527, he was forbidden to explain to the people the mysteries of religion until he had studied theology four years. This decree did not please him; accordingly he retired, with his followers, from Alcala to Salamanca. There also, Ignatius and his followers were imprisoned, upon the ground that, being laymen, they should not undertake to preach. At length, worried out with opposition, Ignatius determined to leave Spain and visit Paris, and begin anew his studies. Accordingly, after having encountered opposition, which would have discouraged almost any other person, and having been abandoned by his followers in Spain, he went to Paris, and there began to form a new body of disciples; and this city, therefore, is properly the cradle of his society. His first converts were Le Fevre, who had been his tutor, and Francis Xavier, who taught philosophy in the University. Soon afterwards he added four to their number, namely, Lainez, Salmeron, Bobadilla, and Rodriguez. In order to bind these new disciples by irrevocable engagements, he took them on the day of Assumption, 1534, to the church of Montmartre, near Paris, where Le Fevre, who had recently been made a priest, said mass, and administered to them the sacrament in the subterranean chapel.

After mass, the seven together, in audible and distinct voice made a vow to undertake, within a prescribed time, a journey to Jerusalem for the conversion of the infidels of the Levant; to leave all they possessed, except what was needful for the journey, and in case they could not accomplish this purpose, to offer their services to the Pope, and obey his orders wherever he should please to send them. Three others soon joined their company, namely, Le Jay, Codur, and Brouet. To execute this vow, the ten companions appointed Venice as the place of meeting. On their journey thither, though not yet priests, they publicly preached, and at Venice they were publicly attacked. Ignatius succeeded, however, in calming this rising storm, and even succeeded in gaining for himself and several of his companions, admission to the priesthood. They arrived at

Rome near the end of Lent in 1538; and having met, they agreed, according to Baillet, "that it was needful, as soon as possible, to constitute themselves into a religious society, in order to prevent the company from ever dissolving; and to put themselves in a situation to multiply in all places, and subsist till the end of ages." These were large views, inasmuch as they contemplated an extension and duration without limits of time or place. Ignatius declared to his companions, that he had had in his mind ever since the first year of his conversion, and the vision in which the plan of the order was revealed, a name for it, which was "The Society or Company of Jesus." Still, Ignatius did not so far rely upon his visions as to neglect human means against the attacks which were made upon him in Rome: for in that city too (as well as at Venice, Paris, Salamanca, and Alcala), his singular conduct and indiscretions, particularly his efforts at preaching, excited against him strong opposition. By insinuating himself into favor with the great, he surmounted, not only the obstacles thrown in his way, but even succeeded in obtaining the approval of his order by Pope Paul III., to whom he presented the plan of his institute in 1539. The plan was referred to three cardinals for examination; Guidiccioni, who was one of them, was strongly opposed to it, and even wrote a book in order to present the reasons of his opposition in their proper force. The influence of this cardinal carried the other two with him.

During this examination, an event occurred which afterwards gave the Jesuits great influence at the Court of Portugal. John III., then king of Portugal, wished to send some missionaries to the Indies, and he charged his ambassador at Rome to choose for him ten suitable persons. The ambassador's name was Mascarenhas, who was an intimate friend of Ignatius. Mascarenhas made application to Ignatius for some of his companions, and the latter gave him Rodriguez and Bobadilla; but Bobadilla having fallen sick, Xavier was substituted in his place. On the 15th March, 1540, more than six months before the institute of Ignatius was approved, these missionaries departed with Mascarenhas for Portugal.

Xavier was full of zeal. The Jesuits call him the apostle of the Indies; but notwithstanding his vow of poverty, he

thought it expedient, with a view to dazzle the pagan princes of the East, and to gain their favor, to appear before them clad in the richest stuffs, with splendid equipages, and a numerous retinue. He pursued the same policy to the end of his life. Such means of persuading the men of the world to embrace the faith of the gospel, are much more than merely questionable. They mark the strongest possible contrast between the first apostles and the apostles of this society.*

Ignatius, being naturally intriguing, employed every sort of means to remove the obstacles in the way of the approbation of his institute; and perceiving that the chief impediment arose from this, that the obedience promised to the pope was limited, changed this part of his project and promised obedience without limits; such as, it was proposed, should be given to the general of the society, who should be elected. Paul III., flattered by this promise, began to be more favorable. At length, yielding to the most pressing solicitations, and upon the promise of perfect submission to the pope, Paul III., by a bull dated 27 Sept. 1540, approved the institute of Ignatius. The pope limited the number of companions to sixty, but the restriction was soon afterwards removed by a bull in 1543.

What distinguishes this society from all others in the Roman Catholic church is not any rule which subjects the members of the body to remarkable practices. The Jesuits announce that their manner of life is common, and that they are not bound to any particular penances or mortifications. The society is much more remarkable for the privileges it has obtained from the popes, than for any of its rules of life. The society has obtained from the popes more than forty bulls, the joint effect of which is, to exempt them from every sort of jurisdiction—as well ecclesiastical as civil—from all tithes, and other impositions upon their goods. These privileges are in opposition to the rights which bishops and

* It should be remarked, however, that Xavier having been thus separated, at a very early period of the society, from his companions, was prevented from taking part in forming the rules by which the society was to be governed, and by means of which it afterwards perpetrated incalculable mischiefs.

curates, universities, and other societies in Roman Catholic countries, claim to themselves; and hence one ground of the opposition which, for a considerable period, was made to them by other bodies of Roman Catholic ecclesiastics. But, more than this, their privileges, claimed by virtue of papal bulls, are in opposition to the temporal powers of princes, governors, and magistrates; and if carried into effect, would overturn every other power. From a survey of these privileges and immunities, it is obvious that the design of the Jesuits was to swallow up all other orders of religious persons in their own communion, as well as all other authorities and all property;—in a word, to concentrate in their society all power, and to become universal monarchs; hence De Pradt's definition of Jesuitism, "*Empire by Religion.*" If the views of Ignatius extended originally to the results which his society afterwards attained, his genius was vast indeed, and better fitted for a conqueror than for an apostle; and it is chiefly as a conqueror the Jesuits delight to contemplate him. This is evident from the inscription they have placed on his tomb, by which he is declared to be greater than Pompey, Cæsar, or Alexander.

The Lord Jesus Christ, when establishing his church, expressly excluded all sort of domination. Luke xxii. 25, 26. Peter, too, 1 Epist. v. 3, cautions his fellow-elders against lording it over the (κληρον) portion of the lord's flock which came under their charges respectively. This sort of government, our Lord declared, belonged to the kings of the earth, who must often exercise a vigorous dominion to coerce the unruly passions of men. But, said he to his disciples, "ye shall not be so," or, "but you, not so—the greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and the leader, as he that serves." Accordingly, the practice of the early Christians was to decide by assemblies, in which each member participated, and the authority was possessed in common, Acts xv. 6–29. However far the Roman Catholic church has departed from this rule, all other societies of religious persons in that communion have so far conformed to it that they decide, whatever concerns their respective bodies, by chapters. The Jesuits, on the contrary, decide nothing in this way. Gregory XIV., by his bull of 1591, declared "it was the will of Ignatius that the form of the

government of his society should be monarchical, and that everything should be decided by the will of the general alone."

Another peculiarity of the institution of the Jesuits is this: The Lord Jesus Christ appointed that his disciples should meet to pray—and such has been the practice of Christians in all ages; but one of the chief privileges which Ignatius obtained from the pope was an exemption for his disciples from the obligation to recite the office in common.* Both these regulations are in direct opposition to the gospel, and in their operation cannot be otherwise than antichristian.

"In one word, in the privileges which the Jesuits have obtained," says the author of the *Histoire générale de la naissance et des progrès de la Compagnie de Jesus*, "we perceive a plan formed with address, dictated by unbounded ambition, not only to establish in the society an absolute monarchy, but to elevate the society to the monarchy of the whole world, by subjecting to it every other authority."

If we believe the Jesuits in the *imago primi Seculi*, the spiritual exercises and their constitutions were dictated by the Virgin Mary. *Scripsit illa quidem Ignatius, sed dictante Maria.*

Such assertions can hardly fail to remind the reader of the artifices by which the impostor Mahomet supported his pretensions to be the apostle of God—such as his interview with the angel Gabriel, and his nocturnal journey to heaven under the guidance of that angel. We might cite an earlier example of this kind of imposture, in the case of Numa Pompilius, the second king of heathen Rome, who pretended, that he might more successfully introduce his laws and new regulations into the state, that they were previously sanctioned and approved by the nymph Egeria. Such pretensions can deceive none but the ignorant, nor can they be needful to the success of any schemes or projects not founded in imposture.

But the Jesuits did not stop there. The constitutions of their society, they blasphemously pretended, emanated not

* *Teneantur tamen singuli privatim et particulariter et non communiter ad dicendum officium.*—Bull Paul III., of 27th Sept., 1540.

from the Virgin Mary alone, but from the Lord Jesus Christ himself. This fact appears in a document presented by the University of Paris to the Parliament in 1644; and in the same document are stated other extravagant pretensions of the society: for example, that the Lord Jesus Christ goes to meet every Jesuit who dies, to conduct him to paradise; that none of those who die in the society will be damned. Some restrain this privilege to three hundred years—others appear to extend it to the society during the whole of its duration, which they flatter themselves (and, perhaps, not without reason) will subsist till the end of time.

Scarcely had Ignatius obtained the approbation of Paul III. to his institute, when he scattered his companions through all nations. Lainez had already reached the court of Charles V. He even obtained a commission to negotiate the marriage of the daughter of the King of Portugal with Philip II., son of that emperor. He gained access for his society to Portugal. Ignatius and his companions had promised the pope, in 1540 and 1543, to fight under his standard, to be his soldiers, and to obey him in all things. Consequently, Paul III. heaped favors upon them, and sent Lainez and Salmeron to the Council of Trent. Le Jay attended the same council in the character of theologian and bishop of Augsburg. The favor shown to the society by the pope, and the zeal which its members showed against the Reformation, influenced several princes, who took part in the religious wars of that time, to admit the Jesuits into their states, and grant them establishments.

The rapidity with which the society increased is very remarkable. In 1540, when they presented their petition to Paul III., there were but ten members of the society. In 1543, there were only twenty-four members. In 1545, they had but ten houses; but in 1549 they had two provinces—one in Spain, the other in Portugal—and twenty-two houses. At the death of Ignatius, in 1556, the society had twelve large provinces. In 1608, Ribadeneira reckoned twenty-nine provinces and two vice-provinces, twenty-one houses of profession, two hundred and ninety-three colleges, thirty-three houses of probation, other residences to the number of ninety-three, ten thousand five hundred and eighty-one Jesuits. In the catalogue printed at Rome, in 1679, it is

stated there were 35 provinces, 2 vice-provinces, 38 houses of professed, 578 colleges, 48 houses of probation, 88 seminaries, 160 residences, 106 missions, and in all 17,655 Jesuits, of whom 7870 were priests. According to Jouvency, the society had, in 1710, 24 houses of professed, 59 houses of probation, 340 residences, 612 colleges—of which more than 80 were in France—200 missions, 157 seminaries and boarding-schools, and 19,998 Jesuits. This rapid increase of the order, in spite of the opposition it had to encounter, is dwelt upon by the Jesuit historians with much self-complacency.

One of the most influential of the opponents of Ignatius and his companions was Melchior Cano, a Spanish ecclesiastic, and a Dominican. He lived at Salamanca. This dignitary thought he perceived in the rapid progress of the society, omens of disaster to the Roman Catholic church. He believed, it is said, that the end of the world was near, and that antichrist was about to appear, because his fore-runners and emissaries were beginning to appear. He declared, everywhere, not only in private conversation, but in his sermons and public instruction, that he saw in them the marks which the apostle declared would distinguish the followers of antichrist. The authority of Cano made a great impression upon the inhabitants of Salamanca. The Jesuits were pointed at—they were avoided—parents would not commit their children to them for instruction. Even the magistrates, in concert with the university, deliberated about expelling them, as corrupt persons, from the city.

The Jesuits encountered similar troubles at Alcalá. The archbishop of Toledo, to whose diocese that city belonged, was extremely displeased with their proceedings. The chief cause of displeasure arose from the fact, that the Jesuits presumed to preach and to hear confessions within his jurisdiction without his approbation. The archbishop was a zealous defender of the rights of bishops, as he deemed them, and it may be observed that the interference of the Jesuits with the bishops and ordinary and local ecclesiastical authorities, was for a long time one of the chief causes of opposition to the society. Ignatius being consulted upon this occasion, directed his followers to spare neither solicitations nor prayers nor any sort of submission which might

conciliate the archbishop, but at the same time to submit to no invasion of the privileges granted to the society by the pope. With this answer, he transmitted a bull he had obtained from the pope in 1549, by which "the society and all its members, their persons and goods, were exempted from every sort of superiority, jurisdiction, and correction of the ordinaries. This bull even forbade all archbishops, bishops, &c., and every other power, as well ecclesiastical as secular, from impeding, troubling, or molesting the companions of Ignatius, their houses, churches, or colleges, whenever they should judge it proper to form any such establishment.

This style of ecclesiastical legislation is not changed. In the bull of Pius VII., so late as 6th August, 1814, restoring the order of Jesuits which had been suppressed by a bull of Clement XIV., 21st July, 1773, are the following clauses:—

"We order that these present letters shall be inviolably observed according to their form, for ever and till never. . . . That they shall not be submitted to any judgment, or to any revision on the part of *any judge with whatever power invested*. We declare null, and of no effect, every attempt that shall be made against these present dispositions either knowingly or through ignorance, &c., &c. Further, we will that the same faith be given to copies, &c., of our present bull as to the original, &c. And that it be not permitted to any person to infringe or to oppose by an audacious temerity, any of the dispositions of this present ordinance; and if any person attempt it, let him know that he will incur the indignation of Almighty God, and of the holy apostles Peter and Paul." This document, be it remembered, assumes to be of full and equal force in all countries,—in the United States, in England, as in the Roman States.

It is easy to see what would be the effect of such documents in countries where the mass of the people are superstitiously and blindly devoted to the decrees of the popes, and we may also see a reason why the Jesuits are such strenuous advocates of the absolute power of the See of Rome: holding their world-wide powers, as it were, by charter from that See, the sole foundation of the pretensions of the society, which certainly are not bounded by time or worldly space. In the bull of Pius VII., just cited,

the pope grants the society (as well as declares them to possess already) the right and privilege to bring up youth in the principles of the Catholic faith, and to form them to good morals, and to direct colleges and seminaries. The reader will have no difficulty in believing that such teachers, if they could get the whole business of the education of the youth of the United States into their hands, would in one or two generations extinguish every spark of our civil and religious liberties; for (in the words of M. de Chatelais) "How can any one think that men who belong to no state,—who are accustomed to place a religious chief above the chief of their state,—to put their order above the country,—their institutions and constitutions above the laws, should be capable of instructing and forming the minds of youth? It is evident that education should be in conformity with the constitution and laws,—if contrary to them, it would be radically bad." These considerations give immense importance to the subject of education in the United States. The Jesuits see the question in all its bearings; but our politicians do not; or if they do, many of them seem to care less for the liberties of the country than for the success of some ephemeral, or even a paltry personal interest. But this is a digression.

We add, that about the time in question the society experienced similar troubles at Saragossa, as at Alcala and Salamanca. At Saragossa, the people rose and expelled the Jesuits from the city; but they soon found means to return. It has been remarked that from the origin of the society its members possessed in the highest degree that profound and crafty policy, which they afterwards used with so much success in surmounting the greatest obstacles.

We shall now proceed to describe the institutions of the society of Jesuits.

We shall not attempt to trace, at present, the progress of the society towards the establishment, which it obtained by right or by wrong, in the several kingdoms of Europe. The reader has had already some account of the opposition made to the society in Spain. In France, the first efforts of the Jesuits were unsuccessful; but nothing daunted, they renewed them in 1560. Some authors contend, that they never did obtain a footing *of right* in France, although their

existence in that country as a matter of fact, none will dispute. In 1564 they opened their schools at Paris, which, as has been said, was the cradle of the society. The university opposed them; and upon a citation they appeared on the 14th Feb. 1565, when the following colloquy occurred between them and the rector of the university :—

Rector. Are you seculars, regulars, or monks ?

The Jesuits. We are in France such (*tales quales*) as the Parliament has denominated us; that is to say, the society of the College called “of Clermont.”

The Rector. Are you in reality monks or seculars ?

The Jesuits. The present assembly has not the right to ask us that question.

The Rector. Are you truly monks, regulars, or seculars ?

The Jesuits. We have already answered several times that we are such as the court has denominated us.

The Rector. You give no answer upon the *name*, and you will say nothing upon the *thing*. There is a decree which forbids you to take the name of Jesuits or the society of Jesus.

The Jesuits. We do not stop at the *question of name*. You can cite us to justice, if we go against the contents of the decree.

Afterwards they said, that the name of “religious” and of “monks” ought not to belong to them, not thinking themselves worthy to profess a kind of life so holy and perfect. Neither were they “seculars,” as other priests are, since they live in congregation or society under certain laws and constitutions, approved, not only by the popes, but by the kings of France, and by the general assembly of Poissy. They concluded by saying, that they could not explain more clearly what they were.

Such ambiguous language was not calculated to facilitate their introduction into a country where the ruling power (as in France) deems it necessary sedulously to guard against the introduction of influences which may tend to the destruction of the public order. Still, as a matter of fact, the Jesuits soon obtained establishments, not only in France but throughout Europe; and in the Indies also, and in America. An account of their transactions, and of the influence which they exerted upon social order in the countries in which

they gained a footing, would be instructive. That subject would bring before the reader details of a frightful character. He would read of the conspiracies against Henry III. and Henry IV. of France, and of the assassination of the last named of these sovereigns. He would read, too, of a multitude of conspiracies against Queen Elizabeth and King James of England. Besides transactions like these, he would learn that the society has everywhere shown itself so much the enemy of public order, that it has suffered the disgrace of at least thirty-seven general or partial expulsions from almost as many different cities and countries. It would, however, require volumes to despatch a subject of such magnitude, and the reader's attention, therefore, will be invited to some considerations touching the nature of the institutes of this society, which, though not so interesting perhaps, are not less important.

It has been remarked, that one of the chief causes of opposition to this society at its origin was their interference with ecclesiastical order; or in other words, with the rights of bishops. But it must not be supposed that ecclesiastical reasons were the only grounds of opposition, or that ecclesiastical persons were their only opponents, though they were probably the first to see the bearings of the new institution upon their own interests, which led them also to discover its bearings on the various interests of society. The magistracy of France were, at a very early period of the society, warned by the ordinary clergy and others of the sinister influences with which they were threatened. The celebrated Pasquier predicted, "that the magistrates would one day (though too late) reproach themselves for having tolerated the Jesuits, when they should see the deplorable consequences of the society,—the destruction of the public order and tranquillity,—not only in that kingdom, but throughout Christendom, by the stratagems and tricks, the superstition, dissimulation, feigned pretences, impositions, and detestable artifices of this new society," &c. The advocate general Marion remarked:—"That the wisest men of the time,—men really excellent in conjecture concerning the affairs of the world, predicted, almost from the first, that if the society were allowed to exist in France, a flame of discord would in process of time be kindled in the

midst of that country by means of it." The author of the history of the society already once referred to (writing in the light of events), declared that it "was the enemy of all rule and all authority, of all well regulated society; that its tendency was not only to erect itself into a universal monarchy, or rather universal despotism, but to gather all things into itself, as into a centre, to overturn everything that could oppose an obstacle in the way of its own aggrandizement; in fine, to make itself the sovereign and despotic arbiter of all the dignities, and all the riches of Christendom." "The institution itself (said M. Nicole) is radically vicious and depraved; and from thence have flowed, as from a natural source, the disorders and daring crimes, with which the society has been reproached." But we are now to call the attention of the reader to some particulars concerning the nature of the institutes of the society, and the first which will be noticed *is its tendency to establish a universal monarchy, whereof the general of the society is the head or despot.*

The Directory of the society, as already observed, pretends "that God communicated to Ignatius, as to the chief and founder of it, the entire plan of the society as well in respect to its exterior government, as the interior form of the virtues or powers which should prevail therein."*

The Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius disclose, in a manner, what this plan was. He pretended that the Lord Jesus Christ appeared to him under the image of a warlike king, and the society itself under the image of an immense army, which was to have him for its head. The formation of the society is represented as an invitation on the part of the Divine Monarch to all his subjects (that is to say to all Christians), to enter into his army, and to follow him in the war he was going to wage against the devil. God and Satan, in the eyes of Ignatius, were two great monarchs who had declared war against each other, and were levying troops each for himself—who respectively displayed their banners and took the field, and exhorted their subjects to

* Proœm. No. 3. Dominus Deus ideam totam societatis nostræ, tum exteriorem, tum etiam quæ ad interiorem virtutum formam pertineret, ei tanquam capiti et fundatori communicavit.

follow them. The troops and soldiers of the Lord Jesus Christ were to be this society of Jesus, that is the Jesuits and their associates, whom they called (*nostri*) *ours*. The devil's army were those who would not consent to belong to the other army, that is, the society of Jesuits; and these they called (*externi*) *the external*.

The society of Jesuits is formed upon this vast military plan; and its object, as has been said, was to establish under the name of "The Society of Jesus," a universal monarchy. But in order to succeed in carrying that design into effect, it was necessary to proceed warily, and to present at first an exterior appearance which should not only not alarm, but on the contrary be as attractive as possible. Above all, it was necessary to conceal, under an impenetrable veil, the mystery, and the end of the society. An example of this policy has already been given. Besides, it was needful that the society should possess those capabilities, and that versatility of action, which the variety of places and circumstances should require. Again; the plan of the society required a capacity to receive within its bosom men of all orders and conditions, and perhaps too of all religions—laymen as well as ecclesiastics—married persons as well as unmarried, bishops, popes, emperors, kings, &c. Another exigency of the plan was, that its government should be despotic—that all authority, all its property—in short the exclusive administration and direction of all its affairs, should be lodged in the hands of its chief or general; that all its members should be blindly dependent, in all things, upon the will of the general, as well in respect to the disposal of their persons as of their goods; to him they must look, as well for their doctrines or principles, as for their mode of thinking and reasoning upon all points: so that the spirit of the general should be necessarily, and always, and everywhere, the spirit of each one of the members; thus constituting (so far as this idea can be realized) the entire society into one *mystical man*, whom we have seen Melchior Cano associated with the antichrist predicted in the Scriptures. Add to these particulars the following: The plan and the objects of the society required that no authority, either temporal, secular, spiritual, or ecclesiastical—not even councils, bishops, popes, or kings, should be able to control the society; but on the contrary, that the society

should be, in all respects, *independent of the laws of the church as well as of the state.* The reader will naturally suppose also that immense riches were indispensable to the accomplishment of views so vast, and, of course, that it was needful to make provision in the institutions of the society to secure, to an unlimited degree, the possession of wealth. Finally, in order to allure the multitude into their ranks, it was necessary to inveigle the lovers of this world by a system of doctrines and morals, which, while it imposed no restraint on the bad passions of men, would make the society an object of terror to all its enemies.

It is the combination of these characters and objects which constitutes the Institution of this society. It is more than doubtful whether the entire plan was struck out, as it were, at a single heat. To Lainez, the second general of the society, no doubt the society owed no small part of its early constitution. Certain it is, that he did much more than Ignatius towards the formation of the system of religious doctrine, for which the society afterwards became so distinguished. He was remarkable for cunning, and he had the adroitness to turn to the temporal advancement of the society, much that Ignatius perhaps would have considered only in reference to its spiritual interests. The reader will expect some proofs of the particulars which have just been stated. To exhibit them at length, and in their full form, would require volumes; and it would be superfluous to detail them at length, if it were practicable to do so. The reader who desires full information upon these and kindred topics, must be referred to the numerous histories of the society which have been already written.* All that it is proposed to do in this article, is to gather and compile such facts as shall incite the reader, who is not instructed upon this subject, to such an investigation of it as its importance, considered relatively to the social and political well-being of our country, requires. For if the society be such in its constitution and objects as historians have represented it, and if its power at present to do mischief be such as it has been in times past; or if not, yet if it be capable of regaining its lost power, the reader will

* See De Pradt's History of Jesuitism, ancient and modern. Also the history already referred to.

agree that it intimately concerns our countrymen to do what they can, to guard our liberties against the attacks of this enemy of all government and all authority but its own. We proceed then to remark, that *in order to attract men into their ranks it was deemed expedient to impress them with a high idea of the origin of their society.* Accordingly, as we have seen, the Jesuits pretend that their institutions were given by inspiration. Not only the entire plan (*ideam totam*), as well for the external government of it, but also for its spiritual régime, was communicated to Ignatius during a miraculous ecstasy. Their constitution and rules were, as they pretend, dictated by the Virgin Mary, and in part at least by the Lord Jesus Christ himself; so that those who join the society become subject rather to the laws of the Lord Jesus Christ himself and of the Virgin Mary, than to the laws of Ignatius. Even the name of the society, they pretend, is divine. The rapid progress of the society was, as they say, also predicted. Ignatius pretended that he saw it in his trance, which continued eight days; and on this ground, he exhorted his companions to establish the society as soon as possible, and to place it in a condition to multiply in all places, and to subsist until the end of time. (Baillet, Vie de St. Ignace. *Imago primi seculi*, lib. i. p. 127.)

According to the Jesuits of Poitiers, Ignatius wrought more miracles than Moses, and as many as the apostles. His signet had so much authority over creatures that they instantly obeyed him, &c.; and of him, they blasphemously say, it is written, as well as of the Lord Jesus Christ himself, that in these last days, God has spoken unto us by his son Ignatius, whom he has constituted heir of all things; and they add, the parallel fails only in this point of praise, that "by him he made also the worlds," *per quem fecit et secula*. It may be supposed that, in this age of light, such enormous pretensions can deceive no one. They may not deceive an enlightened Protestant, or an enlightened Roman Catholic, but the ignorant of all communions may be duped into the belief of these pretensions, impious and absurd as they are. And, in fact, those who believe the creed of Pius IV. (as all Romanists profess to do), would not be likely to perceive anything impious or absurd in such pretensions. The rapid increase of the society proves this. Besides, if Protestants will allow

the Jesuits to educate their children (which they would gladly do, and may easily do gratuitously, out of the immense means which they can command, as well from their own society as from the general contributions of the Roman Catholic church), they will perform the office so as to prepare multitudes for the ready belief of the miraculous origin of their society. But to return :

In this idea of *universal heirship* (in this *hæredem universorum*) is involved the universal monarchy to which, they say, Ignatius was called. This idea accords with the following passages in their "Image of the first age"—"the Lord Jesus excited Ignatius to undertake the greatest things in the world; saying to him in effect: Rome and Italy are too small for thy courage. Europe is not large enough for thee: thou must seek new kingdoms and new worlds, where thou mayest plant the trophies of religion." They add, that Ignatius, after having conquered himself, had reason to hope he would conquer the world (*Imago primi seculi*, l. 1. c. 10. p. 118), and as we have seen, they extol him above Cæsar and Alexander.

As to the prerogatives granted by heaven to those who join this divine society, they are pre-eminent and almost innumerable. The society itself they compare to the chariot of Israel, to a company of angels. They call it the company of the perfect—a virgin without spot—the great miracle of the world, &c., &c. (*Imago primi seculi*.) And with respect to the individual members, they are all, as they say, the freemen and companions of Jesus Christ; that the Lord himself comes to meet each Jesuit at his death to receive him. They pretend that God granted to the society this incomparable privilege, that during the first three hundred years of the institution, no one who should die therein should be damned. These three hundred years have but lately expired; but the privilege, they say, was afterwards extended to other ages, that *whoever should die in the society should certainly enjoy eternal happiness*.*

* Hoc est hominum societatis Jesu privilegium, ut mortuum Jesuitam obvius Jesus excipiat.—*Imag.* 1 sec. l. 5, p. 648. Scito . . . Deum imperatorem amare societatem; eisque concessisse beneficium . . . nimirum ut trecentis primis annis nemo qui in ea ad mortem usque perse-

Monstrous as these pretensions are, they have had the influence, as history attests, to attract bishops, kings, and emperors into the ranks of this society; and have caused them to yield a willing subjection to their superiors in the society. Thousands there are in this country, and millions in Catholic Europe, who are fitted by education devoutly to follow their example.

The next point to be noticed, is the mystery with which the Jesuits conceal their institutions. In order to draw sovereigns and people into their ranks, it was necessary that the character and the end of their institution should not be known. Accordingly, it is a law of the society that these should be most scrupulously concealed. Thus, although the constitutions of the Jesuits, both original and supplementary, and the greater part of the bulls of the popes granting to them their privileges, have been printed, we are not, for that reason, to suppose that their peculiar institutions are known. It is a general rule of the Jesuits to make their mysteries inaccessible to strangers; and even all Jesuits are not admitted to a knowledge of these. The thirty-eighth of their *common rules* expressly commands not to communicate to those without (*externis*) either the constitutions or the other books and writings (*scripta*) which contain their institutions, or the privileges of the society.*

veraverit, damnetur.—Ib. p. 649. Felicem te . . . cui contigit socium esse ejus ordinis, in quo qui decedit, vitâ fruatur sempiternâ. Ipsius societatis omnes omnino ac singulos, ad mortem usque in eâ si constiterint salvandos.—*Ibid.*

* Constitutiones aliove hujusmodi libros aut *scripta*, quibus societatis constitutum vel privilegia continentur, non nisi ex superioris expresso consensu *externis* communicet, p. 35, edit. of Lyons, 1706. These constitutions, books, and writings must be something different from anything contained in the *Libri Instituti Societatis Jesu*, which were published at Anvers in 1635, in 12 vols. 12mo. In this work are contained:—

1. Literæ Apostolicæ, quibus institutio, confirmatio et varia privilegia continentur Societatis Jesu.
2. Constitutiones cum examine et declarationibus.
3. Regule.
4. Decreta congregationum, that is, the decrees of the first seven congregations or assemblies which had been held previously to the publication of the work.
5. Canones congregationum.
6. Formulae congregationum.

In 1584, the general Aquaviva, in sending to the Provincials the collection of *Litteræ Apostolicæ*, reminded them that in the communication which they should make of them to the superiors of houses, they should most carefully (*diligentissimè*) observe the thirty-eighth of the *common rules*: and in the ordinances of the generals, there is one which purports that the Compendium of Privileges shall not be shown to (*externis*) those *without*.*

It is difficult to believe that these prohibitions have respect merely to the printed constitutions and books of the society; for these, notwithstanding all precautions—such as having them printed in their college at Rome, or securing whole editions of such as are published elsewhere—may easily come to the hands of strangers. These prohibitions, therefore, have respect principally to their secret constitutions and *secret writings* not committed to print, which none but the (*Nostris*) members of the society are allowed to know. But even all the (*Nostris*) members have not the same privileges. The fifth general congregation ordered that a certain rule should not be communicated to all the members of the society, but only to the superiors.†

The declarations upon the constitutions also say, in general terms, that the entire constitutions must not be shown to Jesuit novices, but only an abridgment of them, although

7. Ratio studiorum.

8. Ordinationes Generalium.

9. Compendium privilegiorum et gratiarum.

10. Instructiones ad Provinciales, &c.

11. Industria ad curandos animæ morbos.

12. Instructio Claudii Aquavivæ.

13. Exercitia spiritualia S. P. Ignatii Loyolæ.

14. Directorium exercitorum.

15. Epistolæ Præpositorum Generalium.

16. A general index to the whole, which forms by itself a small volume.

These *published* matters cannot be the mystery or secret which the 38th rule forbids to communicate to the *externi*.

* Compendium privilegiorum seu majus, seu brevius, sine permissione generalia, nunquam recedetur. Exemplaria autem quæ ad usum præcipuè Superiorum et consultorum, in singulis domibus et collegiis esse debent, ita *Nostris* cum facultate Provincialis concedi poterunt, ut *externis* non ostendantur, nec ad alia loca exportentur.

† Ita tamen ut non evulgentur in manus omnium, sicut regulæ, sed tantum usui sint superioribus, ad majorem lucem habendam. Congregat. 5. Decret. 42.

they are none the less *Jesuits* and *Nostris* for being novices.* And in other places they speak of this abridgment as designed alike for the (*Nostris*) members of the society, and to be shown to strangers when *there is a necessity* to show any part of their constitutions.†

In this respect the society of Jesuits is different from all other societies of religious—so it is said—in the Roman Catholic church. The institutions of the Dominicans, the Benedictines, the Franciscans, &c., &c., are all known, or may be known. But in 1621 this society refused to make known to the Procureur-General of the Parliament of Aix, in France, their institutions, in order that he might determine whether they contained anything repugnant to the liberties of the Gallican church. In the beginning of this article, also, the reader has an example of the manner in which the society is accustomed to treat all attempts to discover their secrets. In fact, the society has, in defiance of all the powers of civil and ecclesiastical states—despotic as those powers have been, and are in some countries—preserved inviolably the peculiar mysteries of their institutions; so that it is now universally known to be a secret society, and is treated as such by all who have occasion to write of it or deal with it in any way since its revival in 1814. Even the power of Napoleon was insufficient to exclude that society from France, although exerted for that purpose. The reader who desires more minute information upon this point may be referred to De Pradt's History of Jesuitism, Ancient and Modern.

The expediency of allowing secret societies to exist in a state or kingdom, has been much discussed in Europe, both by politicians and ecclesiastics, especially in France. In the United States, the question was raised, not many years since, relatively to the society of Freemasons, but chiefly with a view to political party purposes. It is much to be regretted that a question involving a great principle, which

* *Non oportebit constitutiones universas, ab iis qui novi accedunt legi; sed compendium quoddam agi.*—*Decl. in Exam. c. 1, G.*

† *Præter constitutiones universatiores et breviores quæ ut observentur a nostris et ostendantur, cum oportebit, externis, erunt magis ad usum accommodatæ.*—*Decl. in Proem. n. 2.*

should be equally interesting to all who wish well to their country, should be thrown into the vortex of party politics, because it will inevitably be misrepresented by the designing, and misunderstood by a large portion of the citizens. It is even more to be regretted that a great principle, like this, should be discussed in relation to any society, which, comparatively with the society of the Jesuits, is of small, not to say trifling, consequence to the public. In those countries where the government is monarchical, and the Roman Catholic religion is established by law, the great point of interest has been to guard the monarchy and the hierarchy against the machinations of the Jesuits.

But since the French Revolution, the policy of the popes and of the Roman Catholic church has been changed. The violent measures of the French Revolution affected very seriously the interests of that church throughout the whole of Catholic Europe, and the persuasion now appears to prevail in the councils of that church that the aid of the society of Jesuits is indispensable to the maintenance of the existing order of things; and the encouragement the society has received from the See of Rome is, no doubt, one cause of their recent success. That church can command immense means, and large sums are actually raised for the propagation of its superstitions in Protestant countries. There are no agents which the church can employ better suited to this design than this society, and hence its importance to that church.

In the United States, where there is neither monarchy nor an established church, the point of interest is to guard our liberties against invasion by secret enemies. Our government is what the people make it; and the enemies of our liberties have only to corrupt the people, or to impress them with false notions of liberty and government, and our political ruin will be accomplished. Without inquiring into the secret designs of the Jesuits in respect to this country, enough is known of their institutions to convince every reflecting mind that their influence cannot be otherwise than mischievous. The society itself is an absolute monarchy, of a very peculiar kind. The will of the general, who is despotic, is to be implicitly obeyed by the entire body. The general resides at Rome, where civil and reli-

gious liberty are known only to be anathematized. Does the reader suppose that a society thus constituted and thus governed, will inculcate principles of government, religion, or Christian morals friendly to our civil or religious freedom? Matt. xii. 26, 27, and 28. Will they teach principles subversive of their own organization? They are (as they say), the army of Jesus—founded by inspiration. All who do not belong to them belong to the army of Satan—they are combatants for their own principles and the interests of their society; and it is not to be supposed that any effort will be spared to realize the universal monarchy which the society designs to establish.

In this country the society of Jesuits has not been regarded as of much importance. Its history has not been studied as it deserves. The politicians of Europe discover its bearings upon our institutions much more clearly than we do. They know the society by experience; and it is to be feared that we shall know it only when it is too late. But there are principles of common application among us, which, if of importance in any case, apply with the greatest force to this society. Whenever application is made to any of our Legislatures for the grant of corporate powers, not only is the object of the proposed incorporation scrupulously considered, but care is taken that the powers granted shall be in harmony with the laws of the state; and it is usual, when the power to make bye-laws is given, to qualify this franchise with the restriction that its laws shall not be contrary to the laws of the state. So great is the jealousy of some of the States that they will not allow a foreign corporation to exercise any of its franchises or powers within their limits. But the Jesuits are a foreign corporation, deriving its existence and powers from bulls of the popes, who are foreign princes, and have no right to grant a franchise to be exercised beyond the geographical limits of their temporal dominions. Their foreign origin, therefore, is a sufficient reason with any government jealous of its rights, for excluding the society from its territories; but when the Jesuits claim the right to enter a state (*incognito*) for purposes some of which, and we may add the chief of which, they refuse to reveal, it seems not only the right but the duty of the state, if possible, to exclude them.

It must not be supposed that this society, so far as it exists within a particular country, is a mere voluntary association of certain individuals who are the citizens of the state or country, and as such have the right to associate for the advancement of their individual happiness. The society is *one*, though its branches are spread far and wide. In fact, the society has many *provinces*, in each of which it has established, under the control of its general, a secret council; and this council is composed of men who in fact expatriate themselves by taking the vows imposed upon them by the society. These men assemble under circumstances which prevent any person, not of their number, from knowing for what purpose they convene—what resolutions they adopt. These men acknowledge no law but their secret sentiments—their impenetrable customs—the interests of their society—the will of their general. The ties that bind them together are neither few nor fragile. Of all societies which have ever existed, this is the most strongly compacted. No charter of a state or country could give it the consistency or force which it has acquired under color of grants from the popes. Nor must the reader suppose that the Jesuits trace their authorities solely to the bull of Paul III., by which they were instituted in 1540. The popes have made and published a collection of bulls touching this society to the number of forty and upwards. In the first part of this article is an extract from the bull of Pius VII. in 1814, showing the arrogant pretensions of the See of Rome to confer privileges upon this society to be exercised in all countries, which, if it could have any lawful effect in foreign countries, would make the society a body politic and corporate, with power to make its establishments and prosecute its secret designs in all countries in spite of the authority of their civil governments.

ZETA.

ART. III.—THE PARABLES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

XL THE LABORERS IN THE VINEYARD.

Matthew xx. 1-16.

"FOR the kingdom of heaven is like a man—the master of a family—who went out early in the morning to hire laborers for his vineyard. And when he had agreed with the laborers for a penny a-day, he sent them into his vineyard. And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing in the market-place idle. And he said to them, Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatever is just I will give you. And they went. And again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did likewise. Also he went out about the eleventh hour, and found others standing idle, and said to them, Why stand ye here the whole day idle? They said to him: Because no one has hired us. He said to them, Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatever is just ye shall receive. And evening having come, the lord of the vineyard said to his steward: Call the laborers, and pay them the hire, proceeding from the last on to the first. And they came who were hired about the eleventh hour, and they received every one a penny. When, however, they who were first came, they thought they should receive more. And they also received every one a penny. And on receiving it, they murmured against the master of the family, saying: These last have wrought but one hour, yet thou hast made them equal to us who have borne the burden of the day and the heat. But he answered, and said to one of them: Friend, I do not wrong thee. Didst not thou agree with me for a penny? Take that which is thine and go: for I choose to give to this last, the same as to thee. Is it not lawful for me to do what I choose with my own? Is thine eye evil, because I am good? So the last shall be first, and the first last. Many indeed are called, but few are chosen."

This parable was occasioned by an inquiry by Peter respecting the reward they were to receive, who had forsaken all and followed Christ. On the young man's going

away sad, whom Christ had directed to sell all his possessions and give to the poor, and come joyously and follow him, he said to his disciples: "Verily I say to you, with difficulty shall a rich man enter into the kingdom of heaven. Again, indeed, I say to you, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. And when the disciples heard it, they were exceedingly astonished, and said: Who then can be saved? And Jesus looked at, and said to them: With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.

"Then Peter answered, and said to him: Behold we have left all and have followed thee. What then shall be to us? And Jesus said to them: Verily I say to you, that at the renovation, when the Son of man shall sit upon the throne of his glory, ye who have followed me, shall also sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And every one who shall have forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or fields for my name's sake, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit eternal life. But many that are first shall be last, and the last first," chap. xix. 28-30.

It is this last announcement which the parable is given to illustrate; and the truth which it teaches is, that while all whom Christ calls into his kingdom here, are to receive a reward, the recompense with which they are to be crowned is not to be determined by the time, that is, the age in the progress of the kingdom, at which they enter it, but by his sovereign pleasure: and its aim seems to have been, to correct an expectation entertained by the disciples or others, who imagined that the kingdom was immediately to be established in its final form, swayed by Christ in person, and that they who first entered the kingdom and were admitted to the most intimate relations to Christ, were on that account to attain higher rewards than others, and occupy stations of greater dignity and honor. Some writers have assigned it a more extensive design, and held that it teaches that the rewards of the children of the kingdom are to have no reference in their degrees to the measure of their labors. It is, however, expressly announced by Christ in his response to Peter, that the twelve disciples are to be distinguished above others by an elevation to a kingly dominion over the

twelve tribes of Israel, and that every one who has forsaken houses, brothers, or sisters, a father, a mother, a wife, or children, or fields, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life. Yet while the recompense is to bear some proportion to the proofs of love and fidelity that are given here, it is not to be determined by the era or date at which they enter the kingdom, nor the amount of labor they perform in it, but is to be determined by God in his sovereign grace. To unfold the parable, the analogy is to be considered of the owner of the vineyard to Christ; of the vineyard to the kingdom of heaven; of the laborers in the vineyard to the children of the kingdom; of the different periods during which individuals of each class act in their sphere; of the principle on which their rewards are bestowed; and of the right of the householder and of Christ to confer their rewards on that principle.

1. The analogy of the master of the family to Christ as the monarch of the kingdom of heaven. It was the exclusive right and office of the owner of the vineyard to hire laborers to work in it, to direct what tasks they should perform, and to decide what wages they should receive. They had no right, irrespective of his will, to introduce themselves into his grounds, labor there as they chose, and then demand of him wages. That would have been equivalent to a supreme control over his property, and made him their dependent and vassal. But as he was the absolute proprietor of the vineyard and its fruits, it was his right alone to employ persons to cultivate it, and assign them at every stage of their work, the labor they were to perform.

So it belongs exclusively to Christ to introduce whom he pleases into his kingdom, and constitute them its children. Men cannot intrude into it like invaders into a vacant territory, and take possession of its infinite treasures independently of his will and agency. Such a power in them would imply that he is not the monarch of his kingdom, and cannot determine the conditions on which men shall become his subjects; but that they can grasp forgiveness, justification, and eternal life at their will, and make them theirs of right, without any act of concurrence on his part. But men have no such power: they have not the slightest right or title to a place in his kingdom, and participation in its immeasurable

gifts. It is, with all its boundless blessings, far more absolutely and exclusively his, than the vineyard was the possession of the master of the family who owned it. And it is his alone in absolute sovereignty, to determine who shall enter it, become its children, and inherit its glorious privileges and immortal joys. Those who obtain its blessings, are those who "were chosen in him before the foundation of the world, that they should be holy and without blame before him in love, having predestinated them unto the adoption of children to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace."

2. The analogy of the vineyard to the kingdom of God. The vines of the grape-field needed the culture and care of laborers in order to their yielding a crop of fruit, which was the object for which they were planted and sustained. They required perhaps to be supplied with fresh soil, to be pruned, to be irrigated, and to be shielded from injury by insects, and sustained by props when overloaded; and the fruit itself, when mature, was to be gathered by human hands, and made to yield its wine in the press, or be prepared for food by drying or other processes. If left without cultivation, they would soon run to a mischievous luxuriance, and their fruits, if not gathered and cured, be wasted by the elements or devoured by birds and insects, and the whole purpose of the vineyard, which was to yield sustenance for men, be lost.

So also the great object of the kingdom of heaven is reached by labor; for that kingdom, as well as the vine, has fruit peculiar to itself: the fruit of the Spirit which is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance, against which there is no law; the fruit of righteousness, the fruit of the wisdom which cometh down from above which is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy; and these are growths that are not natural to the human heart. They are introduced there only by the Spirit of God, and they need to be cultivated with the greatest diligence and skill, in order that they may flourish and reach maturity. The great business of those who are introduced into the kingdom of heaven, is to cultivate them in themselves especially; and their fitness for

the rewards of the kingdom is just in proportion to their success in their culture.

8. The analogy of the laborers to those who are introduced into the kingdom of God. A portion of the laborers were hired by the householder, and entered on their work in the vineyard early in the morning. They had wasted no part of the day in idleness. The others, who were hired at the sixth, the ninth, and the eleventh hour, had, during the preceding part of the day, been idle. They had no vineyard of their own by the cultivation of which they could obtain a subsistence: they had no one of whom they could procure the means of life in exchange for their labor.

So also those who are called by Christ into his kingdom, are called at various stages of its progress; some at its institution in Judea; some after its extension into Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy; some in all the ages that followed and are to follow to the time of his second coming. They are like the laborers also introduced into it at different stages of life; some in youth who spend all their mature years in the ranks of his disciples; while others are called at a later period—at its meridian, at the commencement of its decline;—when the shadows of evening have begun to fall around them. And as all the laborers, whatever the hour was at which they entered the vineyard, would have remained unemployed and without the means of supplying the wants of the day, had not the owner of the vineyard hired them; so all those whom Christ introduces into his kingdom would continue to live aliens from it, were they not brought into it, and constituted its children by his sovereign act. None of them have, naturally, any title to it, or any disposition towards it. They are all averse: and their transference from the realms of darkness into light, is the work of divine, not of human power. They are born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

There seems to be a less perfect analogy between the relations to the two classes, of the objects on which they were to expend their labor. The vines and fruits, or whatever else of the vineyard it was, to which the laborers devoted their toil, were distinct from themselves. They were employed in planting perhaps, pruning and dressing, removing weeds and shrubs that encumbered the vineyard, or gathering and

curing the fruit. That which the children of the kingdom are to cultivate, is the fruit of the Spirit—holy affections in their own hearts, and the principles and acts in which they find their proper expression to others; things that are indeed distinct from themselves as mere existences; but yet are less so than the growths of the vineyard were from the laborers who cultured and harvested them. The children of the kingdom, however, are not confined wholly to the nurture of their own piety. A still broader field is open to their labor in the hearts of others; and one of their aims in causing their light to shine, is to be, that others may be led by their good works, to glorify God. They are to follow after the things which make for peace, and things wherewith one may edify another. They that are strong are to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please themselves; but every one is to please his neighbor for good to edification; that they may with one mind and one mouth glorify God.

4. The analogy of the payment of the laborers, with the gift of rewards by Christ to the children of the kingdom. The laborers were summoned to receive their pay at evening, which was the time agreed on for the settlement.

So the children of the kingdom are to be summoned to a judgment at the close of the present dispensation, when Christ is to come, and are then to receive the rewards of eternal life. They enter into rest indeed at death, and are exalted during the space that intervenes to their resurrection, the Scriptures indicate, to high degrees of knowledge and blessedness. But it is at Christ's advent at the close of the present dispensation, that they are to receive their chief rewards,—a resurrection in glory to immortal life; a public justification and adoption as God's children; investiture with a priesthood and kingship, and a reign with him in his millennial and eternal kingdom.

5. The analogy of the principle on which wages were given to the laborers, to the righteousness and sovereignty with which Christ is to give rewards to the subjects of his kingdom.

There was nothing promised by the householder to any of those whom he hired, beyond the proper wages for the work they performed:—to those who entered the vineyard early and toiled throughout the day, the usual wages for a day's

work; to those who entered at later hours, only such wages as were right. There was no pledge given that those who were first hired should be first paid; nor that the sum paid them should be as much greater than others received, as the period was longer during which they toiled. That was left wholly to the pleasure of the householder.

So no pledge is given by Christ that those who enter his kingdom at an early stage of its institution, or at an early period of life, shall be called to their reward earlier than others who enter his service at a later or a maturer age, nor that their reward shall be greater than that of others in proportion to the longer period of their service as the children of his kingdom. Those who were called into his kingdom in the first century of the Christian era, or in the first years of their lives, are to be rewarded with a glorious resurrection and a crown, no sooner than those who enter it later, and labor in it but a short period. That all are then to receive the same rewards, is to be the work of his sovereign pleasure.

The householder caused the settlement with the laborers to be so conducted, that his peculiar bounty to those hired late in the day, was made known to those who commenced their labors in the morning. The order of the settlement with the several parties, was the reverse of the order in which they were hired; the last hired being the first who received their wages, and the first hired, the last that were paid; so that they became aware of the unexpected gratuity bestowed on all but themselves. So Christ will conduct the judgment and reward of those who belong to his kingdom, in such a manner, that all his peculiar grace to individuals and classes will be fully understood and appreciated.

6. The laborers who were first hired, on learning that the price of a full day's work was paid to those who entered the vineyard at the eleventh hour, expected that a greater sum would be paid to them, proportional in a measure to their longer labor: and on receiving but a penny, murmured at it as unreasonable and unfair; as though the householder was bound to pay those whom he hired, in a ratio to the time during which they had toiled. But this was most unjust to him, as it implied that his gratuity to those who were hired at the eleventh hour, invested them who were hired in the morning, with the right to claim twelve times

the wages for which they had agreed to work through the day.

So those who have imagined that they are to receive a greater reward than others, because they served in an earlier age, or longer than others in his kingdom, assume in effect that his grace to others is to invest them with a right to distinctions and honors that can only be the gift of his sovereign goodness. His gratuitous bounty to one, is not to place him under obligation to confer the same or a superior bounty on others.

The householder reminded the individuals who charged him with injustice, first that he did not violate their rights in giving to others more than they could claim as their due: next, that he had a right to do as he would with his own; it was his prerogative, not that of the servants whom he hired, to decide who should be the recipients of his bounty; and finally he indicated to the murmurers, that they only showed their own unreasonableness and injustice in defaming and denouncing an upright and generous act, which should have commanded their approval and commendation: for they did not attempt to prove that his bounty was misplaced; they did not intimate that those who had had opportunity to work but one hour, did not stand in as great need of the penny they received, as those who had toiled all the day, and that the extra payment, therefore, was not a justifiable and benignant gratuity.

So Christ will vindicate himself from all imputations of unreasonableness or injustice in the rewards he bestows on the subjects of his kingdom at his coming. He will show that those whom he accepts and crowns are all in equal need of the redemption he bestows; that he has an infinite right to make the distinctions he does in the distribution of his gifts, and that his sovereign goodness should command the acquiescence and approval of all who belong to his kingdom.

The parable thus exemplifies the fact and the mode in which many that are first shall be last, and the last shall be first. The first of the laborers in the parable were those first hired, and first introduced into the vineyard; the last were those who were last hired, and last entered the vineyard to labor. The reverse which took place in their relations,

did not consist in the gift to the last of a greater sum as wages than was paid to the first; as they all, without discrimination, received a penny. The last were constituted first by their being the first to receive their pay, and by their receiving eleven times more in proportion to the period of their labor than the first; and the first were constituted last, by their being the last to receive their pay, and by their receiving but a twelfth part as much in proportion to the time during which they labored as was paid to the last.

So the first in the kingdom of God, are those who entered it in the first age after its institution; and the last those who enter it in its last age immediately before Christ's coming; and many accordingly, who first entered the kingdom, and imagined that they were to rise to peculiar distinctions and honors on that account, will find at the day of judgment, when Christ rewards all his holy ones, that they are not to attain any eminence above others by that circumstance; but those who enter the kingdom in later ages, and even those who are renewed and constituted its children in the last hour, as it were, before Christ comes, will receive the same great gifts that constitute redemption as they: namely, they will be raised from death in glory, or changed from mortal to immortal; they will be publicly justified and invested with crowns; and they will be admitted to the glories and beatitudes of eternal life in his kingdom, in precisely the same manner as the laborers who wrought only during the last hour of the day received the same wages as those who had wrought through the whole space from morning to evening.

In the expression with which the Saviour closes the parable, "Many indeed are called, but few are chosen;" *καὶ* is used in the sense of indeed, moreover, or in like manner, and the announcement has relation to the Jews and Gentiles at large, to whom the call of the gospel is addressed: and expresses the great truth, that God exercises his sovereignty, not only in bestowing rewards on those who are constituted the children of his kingdom, but also in selecting them as the subjects of that grace. The call to enter the kingdom is addressed to great numbers; to but few, however, is it made efficacious by the power of the Holy Spirit.

The great lesson taught by the parable thus is:—

First.—That those who were called into the kingdom in its first age, and toiled long in it, are not on that account to receive rewards superior to others; but that instead, many of them are to be less distinguished by Christ's bounty, than others who enter the kingdom even in the last age that is to precede his coming. So that many that are first in time and length of labor, shall be last in being rewarded; and many that are last in time and shortest in the period of their labor shall be first in being rewarded.

Next.—That the sovereignty in the distribution of his gifts, which Christ thus displays, will be marked by rectitude and wisdom, and will be vindicated by him against all objections and doubts, with which his erring people may now contemplate it. They will then see it to be just and worthy of his infinite perfections.

XII. THE TWO SONS.

Matthew xxi. 28-32.

"But what think ye? A man had two sons. And he came to the first and said: Son, go work to-day in my vineyard. And he answered and said, I will not: but he afterwards repented and went. And he came to the second and said likewise. And he answered and said, I go, sir, and went not. Which of the two did the will of his father? They say to him: The first. Jesus said to them: Verily I say to you that the publicans and the harlots go before you into the kingdom of God. For John came to you in the way of righteousness and ye believed him not, but the publicans and the harlots believed him: and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not, to believe on him."

This parable was occasioned by the pretence of the chief priests and elders that it had not been made known to them from whom Christ drew his authority to teach the doctrines he was proclaiming; and was designed to exemplify their extreme and hopeless wickedness in professing subjection to God, while they openly disregarded his clearest and most imperative commands.

"And having come to the temple, the chief priests and the elders of the people came to him as he was teaching,

and said: By what authority doest thou these things; and who gave thee this authority? And Jesus answered and said to them: I also will ask you one question, which, if you tell me, I also will tell you by what authority I do these things. The baptism of John, whence was it? From heaven, or from men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying: If we should say from heaven, he will ask us: Why then did you not believe him? But if we should say, From men; we fear the multitude; for all hold John as a prophet. And they answered Jesus and said: We do not know. And he said to them: Neither do I tell you by what authority I do these things," v. 23-27.

The parable then follows, and is explained by Christ as designed to show that the chief priests and rulers, the professed ministers of God and expositors of his law, in rejecting John the Baptist and Christ as not his genuine and accredited messengers, exhibited a greater and more hopeless alienation and wickedness, than the publicans and harlots; for the priests and elders did not believe John, notwithstanding the sanctity of his life; but the publicans and harlots believed him. Nor yet did the priests and elders, after they saw the faith of those outcasts, repent and believe on him.

Let us look at the analogy of the son who at first refused obedience to the father's command, to the publicans and harlots. He openly disregarded his father's will, and said he would not work in the vineyard. He either claimed in effect that he was under no obligation to render the service his father required, or else resolved, in defiance of right, to devote his time to idleness or amusement. His passions were so lawless, and his conscience so dead, that he did not attempt to disguise his purpose to rebel. In like manner the publicans and harlots were, antecedent to John's preaching, undisguised and unhesitating in their violations of the law of God. Oppression and extortion were the very profession of the publicans or tax-gatherers; the means on which they relied for the accumulation of property; and their peculiar vice was the profession also of the other class of outcasts, and the stated means of their livelihood. Both were expressly devoted to their respective sins, and bold and unblushing in them.

A like resemblance subsisted between them, also, when the change took place in their views and dispositions. The son was instantly startled, very probably, and filled with alarm, by the very boldness and recklessness with which he had set his father's will at defiance. A sense of his unfilial spirit, of his deep and desperate wickedness, flashed through him, not unlikely, like a shaft of lightning from a midnight cloud that lights up a scene that was before wrapped in impenetrable darkness, and reveals all its objects in a moment to the eye, and disclosed to him, as in the blaze of noonday, his perverseness, his guilt, and his obnoxiousness to divine wrath. The schemes of forbidden pleasure on which his thoughts had been bent for the day, may thence have been swept at a stroke from his heart, his stubborn and remorseless spirit reduced to submission in an instant, and rectitude, filial love, and a disposition and purpose to render the service required by his father, taken possession of his breast, and given birth to immediate and joyous obedience.

So it was because of the enormity of their sins, that the publicans and harlots were aroused from insensibility by John's announcement, that the kingdom of God was at hand, and summons of them to repent. They saw at a glance, that if the expected Messiah was about to appear, and assume the sceptre of Israel and of the world, there could be no hope for such audacious sinners as they were, unless they yielded to the call to repent. And as it was the greatness and ignominy of their sins that roused them from their stupor and filled them with alarm, so it was not, improbably, the grace of the call to repentance that they might be saved—which was addressed to them as well as all others—that touched their hearts with remorse, and subdued them to tears and sorrow for their offences on the one hand, and kindled their hearts with love to the Messiah and trust in him on the other. The greatness, the freeness of his mercy, the graciousness of his condescension, appeared the more touching and wonderful, from the depth of the guilt and degradation to which he stooped to save them. These new-born views and affections were as natural to them under the renewing influences of the Holy Spirit, as those of the repentant son were to him.

A like analogy subsists between the other son and the chief priests and elders. He assented immediately and courteously to his father's command, as though he was conscious of his duty, and was animated by none but the most filial affections, and had no schemes of pleasure that could interfere with the obedience which he promised. All that was, however, a mere hypocritical show. The secret feelings of his heart were the direct opposites of those which he professed; and he accordingly, the moment his father was withdrawn, dismissed all purpose of obedience, and spent the day in idleness or the pursuit of some selfish gratification, and showed, thereby, that he had no respect to his obligations, and no care for his father's wishes. His disingenuousness was a natural barrier, accordingly, to his being awakened to a sense of his guilt. Deception, hypocrisy, a crafty show of obedience, while he lived in transgression, were the great elements of his policy. He had no conscience to check or restrain him. He had no filial feelings or virtuous principles which could be roused by reflection or a bold appeal, and arrest him in his career of rebellion. It was natural, therefore, that he violated his word, and passed the day in rebellion without remorse, and was prepared to repeat the same course the next day, if again commanded by his father to work in his vineyard.

In like manner, the chief priests and elders were made, by their hypocrisy, far more callous and remorseless than the publicans and harlots. They were by office the ministers of God, regarded themselves as having a knowledge of his will, and made obedience to it the professed business of their lives; and yet so blinded were they by that belief and profession, that though utterly estranged from him, and the vassals of the most selfish passions, they were wholly unaware of their alienation, and perverted his word, and rejected without remorse the great messenger, John the Baptist, he had sent, distinguished by the sanctity of his life, and the boldness and fidelity with which he summoned them to repent, and prepare for the advent of the Messiah, who was about to appear and establish his kingdom among them. Their false religion, their mistake of the forms of piety for its spirit, of a round of ceremonies for a true worship, their pride of office, their jealousy of rivals in the popular favor, served

to pervert and stifle their consciences, blind them to the discovery of their character, and harden them against a sense of their sins. Their self-righteousness, their public and official reputation, were barriers, therefore, to their being roused to repentance. They were far less likely to be touched by the calls and warnings of John or of Jesus, than the outcasts of society, like the publicans and harlots, who having no pretence whatever to the character which God requires in order to pardon and acceptance, were conscious at once that they must repent and obtain a gracious admission to the kingdom of God, or perish.

The lessons taught by the parable are—

First, that hypocrisy in religion, a studied profession of obedience conjoined with a deliberate and systematic violation of God's will in the pursuit of selfish and sinful pleasures, is a worse barrier to repentance than open and disgraceful vice; for while it bespeaks essentially the same lawlessness, it is associated with the additional sin of treachery and deceit. There is no ingenuous feeling in minds of that cast on which truth can act. Conscience is deadened. Selfishness, pride, the love of sin, and craft, have supreme dominion, and are leagued together to exclude every antagonistic power, and hold the soul in their vassalage.

Secondly, official hypocrites, priests and rulers in the church, who mistake the form and profession of religion for the power, who pervert their office to the promotion of their private and selfish ends, and who reject and persecute the true ministers and followers of Christ, are more hopeless of reformation than those who openly set religion at defiance and live in unblushing sin; for they aim not merely at occasional gratifications by the violation of the divine law—they attempt to annihilate religion itself and substitute a hollow and malignant system in its place. There is ordinarily, therefore, not the remotest hope of their being roused to repentance. They in effect arrogate the place of God; they usurp authority over his law; they set aside his word; they tread under foot the Son of God, count the blood of the covenant an unholy thing, and do despite to the Spirit of grace. Their destiny is consequently, "Vengeance." "I will recompense, saith the Lord." Their attitude towards him is precisely that of Satan. The Spirit of God accordingly does not strive

with them. They are left to work out their principles and meet their appropriate doom. This great truth has been verified in the history of every generation of the ministers of religion who have apostatized, both of the Hebrew and the Christian church, and especially of that vast train in the Romish communion of usurpers of God's place in his temple, who are denominated the Man of Sin, whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signs and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness, because they receive not the love of the truth that they might be saved. And therefore God sends them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be condemned and consumed by the spirit of Christ's mouth, and destroyed by the brightness of his coming, when he descends to vindicate himself from their false teachings, and establish his throne on the earth.

XIII. THE WICKED VINE-DRESSERS.

Matthew xxi. 33-46; Mark xii. 1-12; Luke xx. 9-19.

"Hear ye another parable. There was a man, a householder, who planted a vineyard, and put around it a hedge, and dug in it a winepress, and built a tower; and he let it out to husbandmen, and went abroad. And when the time of fruit drew near, he sent his servants to the husbandmen to receive his fruit. And the husbandmen took his servants, and one they beat, and one they killed, and another they stoned. Again he sent other servants more than the first, and they did in like manner to them. And afterwards he sent to them his son, saying: They will reverence my son. But the husbandmen seeing the son, said among themselves: This is the heir, come let us kill him, and we may hold the inheritance. And they took and cast him out of the vineyard, and killed him.

"When then the lord of the vineyard shall come, what will he do to those husbandmen? They say to him: He will miserably destroy those wicked men, and let the vineyard to other husbandmen who will render him the fruits in their seasons. Jesus saith to them: Have ye never read in the Scriptures?—The stone which the builders rejected is be-

come the head of the corner. This is done by the Lord, and it is marvellous in our eyes. Wherefore I tell you that the kingdom of God shall be taken from you and given to a nation bringing forth its fruits. And whosoever falls upon this stone shall be crushed, but he on whom it falls shall be winnowed," i. e., scattered to the winds like chaff.

In the preceding parable Christ exemplified the hypocrisy of the priests and rulers of the Jews in professing obedience to God while they deliberately disobeyed him, and pointed out the hopelessness of their reformation. In this he illustrates their rebellion in the different and higher form of usurping dominion over God's people, persecuting his servants, and killing his son; and announced the destruction which awaited them for their daring sins. Its object accordingly is not, like most of the parables, to illustrate the kingdom of heaven, but the conduct of the Jewish priests and rulers in their offices towards his people, and especially his messengers and his son, antecedently to the institution of that kingdom. The analogies that need to be traced, in order to expound it, are those of the vineyard to God's people; of the householder to God as their ruler; of the husbandmen to the Jewish priests and rulers; of the treatment of the householder's servants and son by the husbandmen, to the treatment of the prophets and of Christ by the Jews; and of the punishment of the husbandmen to the punishment of the Jewish rulers and nation for their sins.

1. The analogy of the vineyard to the Jewish nation or God's people. A vine or vineyard is frequently employed in the Scriptures as the representative of the Hebrew nation as God's chosen people, as in Psalm lxxx., in which the bringing of a vine from Egypt, planting it, and causing it to take root, to cover the hills with its shadow, and to send out its boughs to the sea, are used to represent the removal of the Israelites from Egypt and establishment in Canaan; and Isaiah v. also, in which fencing a vineyard, clearing it of stones, planting it with a choice vine, and building a winepress and a tower, are used as representatives of the establishment of the Israelites with their sacred institutions as his people in the land of Canaan. The vineyard of the parable was furnished with everything that was requisite, with the proper care of the husbandmen, to the growth of a crop

of grapes, and separation from them of their wine. It had a hedge set around it to protect it from the intrusion of beasts that might ravage it, and from men that might plunder the fruit. It was planted with a vine which had reached such a growth, it would seem, that it was in the next season to bear fruit. A watch-tower was erected in it, from which its whole circuit might be overlooked, and the intrusion of mischievous animals or of thieves immediately detected; and it had a winepress for the expression, when the crop was gathered, of the wine. It had all therefore that properly belonged to a vineyard, was in a fit state to be let to husbandmen, and nothing was needed but proper care from them to secure a good crop.

In like manner the Israelites were furnished with everything that was proper to them as God's people, so that with the due care of the priests and rulers, to whom they were committed, they should have rendered an acceptable obedience to God. They were separated from all other nations by a hedge, as it were, of prohibitions. They were established in their land in a condition eminently favorable to their piety; having a law directly instituted by God, and a system of religious doctrines and rites adapted in the highest measure to nurture them to obedience. A vast array also of means was appointed and employed, to enable the priests and rulers to discern if any portion of them were drawn into apostasy, either by their own hearts, or any of the insidious foes around them to whose tempting influence they were exposed.

2. The analogy of the householder to God as the monarch of his people. The owner of the vineyard having thus fitted it for easy and successful cultivation, had a right to make such a disposition of it, as to secure to himself a proper return for the toil and money he had expended on it. He was its absolute proprietor. None could take possession of it, and appropriate its produce to himself or others without his permission. It was the part of wisdom also to secure to himself a proper share of its fruits. To have had no reference to its fruits; to have expended such a sum in purchasing it, and fitting it to yield grapes, and yet have had no care what became of its produce, would have been the part of thoughtlessness and folly. He accordingly made it the condition of his let-

ting it to the husbandmen, that they should yield to him a proper proportion of its fruits.

In like manner, God, who had delivered the Israelites from bondage in Egypt, conducted them to Canaan, established them in peace and safety, given them his law, and furnished them with all the means that were requisite to a holy life as his chosen people, had a right to require of them such a return of obedience. His express object in separating them from the other nations, exercising such a peculiar providence over them, appointing them such a system of religious and civil laws, and conferring on them such peculiar and eminent gifts, was that they might serve him as his people. To have left that end out of view, to have been indifferent whether they yielded him the homage he demanded or not, would have been to treat his rights and their obligations as of no significance; put sin on a level in acceptableness with obedience; and thence to overcloud and deface his own perfections. It is infinitely appropriate, therefore, his own glory demanded, that in committing his people to the teachings and government of the priests and rulers, he should require them so to fulfil the task he assigned them that they should cause a suitable return to be made to him, from the people, of obedience. And had they proved faithful to their trusts, that result would have been gained.

8. The analogy of the conduct of the husbandmen to that of the priests and rulers.

The husbandmen proceeded in their treatment of the servants of the owner of the vineyard and his son, as though the vineyard was their property; as though in beating, stoning, and killing the servants, and putting the son to death, they committed no crime, but inflicted a just punishment on the servants and son for a violation of their rights, in demanding the stipulated fruits of the vineyard: for scourging, stoning, and killing were the penalties which the law assigned to great crimes. They treated those messengers of the householder therefore as great criminals; and thence, in effect, assumed that the fruits of the vineyard were exclusively theirs, and were to be appropriated to their own use, as they pleased, without consulting his will. Their sin consisted, primarily, accordingly, in a usurpation of the householder's rights of property and dominion: and it was on that

that they proceeded in the atrocious outrages which they inflicted on his servants and son.

So also the priests and rulers arrogated the rights of God over his people, and proceeded in much the same way that they would, had the nation been theirs, and owed them the submission and allegiance which were due to him. They made void the law of God, in a large degree, and substituted their traditions and the commandments of men in its place: and in beating, stoning, and killing his prophets and his Son, they treated him as though it were a violation of their rights, that he sent such messengers to proclaim, and demand obedience to, his will. The punishments they inflicted on them were such as could be justly inflicted on none but great criminals. They accordingly treated the nation, in a great measure, as though it were theirs instead of God's people, prostituted their offices to the promotion of their private ends, and led the people generally into the most open and awful rebellion. The picture drawn by Jeremiah of the wickedness of the prophets, priests, and rulers, and the debasement and corruption of the multitude, was true of the nation generally for a long series of ages. "But this people hath a revolting and a rebellious heart: they are revolted and gone. Neither say they in their heart: Let us now fear the Lord our God, that giveth rain in his season; he reserveth unto us the appointed weeks of harvest. For among my people are found wicked men: they lay wait as he that setteth snares: they set a trap, they catch men. As a cage is full of birds, so are their houses full of deceit; they are become great, and waxen rich. They are waxen fat; they shine; they overpass the deeds of the wicked; they judge not the cause, the cause of the fatherless, yet they prosper; and the right of the needy they do not judge. Shall I not visit for these things, saith the Lord? Shall not my soul be avenged on such a nation as this? A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land; the prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so." Chap. v. 23-31. A like picture is drawn of them by Micah: "And I said, Hear, I pray you, O heads of Jacob, and ye princes of the house of Israel: Is it not for you to know judgment? who hate the good, and love the evil; who pluck off their skin from off them, and their flesh from off their bones;

who also eat the flesh of my people, and flay their skin from off them; and they break their bones, and dash them in pieces, as for the pot, and as flesh within the caldron. Then shall they cry unto the Lord, but he will not hear them; he will even hide his face from them. Thus saith the Lord concerning the prophets that make my people err; that bite with their teeth, and cry peace; and he that putteth not into their mouths, they even prepare war against him. Therefore night shall be unto you that ye shall not have a vision; and it shall be dark that ye shall not divine. . . Hear this, I pray you, ye heads of the house of Jacob, and princes of the house of Israel, that abhor judgment, and pervert all equity: they build up Zion with blood, and Jerusalem with iniquity. The heads thereof judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money; yet will they lean upon the Lord, and say, Is not the Lord among us? No evil can come upon us. Therefore shall Zion for your sake be ploughed as a field, and Jerusalem shall become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest," chap. iii. The rulers, priests, and prophets thus openly set aside the will and right of God, and usurped dominion over his people as though they were theirs instead of his; and exerted their whole power to corrupt and debase them; and it was chiefly by their influence that they were, as a nation, prompted to the idolatry at first, and subsequently to the rejection of Christ, which led to their dispersion and destruction. Their conduct towards God and his messengers was thus, for a long series of ages, precisely like that of the husbandmen towards the householder and his servants and son.

4. The analogy of the treatment of the householder's servants and son by the husbandmen, to the treatment of God's messengers and son by the priests and rulers: As the husbandmen beat and stoned some of the householder's servants, and slew others, and finally put the son to death, with the purpose of keeping possession of the vineyard, so the priests, princes, and rulers persecuted God's messengers, the prophets, and put some of them to death; and finally crucified his Son, under the belief that they should thereby confirm themselves in the power which they had usurped over his people. The office of the prophets had been a perilous

one in every age. The rebukes which they were commissioned to utter to the priests, rulers, and people, the denunciations of the national sins, and the predictions and warnings of judgments with which he was to punish their crimes, exposed them to the resentment especially of those in power; and they were accordingly often subjected to insults, violence, and death. Isaiah, Amos, Zechariah, and John the Baptist, were put to death; Jeremiah was imprisoned and stoned; and nearly the whole series, Stephen intimates, experienced the hatred and vengeance of the priests and rulers. "Which of the prophets," he asks, "have not your fathers persecuted; and they have slain them who uttered predictions respecting the coming of the Just One, of whom now ye have become the betrayers and murderers." (Acts vii. 52.) Their treatment of the prophets, and of Christ, was thus precisely like that which the householder's servants and son received from the husbandmen.

5. The analogy of the punishment which the husbandmen were to receive to that which was inflicted on the Jewish priests and rulers. The husbandmen were to be destroyed in a violent and ignominious way, and the vineyard to be let to others who would render the householder the fruits in their seasons. In like manner, the priests and rulers were to be divested of their offices over God's people: the nation rejected, and all who did not submit themselves to Christ, whom they had crucified, smitten with destruction. "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth its fruits; and whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be crushed: but he on whom it falls shall be winnowed." And this was accomplished about forty years after the prediction was uttered, in the conquest of Jerusalem; the slaughter of vast crowds of the priests, rulers, and people; the abolition of the national worship; the dissolution of the national organization; and the dispersion of the survivors as captives through the empire of their conquerors, where they continue a broken and powerless race, to the present day.

The sentiment of justice that is common to man prompts every one to feel that so selfish and monstrous a crime as that of the husbandmen deserves, and must meet, a condign punishment. The great lesson which the parable teaches is,

that those who are guilty of a like usurpation of the rights of God over his people, and persecute in a similar manner his true ministers and witnesses, and put them to death, will infallibly meet from his hands a retribution as terrible as their sins are daring and impious.

ART. IV.—NOTES ON SCRIPTURE. CRITICAL CONJECTURES.

John xvii.—Spener, as his biographer remarks, loved this chapter with peculiar affection, although he never preached on it; saying that he did not understand it—that the full comprehension of it exceeded the measure of faith the Lord is accustomed to give his followers in this life. (See Tholuck in *loc.*) It is commonly regarded as a prayer, but in reading it, especially in the original, we are struck with the absence of supplicatory expressions. May we not err in considering it simply as a prayer? Let us attend to particulars. In verse 2, we find an explicit reference to an antecedent transaction between the Father and the Son, by which power over all flesh was committed to the Son, and a certain portion of the human race given him. It reminds us of such passages as Is. liii. 11; Dan. vii. 14; Luke xxii. 29, 30; Gal. iii. 17; Eph. i. 4; Rev. xiii. 8. In verse 4, the Redeemer speaks of a work committed to him, with plain allusion to an antecedent transaction, in the nature of a compact or covenant. In verses 6 and 12 (see also vs. 9 and 11) he alludes repeatedly to those who had been given to him, and speaks of what he had done in their behalf. In verses 9, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 24, he stipulates for blessings in their behalf, some of which refer exclusively to this life, and others (it is suggested) to the future. But observe the style of our Lord's address. It is not, properly speaking, supplicatory: "Father I will," &c. (πατερ . . . θελω), and in verse 9 the word he employs (ερωτάω), does not properly signify *pray* (δέχομαι, προσευχόμεαι, ἐπερωτεύω, see Luke xxii. 32, 40, 41, 44, 46) but (interrogo, quæro) *ask, inquire, stipulate*, which led Bengel to remark: "Rogat Jesus cum jure, postulat cum fiducia, ut filius non ut servus;" and he might have added—

as if he were rehearsing the terms of a covenant which included the particulars mentioned. The remaining verses of the chapter (2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, (11, first clause) 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26) are declarations, not petitions, concerning what the Father had done, or he had done, or some particular truth or purpose connected with the Redeemer's work.

May we not then regard the chapter chiefly as a disclosure or setting forth (*ἀποκάλυψις*) of those parts of the covenant of redemption which have especial reference to those who had been given to the Son by that covenant, namely, the church of the first born, or the elect church? If it be inquired why it was uttered audibly, in the hearing of the disciples, the answer is suggested by v. 13 (see John xi. 41, 42). It was for the instruction, the comfort, and encouragement of the church, especially for their own instruction, in a mystery never before so clearly revealed. It was pronounced audibly, that it might become the recorded evidence of the blessings stipulated for by the Redeemer himself, in behalf of all those who had been given to him by the covenant of the Father.

There can be no doubt that some of the truths of revelation were reserved to be first plainly declared by Christ. (See John i. 18; Matt. xi. 27.) John Hussey, in his treatise on the Glory of Christ, reckons the doctrine of the Trinity as one of them: "The foundations of which," he says, "lay firm in the Old Testament, but the light to discover it clearly was not given till the great Teacher came." And why may we not consider this chapter in the light of a special revelation by our blessed Lord of the mystery of the elect church, reserved as the crowning instruction or act of his prophetic office?

If we adopt this view of the chapter, we must receive the Redeemer's words in their largest import. He said what he said with a perfect knowledge of the divine purposes in all their minuteness, vastness, richness, glory, and endless duration. He was addressing the Infinite Father, who only could comprehend the sense in which his words were uttered (Matt. xi. 27). It was the Infinite Son of God speaking to God the Father concerning his infinite and eternal purposes towards the elect, in the terms of the eternal covenant

between them, so far as these terms could be expressed in human language; confessedly inadequate in its nature to represent the things intended except by reference to or comparison with others, too vast to be conceived of by finite minds. (See vs. 5, 11, 21, 22.)

Thus considered, we feel no surprise at Spenser's sentiment, nor that Luther should have confessed the thoughts to be unfathomably deep. The development of their exhaustless meaning is reserved, no doubt, for the ages of glory, when the elect of God, with unveiled faces reflecting as mirrors the glory of the Lord, shall be transformed into the same image from glory to glory. (See Eph. ii. 7, and 2 Cor. iii. 18, comp. with v. 22.)

John xvii. 20-24. Our Lord did not, during his personal ministry, so far as we know, speak publicly of the church he intended to establish. On two occasions, in private, with his disciples, he did (Matt. xvi. 18; xviii. 17). Besides these, we find no mention of the church *eo nomine* in the gospels. In the passage above referred to, he first plainly declares, in the hearing of eleven of the apostles, the mystery of the elect church, or that company of redeemed and glorified men, through whom he will make manifest to the universe the manifold (*πολυτοικίλος*) wisdom of God (see Eph. iii. 10, 11, and Grotius).

We observe, 1. That the language our Lord employs embraces all who shall believe on him to the end of this dispensation. "Neither pray I (*ἵνα*) for these alone, but for them also who shall believe on me through their word," v. 20.

2. The union prayed for cannot be consummated until the entire body shall be gathered: "That they all"—from the first to the last-born of those included in the petition—"may be one," v. 21.

3. As a means to this union the Redeemer declares that he has given them the glory the Father had given him: "And the glory thou gavest me I have given them, that they all may be one," v. 22. This gift of glory, although sure by the promise, cannot be outwardly manifested or even fully enjoyed until the whole body shall be completed and gathered to the Lord (1 John iii. 2).

4. The union prayed for is such in kind as can exist between no other orders or ranks of creatures: "That they all

may be one as *thou Father art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us . . . even as we are one, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfect in one,*" vs. 21-23. These words import union to God the Father, by the indwelling of the Father in the Son and the Son in them—union indissoluble by their dwelling together as one body in the Father and the Son. The idea is incomprehensible by us. Earthly analogies fail here. No such union exists even among the holy angels, or between them and God; and as this union is to be wrought through the incarnation of the Son, we may believe, that none such can ever be constituted between God and any other order of his creatures (Heb. ii. 16). Observe, too, the exuberance of expression, and all by way of comparison, vs. 11, 21-23.

5. Union to the Redeemer by being locally gathered into his presence, and being for ever with him. "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory," &c., v. 24 (and see xiv. 3; 1 John iii. 2; 1 Thess. iv. 17). This union cannot be consummated until the mystery is finished, and the kingdom of God shall come in outward glory.

Surely this language expresses much more than our Lord intended by the symbol of the vine and the branches (John xv. 1, 2), much more than the mission of the Comforter to the church in its militant, afflicted state, was intended to fulfil (John xiv. 16, 26; xv. 26, 27; xvi. 13-15). Mutual love, no doubt, is a bond of union, as well as a token of discipleship (John xiii. 35; xv. 12, 13, 17; Col. iii. 14); but it has never yet existed in the church on earth, in such power, as to produce any decided influence on the world at large. But the union here spoken of is the matured, the perfect product of divine love. "That the world may know that thou hast . . . loved them as thou hast loved me," vs. 23, 26. Here again, we observe, the Redeemer expresses himself by a comparison which no finite mind can comprehend. Who can measure the love of the Father to his beloved Son! "What manner of love is this," exclaims the beloved disciple, "that we should be called the sons of God?" and be loved by the Father as his beloved Son! 1 John iii. 1.

To this passage, as to a fountain, are to be traced all those

passages in the Epistles which relate to the exaltation, the glory, the happiness, and the employment of the elect church, in the world to come. Our Lord seems to have reserved this mystery, as the subject of his last instructions to the apostles, which, however, he addressed not to them, but to the Father in their hearing, for their instruction, consolation (v. 18), and support. At that time they were incapable of forming any proper idea of its import; but afterwards their minds were filled and their hearts warmed with inexpressible conceptions of it under the teachings of the Holy Spirit. Paul, more frequently than the other apostles, endeavors to give full expression and development to the thoughts involved in this language of the Redeemer. Take, for example, Rom. viii. 28-39; 1 Cor. ii. 9; iii. 22, 23; xv. 42-49, 53; 2 Cor. iv. 17; iii. 18; Eph. i. 10-12, 22; iii. 10, 11; Phil. iii. 8-11; 2 Tim. ii. 10, 12. There are similar passages in the writings of the other apostles, see 1 John i. 3; iii. 1, 2; 1 Pet. v. 1; 2 Pet. i. 4; and John i. 12; Rev. ii. 26; iii. 21; v. 10; xx. 6; xxii. 5. To these, it would be easy to add many others. Such passages may be regarded as commentaries, or (perhaps we should say) as so many specifications of particulars included in these petitions or stipulations of our Lord for his elect people.

These hints, imperfect as they are, may suggest a course of investigation which it would profit the reader to pursue. Let him take up the New Testament at this passage, and read onward to the end, with the single object of noting every passage in the Acts and Epistles, which is virtually included in this prayer of the Redeemer for his people, and he will be better able to judge how large and how precious a portion of the writings of the apostles is derived from this inexhaustible source.

It would be pertinent to consider, also, in this connexion, whether so great blessings as those stipulated for by the Redeemer in behalf of his elect, can be expected or hoped for, otherwise than as the mere gift of sovereign grace. The gift of a glorified body like the Redeemer's—the gift of sonship to God, of brotherhood to Jesus, of exaltation above angelic nature, of union to God the Father and the Son like this—can these be the due reward of works? May we not safely affirm, that many of the most dangerous errors of

nominal Christians spring from low conceptions, not to say absolute blindness to the glory of God's purposes of redemption as revealed in the Scriptures?

John xvii. 20-23. If the first of these verses extends to all believers to the end of this dispensation, who are the world, who are to believe in consequence of their adherence to and union with the Redeemer? The difficulty disappears, if we adopt the doctrine of a personal advent before the Millennium. For then, the petition in the twentieth verse embraces those only who shall believe on Christ previously to his second coming; that is, the elect church of this dispensation. But when that body shall have been completed, and all believers under the dispensation of the first advent shall have been gathered unto Christ, then the promises in Ps. ii. 8 will be fulfilled. "The heathen (or the nations) shall be given unto him for his inheritance," &c.: in other words, the world at large will then believe in the divine mission of Jesus, and will assuredly know, not only that the Father sent him into the world, but that he loved his redeemed ones as he loved their Redeemer. The union of the elect among themselves and to God through Christ, and the glory which he will bestow on them, will then in some way, as we are here taught, serve as an instrument or means of the world's conversion. (See Woodward's Essays on the Millennium, Essay I., for some valuable thoughts on this subject.)

John xiv. 12. Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also, and greater than these shall he do, *because I go to the Father.*

Our Lord had just before declared to Philip (v. 11) that the works he had performed were sufficient to prove his union with the Father, by the indwelling of each in the other. The miracles he had publicly wrought proved to the nation that he was the promised Messiah, and left them without excuse for their unbelief (xv. 24), but these were not all his works, nor his greatest works. His disciples, and Philip among the rest, had been privileged to see miraculous works of a different order from those he publicly performed, which proved him to be not only the Messiah but the sovereign Lord of Nature. He had hushed the raging winds and waves by his word (Matt. viii. 26, Mark iv. 39, Luke viii. 24). He had walked on the waves of the sea as on solid ground

(Matt. xiv., Mark vi., Luke vi.). The fishes of the sea had felt his mysterious power (Matt. xvii. 27, Luke v. 6. See Ps. viii.) The fig tree perished under his curse. (Matt. xxi., Mark xi.). The miracles he had *publicly* wrought, are, for the most part, described in his answer to John the Baptist (Matt. xi. 5), to which we may add those recorded in John ii., Matt. xiv. xv., Mark vi. viii., Luke ix., and John vi.

Now our Lord affirmed, that these works and greater should every believer on him perform; and the promise is not limited to the eleven apostles then present with him, nor to the believers of that age, but extends to all who should believe on him in after times, till faith and hope should be superseded by sight and fruition of the kingdom of God. But no such works as some of these were performed by the apostles. Paul walked not on the sea (Acts xxvii.). He could not hush the tempest by his command. The miracles the apostles wrought after our Lord's resurrection were chiefly miracles of healing and of power over evil spirits (Acts xix. 12, xiv. 10, iii. 6; but see xiii. 11), and the powers which the apostles possessed have long since disappeared from the church. How then can we reconcile the promise of the Saviour with the event? The answer to the question is suggested by the reason annexed to the promise—"because I go to the Father." His return to the Father insured the exaltation and glorification of every believer, and the ultimate gathering of the whole body unto him, and also the perfect union of all to the Father, by the indwelling of Christ in them. (John xvii. 20-24.)

Before his incarnation, he had performed works transcendently greater and more glorious than those he had exhibited to the Jews or to his disciples. (Gen. i., 1 Cor. viii. 6, John i. 3, Col. i. 16, Eph. iii. 9, Rev. iv. 11, x. 6.) The wide world had felt the withering influence of his curse, and was disrobed thereby of its beauty and glory. But such acts of power the divine wisdom did not see proper to appoint as proofs of his messiahship. Now, however, being about to return to the Father to resume the glory he had with him before the world was (John xvii. 5), his sphere of action, in his human nature, if we may so express it, would no longer be circumscribed; nor his acts limited, by the purposes of his mission to the Jews. Henceforth they would be commen-

surate with the infinite concerns of the universe, and suited to the infinitely diversified exigences of the kingdom of God. As mediator and the manifester of the divine power and glory throughout all worlds, all things, all authority, and all power were committed to him, and this power it was his purpose to exercise through his elect church (Eph. i. 22, 10, iv. 10, Col. ii. 10, Rev. vii. 9, v. 10, i. 6), made sons of God by adoption (Rom. viii. 23, 1 John v. 1, 2), partakers of the glory of Christ (John xvii. 22, 1 Pet. v. 1, 4), and sharers of his throne (Rev. iii. 21), in order that he may through them make manifest to the universe the manifold wisdom of God (Eph. i. 22, iii. 10, v. 25, 27, 29, Col. i. 18, 24). To this consummation it is suggested our Lord referred; and in the execution of such a service, we may easily conceive, that every believer shall, through his union to the Mediator, and in virtue of the powers he shall derive from him, and of the divine power dwelling in him, do greater works than those our Lord performed for convincing the Jews or his disciples of his divine nature and mission, whilst he tabernacled in humiliation in the flesh.

The Rev. Thomas Meyers has remarked on this promise, that "if it must be fulfilled in the experience of every believer, it may refer to works which he shall perform, when, seated on his throne and clothed in his resurrection body, he shall rule in the kingdom of his Heavenly Father. During that period of blessedness, every glorified saint shall perform greater works than Christ Jesus performed when tabernacling in the flesh."

We are prone to shorten and contract the scope of our Lord's promises to present times and things, as if they must be fulfilled, if fulfilled at all, in this world. Of course we do not intend, in this remark, those promises which *expressly* refer to the future state. But in considering all his words, we must never forget, that he spoke from an infinite fulness of knowledge. The present order of things in this world was ever viewed by him in its connexions with the vast scheme of which it forms but a small part. His mind embraced the whole series of the divine dispensations in all worlds, of endless duration, and many of the things he promised fell far outside of the cycles of present things. In the ages of glory which the apostle intimates will be brought in, one after

another (*ἐν τοῖς αἰσιν τοῖς περιχρημαῖς*, Eph. ii. 7), in the progress of the universal government of God, all our Lord promised his elect will be performed, in a deeper, richer, more precious, more glorious sense than the most enlarged finite mind will ever be able to anticipate (1 Cor. ii. 9). Wisdom (see Prov. viii. 22, John i. 1-4) will yet be justified by her children (Matt. xi. 19), in all her words and ways.

Matt. xvi. 18. And I say unto thee, that thou art Peter, &c.

The name Peter is commonly considered the Greek of Cephas, which signifies *a stone*, and the hermeneutical clause in John i. 42 supports that sense. But that clause is not contained in the ancient Syriac version, and if we compare it with the like clauses in the 38th and 41st verses of the same chapter, we see a variety of expressions, which the evangelist was not likely to use. This leads us to suspect that the phrase itself may be an interpolation introduced from the margin. It adds nothing to the sense, if true, but perverts it, if false. If it be an interpolation it was made no doubt very early, and quite in accordance with the common opinion of the Fathers.

It should be added, also, that the Syriac version renders *συ εἶ πητρος* "thou art Cephas." If, however, the reader can get over these difficulties he may find something for consideration in the following suggestions:

Jerome reckons *πητρος* among names of Hebrew derivation (Works, vol. ii. p. 322, in fol.). So does Hesychius (see his Glossary), who defines it, *πηλουν πιγιγυσσεν*. He adds, *ουτος και Σιμων και Κηθος και Συμειν λεγεται*. The name *πητρος* he derives from פֶּתֶר (*pa-tur*) *interpretavit* (Gen. xli. 12), or from פֶּתַר, *solvit*. Alberti, in his Glossary, gives the same etymology. He defines it *πηλουν η διαλυνει* (see also 2 Peter i. 20, and Pott's note thereon, in Koppe's N. T. Also Trommius, Index Hebraeus, Calasio's Concord., Cocceius Lex. Heb., and Bryant's Ancient Mythology).

Let us assume this signification of the name, and also that it was first conferred upon Simon Bar-Jona at that time, or (if it had been previously applied to him in the *Greek* sense of *πητρος* corresponding to Cephas) that our Lord on this occasion applied the name to him in the sense of פֶּתֶר, or פֶּתַר P. T. R., its Hebrew origin. Thus understood, the name signifies one who interprets, explains, solves, acknow-

ledges, or avows something secret, difficult, mysterious, or not known before. This sense would be apposite to the occasion on which this name was given to Simon, and in perfect harmony with the context.

Beginning at the 18th verse of this chapter, we read that our Lord inquired of his disciples, in a private interview with them near Cæsarea Philippi, what opinions were commonly entertained by the people of his person and character. Their answer discloses several, which, though highly honorable to him as a man, fell infinitely below the truth (v. 14). He then, without a remark, proposed the same question to them (v. 15). Simon immediately replied in a way which showed that he had discerned the true mystery of his person. His answer drew from our Lord the words in verses 17, 18, 19, which may be paraphrased thus: Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona (not on account of thy greater sagacity, but) because my Father has by his Spirit revealed to thee the mystery of my person (as God-man), and made choice of thee, first of all this people, to declare it to thy brethren. For this cause I give thee a new name. Thou shalt be called Peter (*ἰσίδωρος*), which signifies one who truly *interprets* (Gen. xli. 12), and upon this rock, *that is* upon this work of the Holy Spirit, in showing unto others the mystery of my person (the doctrine of the incarnation), as he has shown it unto thee, I will build my church, &c.

Did our Lord hold this discourse in the prevailing Aramaic dialect of the country, or in the Greek language? If in the former, did he give this apostle a name *idem sonans* (or at least having the same radical letters) as *πίτρες*, or a name dissimilar in sound, but corresponding in sense with the Greek name *πίτρες*? If the former, is it not more probable he would derive it from the sacred language of the nation than from a language of Gentiles? Some persons maintain that our Lord commonly spoke Greek in his intercourse with the people, and that the Greek language was the vernacular speech of the apostles (Dominic Diodati *de Christo Grace loquente*, Dr. Hug, and some others), but the common opinion of interpreters is otherwise. Yet if the Greek were the vernacular of the nation or of the apostles, why may we not still suppose that our Lord, in forming a new name for this apostle, should derive its elements from the ancient

language of the nation in which he was accustomed to read the Scriptures to the people (Luke iv. 17), in conformity with the usages of the synagogue? (Acts xiii. 27.)

We should like to see an investigation of these questions, and of the whole subject, in order to decide whether Protestant commentators do not concede too much to Romanists in adopting, as they do very generally, their interpretation of this name.

Matt. xvi. 18. "And upon this rock I will build my church," &c.

This clause of the verse should be read in immediate connexion with the 17th verse. The words, "And I say unto thee that thou art Peter," were used (in passing, so to speak) in order to denote an encomium and blessing upon this apostle by giving him a name commemorative of the distinction the Father had just conferred upon him. They interpret, for the moment, the leading thought of the Saviour, and should be passed over or read parenthetically in considering the grammatical construction. Our Lord refers by these words (*ὡς ταύτην τῇ πέτρῃ*) not *simply*, nor so much to what Simon had said, as to what *he* had said in respect to the source of Simon's knowledge of the mystery he had just declared. Indeed his reply incorporates the confession or declaration of Simon, so that the words (*ὡς ταύτην τῇ πέτρῃ*) embrace not only the truth this apostle declared, but the equally indispensable truth or fact which he himself had declared, *namely*, the work of the Holy Spirit in revealing to him the mystery of Christ as the Son of God incarnate in his human person (John xvi. 7-14). With respect to the Holy Spirit considered as a distinct person, having a separate work or office to perform, we may say he builds upon the foundation of the truth the apostle had declared. That is indeed the great truth which he applies (Acts xvi. 31). But we must observe that our Lord *is here speaking of himself* as the architect or builder of his church, and thus regarded we may say of him that he builds it upon the foundation of the Holy Spirit's work, while the Father numbers and designates the elect according to his foreknowledge, and gives them to the Son (John x. 27, 28, 16; xvii. 6, 12, 20), to be called and sanctified and builded into the church or body of Christ by

the Holy Spirit (Rom. viii. 30; 1 Pet. 1. 2), the purchase of Christ's death.

In support of this interpretation we may allege, 1. That it accords with the fact. No man ever yet truly discovered the mystery of Christ as God-man, mediator, except by the teachings of God's Spirit. (John iii. 5; vi. 44, 45.) Men may speculatively confess this truth by force of education, but they do not and cannot really discern it so as to feel its power without divine teaching. "Flesh and blood" do not reveal it effectually unto men now any more than in the days of the apostles. 2. The church our Lord spoke of was then future. "Upon this rock I *will* build (*οικοδομήσω*) my church." It is observable that the word church (*εκκλησία*) does not occur in the Acts of the Apostles until after the pouring out of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 47). Why did not Luke employ this word in Acts i. 15, 21; ii. 1, as an uninspired writer might, and perhaps would, unless because the church, properly so called, is the product of the Holy Spirit's work, which was not to commence in power until the day of Pentecost should be *fully* come? After the day of Pentecost the word church (*εκκλησία*) occurs very frequently, and is the word usually employed to designate the company of believers.

Matt. xvi. 18. "And the gates of hell (*ᾗδου*) shall not prevail against it."

By the "gates of hell" Whitby understands Hades or death, so that our Lord's words signify that death (or the gates of the invisible world) shall not prevail or have any power against that church which he had resolved to build. This appears to be the true sense of the expression. But there is a latent thought connecting it with the preceding context which escaped the observation of that learned though not altogether orthodox commentator.

The Jews were the peculiar people of God. They were by right the Saviour's own (*οἱ ἱδού*, John i. 11) people. They had the first offer of the kingdom by God's covenant, and had they accepted it and the Lord Jesus their king, with true discernment of his character and with the obedience of faith, they would have become the truly holy nation and his royal priesthood or his church (Exod. xix. 5; 1 Pet. ii. 6, 9; Matt. viii. 12; xxii. 1-7). From the reply of the apostles to

our Lord's inquiry, "Whom do men say that I the Son of Man am," we learn that even those of that people who regarded him with most favor and reverence esteemed him *merely* a man, though an extraordinary man and highly favored of God (v. 14). Even his disciples were ignorant of his true character until Peter was taught it by revelation of the Father, and declared it to his brethren. How then was it possible that the masses of the nation—the carnal, the corrupt, the worldly—should receive him with true faith and with the homage of their hearts. It was impossible. They would reject him and put him to death. This thought was ever present to his mind, and influenced the course of his remarks on the occasion.

But would his incarnation, mission, and work on that account be in vain? Far otherwise. The divine plan was adapted to this foreseen event. His rejection and death would issue in an increase of glory by the openings of a new and world-wide dispensation, stretching through many successive generations of men. Out of these generations he would gather, from age to age, a multitude of all nations whom no man can number, and these he would build into a church which should take the place of that unbelieving people to whom he came (Matt. xxii. 8). This is the second thought supposed to be tacitly present to the Saviour's mind.

And what though the members of this church shall be swept in rapid succession by the hand of death into the invisible world; that world shall be but their resting-place during the progress of the building. The gates of that world shall have no power to detain them. They shall open and yield them up at the Saviour's bidding the very moment the full number of his elect shall be completed. Then shall the mystery of the elect church be finished, the Saviour and his redeemed appear in outward glory, and the kingdom which he preached to the Jews shall come again and be visibly established.

Such, we suppose, is the undercurrent of thought connecting the different parts of this passage. Our Lord contrasts tacitly a present visible church, viz., the blind corrupt Jewish nation which he knew from the beginning would reject him, with the church it was his purpose to build through the agency of the Holy Spirit, a very small part of which only,

comparatively considered, would at any one time be visible on earth during the lengthened dispensation appointed for its gathering. And though men might suppose, unless otherwise taught, that death (from which his people would not be exempted) would interpose an insuperable obstacle to the building of such a church, yet this is an apprehension of no account, for death shall have no power to prevent or retard even a moment the consummation of his purpose.

This view of the passage involves the doctrine of the first resurrection, and if we may adopt it we may also infer that our Lord intended by the *church* all those who shall truly believe on him until his second coming in glory—not the visible church on earth merely. The gates of death, or Hades, were spoken of in reference exclusively to those believers who shall have passed them. The number of these is ever continually increasing by fresh accessions, while the church on earth, at all times only a minute proportion of the body to which they belong, continually suffers diminutions which can be supplied only by new converts. Romanists, to convert this passage to their use, first dislocate it from the context, and then misinterpret its meaning. As now explained, it unlocks the sense of the whole passage.

PHILO.

ART. V.—GEOLOGY AND THE BIBLE.

IN the article on the Sources of the Materials of the Strata of the Earth, in the Journal of October, 1852, we expressed the belief that the strata that now form the crust of the continents and islands in *the main*, lay, previous to the deluge, beneath the sea, and were formed, at least chiefly, during the interval from the creation to that catastrophe: and that “the primitive earth occupied by the first pair,”—after their expulsion from Paradise,—“and their descendants down to the flood, was then submerged—by its own subsidence—and still continues,” at least mainly, “to lie at the bottom of the ocean.”

This is regarded by several correspondents as inconsistent

with the description of Eden, Genesis ii., which implies that the garden in which the first pair were originally placed, was somewhere in the elevated region from which the Tigris and Euphrates spring, and therefore that that part of the continent of Asia did not lie beneath the ocean during any part of the period that intervened between the creation and the deluge. One correspondent, accordingly, expresses the hope that we shall meet "the geological difficulty" he suggests, "growing out of the description of the garden of Eden, Genesis ii., which seems to conflict with the view that the present continent of Asia has been raised from the bottom of the ocean, since the deluge, and the primitive and antediluvian continents submerged."

Another asks, how on that view we can account for the existence of the fossil limestones that abound on the Tigris? He says:—

"It is the general opinion, supported, I believe, by etymology, that the garden of Eden was situated somewhere in the neighborhood of the Tigris and Euphrates. If such were the fact, of course that region has not undergone any great geological change since the creation of man. Now it appears from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, book iii. cap. iv. sec. 10, that shelly marble, λίθος κογχυλιάτος, exists on the banks of the Tigris: which proves conclusively that the country has at some period been at the bottom of the sea. Does not this seem to support the preadamite theory? I should like to have your view on the subject."

The supposition that the garden of Eden was situated in Armenia near the sources of the present Tigris and Euphrates, which has been very generally entertained, and is advocated at large by Reland, Michaelis, and other eminent scholars, and maintained as probable by many at the present time, is not inconsistent with the view we advanced; inasmuch as the first pair were expelled from the garden of Eden immediately after the fall, and may, if not at once, within a brief period have been compelled, by the gradual subsidence of that part of the primitive continent, to retreat to the southeast on to lands that retained their original elevation until the deluge, and now lie buried beneath the Indian, and perhaps the Atlantic seas. As the garden at least, and the whole region for aught that appears, was thus

deserted by Adam and his descendants, it may have descended and lain beneath the ocean for ages, and received all the strata by deposition from the incumbent waters that now form its surface, and emerged again at the deluge, and yet leave both the description of the primeval Eden, and the view we advanced of the changes that took place at the deluge, entirely true and consistent with each other. And that important changes were wrought in that region, betwixt the planting of the garden of Eden and the time when Moses wrote, seems apparent from the inapplicability of the description of the garden of Eden, and its rivers, to the present form of the country and its great streams. The sacred narrative represents Eden as a region far more extensive than the garden that was planted in it for the residence of the first pair; and that out of the exterior Eden a river ran into the garden to water it; probably by being distributed into a number of channels, which on passing out of the garden, doubtless on different sides, formed four heads, fountains, or perhaps lakes, from which four great rivers proceeded. The first, Pison, is supposed to be the Phasia, which empties into the Euxine; the next, the Gihon, held to be the Araxis, runs into the Caspian; the third, the Hiddekel, or modern Tigris, which forms the eastern boundary of Assyria, and very probably in that age entered the Persian gulf or Indian ocean, far eastward of the Euphrates, with which it now unites; and last, the Euphrates, which terminates in the Persian gulf. But these rivers do not, like those of the sacred text, have their origin in a single stream that, after running a distance, is divided into several channels and finally forms four heads, or collections of water, from which they severally have their rise. The present rivers of the country have their sources in regions that are quite distant from each other, and that are separated by lofty mountain ranges. It is clear, therefore, that if the country between their present heads in that region was the site of Paradise, great changes have been wrought in its configuration since; and that among those revolutions is the formation of its present mountains. The supposition, therefore, that since the expulsion of our first parents from it, it has been depressed beneath the ocean, and overlaid with the strata that now form its surface, is not only consistent with

the sacred narrative, but is essential in order to account for the difference of its present conformation, from that which is ascribed to it by the sacred writer at the time when it was made the abode of the first pair.

A number of other objections to the views we have advanced, have been suggested by different parties, but they are of a trivial character. None of them touch the great principles on which we proceed; none of them overturn any of our facts or reasonings. On the other hand, however, those principles and facts are admitted by great numbers who are distinguished for talents and learning: and the objections we have urged against the geological theory are very generally felt, we believe, by those who have examined them, to be unanswerable. Unless they can be fairly and effectually met, they undoubtedly place the advocates of the current system in a very embarrassing condition; as we have endeavored to show, first, that their theories respecting the formation of the strata and the great age of the world are not, as they maintain, scientific, but are founded on a mere hypothesis respecting the agents by which the present crust of the earth was formed; and assume therefore at the outset the very points on which the validity of their reasonings respecting the age of the world depends. Secondly, that if their assumptions were admitted, still no such effects could have been wrought by the agents to which they refer the formation of the strata, as they represent. Thirdly, that a large share of their assumptions and speculations is wholly inconsistent with the laws of matter, and unworthy of men who make the great processes of nature their study. Fourthly, that their attempts to reconcile their doctrine of the vast age of the world with the inspired history of its creation, instead of succeeding, have only served to show the irreconcilable contradiction of their speculations with the sacred text. And finally, that there are modes of accounting for the formation of the strata, that are far more eligible than that which they entertain, and that bring their structure into harmony with the teachings of the Scriptures respecting the creation and deluge.

To these formidable difficulties with which their system is encumbered, we may add, that geologists themselves are not

agreed in regard to some of the most important questions to which their theories relate, and find themselves altogether unable by their principles to solve many of the most important facts which they attempt to explain.

Thus, they differ entirely in respect to the question whether the matter of the globe existed originally in a gaseous form, and on being condensed passed into a state of fusion, and finally, by the gradual cooling of its surface, became invested with a rocky crust, from which by subsequent agencies the materials of the present strata were drawn. This theory is entertained by a large number of writers such as Macculloch, Buckland, Hitchcock, and made the basis of their whole geological system. It is one of the grounds of their referring the first existence of the world to an epoch immeasurably earlier than the Mosaic creation. It is with the formation of that supposititious globe that they occupy the long-period which they hold elapsed between the creation announced in the first verse of Genesis, and the "wreck" of the world which they maintain is described in the second. And they refer to the action of that molten ocean, which they regard as still occupying the interior of the globe, many of the great changes, such as the elevation of mountains, the dislocation of the strata, and the ejection of lavas, which have been wrought on the surface. This theory, however, is rejected by other writers, such as Lyell and Sedgwick, who regard it as not only groundless, but as unscientific, and an embarrassing encumbrance on geology.

Thus Sir C. Lyell says:—

" 'When the progress of astronomical science had exploded the theory' 'that the earth's axis was once perpendicular to the plane of the ecliptic,' 'it was assumed, that the earth at its creation was in a state of fluidity, and red hot, and that ever since that era it had been cooling down, contracting its dimensions, and acquiring a solid crust; an *hypothesis hardly less arbitrary*, but more calculated for lasting popularity, because, by referring the mind directly to the beginning of things, it requires no support from observation, nor from any ulterior hypothesis. They who are satisfied with this solution are relieved from all necessity of inquiring into the present laws which regulate the diffusion of heat over the surface; for however well these may be ascertained, they cannot possibly afford a full and exact

elucidation of the internal changes of an embryo world.'"—*Principles of Geology*, vol. i. p. 113.

Geologists are thus divided on this theme into two classes: and their difference is of the most essential character; as it is demonstrable by the most ample proofs that if the matter of the globe once existed either in a gaseous form, or a state of fusion, no such rocky envelope as now constitutes its surface could ever have been formed on it. It embarrasses geology with a crowd of inextricable difficulties instead of explaining any of its facts, and overturns it instead of yielding it support. Can a speculative system so entirely unsettled in respect to its first element, have any title to be regarded as a demonstrative science?

They differ also in a very considerable degree in respect to the energy of the agents, to which they refer the formation of the strata, and the various changes which have been wrought in their condition; such as their elevation from the bottom of the sea where they were formed, their dislocation and denudation, and their upheaval into mountains, hills, and plains. Thus the theory of Sir C. Lyell is that those agents, which are fire, water, and air, are the same as those that are now producing changes on the surface of the earth; and that the energy with which they acted in producing all the great effects which it is the province of geology to investigate, was essentially the same as that with which they are now giving birth to similar effects: and this theory is made a main ground of their inference of the great age of the earth. Others, however, reject this theory, and maintain that those agents must have acted with far greater intensity and rapidity, or they could never have wrought the stupendous changes that have taken place on the face of the earth. How could the Alps, the Himalaya, the Andes ever have been thrust up fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five thousand feet above the level of the sea, how could whole continents and islands have been elevated from the ocean, if no expansive forces ever acted beneath them of greater energy than those which are now producing similar changes? To attempt to account for those stupendous effects by causes of such utter inadequacy, is little less absurd than it were to attempt to explain their origin without any causes whatever. It is not,

indeed, too much to say, that there is not a single class of important facts in the whole domain of geology that can be adequately explained on the supposition that their causes acted only with the energy with which similar forces are now producing effects on the earth's surface. This is a very embarrassing consideration. Can a system be entitled to the name of a science, which thus, instead of solving, confounds and contradicts the effects which it proposes to explain, and exhibits their production as a sheer impossibility !

Geologists differ equally in regard to the possibility, and the proper method of reconciling their theory of the great age of the earth, with the history given by Moses of its creation. Thus one class openly admit that it is impossible to reconcile the facts of geology with that history ; and maintain that the narrative in Genesis is not to be regarded as a record of facts, but only as a myth or allegory that is designed for the moral instruction of men. Another class maintain that the six days of the sacred narrative were not natural days, but indefinitely long periods, and that the creation of plants and animals, therefore, took place innumerable ages anterior to the creation of man, and that it was during those vast cycles that the strata were formed in which they are imbedded. A third class, however, reject that construction, and holding that the days of the creation recorded by Moses were natural days, maintain that that creation was not the creation of the vegetables and animals that lie imbedded in the strata, but of a different set, which now occupy the earth ; and that the formation of the strata with the relics of life that lie entombed in them, is to be referred to a vast series of ages that intervened between the first existence of the earth and the Mosaic epoch. These are also fatal difficulties. Can a system be entitled to be considered an exact science, the friends of which are obliged to resort to such contradictory and false expedients to reconcile it to the word of God !

Besides their differences on these fundamental points, they disagree also in regard to many of the subordinate questions, such as the origin of lime, which is a leading constituent in a vast share of the strata, the materials from which the coal beds were constituted, and the method of their aggregation and deposition, and others of like importance. Beyond, indeed, the facts that are ascertained by the eye of the lead-

ing features of the strata, their deposition from water, the fossils that are imbedded in them, the order in which they are arranged, the upheavals, fractures, and denudations they have undergone, the intermixture with them, or injection into them of lavas and other melted elements from the interior of the earth,—the whole of the speculations of geology are little else than a chaos of assumptions and conjectures, that have neither any decisive proofs, nor any considerable measure of plausibility to recommend them. And the tendency of inquiry at present is, not to confirm but to overthrow them. Every important advance that is made in discovery serves to weaken or confute some of the confident postulates on which geologists have founded their inference that the world had subsisted through vast ages before the creation not only of man, but of vegetables and animals. Thus, relics of vegetables and animals have recently been discovered in the old red sandstone, and other early strata, which a few years since it was confidently maintained had no existence until numerous ages after those formations were completed: while the discovery in the Swabian Alps of numerous human skulls intermixed with the bones of the Mastodon and other contemporary animals, has at a blow struck thirty thousand years from existence, which Sir C. Lyell has held must have intervened between the destruction of the Mastodon and the appearance of man on the earth. And the whole drift of the wider and more careful investigations that are making, is towards the confutation of the hypotheses which assign a vast age to the world anterior to the creation of man. Confidence in them is diminishing, as unscientific, and as hostile to the teachings of revelation; while the feeling is deepening that facts may ere long be brought to light, that will demonstrate their utter erroneousness, and show that the records of the creation and history of the world that are graven on the rocky tablets that lie buried beneath its surface, are in harmony with the narrative in Genesis of the creation which the pen of inspiration has given.

ART. VI.—THE ELEVATION OF NATURE CHRIST IS TO
BESTOW ON THE REDEEMED.

THE Scriptures announce to us in a very impressive form, that at the close of the present dispensation, Christ is to come in the clouds of heaven in power and great glory, and receive the dominion of this world, that all peoples, nations, and languages may serve him, and that he is to reign over them here for ever and ever (Dan. vii. 13, 28; Rev. xi. 15). They foreshow also, that at that epoch, the curse, in its various forms, brought on the race by the sin of the first pair, is to be revoked, so that there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, nor pain (Rev. xxi. 4). This implies a stupendous change in their corporeal nature and in the condition of the atmosphere, the earth, and its fruits, which are now in many instances the direct causes of disease and means of its diffusion. It is foretold accordingly, that those of the living at the time of Christ's coming, who do not perish by the destroying judgments with which he is to strike the impious, are to be changed from mortal to immortal, and that the atmosphere and earth are to be created anew and made fit for the residence of those who are thus redeemed from the curse; and for the risen and glorified saints also, who are to return with Christ at his coming, and reign with him over the holy and happy nations. It is indicated also that mankind are to continue on the earth in an endless series of generations (Joel iii. 20), and that Christ is to exercise the office of intercessor through everlasting ages for persons of the race that are to come unto God through him (Heb. vii. 24, 25), which shows that the work of redemption is to continue for ever. And finally, it is revealed that the great tempter to sin is at Christ's coming and establishment of his throne here to be banished from the earth, and never again, with the exception of a short period, be permitted to entice men to sin.

These great features of the administration Christ is to exercise over the world after his coming, are drawn in the clearest manner on the pages of the prophetic Scriptures, and they are in harmony with each other, and form a whole worthy in its beauty and glory of the wisdom, the power,

and the grace of Jehovah: while on the other hand there is no other view given in the sacred volume of the destiny of the race. There is no hint that after a period their number is to be completed and their propagation cease: there is no intimation that the earth is not for ever to subsist and be occupied by them: there is no announcement that Christ is not for ever to reign here and continue the work of redemption: nor is there anything revealed which implies that he is to exercise an essentially different administration over men.

How is it then that a large share of the church, instead of receiving these teachings of the prophetic word, entertain a wholly different view of the scheme of the Divine government; denying that Christ is ever to reign on the earth; affirming that the object of his second coming is to be simply to raise and judge the dead, destroy the earth, and transfer the saved and the lost to different scenes of existence; and holding therefore that the race will soon complete its number; that the last generation will come into being about a thousand years hence; and consequently that the work of redemption will then terminate? This is certainly a remarkable contrariety of opinion on subjects of such moment, and that are treated with such clearness in the word of God. How is it to be accounted for? How is it that not merely believers and unbelievers, but that good men differ thus; while there is neither any contrariety in the teachings of the Scriptures on those subjects, nor any lack of clear and specific revelations respecting them?

It is not our purpose in the answer we shall give to the question, to notice all the causes that have contributed to generate and diffuse the mistaken notions that prevail respecting it. We shall not dwell on the false system of interpretation introduced by Origen in the third century and soon adopted by the leading members of the church, the very object of which was to infuse into the doctrinal and prophetic Scriptures, under the pretext of an allegorical or double sense, a totally foreign and false meaning, and give thereby a new and mystical signification to all the great predictions respecting Christ's reign, the restoration of the Israelites, the renovation of the earth, and the resurrection of the holy dead, and residence with Christ as kings and priests; and to

make out that the present is the last and best dispensation of the world,—though it is in fact by that allegorical method of interpreting the predictions on these subjects that antimillennarian writers generally set aside their true meaning and warp them to the support of their peculiar theories. Nor shall we dwell on the fact that it has been the policy of both the Catholic and the Protestant churches of Europe that are connected with the State to represent themselves as the true churches, and their nationalization by the governments as having the sanction of heaven; and thence that a vast crowd of partisan writers have exerted themselves to frame such constructions of the prophecies as to give a color of truth to that claim, and set aside the predictions of Christ's coming anterior to the millennium, and destroying the governments and hierarchies to which they belong. The whole force of the state, of the church, of public opinion, of self-interest, and of ambition, has been employed to discredit and beat down the truth, and give currency to the system which has gained the faith of the church. Nor shall we touch on the exertions that have been made in this country by ministers and others to sustain the prevailing theory, from mistaken notions of the divine purposes respecting the conversion of the world, or other like reasons.

Passing these and other similar themes, we propose to treat only of the objection which is very generally entertained, and often offered with the feeling that it is unquestionable and decisive: that it is inconsistent with the dignity of the Son of God to descend and reign visibly on the earth as the monarch of men on the one hand, and on the other that it is incompatible with man's nature that he should behold his glory, live under his reign, and have communication with the risen saints. Thus Mr. Beattie represents it as unbecoming the dignity of Christ to reign in person on the earth. He says:—

“ An opinion prevailed generally before the Spirit was poured out, and has some currency to this day, to the effect *that Christ is to number himself with our mortal monarchs, fix a material throne in our crazy and sickly world, outstrip the children of folly and pride in worldly show, and in his own regal state cause earthly grandeur to culminate.* Well enough this might be were there nothing better,

but the Scriptures use the splendour of our courts and potentates as an image to help our conceptions up to a higher, a celestial magnificence, which distinguishes our exalted Redeemer."

"Whatever anticipations, then, some may indulge of earthly royalties as yet to invest the Son of God, our confession with the church rather is, 'We see Jesus crowned with glory and honor. We see him on his throne, exercising his divine attributes, and managing the kingdoms of nature and of providence, and the dispensation of the gospel, so as to gather his redeemed to himself, and we feel that were he to leave his present position for the most splendid monarchy that earth's treasures and polish could furnish, it would be like descending from the throne to become the deputy of an obscure and distant province of some great empire.'"—*Discourse on the Millennial State of the Church*, pp. 16-19.

Dr. Gilbert offered the same objection.

"Millenarians make it a literal personal reign of Christ with his saints on the earth for a thousand years. To this view we object, that it is carnal, literalistic, and Jewish. This was the very kingdom that the Jews, 1800 years ago, expected, and under the delusive expectation of which they missed the true kingdom and salvation of Messiah. They looked for a political empire, and wished to place on the head of Jesus a literal crown, have him wield an ivory sceptre, and make literal arrows sharp in the hearts of his enemies."—*Presb. Quart.* vol. ii. p. 26.

A writer in the Princeton Review represents it as incompatible with the nature of men that they should live under Christ's personal reign, and have communication with the risen saints who are to reign with him. He says:—

"The first question is, Whom does he associate with himself to take part in administering the government? Millenarians are not agreed here. Some say the martyrs only; others, all the saints who had previously died, together with all the pious found on the earth at Christ's appearing; others still, that all the holy dead, and no others, are in the first instance to be joined with Christ as rulers.

"The next question is, Who are the subjects, or the ruled? They are men in the flesh—mortal men like ourselves, with all our passions and afflictions and infirmities; men who shall live as we do in nations, live by the various pursuits of industry, plant and build, marry and multiply.

"The third question we will raise concerning the condition of things on earth during the Millennium, is this : What are to be the arrangements by which *those two classes of such opposite natures can dwell together, as different departments of the same terrestrial kingdom*, and sustain to each other respectively the relation of rulers and subjects? We will endeavor to communicate to our patient readers all the idea we can get on this subject from Millenarian writings ; though we confess it is about as foggy and indistinct as the idea of departed shades and their abodes, as described in Virgil's *Æneid*."—*Rep.* Jan., 1853, p. 74.

These writers thus assume, that if Christ is to come and reign in person on the earth, he must descend to a level with the present debased monarchs of the nations ; and that mankind themselves must continue to be as disordered in their nature, and as miserable in their lives as they now are ; and it is to such a reign over them in such a condition, that their objections are made. But this is against the clear and emphatic announcement of the sacred word, that when he comes, he will come, not like one of the vain human princes who now reigns on the earth, but in power and great glory, as the King of all kings and Lord of all lords, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, and attended as such not only by the risen and glorified saints, but a countless retinue of mighty angels, the messengers and executors of his will ; and it proceeds on a forgetfulness or misunderstanding of the great fact, that a leading element of the work of redemption is, the deliverance of those who are the subjects of it from the disorder and degradation of our present nature, and elevation to a dignity and glory that will fit them to dwell in the Redeemer's immediate presence, and serve him in the most exalted offices in his kingdom. This recovery of our nature from the curse of the fall and exaltation to a higher form, is taught in the clearest and most impressive manner in the Bible.

It is indicated by the assumption of our nature by the Eternal Word, in order to his executing his work as Redeemer. That is undoubtedly the most wonderful measure of God's providence towards his creatures ; involving the greatest condescension in him, and raising the human person which he assumed, to a higher dignity and grandeur than was ever

conferred on any other created being; and showing, therefore, that man, notwithstanding his present ruin, is, because of God's purposes respecting his redemption, a creature of infinite consequence in the divine kingdom. What an amazing act, that the self-existent, the infinite, the Creator of all, should take a creature into such a union to himself, constituting his deity and the man Christ Jesus one person, and in such a manner that all his official acts are exerted, and all the displays of his attributes as Lawgiver, Saviour, Ruler, Judge, and all the manifestations of his personal glory are made through that glorified humanity! To what a greatness and majesty must that finite being be exalted! What infinite motives of wisdom and love involved in the work of redemption must there be, to have justified it, and made it the most glorious of the measures of the Almighty towards created intelligences! And what, therefore, must man be in the possibilities of his rescue from the blight and degradation of sin, and elevation above the reach of our conceptions in the greatness and dignity of his powers, in the intimacy of his relations to God, and in the beauty and glory of his character! It is impossible to contemplate this most wonderful of God's procedures, without feeling that it is fraught with immeasurable significance in respect to the destiny of the race; that it must be in order to an end in respect to them, as vast, as wonderful in its graciousness, and as sublime in the glories it is to reflect on God, as it is itself beyond what creatures could have conceived possible either to the deity or to man.

That this is one of the most important measures of the divine procedure in the government of the universe, is apparent from the fact that all the higher orders of intelligences are exhibited as feeling a profound interest in it, and deriving from the work of redemption consequent on it, their loftiest views of the benignity and grace of the Most High. That all ranks of intelligent beings have a direct concern in it, is seen from the consideration, that the Word in his human form is now exalted to the throne of the universe, rules over all worlds, and receives the homage as their Creator of all moral beings; and that implies most clearly that they are aware of his incarnation and of its objects. What an amazing relation for Jehovah to assume towards his whole uni-

verse of adorers! How infinite must the ends to be answered by it be, to make it the part of righteousness and wisdom! What a dazzling light must it reflect in their eyes on his perfections, that they see it to be infinitely beautiful and glorious in him; that it adds to their wonder and love that they see him thus clothed in a creature's form, and adore him in it as the self-existent and Almighty! And what grandeur it reflects upon man! What immeasurable interests must lie treasured up in him, to make such an exaltation of his nature in the person of Christ expedient, and a means of blessing to all other ranks of intelligences in the universe!

The intimate relations into which all orders of intelligences are brought to the incarnate Word, is shown in many passages, such as that in which it is declared that the Father has "set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality and power and might and dominion, and every name that is named not only in the present age, but also in that which is to come, and has put all things under his feet, and given him to be the head over all things to the church which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all." It is thus as the head of the church his body—the infinite train whom he is to ransom—that he is invested with the sceptre of the universe, and all the ranks of intelligences are made to pay their allegiance to him; and it is by his acts in that station, we are taught in other passages, that his manifold wisdom is to be made known to the principalities and powers in heavenly places; and that in the ages to come he is to show the exceeding riches of his grace. How vast, how illimitable are to be the effects that are to spring from his incarnation, that the wisdom and love they are to display are to be greater than those made through all his other works! And of what transcendent moment must mankind be in the divine plan, that it is through them that those displays are to be made!

That the celestial orders, indeed, take a direct part in the great measures of his administration over the church, and feel a profound interest in them, is shown by their presence in countless multitudes in the great visions in which Jehovah has revealed himself to his prophets, and made a revelation of the events that were to befall the church. Thus when in

the vision of Daniel vii. 9, 10, the Ancient of days came and judged the wild beast, thousand thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him: and in the vision in the Apocalypse chap. v. 1-12, of the reception of the book by the Lamb from the hands of the Father, the prophet heard "the voice of many angels round about the throne, the number of whom was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, who sang with a loud voice: Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing." Ten thousand times ten thousand, are a hundred millions! They stood, it would seem, at some distance in a circle around the throne. The thousand of thousands, who in Daniel's vision ministered to the Ancient of days, probably stood between that circling host and the elders and living creatures, and amounted also to several millions. What an immense host! But if they were representatives of their several orders like the living creatures and elders, twenty-eight of whom served as symbols of the whole company who had then been redeemed by the blood of the Lamb, "out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation," what infinite myriads were symbolized by them! And what a sublime significance attached to their homage, considered as in effect the breathings of such a universe of angelic hearts! What an impressive view it presents of the importance of the incarnation of the Word, to those countless crowds of lofty intelligences! With what a dazzling glory is he invested to their eyes by his assumption of our nature, in order to the redemption he is to accomplish! And what a grandeur it reflects on man! Of what a salvation must he be capable, and how vast and illimitable must be the scale on which it is to be accomplished, to make such a measure expedient for its achievement; to make that measure and the results that are to spring from it, of such supreme interest to those infinite hosts of the purest and loftiest intelligences in God's empire! And finally the incarnation of the Word is to continue for ever, and he is for ever to continue the work of redemption. It is indicated indeed, 1 Cor. xv. 24-28, that after the last resurrection he is to resign the sceptre of the universe to the Father; but he is still to reign over this world, Rev. xi. 15, and continue to

save the race as they come into existence through an endless series of generations, Heb. vii. 25. It enters thus as an element of the greatness of the ends for which he assumed our nature, that they are to be everlasting. They are never to exhaust themselves. They are never to reach a bound ; but are to continue in all their freshness and greatness, and to go on augmenting through eternal ages !

These considerations show that when Christ comes to reign on the earth, it is not to be to degrade himself to a level with the worthless monarchs who now tyrannize over the nations, and seduce them to apostasy from God ; nor to sink the work of redemption to a likeness to the empty reformatations which revolutionists and demagogues project. The supposition of such a debasement is impious, and can proceed from none but those who know nothing of Christ's nature, nor the work of redemption. But he will come with a power and glory that become his deity and station, and be attended with infinite throngs of angels : and he will come to give a new form and a completeness to the redemption of men immeasurably more glorious to him, and to them, than it has hitherto borne.

And what the new form and higher degrees are that redemption is then to assume, is very clearly indicated in the Scriptures. Thus the holy dead are then to be raised from the grave in glory, and are to be constituted kings and priests unto God and Christ, and to reign with him on the earth. They are indeed advanced, there is reason to believe, during their disembodied life, to far greater strength of faculties, and for higher attainments in knowledge and holiness, than are ever known in this world. That they continue conscious and active in their intermediate state, is clearly shown in the Scriptures ; and thence their perfect freedom from sin implies that they experience a vast change of their nature, a majestic elevation of their faculties, and the all-powerful and all-controlling influences of the Holy Spirit. For what a stupendous work must the instantaneous extrication of the soul from the sway of sin be ! What but omnipotence can at once free it from all its false notions, its erroneous beliefs, its defective principles, its inadequate views, its darkness, its blindness, its prejudice, and fill it with the pure and dazzling light of divine truth ! What but infinite power can in a

moment rectify all its disordered affections, quench every evil desire, extinguish every selfish and sinister disposition, and imbue it with holy and rapturous awe, love, adoration, and trust! What but a vast revolution in its nature, a seraphic exaltation of its powers, and the all-supporting and guiding aids of the Spirit can fit it, without terror, to meet the Redeemer, gaze on his ineffable glory, and unite with the infinite hosts of the redeemed and the angelic throngs, in the homage that is paid him in the heavenly temple! And that they are raised to a far higher comprehension of the work of redemption, and the objects and effects of God's administration over the nations during the present dispensation, is shown also in the sacred word. It is revealed in a very beautiful and impressive form in the vision of the Apocalypse, chap. xv. 1-4, in which the whole of those who triumph over the apostate and persecuting powers symbolized by the beast and his image—during the twelve hundred and sixty years of their tyranny over the saints, are exhibited as standing before the throne on a sea of glass, having the harps of God, and singing the song of Moses and the Lamb, in which they celebrate the greatness of his works, and the righteousness of his ways, and proclaim the approaching redemption of the nations, which is to be consequent on his avenging judgments! What a grasp of intelligence this implies, founded, as it is, on knowledge, not on mere faith in the divine wisdom and rectitude! What an understanding and sense of God's rights! What a comprehension of the aims and issues of the great measures of his administration, even those in which they had been subjected, while on the earth, to the most cruel sufferings for his sake! And what an acquaintance with the great scheme of the salvation of the race—in which the awful judgments that are to mark the close of the present dispensation, are to issue—under the reign of Christ and his saints that is to follow! As the homage of the song of Moses and the Lamb offered by them in the immediate presence of God, is undoubtedly a homage that is perfect in truth, adoration, and faith; so it implies that they are raised to a greatness of knowledge and beauty of thought, that befit beings that serve in the immediate presence of God, and are exalted, therefore, to a strength of

faculties and a largeness of comprehension that immeasurably transcend the loftiest of our present life.

But however great the exaltation of their spirits may be during their intermediate state, they are to receive a far greater expansion and sublimation of their corporeal natures at Christ's coming, by a resurrection in glory. That they are then to experience a vast elevation of being in beauty, energy, and adaptation to the highest offices in Christ's kingdom, is most clearly shown in the sacred word. The body of the believer is at death "sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. And so it is written; the first man Adam, was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." What other terms, what other contrasts could the Spirit of inspiration have employed so fitted to indicate to us the wondrous and ineffable sublimation our outward nature is then to undergo? But great as the refinement and expansion of the powers of the body are to be, and dazzling as the beauty is, in which it is to be arrayed, it is only to be such in strength and splendor, as to fit it to be the residence and instrument of the spirit that dwells within. And what a majesty of the soul that implies! To what a grandeur of intelligence, wisdom, and holiness must it be exalted, that a form of such elevation above corruptible matter, such power, such resplendence and deathlessness is to be but a suitable match for it; an appropriate instrument for the lofty offices to which it is to be exalted! What that splendor of the body is to be, though far transcending our knowledge, is in a measure intimated by John, in saying that we are to be like Christ. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what

we shall be; but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is." 1 John iii. 2. What his glory is, is shown in a measure by his transfiguration on Mount Tabor, when his face shone as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light; and by the splendors in which he appeared to the apostle in the first vision of the Apocalypse. This "change of our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself," is in order to ends that are commensurate with it in greatness and beauty. It is to fit us to serve in his presence, to reign with him over the redeemed nations of the earth, and to be the ministers wherever he pleases of his will. And how august those offices must be; of what transcendent dignity and beauty must be the agencies they are to exert; and of what a lofty and momentous influence; that such an expansion and glorification of our nature is requisite to qualify us for them! And how clearly it seems to imply that the inhabitants of the earth towards whom the glorified saints are to sustain those offices, are also to be raised from their present degradation to a higher physical and moral condition, to fit them for the agencies that are to be exerted on them!

And such a change, it is expressly foreshown, is to be wrought in the believers that are living in the natural body at Christ's coming. Our nature is unfitted by the disarray and disorder to which it is reduced by the fall, for the kingdom which he is then to establish. It cannot enter that kingdom until released from the seeds and sentence of death. "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood,"—our nature in its present frail and dying state—"cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Behold I show you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible; and we shall be changed; for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written: Death is swallowed up in victory." 1 Cor. xv. 50-54. As the dead are to be changed to incor-

ruptible by a glorious resurrection, so the mortal—the living, who are under the sentence of death—are to be changed to immortal—that is, they are to be released from the sentence to death, and from all the tendencies to it that now lurk in our nature, and all the external causes of it, and are to be made capable and assured of immortal life, as truly as Adam and his posterity would have been, had he not fallen.

This—which all believers are to experience ere they are received as heirs and joint heirs with Christ, into his kingdom,—will be a great and wonderful change, and will involve a disinthalment, a rectification and an exaltation of our nature, of which we can scarcely form any adequate conception. It is indeed, we are shown in another passage, to involve to those who are the subjects of it, a perfect repeal of the curse brought on them by Adam: For when John beheld the new Jerusalem—the symbol of the glorified saints—coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband, he heard a great voice out of heaven, saying: “Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; *for the former things are passed away*. And he that sat upon the throne said: Behold I make all things new. And he said unto me: Write, that these words are true and faithful. And he said unto me: It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely.” Rev. xxi. 2–6. “And he showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and the Lamb. In the midst of the broad place, and on either side of the river, was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits, according to each month yielding its fruit, and the leaves of the tree *for the healing of the nations*. And there shall be no curse any more.” Rev. xxii. 1–3. The former evil which sin drew in its train, the curse in all its forms, is thus to be absolutely annihilated; and thence the release from it is to be extended, it would seem, sooner or later in life, to all individuals who then live; for the nations which probably at first are not to

be qualified to drink of the water or eat of the fruits of the tree of life, are yet to be healed by the leaves of the tree, and thereby become meet probably to partake of its fruits. Whether, however, it is to take place with all at the same age, or only when a certain preparation for it is attained, we are not told. On the new generations that come into life, it possibly may not be conferred till they have given proof by a holy life, and a life of as great length as men now live, that they are meet for its reception. Of the greatness and mercifulness of this change; of the refinement and elevation of the senses and appetites it will involve; of the conversion of what is now a source of temptation into a powerful aid to holiness and happiness; and of the extrication thereby of the mind from the bondage of evil, we can form but very inadequate conceptions. We are but little aware of the direful wreck the fall made of the body; of the disarray, the weakness, and the tendency to death with which it was smitten, and by which it became fit only to be the residence of a soul that is in alienation from God. But at the change back from this mortal to immortality, all that train of evils will be swept from the constitution, and its nature restored to its primitive health, vigor, harmony of its various parts and powers with each other, and adaptation to be the residence of a renovated mind, at peace with God, with its fellow creatures, and with itself. If the curse, in all its forms, is removed; if there is no more pain, sorrow, crying, nor death; there can be none of their causes in existence either in any of those who are thus changed, or any who are intimately connected with them: There can be no disordered appetites, therefore, no ferocious passions, no violences, no cruel ambition, no remorseless selfishness, no frauds, no falsehoods, no treacheries, no injustice, no baseness, no ingratitude; none, in short, of the evil affections or injurious acts that naturally wound the heart, and cause sorrow and crying. What a new being will man be made by a change that strikes all these grounds of tears and misery from his nature! What a rectification and ennoblement of his mind must take place, to fit it to be the inhabitant of a body thus restored to integrity in all its powers and functions! Into what a paradise of innocence, virtue, and blessedness will it convert the earth!

At whatever age it may be, however, or after what trial,

that the righteous are thus to be changed to immortal, mankind are still to subsist, we are taught, and multiply in the natural life. Thus the nations are represented as walking in the light of the new Jerusalem, after its descent from heaven, and as being healed by the leaves of its tree of life. It is foretold that the dominion which Christ is to receive at his coming, is to be in order to the obedience to him of people, and nations, and languages; that that kingdom and dominion is to continue on this earth, for ever; and that all dominions shall serve and obey him in it. It is predicted also, and promised in the most explicit manner, that the Israelites shall dwell in their land for ever, and shall multiply and flourish in an endless series of generations. "For as the new heaven and the new earth which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain; and it shall come to pass that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord," Isaiah lxvi. 22, 23.

And finally, the earth and atmosphere, it is revealed, are to be created anew, and freed for ever from their present injurious elements and their defects, and fitted to be the residence of the race in the new form in which it is to exist. Isaiah lxxv. 17, 25, xlix., li., liv., Rev. xxi. 3, 4.

It is thus clearly revealed that these great changes are to be wrought; and they show that the earth and its inhabitants are to present a vast and resplendent scene for the reign of the Saviour; and that the effect of his coming is to be that the race will be raised from its degradation and ruin to a resemblance to him; not that he will descend from the glory of his deity to a level with the base monarchs of the world. The supposition that a reign on the earth must be incompatible with his dignity is thus founded on a total inconsideration of the revelation he has made of the great measures of the administration he is then to institute over the race.

The great redemption, indeed, he is then to accomplish, alone seems worthy of his attributes, and the humiliation and sacrifice by which he achieved it. The notion that is commonly held, that the race is to subsist here and multiply only about one thousand years longer; that its condition during

that period is not to be essentially better than that of pious families and communities now is; that then its number is to be completed, and the two great classes of which it consists are to be transferred to other scenes of existence; and consequently that the number who are saved, especially of adults, is to be extremely small, compared to the vast crowds that perish—seems most palpably out of harmony with the infinite power, wisdom, and love of God, incommensurate with the incarnation and death of Christ, and inconsistent with the descriptions that are everywhere given in the Scriptures, of the boundless blessings that are to result from his work as Redeemer and Ruler of the world. But that instead of putting such an abrupt end to their increase, and leaving most of those who come into existence to perish, he should redeem the race itself—with the exception of those who perish anterior to his second coming, and the few who are to revolt at the close of his millennial reign—and cause them to go on multiplying for ever, as they doubtless would, had they not fallen—seems infinitely suitable to his office as the head of the race. As there is a provision in their nature for their perpetuation in an endless series of generations, and as Adam stood at the head of all that would have sprung from him, had he maintained his allegiance, Christ must, as the head of the race, have stood for identically the same series of persons as Adam did. Otherwise their headship or representative offices are not commensurate with each other. And such an infinite end, and the vast influence it must exert on the rest of the moral universe, seems worthy of his interposition in the form in which it is accomplished. It has a greatness and grandeur that are suitable to his deity, his incarnation, his death, and his reign in visible glory on the earth. And such a redemption alone can involve a perfect defeat of his enemies. Is there any reason to believe, that had Adam retained his integrity, his offspring would not have continued in an endless series of generations? If then Satan, by leading him into sin, prevents the existence of an infinite multitude who otherwise would have sprung from Adam, will he not gain a triumph? Will it not imply that he has wrought an evil which God cannot fully remedy? That however adequate God is to reign over beings who continue in innocence, he is not able to restore a race that

has fallen, so that their existence shall be as compatible with his glory and the well-being of his kingdom, as it would have been had they remained in obedience? His own vindication, therefore, seems to require that he should completely baffle the malice of Satan, by restoring the race from the effects of the fall, and placing its countless crowds that come into existence from age to age, in a condition as favorable to their holiness and happiness as they would have enjoyed, had the first pair not fallen; while the great tempter is equally baffled in the other direction, by the restriction of the lost within such limits, that their rebellion and punishment are overruled and made in the most effective manner to illustrate God's holiness, justice, and truth, and subserve the well-being of his obedient universe.

It is eminently consonant too to the divine perfections that such a theatre should be furnished for the activity of the glorified saints as this administration is to present, in which they are to be intimately associated with Christ in his reign over the ransomed world, and fill important offices of authority and love in the great system of agencies by which the countless millions who are then to be called into existence, are to be raised to spotless sanctitude, unclouded wisdom, and unsullied bliss. How beautiful is the benignity that thus exalts them to a share, as it were, in carrying on the great work of redemption, and unfolds such a scene for the exercise of their lofty powers and the display of their love, their fidelity, and their devotedness! What a contrast this exalted sphere of services and their beneficent and joyous activities in his eternal kingdom present to the meagre notions that are generally entertained of the life of the redeemed, which conceive of it as involving little else than an exemption from punishment, offerings of homage to God, and an undisturbed repose; a theory of the state of the blessed that bears much the same relation to the glorious realities which the Scriptures reveal to us, as the scheme of a monastic association and life bears to the institution of the family, the social community, and the church, which God has appointed as the sphere of our activity.

These views are confirmed by the consideration that the administration that Christ is thus to establish, the great means of illumination, restraint from sin, and excitement to

holiness, which are to be employed, are only such as will be necessary to raise the race from its alienation and debasement to the perfect holiness and perfect blessedness which belong to a full redemption, and are essential in those who serve in Christ's immediate presence, or live under his millennial reign.

It is offered, indeed, by some as an obstacle to their faith in these great purposes God has revealed respecting the future destiny of the race, that they are not able to see how they are to be accomplished; that they cannot conceive, for example, how Christ is to reveal himself to men; how the glorified saints are to reign on the earth; nor how men in the natural life can sustain their presence and communicate with them. Is not this objection, however, the offspring of extreme inconsideration and faithlessness? What truth or fact is there that they can believe, if a perfect comprehension of it is a pre-requisite to their faith? Do they comprehend the ground of their own existence? Do they understand their own nature? Is there a single element of their souls or their bodies of which they have a perfect knowledge? Is there a single function of their complex being that is not a mystery to them? Can they tell how the dead are to be raised? Can they define the difference between a natural and a glorified body? Can they explain how the mortal are to be made immortal? If not—if there is not a single subject in the whole circle of their knowledge of which they have a full or even a moderate comprehension, why should they treat an understanding of their exact nature, or the mode in which they are to take place, as a necessary condition of faith in these great things which God has revealed respecting the reign of Christ on the earth, and the redemption of the race under his sway?

On the whole then, his personal reign on the earth in glory, the elevation of the race from its present degradation, and exemption from the curse of the fall, the universal prevalence of righteousness and peace, and the continuance of the work of redemption through an endless series of generations and ages, are amply revealed in the word of God, and form a scheme worthy of his attributes, worthy of the intervention of Christ, worthy of the boundless interest and admiration with which it is contemplated by the infinite hosts

of his intelligent subjects, and that should be welcomed by his redeemed people here with implicit faith and adoring recognitions of the dazzling splendor of the wisdom and grace that shine in it.

ART. VII.—THE NECESSITY OF ATONEMENT.

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THE Scripture doctrine of atonement, in brief and plain terms, is this:—Man, formed in the image of God, was placed under a moral law, the penalty of which was death. Left to the freedom of his own will, he apostatized from God, fell into a state of guilt and misery, and became liable to the penalty of the law which he had broken. The violated law condemns, and therefore cannot justify him;—that is to say, it cannot affirm two contradictory facts of the same person. The law pronounces against transgressors the sentence of death. That is its penalty. But all men are transgressors; therefore, all men are obnoxious to the punishment threatened against transgression. On the utter hopelessness of this state is founded the necessity of free forgiveness. But to render free forgiveness consistent with the divine perfections and government, a Mediator is necessary. Such Mediator has been provided in Christ. The leading object of his mediation is to reconcile gratuitous pardon with justice. But justice demands the infliction of the penalty. To meet this demand, the Son of God assumed our nature, and laid down his life in place of the guilty violators of the law. Thus, he endured its penalty for them. This voluntary surrender of life by the Redeemer acting as the sinner's substitute, is called by the sacred writers a sacrifice; and the end obtained by it, expiation or atonement. The effect of the atonement is to render the exercise of God's mercy in justifying and saving sinners consistent with the claims of his justice, the honor of his truth, the authority of his law, and the rectitude of his government.

Is this scheme of expiation essential to human salvation? Is the atonement of Christ a necessary ground of the justification of sinners? We affirm that it is; and the purpose of the present paper is to prove and illustrate this necessity.

We argue the necessity of atonement, first, from the inefficacy of all other means and methods of procuring justification unto life.

All men, since the fall, are sinners. The Scripture plainly asserts this, and human consciousness confirms it. But sinners deserve punishment. This is the voice of reason, as well as of revelation; hence, punishment is inevitable without forgiveness. The sentiment has been general among men, that God is inclined to remit the punishment of sin on certain conditions. Manifold, however, have been their opinions touching the nature of those conditions. We propose to notice the principal theories on this head, suggested by the pride of the human heart, and the blindness of human reason. We propose to show how fruitless these theories are in reference to the attainment of pardon and justification, and how unavailing to impart true peace of mind with regard to our destiny beyond the grave.

The sacrifice of beasts and other external ceremonies of religion have been and still are relied on as the ground of acceptance with God. There cannot be a reasonable doubt that animal sacrifices were instituted by God. Yet there is no natural relation between the death of a beast and the forgiveness of a man. Nor is the abolishing of sin by their own proper efficacy ever ascribed to animal sacrifices in the Bible. Neither Moses nor the prophets attribute this power to them; and the apostle expressly affirms that the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins. Such sacrifices were pleasing to God, when brought with a believing disposition. When the case was otherwise, so far from appeasing God, they only the more provoked his displeasure.

What, then, was the true nature and value of the sacrificial system? It was symbolical of the sacrifice of Christ, and derived its efficacy from its relation to its work; its efficacy, we mean, with respect to the blotting out of sins and acceptance of God; for we do not deny that, with respect to the outward theocracy, the legal sacrifices were in themselves vicarious, and had a real efficacy in procuring

theocratical purity and the remission of certain civil penalties. As purely religious rites, however, the sacrifices of the ancient church had much the same relation to a Saviour to come, as the Lord's supper has to a Saviour already come. They pointed to the Lamb of God, the only real sacrifice for sin ever offered up to divine justice on this earth.

The institution of sacrifice, originally of divine appointment, became universal among the nations. Though the greater part of mankind by degrees lost the knowledge of the true God, and sank into idolatry, yet they all retained this rite. The cause of so remarkable a fact must lie deep in the moral nature and relations of man. Nor need we go far to seek it. It is found in the sense of sin and ill-desert universally felt by mankind, and in the apprehension thence arising, that some external means of propitiating the deity and averting the punishment of transgression, are necessary. It is the voice of conscience which has produced this feeling of the necessity of expiation.

The rite of sacrifice became everywhere corrupted in the Gentile world. It lost its proper significance as typical of the one great sacrifice for sin. In losing this, it lost not only all virtue, but all meaning. It became an idle and cruel ceremony. It is not surprising that, after this loss, heathen philosophers wondered how an idea, which seemed to them so absurd and so unworthy of God, could have occurred to men, or gained such prevalence among them; nor that heathen nations, as they advanced in cultivation, began to neglect and sometimes even to despise sacrifices.

But the idea of an inherent virtue in slain beasts to expiate human guilt is not a whit more absurd than the idea, extensively prevalent in our day, that there is anything in the mere external rites of religion pleasing to God and efficacious in procuring His favor. This is the religion of the Romish church, a religion of ceremony, of form, of routine, of outward pomp. Alas! how deeply has the spirit of Rome infected the heart of Protestantism! The doctrine of Rome is not avowed, but it is none the less operative in Protestant churches. How much of our religion is mere outside show, cold and lifeless formalism! How small the proportion of heart-work, of deep, earnest, glowing vitality!

Penances and self-inflicted sufferings are another false reliance for obtaining forgiveness and remission of punishment. This error is as foolish as it is groundless. What would be thought of a human ruler, who should allow the transgressor to choose his own punishment, and to substitute it for the punishment prescribed by the law? Would such a procedure be named wisdom, or weakness? Yet such precisely is the theory which represents self-inflicted tortures as efficacious in averting God's displeasure against sin. "This error is founded on the mistaken opinion, that God, like men, will be touched with compassion at the sight of these self-inflicted sufferings, and thus be inclined to remit those which are due." Absurd as such a notion is, it has been very widely spread among men, and has been, in all ages, the fruitful cause of vigils, fastings, lacerations, cuttings, flagellations, pilgrimages, and other self-tortures, of an intense and terrible severity. Not only heathen nations, ancient and modern, but multitudes who have been favored with divine revelation, have preached such penances, under the grossest conceptions concerning their spiritual efficacy. How false all such views of religion are, no reader of the Bible can be ignorant.

But reason itself, not less than revelation, proclaims aloud that no sufferings on the part of the sinner, whether voluntary or otherwise, short of the full measure required by the law, can avail to satisfy justice. For, if a less degree of suffering than that which the law denounces, is sufficient to uphold the dignity and authority of the divine government, then, clearly, the law itself is oppressive, cruel, vindictive, and unjust—a result involving a blasphemous accusation against God. And to affirm that any sufferings of the sinner short of the curse of the law, which is eternal death, are equivalent to that curse, is as absurd as it would be to affirm that one is equivalent to an infinite series of numbers, or that a moment of time is equivalent to endless ages. A less number, a less quantity, a less duration, a less degree of pain cannot be equal to a greater. Neither can a fast, a vigil, a laceration, or any penance, however severe, or any number of penances however long continued, which I impose upon myself, be equal to that infinite and eternal

wrath of God, which is denounced as the penalty of transgressing his law.

Another ground of pardon, falsely assumed by human reason as sufficient in the sight of God, is that of repentance and reformation. Dr. Priestly does not hesitate to avow the opinion, that no expiation of sin, no expedient of atonement, no satisfaction to offended justice, is necessary beyond what is included in repentance and a good life. Bishop Warburton also "has expressed himself in terms the most unqualified upon the intrinsic and necessary efficacy of repentance, asserting that it is plainly obvious to human reason, from a view of the connexion which must subsist between the creature and his Maker, that, whenever man forfeits the favor of God by a violation of the moral law, his sincere repentance entitles him to the pardon of his transgressions." The same view, in substance, is held by Locke, the eminent author of the *Essay on the Human Understanding*. These are great names, and they have drawn after them a crowd of inferior thinkers and writers. It will be proper, therefore, to examine their theory with some care. We affirm that it is contradicted by right reason; that it is repugnant to the analogies of providence; that it is refuted by the religious history of mankind; and that it is at war with both the spirit and the letter of God's word.

The first point we make in our argument against this theory is, that it contradicts the voice of enlightened reason. That the state of innocence and the state of penitence are not one and the same is a self-evident proposition. The one implies undeviating conformity to law; the other, conscious guilt and ill-desert. What can be plainer than that it cannot consist, with perfect rectitude, to treat them both alike?

But, further: Moral agents are answerable for their whole conduct. How, then, can sorrow for past offences, or the moral amendment consequent upon it, have any retrospective efficacy? Repentance cannot annihilate the past; nor can present obedience more than answer present obligation; for obedience is our duty at all times—now as much as heretofore.

The advocates of the theory which we are considering

affirm that repentance constitutes a valid ground of forgiveness. But what is repentance? Certainly it has in it no element of atonement. It is simply, return to the duty which ought never to have been forsaken. And what is there in this of the nature of a satisfaction to justice? What superabundance of merit to obtain remission of the punishment due to past sins? Would a deserter and a rebel, after having fought for a year in the ranks of the enemy, be regarded as entitled to the reward of uninterrupted fidelity, merely because, touched with remorse, he repented of his treason, and returned to his duty? Would such a mode of treating penitent deserters be likely to prevent or to promote desertion? to strengthen or to weaken the sentiment of loyalty? to vindicate or to give to the winds the majesty of government and the dignity of law?

Let us look at the matter in another point of view. If present duty can atone for past omissions, past duty may atone for present omissions. If the argument, "I am obedient to-day, therefore God will remit the consequences of yesterday's disobedience," be sound and available, this other is not less so, "I was obedient yesterday, therefore God will remit the consequences of to-day's disobedience." The same principle underlies both these arguments. And what is that principle but the old popish doctrine of supererogation, with its attendant absurdities and abominations? Here, then, the philosopher of reason and the child of superstition stand upon the same platform, conducted there by a common disdain of the humbling doctrines of the cross.

The second point in our argument against the idea that God will forgive sin in consideration of the sinner's repentance and reformation, is that such a view is contradicted by the analogies of providence. When the profligate, who, by a course of dissipation, ruined fortune, health, and character, repents and reforms, are the consequences of his sins at once remitted? It cannot be pretended. We know that it may be said—it has often been said—that in such cases the non-remission is the effect of a natural constitution. But that is not meeting the difficulty; it is merely pushing it a little further off. That natural constitution itself is the effect of a divine decree; and every sequence following from it is as truly a divine act, as if it were wholly independent of other

events. If it be said, "True, the consequences of sin are not remitted on repentance in the present life, but they will be in the future;" the unanswerable reply instantly rises to the lips, How do you know that? How do you know that God will not deal with transgressors in the future world, as he deals with them in the present? What certainty, what rational probability is there, that God will reverse the principles and the modes of his moral administration? He has given no assurance to that effect; and it is worse than idle, it is madness, in so important a matter, to build on mere conjecture.

But, as the third point in the present argument, we affirm that the doctrine of forgiveness on repentance and amendment is contrary to the natural sentiments of mankind, as those sentiments appear in the history of their religious opinions and conduct. If this doctrine is congenial to the human mind, wherefore the diversified and costly sacrifices with which men have sought to appease gods to whose wrath they felt themselves exposed from a consciousness of sin? No one, acquainted with the mythology of the heathen, can be ignorant how generally and strongly they retained the tradition of an expiation for sin. Plutarch has observed, that there has never been a nation on the globe which has not had some appointments for expiating transgressions. Is not such a fact (for fact it undoubtedly is) a clear proof, that the mind of man instinctively demands some means of reconciliation to God other than repentance; that, in the common estimation of heathen nations themselves, something besides repentance was wanting to appease the anger of their gods; that, in short, mankind have been unanimous in the apprehension and sense of the natural inefficacy of repentance to procure the divine forgiveness and favor?

The last point in our argument against the theory that God pardons and rewards sinners for their repentance and good works is, that such a notion is repugnant to the teachings of God's word. It is repugnant to all those places (of which the number is not small) which represent justification and life as procured for us by Christ. It is repugnant to such declarations as the following, which are so numerous that whole pages might be filled with them: "By the deeds

of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight," Rom. iii. 20. "As many as are of the works of the law are under the curse," Gal. iii. 10. "Not of works, lest any man should boast," Eph. ii. 9. It is scarcely in the power of prejudice to mistake the import of such passages; it is certainly not in the power of sophistry to break or evade their force. They must be blotted out of the record, before the theory can be admitted that our own works, whether of repentance or reformation, are the procuring cause, and meritorious ground of justification unto life.

Thus clearly does the necessity of atonement appear from a consideration of the inefficacy of all other means of obtaining pardon and salvation.

We argue this necessity, in the second place, from the relation of the divine nature and government to human guilt. It has been well observed by the younger Edwards, the substance of whose remarks on this point we cite in a condensed form, that, when moral creatures are brought into existence, there must of necessity be a moral government. It does not consist with the wisdom and goodness of God to leave his intelligent creatures without any rule of conduct. It is the dictate of reason that they must be placed under law. This is a necessity resulting from the nature of things. But in this case we have the concurrent testimony of history. Experience confirms the deduction of reason. Fact is in accordance with the nature of things. The Bible plainly tells us that, when God made man, he subjected him to moral law. But law implies penalty. A law without a penalty is a contradiction in terms. Any rule of action, not enforced by a penal sanction, is not law, but advice. And a penalty, never exacted, is not what it purports to be; that is, it is no penalty. Now it is better for the interests of virtue not to annex a penal sanction to a law, than, after having done so, to suffer it to become a dead letter. A forfeiture not exacted is a proof of weakness of some kind, want of rectitude, want of firmness, want of wisdom, want of power, or some other defect. It results that, under a perfect government, law must have sanctions, and that those sanctions must be enforced. Whether, in the divine government, the penalty must necessarily fall upon the transgressor, or might be transferred to a substitute, was known only to God himself. The latter of

these alternatives is the true one. But we know the admissibility of this scheme only from the recorded fact that it has actually been admitted into the divine administration.

Several important principles are involved in the argument under this head, which it will be proper to exhibit in detail. As,

1. God's nature is opposed to sin. "The Lord our God is holy." He is of a consummate purity, which cannot tolerate iniquity. He loves what is pure; he abhors what is impure. "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all." The purity of light, as it issues from its radiant source, does but feebly represent the immaculate purity of the Holy One.

2. God's law is the outflow of his nature. The one is in harmony with the other. The law of God has been, not unaptly, called the transcript of his character. It is the reflection of his nature, the expression of his will, the immutable standard of right, the inflexible rule of action to his accountable creatures.

The law is "exceeding broad." Its jurisdiction extends to thoughts and inward affections as well as to words and actions. Even over what is not, over omissions, neglects, and the negation of goodness, it utters its decrees and pronounces its judgments. "Let a man look on all his omissions," observes Foster, "and think what the divine law can raise from them against him. Thus the law, in its exceeding breadth, is vacant nowhere. It is not stretched to this wide extent by chasms and void spaces. If a man could find one such, he might there take his position for sin with impunity, if not with innocence."

The law is also "spiritual." It requires inward righteousness. God, whose eye nothing escapes, regards far less external appearances than internal purity. Therefore, when he prohibits adultery, murder, and theft, it is not the mere overt acts which are the object of the prohibition, but also the lust, wrath, and covetousness which prompt them. God is a spiritual lawgiver. He addresses his commands to the soul as well as to the body. But in respect to the soul, hatred is murder, avarice is theft, and impure desire is adultery. The law is spiritual. It requires the obedience of the whole soul, even an angelic purity. Its demands do

not stop a hair's-breadth short of absolute perfection, not in outward demeanor only, but in motive, principle, and inward affection as well.

3. Sinners are objects of the divine displeasure. "God is angry with the wicked every day." "The Lord will take vengeance on his adversaries, and he reserveth wrath for his enemies." Numerous are the passages of holy writ which speak the same language. True it is that the displeasure of God is not like the displeasure of men,—mere resentment or passion. There is nothing in it of perturbation, agitation, or turbulent emotion. It is a judicial disapprobation, calm and unruffled as the profoundest depths of ocean. That it partakes not of the weakness of human passion is a consideration which makes it far more dreadful to the transgressor; for, in case of such participation, time might cool or even extinguish it. But, since it is the necessary and eternal opposition of the holy nature of God to sin, it can no more die out or abate its intensity than God himself can cease to be what he is.

4. The veracity of God is pledged to the punishment of sin. "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." "The wages of sin is death." "Woe unto the wicked, it shall be ill with him." "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." "He will by no means clear the guilty." These are the true sayings of God. His veracity requires that they be fulfilled. But if sin is pardoned without atonement, fulfilled they are not. If sin is pardoned without an atonement, man does not die in consequence of transgression; the wages of sin is not death; it is not ill with the wicked; he who continues not in the things written in the law is not cursed; God does clear the guilty. And if God clear the guilty without atonement, what must follow? The God of eternal truth would declare what is not true. He would pronounce the condemnation of the wicked in one breath, and their acquittal in the next. He would frown and smile upon the same persons without any change in their relations towards him. In short, he would falsify his word, vacate his truth, deny his own nature, and unhinge the universe.

5. The justice of God demands the infliction of the penalty annexed to the violation of his law. Justice has been

variously classified as commutative, distributive, vindictive, and general, public, or governmental justice. Such distinctions may be convenient enough for certain purposes. But in treating the subject of atonement for sin we are not a little suspicious of such refinements. They are too subtle, too delicate, too shadowy to be clearly perceived and firmly grasped by the mind. We fear their tendency to bewilder and to mislead. The Bible does not recognise these distinctions, and that to our mind is a sufficient reason for rejecting them. It speaks to the common apprehensions of men, and its language is in accordance with those apprehensions. Undoubtedly the Bible is profoundly philosophical, but there never was a book which more completely discarded metaphysics, technically so called. The scriptural idea of God's justice is, that it is that quality in his nature by which he is disposed to treat his intelligent creatures as they deserve, rewarding the good and punishing the evil. This is the simplest conception that can be formed of the attribute of justice. It is the meaning assigned to the word by the common sense and common sentiments of mankind. It is the Bible meaning of the term, and the only one that would ever occur to a plain mind in reading the Scriptures. Every other sense affixed to it is the result of metaphysical refinement. Now, to borrow the well conceived and well expressed thoughts of Dr. Wardlaw on this point, "the righteous God has given us a righteous law accompanied with the threatenings of a righteous penalty. If the law and the penalty were both originally righteous they must remain immutably so. If the law, when given, required no more than what is right, how can it, without bringing a reflection on the perfect wisdom and unchangeable rectitude of the divine character, ever require less? If the penalty, by the threatening of which obedience was originally enforced, contained in it no more than what is strictly just, how can this penalty, without giving rise to the very same kind of reflection, be remitted?" It cannot be remitted. It will not be remitted. The remission would involve a breach of justice. The penalty may fall upon the transgressor, or, if a transfer be admissible, it may fall upon the substitute; but exacted it must and will be, or the honor of the divine government is gone. It is true that human governments do sometimes, without any satisfaction to justice,

remit the punishment threatened against transgression. Such remission may even be wise and salutary, but it is always the result of some weakness in the government, some defect in the law, some obscurity in the evidence, some perverse state of public opinion, or some other of the numerous imperfections which attend all human affairs. But there is no weakness, no defect, no perversity, no imperfection of any kind in the divine government. We cannot, therefore, without presumption, reason from human governments to the divine government, nor from pardons in the one to pardons in the other.

The Bible sometimes represents sin as a debt. Hence it has been inferred by some that, as a creditor may remit a pecuniary obligation without an equivalent, so God may remit the punishment of sin without satisfaction. But the figure must not be pressed too far. The analogy, though striking, has its limits. Sin is a debt contracted against infinite purity, and is therefore without bounds in turpitude; against infinite justice, and is therefore without bounds in guilt. It is a debt which the honor of God's truth and righteousness will exact, and it must be paid. The blotting it out by a gratuitous pardon, the passing it by without an atonement, would be an injury done to infinite justice. It cannot therefore be done. As certainly as the whirlwind scatters heaps of chaff, as certainly as fire consumes the dry stubble, so certainly will justice unsatisfied sweep away and utterly consume the sinner.

Thus, however close the analogy between sin and debt, it is not unlimited. As if purposely to guard against inferring from this analogy that the act of God in forgiving sin is of the same nature as the act of a creditor in remitting a debt, the New Testament constantly connects the pardon of sin with the blood of Christ. "Without the shedding of blood is no remission." "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." Hence it is plain that there did not appear to the inspired penmen any inconsistency between forgiving sin and laying the punishment of it on another; nay, that the latter is an essential pre-requisite of the former. They clearly distinguish between the act of a creditor, who remits a debt at his mere arbitrary pleasure, and the act of the divine lawgiver, who, while he forgives sin, still has

respect to the honor of his truth and the authority of his law.

6. The atonement of Christ was designed to answer the same ends judicially as the punishment of the transgressor. This it does, and can do no otherwise than as it is the execution of the penalty of the law. For what can be more absurd than to affirm that suffering inflicted on an innocent person is a manifestation of justice, or can answer the ends of justice? The Lord Jesus Christ was, indeed, personally innocent, but he was imputatively guilty; he was guilty in the eye of the law, because he had taken the law place of sinners. That the atonement of Christ was designed to answer the ends of justice in the divine government, is a truth abundantly taught in the Scriptures. We will at present cite but a single passage in proof of this, though we might fill pages with quotations confirmatory of it. The author of the Epistle to the Romans says:—"God hath set forth Christ Jesus a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare (*i. e.* make manifest) his righteousness in the remission of sins, * * * * * that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus," Rom. iii. 25, 26. What can be plainer than this? It teaches us that Christ's propitiatory offering was a manifestation of justice in the pardon of sin and the justification of the sinner. It affirms that justice, which demands the execution of the penalty of the law, has not been sacrificed in God's plan of pardon, but, on the contrary, fully sustained. It is the doctrine of Paul, then, that God, to manifest his righteousness or justice, laid on Christ the punishment of sinners, having first charged their sins to his account. Tholuck, commenting on this passage, observes:—"We see ourselves obliged to admit, in this place, the idea of distributive justice." He adds that the loss of that idea in theology has caused "unspeakable evil," and that the doctrine of atonement "must remain sealed up until it is acknowledged."

We argue the necessity of atonement, thirdly, from the fact that an atonement has been made.

This point neither requires nor admits much expansion. The whole argument may be compressed into a few sentences. We cannot rationally suppose that an event so wonderful as the assumption of our nature by the Son of

God, and his suffering death in that nature, took place without a purpose, or for a purpose capable of being otherwise effected. A wise being does nothing in vain; a good being inflicts no suffering without cause. Surely, then, when the blessed Redeemer, perfectly innocent in himself, and the darling of his Father, prayed thrice that the cup of final agony might pass from him, he would not have been made to drink it, if his drinking it had not been an essential condition of human salvation.

Once more: The necessity of an atoning mediation in order to man's deliverance and salvation is unequivocally taught in the Holy Scriptures.

The argument here, unlike that under the last head, might itself be expanded into an extended article. Of the many passages, however, which might be adduced, we shall cite but a small number. Our Saviour himself says: "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things?" Luke xxii. 26. The interrogatory, in the form in which it is put, is equivalent to a declaration of the necessity of his sufferings. Again, he says:—"As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life," John iii. 14, 15. Here the necessity of his death is affirmed in express terms. The passage before cited, Rom. iii. 25, 26, is a plain declaration that the justification of a sinner would not be consistent with the righteousness of God, except as it is made so by the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews assures us that "without shedding of blood is no remission," ix. 22. What form of words could more unequivocally teach the necessity of an atoning sacrifice in order to the forgiveness of sins? The same writer speaks of "having boldness to enter the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way, which he hath consecrated for us through his own body; that is to say, his flesh," Heb. x. 19, 20. Here we are taught that, as the only mode of access to the holy of holies was by passing through the veil, so the only mode of admission to heaven is through the merits of his sacrificial death. The point of comparison between the veil of the temple and the flesh of Jesus seems to be, that they are the sole medium of access—in the one

case to the earthly, in the other to the heavenly sanctuary.

The amount is that, in the matter of salvation, we are shut up to the faith of the gospel. Revelation pronounces that the wages of sin is death. Reason and conscience concur in the justice of the sentence. But neither reason nor conscience can discover the means of escape. Can sinners be justified and saved? That is the question of questions. Reason cannot answer; her oracles are dumb. Conscience thunders in the sinner's ear that he deserves to die, and points to the coming wrath. On this darkness, deeper and more portentous than that which brooded over Egypt, God has caused the light of his gospel to shine. He has revealed to us One mighty to save, the WORD MADE FLESH, "in whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace."

The atonement is an amazing exhibition of the love of God. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." Creation and Providence speak the goodness of the universal parent, and demand the grateful praises of his creatures. But his Son is his unspeakable gift, whose lustre eclipses the brightness of all his other mercies. "This is the noontide of everlasting love, the meridian splendor of eternal mercy."

The atonement is an amazing exhibition of the love of Christ. The tears of Jesus over the grave of Lazarus drew from the Jews the exclamation, "Behold how he loved him!" But if the tears of Jesus were a proof of love, much more his blood. Because he loved Israel, he gave Egypt for their ransom; but because he loved us, he gave himself for our ransom. Love reconciled him to the bitter cup, which was put into his hand, and made him drain it to the last drop.

The atonement is an amazing exhibition of the evil of sin. Nothing short of this could procure its pardon. Sin made a breach between God and man, that none but the incarnate Son of God could repair. By his cross, sin appears sin. Well may we be confounded and overwhelmed with the evidence of its malignity afforded by the passion of

our dearest Lord. The Redeemer's sorrows proclaim the infinite evil of sin more than all the complicated sufferings of the human race in all the ages; yea, more than all the unutterable agonies of the lost in the pit of eternal wailing and despair. Fools make a mock of sin, but no others do.

It is an amazing folly to reject the atonement of Christ. Sinner, a rejection of the atonement is a rejection of the counsel of God against yourselves. Divine justice must be satisfied. Receive this by faith, and with it you shall receive pardon, justification, and eternal life. Decline it, and you will be held bound to pay to the very last farthing for yourself. But such a personal satisfaction to justice can be given only by everlasting duration and torment in the prison of hell, the abode of endless weeping and despair.

ART. VIII.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE
FIGURES OF ISAIAH, CHAPTERS XXXII. AND XXXIII.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THIS chapter is a continuation of the prophecy of the two preceding, and announces first the righteous reign of the Messiah that is to follow his coming and destruction of the enemies of his people, and next the judgments with which they were to be smitten during the period that was to intervene before he comes and redeems them.

1, 2, 3, 4. Comparisons. "Behold, a king shall reign in righteousness, and princes shall rule in judgment. And a man shall be as an hiding place from the wind, and a covert from the tempest; as rivers of water in a dry place, as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land," vs. 1, 2. This speaks a total change not only from the bloody conquests and cruel oppressions of the Assyrians and other enemies of the Israelites, but from the avenging judgments on the wicked of all nations that are to signalize the period of Christ's coming. After he has swept his enemies from the earth, he is to reign for the renovation and salvation of men, and is to shield them from destroying evils

instead of leaving them to their power ; and to make the world a paradise of plenty, beauty, and peace, in place of the theatre and instrument of a curse. The comparisons are very significant and impressive. The king who is then to reign, instead of an avenger, is to be a saviour, like a hiding place from a scorching wind that sweeps from the deserts that border Judea, and bears death on its wings ; and as a covert from a tempest that bursts suddenly from the skies, and dashes thunderbolts, rain, and hail on the unprotected, up-roots the sturdy forest, overturns cottages and hamlets, and strews the fields with their ruined crops. On the other hand, he is to be a source of positive blessings, like a river turned into a region that is destitute of water, and converting what had been a desert into verdure and fruitfulness ; and like the shadow of a great rock, that gives coolness and refreshment where heat and languor had before prevailed. This indicates a wholly new era. Such a king and such a reign have had no parallel in the condition of the Israelites hitherto. To imagine the prophecy had its fulfilment in the times of Hezekiah, is to empty it of its true meaning, and treat it as little better than an ebullition of lofty words—a cruel mockery of the faith and hopes of the Israelites who receive it as the promise of him who is faithful and true, who is in verity to come and reign over the ransomed world.

Having thus drawn the character of the king, in contrast with the slaughterers and oppressors who precede him, the prophet now depicts the altered character of the people. "And the eyes of them that see shall not be dim, and the ears of them that hear shall hearken. The heart also of the rash shall understand knowledge, and the tongue of the stammerers shall be ready to speak plainly," vs. 3, 4. Those of the most perfect faculties, of the highest powers of perception, and the greatest aptitude to receive instruction, are to employ all their energies in grasping the knowledge that is brought within their reach ; and even those who are less happily endowed will be able to comprehend the subjects they are required to study, and communicate their knowledge with ease to others. The inconsiderate and rash even will not be left to misapprehension and false judgments, and those whose organs of speech were before so imperfect that they could not utter their knowledge, will be able to speak plainly.

What can be more absurd than to suppose that these extraordinary changes took place in the time of Hezekiah?

There is to be as great a change also in the moral character of the people as in their intellectual powers, their habits, and their physical conditions. "The fool," the godless, the eminently irreligious, "will no longer be called noble, nor the churl said to be liberal," v. 5. No such reformation in the principles and tastes of the Israelites as is here foreshown has ever yet taken place. The reason is next given why the wicked of these classes will not be permitted under the reign of the Messiah. It is because their evil passions would infallibly reveal and display themselves in crimes that are inconsistent with the safety and purity that are to distinguish that era.

5. Metaphor in the use of empty. "For the fool will speak folly, and his heart will do iniquity, to practise hypocrisy, and to utter error to Jehovah, to make empty the soul of the hungry, and he will cause the drink of the thirsty to fail," v. 6. He will act out his wickedness, and from principle; it will be the expression of his heart; and will be systematic on the one hand, making false professions to Jehovah, and on the other, plotting the robbery of the poor and dependent of even the food that is essential to their life.

There is the same reason also that the churl is not to be permitted under the reign of the Messiah.

6. Elliptical metaphor in the use of instruments for means or measures. "The instruments also of the churl are evil: he deviseth wicked devices to destroy the poor by lying words, even when the needy speaketh right," v. 7. His whole mind is bent on the acquisition of property, and the measures he employs are plots, deceptions, and the robbery of the poor and unsuspecting. How true has this picture proved of a large share of the Israelites down to the present day! And how unsuitable are such selfish and malevolent persons to live under the reign of the Redeemer! Wholly different is the spirit of those who are to be subjects of Christ's kingdom.

7. Hypocatastasis in the use of stand. "But the liberal deviseth liberal" or generous "things, and by liberal things shall they stand," v. 8. The fair-minded and generous will act out his character, and will give the impress of his disposi-

tions and principles to all his conduct. To stand, in an erect and fixed attitude, is put by substitution for a settled and uniform course of action.

The prophet now warns the women of Israel of the judgments that were to come on them during the long period that was to pass before Christ should come and give redemption to the nation.

8, 9. Apostrophes. "Arise, ye careless women; hear my voice! Confiding daughters, give ear unto my speech. Many days and years shall ye be troubled, ye careless women; for the vintage shall fail, the gathering shall not come," vs. 9, 10. This address to the careless and confiding women of Israel who were to feel the miseries of hunger more keenly than the men, was peculiarly adapted to rouse the nation from its lethargy, and impress them with alarm. If the pleasure-loving and thoughtless women, whose wants their parents and husbands were accustomed to supply, were to be smitten with a famine, what were to be the miseries with which the other classes of the people were to be overwhelmed!

10, 11. Apostrophes. "Tremble, ye women that are at ease. Be troubled, ye careless ones; strip you and make you bare, and gird sackcloth on your loins, striking on the breasts for the pleasant fields, for the fruitful vine. Upon the land of my people shall come up thorns and briars, yea upon all the houses of pleasure in the joyous city. For the palace is forsaken; the multitude of the city left; hill and watch tower are for caves for ever; a joy of wild asses, a pasture of flocks," v. 11-14. What a picture of desolation drawn with a single stroke! The fields were to be left uncultured, and even the houses of the wealthy and gay in the city overrun with briars and thorns; the crowds were to disappear from the streets, and the palace deserted by the monarch and court, and hill and tower, where troops were once stationed as their guard, were to become dens for wild beasts, and the favorite resort of wild asses and flocks. And this was to continue till the time of the final redemption of the nation from the curse at Christ's second coming and institution of his millennial reign.

12, 13, 14. Metaphors, in the use of poured, counted, and dwell. "Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness becomes a fruitful field, and the fruitful

field is counted for a forest: Then judgment shall dwell in the wilderness, and righteousness remain in the fruitful field. And the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance for ever. And my people shall dwell in a peaceable habitation, and in sure dwellings, and in quiet resting places," v. 15-18.. The Spirit is represented as to be poured out like a shower from the clouds, to indicate the copiousness and power of his influences; and righteousness, it is promised, shall dwell in the wilderness, to signify that it is to be continually exercised there. Some interpreters regard the wilderness and fruitful field as representatives of the two classes, the evil and the good, of the Israelites, and the change of them to culture and higher fruitfulness, as denoting the reformation of the people. It is mistaken, however; as the population are distinguished from the scene in which they dwell, and the wilderness and field from the righteousness that resides in them. The change predicted of the wilderness and the cultivated field is literal, and is a restoration of the country from the blight and barrenness with which it is foretold, v. 12-14, it was to be smitten in punishment of the sins of its inhabitants. That restoration is to take place at the same epoch as the effusion of the Spirit, and the regeneration of the people; and as a consequence of their renovation, and righteousness, they are to be thereafter exempted from the conquests, wars, and oppressions, with which they before had been smitten; and are to enjoy peace, quietness, and safety. These events are most certainly still future; as no such restoration of the land from its barrenness, no such reformation of the nation, and no such exemption from enemies, and enjoyment of peace and safety, has ever yet taken place.

"But it shall hail at the fall of the forest; and the city shall be low in a low place," that is, shall be wholly overthrown, v. 19. This is a prediction that the time of these great changes is to be a time of destructive judgments in the natural world, such as it is foreshown, Isaiah ii., are to attend Jehovah's coming to avenge himself on his enemies, and redeem his people, when it is predicted, that that day of the Lord shall be "upon all the cedars of Lebanon that are high and lifted up, and upon all the oaks of Bashan, and upon all the high mountains, and upon all the hills that are lifted up, and upon

every high tower, and upon every fenced wall." So also chap. xxx. 30.

The prophet closes the prediction with a blessing on those who are to live after those great revolutions are wrought.

15. Apostrophe. "Blessed are ye that sow beside all waters; that send forth the foot of the ox and the ass," v. 20. Happy are they to be, for they are to be righteous, they are to dwell among the righteous, they are to live in perfect peace and security, and they are to enjoy the perpetual outpouring of the Spirit, and the smile of the divine favor.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Expositors differ much in the interpretation of this chapter; most referring it to the time of Sennacherib; others, on far juster grounds, regarding it as treating of the period of Christ's advent and judgment on the oppressors of his people; inasmuch as the blessings promised v. 5, 15-24 are not to be enjoyed till his reign.

1. Apostrophe. "Woe to thee that spoilest, and thou wast not spoiled; and dealest treacherously, and they dealt not treacherously with thee! When thou shalt cease to spoil, thou shalt be spoiled; and when thou shalt make an end to deal treacherously, they shall deal treacherously with thee," v. 1. The person or power here addressed, is one who has been a conqueror and a plunderer, but who having finished his career of conquest, is in his turn to be vanquished. It may have been true, therefore, of several of the monarchs and nations that overrun Palestine. The intimations, however, of v. 4 and 5, indicate that the spoiling of the once victorious power is to take place in Judea, and be the work of Jehovah; and therefore that its period is to be that of Christ's second coming, and delivering the Israelites from the hands of the enemies, who will have taken Jerusalem, and carried a large share of the inhabitants into captivity. It is predicted of Gog, that he shall say: "I will go up to the land of unwall'd villages; I will go to them that are at rest, that dwell safely, all of them dwelling without walls, and having neither bars nor gates—to take a spoil, and to take a prey; to turn thine hand upon the desolate places

that are now inhabited, and upon the people that are gathered out of the nations, which have gotten cattle and goods, that dwell in the midst of the land: Sheba and Dedan, and the merchants of Tarshish, with all the young lions thereof, shall say unto thee: Art thou come to take a spoil? Hast thou gathered thy company to take a prey; to carry away silver and gold; to take away cattle and goods; to take a great spoil?" Ezekiel xxxviii. 11-13. And it is foreshown that God will suddenly destroy him, by raining "upon him and upon his bands, and upon the many people that are with him, an overflowing rain, and great hailstones, fire, and brimstone;" and that the Israelites shall go forth and gather their weapons for fuel; and "shall spoil those that spoiled them, and rob those that robbed them," chap. xxviii. 22, xxix. 9, 10. It is foreshown, also, that Judah shall, at that last great battle of the enemies of Israel, "fight at Jerusalem, and the wealth of all the heathen round about shall be gathered together, gold, and silver, and apparel in great abundance," Zech. xiv. 14. As the spoiling of the treacherous spoiler, predicted by Isaiah, is to take place at a time when Jehovah is to be exalted, and is to "fill Zion with judgment and righteousness," it is doubtless to be at the same epoch.

2. Apostrophe. "O Lord, be gracious unto us: for thee we wait. Be thou their arm in the mornings; our salvation also in the time of trouble," v. 2. This is a prayer of the prophet for the nation at that crisis; a recognition that the deliverance must be the gift of grace: an expression of trust in God for it: an entreaty that his omnipotence may be perpetually exerted for them, and may give them salvation at that period of their greatest trouble; and it is prophetic probably of the feelings that are then to reign in the hearts of God's people, and be uttered in supplication.

3. Metaphor in denominating God the arm of his people.

4. Metonymy of salvation for Saviour.

5. Hypocatastasis. "At a noise of tumult the peoples flee; at thy rising the nations are scattered," v. 3. The rising of Jehovah, or lifting himself up, according to the common version, that is assuming a conspicuous attitude, is put by substitution for his visibly appearing. It is his advent in flaming fire to take vengeance on his enemies,

that is to cause a tumult of the peoples, and prompt them to fly in confusion and terror. This is foreshown also in Zechariah: "And it shall come to pass in that day, that a great tumult from the Lord shall be among them; and they shall lay hold every one on the hand of his neighbor, and his hand shall rise up against the hand of his neighbor," chap. xiv. 13. It is indubitably, therefore, to take place at the same time. God is not twice to appear visibly in the clouds, and confound and destroy the enemies of Israel by the fires of his vengeance.

6, 7. Comparisons. "And your spoil shall be gathered like the gathering of the caterpillar; as the running to and fro of locusts shall they run upon it," v. 4. The relation in which the spoilers are to resemble those insects doubtless is, their numbers and the eagerness with which they seize and devour the vegetables and trees that are their food. The caterpillar and locust swarm in countless myriads, and are of such insatiable appetites, that they strip and make a wreck of the plants and trees on which they feed.

8, 9. Hypocatastases. "The Lord is exalted, for he dwelleth on high. He has filled Zion with judgment and righteousness: and wisdom and knowledge shall be the security of the times, and strength of salvation: the fear of Jehovah, that is his treasure," v. 5, 6. The elevation of Jehovah in space is put for the higher awe and love with which his people will regard him.

10. Metaphor in the use of filled. Judgment and righteousness are to be manifested in Zion, so as to engross the thoughts of all, as a substance fills the space which it occupies.

11. Metonymy of the cause for the effect. Wisdom and knowledge are to be the source or means of the security and perfect salvation of that period.

12. Metaphor in the use of treasure. The fear of Jehovah, the pervading sense of his infinite righteousness, goodness, and wisdom, with which all hearts are to be penetrated, is to be the richest gift he bestows, the source of the purest happiness his people are to enjoy.

These predictions are referred by many interpreters to the times of Hezekiah; but no such righteousness, wisdom, or fear of Jehovah, prevailed at Jerusalem during his reign, as

answers to these glowing representations. The verses that follow appear to describe the condition of the Israelites immediately before God interposes to deliver them.

"Behold their valiant ones shall cry without; the ambassadors of peace weep bitterly," v. 7. These are ambassadors doubtless of the Israelites, sent to ask for peace of the enemy. . That their valiant ones weep, indicates the hopelessness of their condition; and a reason for their despair is given by the prophet in the verses that follow, in the desolation of their country.

13. Metaphor in the use of breaks. "The highways lie waste; the wayfarer ceaseth; he breaks the covenant, despises cities, regards no man," v. 8. To break a material thing, as a rod or a vessel, is to separate it into parts. It is used in respect to a covenant to denote the resembling act of violating its pledges. The violator of the covenant is doubtless the invader whom the ambassadors address; and their grief springs in a measure from the treachery and recklessness which he displays. This is the character also ascribed to the spoiler, v. 1, where he is exhibited as a deceiver dealing treacherously, and indicates that he is the same individual or power.

14, 15, 16. Metaphors in the use of mourns, languishes, and ashamed. "The land mourns, languishes; Lebanon is ashamed, it withers; Sharon is like a wilderness; and Bashan and Carmel shake off *their fruits*," v. 19. This condition of the plains and mountains, the cultivated fields and forests throughout the sacred land, indicates a severe drought or some other influence that blighted every department of vegetable life; and shows that its period cannot have been that of Hezekiah, when neither Lebanon nor Sharon, Bashan nor Carmel, lay within his dominions, which were confined to Judea.

17. Comparison of Carmel to a wilderness. Carmel was distinguished for its fertility.

18, 19, 20. Hypocatastases. "Now will I arise, saith Jehovah: now will I be exalted: now will I lift up myself," v. 11. Arising, being exalted in place, and lifting himself up, as a person who assumes the attitude of acting and vindicating himself, are put by substitution for the acts of a different kind by which he will interpose, display his presence,

and show that he is the God and deliverer of his people. The time of their despair because of the power of their enemies, and the inability of the country, from its desolation and barrenness, to sustain them, is the time for him to appear, and accomplish their redemption by his own almighty power.

21, 22. Hypocatastases. "Ye shall conceive chaff; ye shall bring forth stubble," v. 11. Conceiving chaff and bringing forth stubble are put by substitution for acts of the mind, purposes, and schemes; and show that their projects for their deliverance would be as fruitless and vain, as it is to sow fields with grain that is blighted and yields nothing but chaff, and to reap or thrash sheaves that are nothing but stubble.

23, 24. Metaphors in the use of conceive for sowing or taking measures for a growth of grain; and bring forth, for reaping or thrashing sheaves that are nothing but straw.

25. Comparison. "Your breath as fire shall devour you," v. 11. This shows that the Israelites themselves, in large numbers at least, are to be in alienation from God, and are to be smitten with his judgments; and such is the representation in the prediction of the siege of Jerusalem at the last great battle, Zech. xiv. 2. The city is to be taken, the population plundered and outraged, and one third of them carried forth into captivity.

26, 27. Metaphors. "And the nations shall be lime-burnings, thorns cut up; they shall be burned in the fire," v. 12. They are denominated lime-burnings and thorns cut up, and therefore dry, to signify that they are to be burned as though they were such; that is with a rapid devouring fire. They are to be literally burned therefore, and thence the time to which the prophecy refers is that of Christ's second coming, when he is to be revealed from heaven in flaming fire, taking vengeance on his enemies. That they are to be burned, is taught also in several other predictions of that great epoch. Isaiah lxvi. 15; Ezekiel xxxviii. 22; Zech. xiv. 12; 2 Thess. i. 8.

28. Apostrophe. "Hear ye *that are far off*, what I have done; and ye *that are near*, acknowledge my might," v. 13. This is a summons to all to examine the great measure of his procedure at this crisis, and acknowledge the omnipo-

tance with which he has punished his enemies, and redeemed his people. This implies that his acts are to be extraordinary, and it is shown, in what follows, that they are to surprise and terrify the wicked, while the righteous are to be protected and permitted to see the king in his glory.

"The sinners in Zion are afraid. Trembling has seized the impious. Who of us can dwell with (this) devouring fire? Who of us can dwell in (these) everlasting burnings?" v. 14. These exclamations are uttered by the impious, and indicate that the burning of the preceding verse is a literal one. This again shows that the crisis is that of Christ's second advent, and destruction of the impious at Jerusalem, as that is the only epoch at which he is to come with flaming fire as the instrument of his vengeance.

29, 30, 31, Hypocatastases. "He that walks righteously, and speaks uprightly: he that despises the gain of oppressions, that shakes his hand from holding bribes, that stops his ears from hearing of blood, and shuts his eyes from seeing evil, he shall dwell on high; his place of defence shall be the munition of rocks; bread shall be given him; his water shall be sure," vs. 15, 16. Walking righteously, is put by substitution for acting righteously; dwelling on high, for being placed in an advantageous and honorable position; and having a munition of rocks for defence, for a perfect protection from the assaults of enemies. None but the impious are to be destroyed by God's avenging bolts. Those who have not committed great crimes, who are righteous in act and speech, and have refrained with abhorrence from oppression, bribery, bloodshedding, and all other evil, are to be shielded from death, and be distinguished by the divine favor. This again indicates that the occasion is to be that of Christ's coming; as there is to be no other infliction of such destructive judgments on the Israelitish nation in which the impious alone are to share.

32. Apostrophe: extending from v. 15 to v. 22. "Thine eyes shall see the King in his beauty; they (thine eyes) shall behold the land at a distance," v. 17. The king, whom the Israelites who survive that crisis are to see in his beauty, is the Messiah, undoubtedly. He is to appear in power and great glory; and to be allowed to see him will be a distinguished privilege and honor. To suppose the prediction re-

lates to Hezekiah, or any other ordinary monarch, is absurd. It was no novelty to the Israelites, who resided at Jerusalem, to see the king. It implied no distinction, it conferred no honor or blessing. The most wretched and worthless beheld him, as well as the most prosperous and worthy. The prophecy that the eyes of the survivors shall see the land at a distance, refers not improbably to the changes that are then to be wrought in its surface by which the Mount of Olives is to be separated into two parts by a deep valley, and a plain is to extend to a great distance to the south. Zech. xiv. 4-10.

"Thine heart shall meditate terror. Where is he that counted? Where is he that weighed? Where is he that numbered the towers? Thou shalt not see the fierce people; the people of deeper speech than thou canst hear; of a stammering tongue *that thou canst* not understand," vs. 18, 19. The terrors the Israelites who are rescued are to meditate, are the terrors of the conflict from which God has delivered them: and in their wonder and exultation at their sudden and marvellous extrication, they are to exclaim: Where is the enemy who was so lately exacting tribute of us, and counting the towers of our city? But swept to destruction by the breath of the Almighty, they are no more to be seen by them. No fresh hordes of the antichristian nations, whom from their deep or guttural voices and stammering pronunciation the Israelites are unable to understand, will ever invade their country.

33, 34. Metaphors, in denominating Jerusalem a tabernacle and Jehovah a place. "Behold Zion, the city of *our* solemnities, thine eyes shall see Jerusalem a quiet habitation; a tabernacle *that* shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken. But thou, the glorious Jehovah, will be unto us a place of broad rivers and streams, wherein shall go no galley with oars, neither shall gallant ship pass thereby. For Jehovah is our judge, Jehovah is our lawgiver, Jehovah is our king. He will save us," v. 20, 21, 22. Instead of the terrifying spectacle they beheld when the invading armies were besieging Jerusalem, and threatening it with destruction, the Israelites are now to see the city a habitation exempt from warlike alarms; and like a tent

that is never to be taken down, or unloosed from its fastenings. This indicates most clearly that the period is that of Christ's coming and establishment there of his throne; as no deliverance of the city from a besieging enemy hitherto has been followed by perpetual peace and safety. And this is shown also by the promise that Jehovah shall be to them like a place of broad running streams—where no armed vessel shall pass to assail or alarm them; which will be at once to make them eminently accessible to those who pursue the arts of peace, while they are to be wholly safe from enemies: and the reason that Jehovah is thus to be a safeguard to them is, that he is their judge, their lawgiver, and their king: which indicates that he is to be so in a wholly gracious manner, not as he was in the days of the prophets, and has been through the ages in which he has smitten them with judgments—and therefore that the period is to be that which follows Christ's second coming; as it is not till then that all Israel is to be saved, and he is to reign over them as his redeemed people.

35. Apostrophe. "Thy ropes are cast loose: they do not hold upright their mast; they do not spread the sail; there is shared the plunder of a great spoil; the lame take the spoil," vs. 23. This is addressed by the prophet to the besieging hosts whose attempt to conquer the city Jehovah is to defeat. Like a ship that is advancing to an attack, and is suddenly arrested by a calm, becomes unmanageable, and is dashed by adverse currents on the rocks, they are in a moment to be intercepted in their attack on the city by Jehovah's interposing, and pouring on them the storm of his devouring vengeance.

36, 37, 38. Hypocatastases, in the use of casting the ropes of a ship loose, not holding up the mast, and not spreading the sail, for the analogous acts by which the armies besieging the city are to be arrested in their assault, and rendered incapable of any further hostile action. What an impressive representation of the disarray into which they are to be thrown, and of their loss of all power either to conquer the city, or to save themselves!

"And the inhabitant shall not say, I am sick: The people that dwell in it are forgiven their iniquities," v. 24. This, too, shows that the deliverance foreshown by the prophecy,

is that of the final redemption of the Israelitish nation at Christ's second coming; as it is then, and then only, that there is to be no more curse, but a full forgiveness, and a full exemption from the penalty of sin, Rev. xxi. 4. The whole cast of the prophecy thus shows that the great events it reveals are to have their accomplishment at that period.

ART. IX.—THE WAR OF THE GREAT NATIONS.

THE events that have marked the conflict in the Crimea during the spring, have continued to be of an unexpected and extraordinary character. If the sudden blight with which the British forces especially were smitten, and swept in vast crowds to the grave, through the negligence and incompetence of the officials there and at home, struck the nation and world with surprise and astonishment; the course pursued by Russia, by which the opportunity was lost of crushing the allies during their weakness, seems scarcely less extraordinary, and indicative either of a want of judgment or of power. Why is it, if the Czar was able to dispatch a much larger force there than he has, did he allow five or six months to pass in almost total inactivity; and, confining himself to the mere defence of Sebastopol, neglect the moment when with a reinforcement of seventy-five or a hundred thousand men, he might have overpowered the invaders, driven them from his territory in disgrace, and compelled them, perhaps, to a peace compatible with his honor and ambition? What can have withheld him from availing himself of his extraordinary advantages, unless it were a sheer inability to concentrate such an additional body of troops in the Crimea, as would have enabled him to assail the allies with resistless numbers, and wear them out, or drive them to their ships? That seems the only probable reason of his inaction. That the forces he had embodied at the commencement of the war are swept away or appropriated, so that no larger portion of them can be dispatched to the Crimea, is apparent from the new conscriptions he has repeatedly called out, which show that he

can keep the armies that are in active service to their original number, or augment them, only by fresh levies. He has no longer any large bodies of old and disciplined troops whom he can march at will to the scene of conflict to sustain his armies at the point of strength he desires. He must fill up the gaps death makes in his ranks by fresh drafts from the population. But it is a slow process to convert new recruits into disciplined soldiers fit for the shock of battle. Four to six months are said to be requisite to drill them so that they can go through an ordinary parade with skill; and a much longer period to teach them to act with the unity and precision that are essential to their efficiency on the battle-field. The reason then that the Czar has made but such moderate and tardy additions to his forces in the Crimea, and has allowed the allies time to recruit their forces, and add greatly to their number, and thereby lost the opportunity of freeing himself from their presence, doubtless is, that it has been out of his power to proceed on a greater scale or at a more rapid pace: that the necessity of distributing a large share of his force at other points, along the Baltic, in Poland, at Odessa, and in the Caucasus, has made it impossible to appropriate any larger bodies to the Crimea than simply to keep up the garrison of Sebastopol, and hold the approaches to that city. But if this be the reason of his dilatory procedure, it seems to render it quite improbable that he can continue to maintain himself against his antagonists. The allies appear to have doubled their forces, and can repair their losses, and add any additional strength to their armies they may choose. It is not unlikely, therefore, that they may soon force the Russian army that has been hovering in the vicinity of Sebastopol and replenishing it with fresh troops, to retreat, and ere the season is over, succeed, by the aid of pestilence, and perhaps famine, in making themselves masters of that place.

One of the most striking peculiarities of the conflict during the last two or three months has been its night battles. The previous contests had been chiefly in the day, when each was aware, as the strife advanced, of the ground it occupied, and the position and movements of its antagonists. These fights in the darkness of night, when little, while at a distance, can be discerned of each other, except from the

flashes of the musketry or the gleam of rockets, and they at length come into contact with the bayonet, in a degree of uncertainty whether they are thrusting at friends or foes, at realities or shadows, must, with the clash of arms, the yells of the combatants, and the groans of the wounded and dying, form a scene of horrors that is seldom surpassed even in the dread tragedies of battle.

Should the contest be prolonged there through the season, they may be smitten by an invisible hand with still worse calamities than they can inflict on each other. A large and crowded camp, in the most advantageous position, can scarcely be healthy during the heats of summer. But in such a region, where the temperature is high, where there is no adequate supply of water, and where the soil is filled with vast masses of the dead, that are sending up their infectious exhalations, it seems little less than certain that the pestilence must reappear among them in a virulent form, paralyse their strength, and consign crowds of them to the grave.

Whatever turn, however, events may take, whether Sebastopol falls and the allies obtain undisputed possession of the Crimea, or they are foiled in the conflict, and compelled to relinquish the siege, and withdraw, there seems no prospect of a speedy peace. If the allies triumph in the Crimea, may not their success prove a reason to the Russians that they should continue the strife rather than retreat from it? If the allies are defeated in their attempts to conquer Sebastopol, may not their discomfiture place them under a violent inducement to renew the struggle in some other scene? But if a new battle-field is to be chosen, where can it be but at the West; and how can a war be waged there with a hope of success, except by exciting the uneasy population of Russia along the borders of Germany to revolt? But how can an appeal be made to the patriotism of the Poles, and offers be made to them of assistance in a fresh struggle for freedom, without exciting a spirit of revolt also in Italy, Hungary, and perhaps Germany itself? And how can powerful armies be marched through the Prussian or Austrian territories without exciting the jealousy of those powers? If indeed an appeal is made to the races that are now groaning in vassalage to remorseless conquerors, who knows that Russia herself may not threaten to resort to that

measure, and drive Austria to take her side in the contest, to save not only her Polish, but her Hungarian, her Slavonian, and her Italian subjects from a revolt? And if such a threat were attempted to be carried into effect by Russia, how could the English or French governments undertake to assist Austria in holding those races in her grasp without incurring the danger of a revolution at home? Whichever policy might be adopted, it would seem scarcely possible that a general revolt of the tortured nations from the despotisms by which they are crushed, should be avoided; and such a movement, backed either on the one side by the Russians, or on the other by France and England, would undoubtedly end in the fall of the old dynasties, and the establishment in their place of new democratic military governments, much like that of France.

But whether these catastrophes are to spring out of the present conflict, or occur at a later period, time only can show. One change, however, of very great importance, seems likely to arise out of it, which no one could have deemed likely to emerge from such a movement. The wars of Great Britain have heretofore served to strengthen the nobility, and confirm them in the possession of all the offices and all the patronage of the government. Their inadequacy to the duties with which they have in this war been charged, and the disappointment and chagrin of the nation at the cruel sacrifice of the army by their ignorance, want of capacity, and negligence, have produced the opposite effect, and raised the feeling throughout all ranks that the honor and safety of the nation require that a revolution should be wrought not only in the army and navy, but in the civil government also, by which capacity and merit, not nobility, shall be the passport to office; and the middle-aged and vigorous only, not the old and imbecile, be intrusted with the most important commands in the army and navy. The necessity of this change has become so palpable, and it is demanded from all quarters in such loud and impassioned voices, that it seems likely it will speedily be introduced in a measure; and along with it not improbably an extension of the suffrage, which has long been promised by some of the party now in power. But how can such a new principle of elevation to office introduced into every branch of the

public service, operate otherwise than to supplant the worn out and incompetent by the young, the talented, and the vigorous; and therefore to transfer the government from the hands of the aristocracy to the people? No result is more certain; and happy will it be for the nation, if it take place gradually and constitutionally, and not by a sudden and violent movement, that shall annihilate all distinctions of rank, as in France at the period of the Revolution, and convert the government from a monarchy to a democracy. A gradual change will infuse a new life into the army and navy, and add strength to the government. A sudden and violent one will involve a revolution, give birth to anarchy instead of order, and lead the way not improbably to a despotism in place of a liberal government.

Whatever the direction may be, however, in which the current of events is to run, it seems likely that the period of the present war is to be fruitful of great occurrences, and that the movement of the nations is to be rapidly towards that catastrophe from which the beast is to arise in its last form, adopt the Catholic church as its coadjutor throughout the ten kingdoms, and institute that persecution of the witnesses which, issuing in their triumph, is to lead on to the fall and destruction of Babylon, and the battle at length, in which the wild beast is to perish.

ART. X.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION of Ernesti, Ammon, Stuart, and other Philologists.—A TREATISE ON THE FIGURES OF SPEECH.—A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF ALL MEN TO READ THE SCRIPTURES. By Alexander Carson, LL.D. New York: Edward H. Fletcher. 1855.

DR. CARSON is a writer of perspicacious intellect, large learning, and great independence of judgment, and his works which we have read abound with original and striking thoughts, and keen and effective criticism. Instead of the blind and admiring acquiescence of such men as J. Pye Smith, D.D., and Moses Stuart, in whatever was advanced by the fashionable philologists and interpreters of Germany,

he tested their dicta and doctrines by common sense and the teachings of the Scriptures, and rejected their errors with as little hesitation as he received their truths.

This volume consists of three independent treatises. The first on the Principles of Interpretation of Ernesti and others, though diffuse and employed chiefly in pointing out errors in the writers on whom he animadverts, is a very able criticism of the superficial, confused, and ineffective system of Ernesti and his followers.

In the Essay on the Figures of Speech he follows mainly in the train of Quintilian, Kaimes, and the modern philologists, including under the term figures a large class that instead of tropes belong, like irony, allusion, interrogation, to the mere sphere of grammar.

The last treatise is an able vindication of the right and duty of all to possess and read the Sacred Scriptures.

2. **REVIVAL SERMONS.** First Series. By the Rev. Daniel Baker, D.D., President of Austin College, Texas, with an Appendix. Third Edition. Philadelphia: W. S. Martien. 1855.

THESE Discourses, which are specially designed to rouse the attention of readers to the calls of the gospel, treat of themes that are suited to that end, and are written with great plainness and seriousness, and present many earnest and impressive appeals to the conscience and heart.

3. **ADAM AND CHRIST**, or the Doctrine of Representation Stated and Explained by E. C. Wines, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1855.

THE author's object in this Discourse, which was preached before the Synod of New York in 1854, and is published at their request, is to present the doctrine of the representative offices of Adam and of Christ as it is taught in Romans v., and defend it from the false views which many entertain of it, and the objections with which it is assailed. The truths he aims to unfold and establish are: that a public and representative character belongs to both Adam and Christ; that our entire nature was tried, miscarried, and fell under condemnation in Adam; and that the same nature that sinned was admitted to a new probation in Christ which issued favorably, so that sinners who believe in him are recovered by his righteousness. These propositions are argued with great directness and force; that sin and death came through Adam is shown to be as clearly taught in the

Scriptures as it is that renovation, righteousness, and life come through Christ; and the fact is exemplified that the principle on which they rest enters in a measure and necessarily into all the domestic, social, and political relations of men. Every form that human society assumes, every combination of persons who act in conjunction with each other, from the family to the state, has an organization with a head, whose actions carry a vast train of good or evil consequences to those with whose interests they are intrusted. And could we raise our glance to the orders of beings who people the countless spheres that fill the realms of space, we should doubtless find that they also are familiar with that principle, and especially that a trial by a representative head is common to all races that come into existence like ours by descent from a parent pair. Some such principle, by which all the population of a globe have one character, and may be placed under a common administration, seems indispensable to an unembarrassed moral government. Were half of a race to fall while the other half continued in allegiance, it would make the institution and exercise of two incompatible administrations requisite; one suited to the unfallen, and one suited to the fallen; one over the holy, fraught only with blessings; one over the rebellious, however it might be mitigated with mercies, still fraught with a curse.

The misapprehensions and cavils of objectors are stated with candor and answered with effect.

4. *ENGLISH PAST AND PRESENT.* By Richard C. Trench, B.D., author of the *Study of Words*, *The Lessons of Proverbs*, &c. New York: Redfield. 1855.

IN this series of lectures the author treats of the English as a composite language, of the words which it has adopted from other languages, of those which have passed out of use, and of the changes that have taken place in the meaning and the spelling of its words. He displays his usual research and his eminent tact in investing his subjects with interest, and adorning them with elegance. His pages abound with curious exemplifications of the changes the language gradually undergoes, and will prove highly entertaining and instructive to readers of all classes.

5. *MESSIAS AND ANTI-MESSIAS.* A Prophetical Exposition, to which are added two Homilies on the Body of Christ, by Charles Ingham Black, one of the curates of All Saints, Poplar, Middlesex. Philadelphia: H. Hooker. 1855.

THE author of this work entertains the belief that the great prophecies of Daniel ii., vii., and viii., and the Apocalypse, respecting the civil and

ecclesiastical powers that have made war on the true worshippers of God, relate to the great races of mankind, the descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japheth, rather than to the four great empires of Babylon, Media, Greece, and Rome, and the Romish church ; and those races under the immediate dominion and sway of Satan ; and he endeavors to explain those and other predictions of the sacred volume on that theory. He accordingly regards Satan—not a combination of human beings—as the great antichrist of the Bible. He supposes the fall and hostility of Satan to have been excited by the divine purpose that the Son should, in assuming a creature's form, take man's instead of the angelic nature. "The archangel may have reasoned, that it would be unworthy of the Deity to cast himself down, or to degrade himself so low, especially when a worthier nature stood prepared and wishful for the divine adoption. In this thought of foolishness lay the sin which made the once glorious archangel the antimessias, the Satan, the enemy, the adversary."

"The great archangel, influenced by pride, an undue sense of his own merit, and a desire for the honors designed for man, fell away. The God-man was to be the world-king ; and the superintendence of earth, hitherto committed to angels, was at last to pass into the hands of the Great Sovereign. . . . The archangel opposed the design of the Most High—the union of God and man—and the proposed dominion of the Incarnate One, anointed to these dignities. Thus Satan is the *antimessias*, the resister of the Anointed One ; and *all the subsequent spiritual history of a creation*, exposed in a great measure to the devices and snares of the rebel cherub, presents us with little else than ever-foiled and ever-renewed efforts on the part of Satan to separate the world-kingdom from the God-man, or to deny in him either the human or the divine." His theory that the great antichristian dynasties of the prophets belong to races rather than nations, leads him to interpret the four metals of Nebuchadnezzar's image as symbols of princes or political powers of the descendants of Ham, Shem, and Japheth, rather than the Babylonians, Medes, Greeks, and Romans. The golden head, he interprets, of the Babylonian dynasties, of the line of Ham ; the breast and arms of the Roman rulers, of the line of Japheth ; the belly and thighs of the Mahometan Caliphs and Sultans, of the line of Shem. The powers symbolized by the legs and feet he holds have not yet risen. He regards the first three beasts of Daniel vii. as symbols of the same conquering races ; but makes the fourth beast the representative of the *political* organizations in the world of the power of antichrist : and the seven-headed and ten-horned beast of the Apocalypse, he regards as representing the union of the unelect of the three races in the service of antimessias. We might cite a

great number of constructions that are equally fanciful and mistaken. While the author appears deeply serious, and presents many thoughts that are just, yet, proceeding as he does on a false theory, and endeavoring very arbitrarily to draw the Scriptures to its support, he cannot be recommended as a safe guide to those who wish to make themselves acquainted with the true meaning of the prophetic word.

6. **THE VOICE OF THE CHURCH ON THE COMING AND KINGDOM OF THE REDEEMER**; or, a History of the Doctrine of the Reign of Christ on Earth. By D. T. Taylor. Edited by H. L. Hastings, Peace Dale, R. I. H. L. Hastings. 1855,

THIS history of the doctrine of the church respecting the reign of Christ on the earth during the millennium, consists chiefly of extracts from the writings and testimonies concerning the faith of the principal Christian fathers down to the elevation of the Romish church to supremacy in the sixth century, and of the Protestant divines from the Reformation to the present age; and it presents the most ample proof, in the first place, that the doctrine of Christ's coming at the commencement of the thousand years, destroying the antichristian powers which are to tyrannize over the church till that time, raising the holy dead in glory, and reigning in power over the renovated earth and redeemed nations, was held universally by the church from the days of the apostles till the middle of the third century, and that it continued to be held and taught generally till the close of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century. In the second place, that its first rejection by Origen, Dionysius, and others of Alexandria, in the third century, was not on the pretext that it is not taught in the Apocalypse, according to the natural meaning of the prophecy, but by setting aside that meaning, either on the pretext of an allegorical sense, which enables the interpreter to assign any signification to it he pleases, or else under the assumption from the very fact that the Apocalypse reveals such a coming and reign of Christ, that it is not a work of inspiration, and is not therefore of authority. The former was the method by which Origen rejected the doctrine of the millennial reign of Christ; the latter the expedient by which Dionysius attempted to escape it because he regarded it as indisputably taught in the Revelation. In the third place, that the belief which at length took the place of the doctrine of the primitive church was that introduced chiefly by Augustine, who held that the thousand years of Satan's imprisonment, and the reign of the holy dead, commenced with Christ's ministry; that the binding of Satan, and resurrection of the holy dead, were therefore mere emblems of the diminution of Satan's power and the

renovation of dead souls ; that the church consequently was never to see a better age than it had already in the fourth century enjoyed ; and that the world was to reach its end, and the work of redemption be consummated, at the close of six thousand years ; the doctrine which, with the exception that the millennium of Satan's binding and the reign of the risen saints was thought to commence at the nationalization of the church by Constantine instead of Christ's ministry, continued to prevail generally through the dark ages to the Reformation, and was held in a measure by Luther and others. No such doctrine as that which is now generally held, of a thousand years, under the present dispensation still future, during which Christianity is to be diffused by human instrumentality throughout the world, and all nations be converted, was in that period known to the church. And finally, that the doctrine now held by nearly the whole Protestant church, that the imprisonment of Satan, the resurrection and reign of the holy dead, and the personal reign of Christ on the earth, are merely figurative, or symbols of the prevalence of Christianity for a thousand years under the present dispensation, was introduced into the English church in the seventeenth century, or about one hundred and fifty years ago, by Daniel Whitby ; while he admitted, without disguise, that the doctrine of Christ's personal reign, which he rejected, was held universally by the primitive church, and on the ground of the teachings of the prophetic Scriptures. Thus he said :

"The doctrine of the millennium, or the reign of the saints on the earth a thousand years, is now rejected by all Roman Catholics, and by the greatest part of Protestants, and yet it passed among the best of Christians for two hundred and fifty years for a tradition apostolical, and as such is delivered by many fathers of the second and third century, who spake of it as the tradition of our Lord and his apostles, and of all the ancients that lived before them, who tell us the very words in which it was delivered, *the Scriptures, which were then so interpreted*, and say it was held by all Christians who were exactly orthodox." He adds, "It was received not only in the eastern parts of the church by Papias (in Phrygia), Justin (in Palestine), Irenæus (in Gaul), Nepos (in Egypt), Apollinarius, Methodius, but also in the west and south, by Tertullian (in Africa), Cyprian, Victorinus (in Germany), Lactantius (in Italy), and Severus, and by the first Nicene Council. These men taught this doctrine not as doctors only, but as witnesses of the tradition which they had received from Christ and his apostles, and which was taught *them* by the elders, the disciples of Christ. They pretend to ground it *upon numerous and manifest testimonies both of the Old and New Testaments, and speak of them as texts which would admit no other meaning.*"

The catalogue of writers in Great Britain eminent for talents, learning, piety, and usefulness, who have held the doctrine, is very large, and comprises many of the most distinguished names from the Reformation to the present time.

We recommend this volume to the perusal both of Millenarians and Antimillenarians. The former will see that the doctrine they entertain was indisputably the doctrine of the primitive church during its three first and best ages, and that it has been held by a vast succession of great and good men from the Reformation to the present day. The latter will see that their doctrine of a millennium under the present dispensation still future, is not only in contravention of the faith of the church of the apostles and their successors for three centuries, but came into existence only about one hundred and fifty years ago, and has very few writers of much rank to support it.

7. THE BRITISH PERIODICALS, Republished by L. Scott & Co.

THESE publications since our last notice, present a large array of able articles, and display in their discussions, especially on the war and the misfortunes of the campaign in the Crimea, an unusual measure of independence, impartiality, and spirit. A truly novel and imposing spectacle is presented by the union of all the great parties in the unsparing criticism and inculcation of nearly the whole body of the men both at home, in the Baltic, and in the Euxine and Crimea, who have been intrusted with the conduct of the war, as unequal to their places; with neither commanding talents, the tact acquired by experience, nor ordinary sense, but as weak and worn out with age. The mismanagement in the Crimea especially has been so palpable, so fatal, and on so vast a scale, that patriotism and self-respect forbid that it should be excused or overlooked; and the writers of all classes have striven to shield the nation from dishonor by pointing out and denouncing the blunders with little reserve, and urging efficient measures to prevent their recurrence. Of the articles on this subject, those of the *Westminster* for April, and the *North British* for May, are very thorough and caustic, and present an astonishing picture of ignorance, negligence, and incompetence, even with all the means in their hands for the remedy of the most palpable and insupportable of the evils under which the army was sinking. It is a new incident in the history of modern warfare, that the troops of one of the most enlightened nations in Christendom should be left to starve, because no one is charged with the office of delivering to them the food which is provided for their sustenance: that they should suffer and perish by thousands from cold and nakedness, because nobody

is authorized to distribute to them the clothing with which the ships at anchor within a stone's throw of their camp are laden. The groans of mingled indignation and shame which burst from the whole British population when that unpardonable misconduct was made known to them, have been echoed by the whole periodical press, and in a style that indicates that there is no likelihood that the public dissatisfaction can be allayed without a thorough reformation in the administration of the war, and such successes as shall retrieve in a measure the national honor. The articles on this subject in the *London* and *Edinburgh* for January, in the *Westminster* for April, and the *North British* for May, especially deserve perusal; the most full and graphic details, however, of the war, are presented in *Blackwood*, whose story of the campaign, written on the ground, depicts the great features of the region, the day and night battles, and the dire spectacles of death and misery that have filled the scene, with unusual strength and vividness.

Of the articles on other topics, that of the *Edinburgh* for January, on Mezzofanti, abounds with curious information respecting those who from the early ages have been distinguished for their knowledge of languages, and presents a striking picture of that extraordinary person, who was conversant with upwards of forty. The article in the same number on Charles V. treats largely of the Reformation, and of the efforts and influence of that prince to check and intercept it. The following passage is worth transcribing:

"There seems to us to be no grounds for supposing that if Luther had died in 1506, a novice in the Augustinian convent of Erfurth, the Reformation, such as it now is, would have taken place. At first sight, indeed, it may appear that the corruptions which he attacked were too gross and palpable to endure the improved intelligence of modern Europe. But we must recollect that on his death Protestantism ceased to extend itself. Its limits are now nearly such as he left them. What was popish in 1546 remains popish now. Nor is this to be ascribed to inferiority of political institutions or of cultivation. The democratic cantons of Switzerland, and the well-governed industrious Flemings, are as strenuous in their adherence to Roman Catholicism, as the despotically ruled Danes have been in their rejection of it.

"The most highly civilized portions of the continent are France, Italy, the Low Countries, and Germany. Not one fourth of their inhabitants are Protestants. If the inherent vices of popery have not destroyed it in France, if it has withstood there the learning and wisdom of the seventeenth century, the wit and license of the eighteenth, and the boldness and philosophy of the nineteenth, what right

have we to assume that those vices would have been fatal to it in Great Britain ?

“Nor can the permanence of Roman Catholicism be accounted for by its self-reformation. Without doubt, with the improved decorousness of modern times, some of its grossest practical abuses have been removed or palliated. Indulgences are no longer on public sale. The morals in monasteries and convents, and those of the secular clergy, are decent. There is less of violent active persecution. But a church which claims to be infallible cannot really reform her doctrines. Every error that she has once adopted becomes stereotyped, every step by which she has diverged from truth is irretrievable. All the worse superstitions of the Romish church are maintained by her at this instant as stoutly as they were when Luther first renounced her communion. The prohibition of inquiry, the reliance on legendary traditions, the idolatry of relics, the invocation of saints, the adoration of the Virgin Mary, the merit ascribed to voluntary suffering, and to premeditated uselessness, the conversion of the sacraments into charms, of public worship into a magic incantation muttered in a dead language, and of the duty of Christian holiness into fantastic penances, pilgrimages, scapularies, and a whole train of superstitious observances worthy of paganism in its worst forms, are all in full vigor among many of the Teutonic races, and among all the nations whose languages are derived from the Latin. The clergy of France, once the most intelligent defenders of the liberties of the Gallican church, are now more ultramontane than the Italians.

“We repeat our belief, that if Luther had not been born, or if he had wanted any one of that wonderful assemblage of moral and intellectual excellences that enabled him to triumph in the most difficult contest that was ever waged by man, if he had had less courage, less self-devotion, less diligence, less sagacity, less eloquence, less prudence, or less sincerity, the pope would still be the spiritual ruler of all western Europe and America, and the peculiar doctrines of Romanism would prevail there, doubted indeed or disbelieved, or unthought of, by the educated classes, and little understood by the uneducated, but conformed to by all.

“On the other hand, if Charles V. had been able, like the Elector of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse, to shake off the prejudices of his early education—if like them he had listened to Luther with candor, and like them had been convinced, and instead of striving to crush the Reformation had put himself at its head, a train of consequences would have been set in motion not less momentous than those which would have followed the submission or premature death of Luther.

"The Reformation would have spread over the whole of Germany and of the Netherlands. The inhabitants of those vast countries were all eager to throw off the dominion of Rome, and were kept under her yoke only by the tyranny and persecution of Charles. Germany would have remained an empire."

The articles on the siege of Rhodes and Mount Athos are curious and entertaining, while that on the History of the Puritans presents a vivid sketch of the annoyances and persecutions to which they were subjected from the reign of Henry VIII. to the ejection of the nonconforming clergy under Charles II., in 1662.

The article in *The London Quarterly* for January on Psychological Inquiries abounds with curious facts and speculations, and is especially entitled to perusal by scholars and professional men who are in danger of making excessive demands on the brain.

"In our previous investigation," the writer says, "we were unable to trace the varying functions of the nervous system to any anatomical or chemical arrangement or peculiarity. In our present analysis of the discoveries of Bell and M. Hale, we find that the size or mass of nervous matter bears no direct proportion to its power, a very minute portion of the spinal substance sufficing to generate the phenomena of reflex function. This holds good as to the brain. If a spot, only one twelfth of an inch in breadth, situated at the point of the calamus scriptorius, be injured, death is instantaneous. A little on one side of this life-knot Bernard inserted a needle in a rabbit's brain, without interfering with respiration or any other important vital function, but the animal eliminated sugar from its system so long as the irritation was kept up by the needle and no longer. Within a few lines of these two points is a third, giving origin to the nervous vagus, to which if an electric current be applied the heart ceases to beat. Here we have three distinct centres of power originating in very minute portions of nervous matter; injury to the first destroying life with the rapidity of lightning; injury to the second as rapidly changing the complicated elaborations of vital chemistry; while irritation of the third centre brings the never-ceasing action of the most enduring muscle of the body, the heart, to a stand-still. The inferences from facts like these are fatal to phrenology; size and power are no longer necessarily connected."

The Edinburgh and *London Quarterly* for April contain a variety of able and entertaining articles. Of *The London Quarterly*, those on the Crystal Palace, Food and its Adulterations, the Emperor Nicholas, and Sir Richard Steele, are particularly attractive. Of *The Edinburgh*, the most valuable are English Surnames, Huc's Travels in China, the Chemistry of Common Life, a highly entertaining and instructive discussion, and the Autocracy of the Czars.

The North British for February has an article of high interest on the Vaudois and Religion in Italy, from which we transcribe a passage.

"We cannot trace the introduction of heresy into the valleys to Valdo, nor Claude, nor Vigilantius. We cannot assign a date at all, and the parties who have assailed the Vaudois have not been able to point to the time when their doctrines were first introduced. We accept the language the Waldenses themselves addressed to their princes: 'We are descended from those who, from father to son, have preserved entire the apostolic faith in the valleys which we now occupy. Permit us therefore to have that free exercise of our religion which we have enjoyed time out of mind, before the dukes of Savoy became princes of Piedmont.' The strong presumption from such fragments of Piedmontese history as have been preserved is, that the Cottian Alps received the gospel in the *second century*. Through that region lay the great Roman road by which the legions of Italy marched to Gaul. It was by these valleys that Hannibal led the Numidian army that conquered at lake Thrasymentum. The highway from Rome to Lyons lay across these mountains, and Irenæus, or some of the early preachers of the faith of Christ, may have passed over them when carrying the gospel to lands beyond the Alps. It was likely in this way that the glad tidings were first heard in the valleys, and we have some scanty notices too, in the old historians which have lately come to light, of refugees from the Italian lowlands who found a shelter in these regions from the persecution of the pagan emperors. The facts then remain, whatever may be said of Valdo or Claude, that Christianity, in its purest form, had taken root in the valleys of upper Italy in the first centuries of the church, and that it has remained there till our own time."

The article presents an interesting sketch of the aids which the Waldensian churches have of late years received from the Protestants of Great Britain, and of their condition under the present government of Piedmont, which legalizes their churches, and allows to them entire freedom of worship.

The North British for May has a spirited article on Sir Walter Raleigh and his Times, and one of great interest on the Life and Inventions of James Watt.

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ART. I.—THE PARABLES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

XIV. THE WEDDING GARMENT.

Matthew xxii. 1-14.

“AND Jesus answered again, and spake to them in parables, saying: The kingdom of heaven is like to a king who made a nuptial feast for his son. And he sent his servants to call those who had been bidden to the feast, and they would not come. Again he sent other servants, saying, Tell them who have been bidden, Behold I have prepared my dinner: my oxen and fatlings are killed, and all things are ready: Come to the feast. But some were indifferent and went away—one to his field, and one to his merchandise, and others seized his servants and insulted and slew them. And the king hearing it, was angry, and sent his troops and destroyed those murderers, and burned their city. Then he said to his servants, The feast is ready, but they who were invited are not worthy. Go therefore into the highways, and as many as you find, invite to the marriage feast. And those servants went into the ways, and gathered all whom they found, both bad and good. And the feast was supplied with

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guests. And when the king came in to see the guests, he saw there a man not having on a wedding garment. And he said to him, Friend, how is it that you have entered here not having on a wedding garment? And he was speechless. Then the king said to his servants: Bind his feet and hands, and take and cast him into the darkness which is without. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. For many are called, but few are chosen."

This parable is designed to exemplify, first, the reception the kingdom of God met from the Jews; and, next, the admission of both evil and good, whether Jews or Gentiles, to seats in the church, or professed assembly of Christ's disciples, as though they were acceptable guests; but none of them, however, are to be allowed to partake of the blessings of salvation but those who have a wedding garment. That those to whom the servants in their first and second mission announced that the feast was ready, represent the Jews, is seen from the fact that they had been previously apprised that there was to be a feast, and invited, when it should be prepared, to attend it. As the notice beforehand that there was to be a feast, and that they were to be asked as guests, represents the notice that was given beforehand that the kingdom of heaven was about to be instituted among the Jews, and that they were to be called to partake of its blessings; it is obvious that those to whom the marriage banquet was announced in that manner were Jews, as they alone were apprised beforehand of the approaching institution of the kingdom of God. The guests afterwards called from the highways denote those, whether Jews or Gentiles, to whom the call of the gospel was addressed, after it had been rejected by the Jewish nation.

To unfold the parable we must trace the parallel between the king's son and the Messiah, between the feast and the blessings proffered to men in consequence of the institution of the kingdom of heaven, between the several classes called to the feast and those to whom the call of the gospel was addressed, and between the man without a wedding garment and those who have not the requisite qualifications for the kingdom of heaven.

1. The king's son was the heir of his throne. The institution of a feast in consequence of his marriage, was a public

and joyful recognition of him as such, and approbation of his marriage; while, on the other hand, the invitation to distinguished persons in the realm, who stood in intimate relations to the monarchy, to attend the feast, was a summons to them to testify their interest in the arrangements that were made for the perpetuation of the monarchy, and pledge their hearty and grateful allegiance. It was an occasion, therefore, of great moment to the kingdom. The cheerful acquiescence of the nobles and immediate officers and supporters of the government, and cordial expression of attachment and devotion to the royal family, was adapted to strengthen the government; while a refusal to attend the feast implied a total want of respect for the monarchy and indifference whether it was perpetuated or not, and was consequently as gross an insult as could be offered to it.

So he whose public recognition as the heir of his throne and kingdom, the king's acknowledgment of his son as his heir represents, is Christ the Son of the Father, who at the institution of the kingdom of heaven was publicly invested with all authority in heaven and earth, and now reigns with the Father on his throne. And he was openly proclaimed to the Jews and Gentiles as such at the inauguration of his kingdom; and they were called to recognise him in that character by accepting the blessings he proffered to them in the gospel. The reception which that proffer met from them was consequently of the utmost moment to God and his kingdom. In joyfully accepting it, they to whom it was made would but have rendered to God the honor that was due to him; while in rejecting it they exhibited a total disregard to his rights and glory, and treated him and his government as unworthy of their regard. It was in fact, therefore, the greatest affront they could offer to him—a scorn of his claims, denial of allegiance, and a virtual assumption of an independence of his sway.

As the king's son was not to enter on the formal and public exercise of the government of the kingdom until the sceptre was transferred to him by his father; so Christ was not to enter on his open and visible reign on the earth until the close of the present dispensation, when he is to be publicly crowned as its king, and reign over all nations for ever and ever.—Dan. vii. 13, 14, 28. Rev. xi. 15.

2. The parallel of the feast to the blessings of the gospel which it represents. The feast was given after the marriage, and presented the son to the guests as the heir of the sceptre; and their acceptance and participation of the feast was to be a recognition of him in that relation, and expression of their submission and allegiance to him. So the call of the gospel presented the Son of God as the monarch who is hereafter to sway the sceptre of the kingdom of heaven on earth, and the invitation to accept the blessings of the gospel that are conferred on believers in this life is an invitation to recognise him in that character and pledge allegiance to him. As the reign of the king's son was future, and was not to commence till the throne was transferred to him by his father, so the personal reign of Christ over his kingdom here is not to commence till his public inauguration as the king of this world at the close of the present dispensation, and the subjugation of all dominions and all nations to his empire. And as the feast consisted of tasteful food, for the nourishment and invigoration of the body, so the blessings of the gospel which they represent are the gifts which are the means of spiritual life and energy to the soul; the renewing influences of the Spirit; the teachings of the word; the comforts, supports, and joys of communion with God; and a life of faith, prayer, and the hope of redemption.

8. The parallel of those who were notified beforehand of the feast, and invited to be guests, and the Jews. Those who were first invited to be guests were doubtless those connected with the court and in important stations in the kingdom, whose public approval of the monarch's proceedings was especially due to him and to his son. They were professedly the friends of the king; they stood in intimate relations to him; they were the persons whose position made it most clearly their duty to yield a prompt and ardent concurrence with his wishes, and whose approval and allegiance were most essential to the stability of his son's government. Yet when the servants announced to them that the feast was ready, and called them to attend it, they would not. This indicated a total want of proper respect for the king and the welfare of his kingdom; and implied either that they were indifferent whether the father transmitted his sceptre to his son or not; or else that they had become dis-

satisfied with their dynasty and were conspiring to overthrow it, and grasp the supreme power themselves or transfer it to others.

And this was precisely the part acted by the priests, rulers, and leaders of the Jewish people at the first proclamation to them of the gospel of the kingdom. The priests, expositors of the law, and all of the educated classes especially, had been apprised, not only by the ancient prophets, but by John the Baptist, that the kingdom of heaven was at hand, and called to repentance, that they might be prepared to secure the blessings of Messiah's reign. Yet when Christ was actually presented to them, and publicly acknowledged by the Father as his Son, as at his baptism and on other occasions, they to a man, as far as the narratives of the apostles indicate, refused the blessings which he invited them to receive. The king then sent other servants to those who had been invited, to inform them that he had provided an expensive and rich feast for them, and urge them to attend it; but some not caring for it, went one to his field, and one to his traffic, and others seized his servants and abused and slew them. And this corresponds to the conduct of the Jews, especially of the higher classes, towards the apostles and others, whom Christ commissioned to preach the gospel to them after he had closed his ministry and ascended to heaven. There was a new proclamation of the gospel at the day of Pentecost and afterwards, corresponding to the second notification by the king's servants, that the feast was ready, and invitation to attend and partake of it. But some heard it with indifference, and went to their fields and traffic as though the gospel had no claims to their attention, or was of far less importance than the culture of their grounds and the pursuit of their merchandise by which they gained the means of this life's good; while others seized the apostles and other early preachers, and some of them they imprisoned, scourged, and subjected to a variety of injuries, and others they put to death. Thus Peter and John were imprisoned; then they and the other apostles were beaten; Stephen was stoned; James was killed; and after Paul's conversion many attempts were made to take his life.

4. Parallel of the punishment inflicted on those who abused and slew the king's servants, and the retribution with which

the Jews were visited for their rejection of the call of the gospel, and persecution of the apostles and other Christian teachers. The king was indignant at the scorn with which his principal subjects treated his feast, and the cruelty with which they insulted and murdered his servants; and he sent his troops and put the murderers to death and burned their city. And that was the identical doom to which the Jewish priests and rulers, and the population of the capital who followed and supported them, were consigned. About forty years after Christ's crucifixion the Roman armies, which God had appointed to that office, swept nearly the whole of the higher ranks and vast crowds of the common people of the Jews to the grave by the sword; and captured, sacked, and burned Jerusalem, and made it a heap of ruins. What more graphic picture of the conduct of the Jews in respect to the gospel of the kingdom, and of the retributive judgments with which they were smitten for their unbelief and rebellion, could have been drawn in so few strokes by even the pencil of inspiration!

5. Parallel of the new mesasures which were taken to obtain guests for the feast, with the new proclamation that was made of the gospel to men. "Then the king said to his servants, The feast is prepared, but they who were bidden are not worthy. Go therefore into the highways, and as many as you find invite to the feast. And the servants went out and gathered all whom they found both bad and good." The invitation now, instead of being confined to those who were originally bidden, was addressed to whomsoever the servants happened to meet in the public ways, and without any regard to their character.

And there was a similar change of the parties to whom the gospel was preached, about six or seven years after Christ's ascension, when the Jewish people had as a body rejected the blessings of the gospel, and entered on a blind and obstinate persecution of those who preached and who embraced it. The persecution and death of Stephen drove many believers into the neighboring countries, where they preached the gospel to all whom they met, whether Jews or Gentiles, and large accessions to the church from the latter speedily took place at Casarea, Antioch, and, within a brief period, in the principal cities of Asia Minor, Greece, Macedonia, and

Italy. These pagans, the votaries of the most debasing religions, were to the Jews, the people adopted by God as his own, what the promiscuous passengers of the highways, of all ranks and conditions, evil and good, were to the noble and dignified persons whom the king originally invited to the feast.

6. Parallel between those who were gathered from the highways to the feast, and those who were induced to profess an acceptance of the blessings of the gospel by joining the company of Christ's followers. There was a large number gathered from the highways to the feast; as many as the king had originally designed to entertain, and consisting of bad as well as good. So a great crowd was gathered into the church after a general and promiscuous offer of its blessings was made to all who would accept them, whether Jews or Gentiles, whether good or evil. And as those who entered the house where the feast was given did not, by their mere entering it, secure an actual participation of the feast, but only such of them as had the requisite wedding garment; so those who entered the church by a profession of faith did not thereby secure an inheritance in the kingdom of heaven, but only such of them as had the requisite repentance, faith, and love. As the guests at the feast did not, by their acceptance of it, become subjects of the Son's rule, but only manifested their acquiescence in his inheriting the sceptre, and pledged their allegiance; so those who enter the church do not thereby become heirs of the kingdom of God, in the form which it is to receive at Christ's second coming; but only profess their allegiance to Christ and acceptance of his kingdom as their everlasting inheritance when he comes to reign over it in its triumphant form. The blessings they immediately obtain by entering the church with a true faith and love are not the actual possession of that kingdom, but only the spiritual gifts that are preliminary to it, namely the renewing and sanctifying influences of the Spirit, the teachings of the word, the ordinances of worship, communion with God, and the supports and comforts of faith and hope in Christ which believers enjoy under the present dispensation of trial preparatory to the full rewards of a resurrection, and glorious, holy, and blissful life in the eternal kingdom he is to establish at his second coming.

7. The parallel of the guest without a wedding garment, to those who enter the church without the holy affections which are requisite to their being heirs of the kingdom of God. The princes of the East were accustomed to furnish the guests whom they invited to a feast, with splendid robes which they were to wear. The guest who was without a robe, therefore, had deliberately refused one that had been offered him, and appeared in his own dress, either out of disregard to propriety, or for the purpose of insulting the king of whose bounty he was designing to partake. It was natural, therefore, that he was speechless when asked by the king how he came there not having on a wedding garment? He could offer no justification of his attempt to partake of the feast while refusing to comply with the proper conditions of it. He was bound hand and foot, therefore, and turned out into the darkness without—the feast being in the night—and compelled by his bonds to remain there, unable either to enter among the guests again or to depart, and lament his folly in debarring himself from the enjoyments of the feast. In like manner a mere entrance into the church does not constitute men children of the kingdom of heaven. The visible church is not that kingdom, any more than the hall or reception-room of the king's palace was the kingdom over which his son was to reign. A mere union to the church, or public profession of faith in Christ, is not a qualification for that kingdom. A peculiar character, a special relation to Christ is essential as a condition of it; and that relation, which is a justification by faith in his blood, is conferred by God himself, as the wedding robe was by the king, and is what is symbolized in the New Testament by a white robe, which is called the righteousness of the saints. Those who enter the church and remain in it without that robe, who do not directly and with all the heart accept Christ by faith as their righteousness and salvation, cannot be admitted into his kingdom. They, like the guest who refused a wedding garment, refuse the justification which God bestows, and which is the necessary condition of admission to his kingdom. They are guilty of an open affront to him in attempting to gain the blessings of salvation without accepting it as a gracious gift; and he is obliged, in vindication of himself, to exclude them from his kingdom, and bind them in the darkness without, where they will be compelled

to realize the greatness of the blessings which they have forfeited, and to feel the impossibility of their supplying their wants from any other quarter.

The parable teaches several important lessons.

First: What a dark picture it presents of the dispositions of the Jews, God's chosen people, towards the kingdom of the Messiah, which God had through their prophets announced to them, was about to be instituted in the world! Instead of welcoming that kingdom, they refused its blessings, some treating them with utter neglect, as unworthy of their consideration, and others—their priests, rulers, and teachers of the law—conspiring against his apostles and ministers, and persecuting and slaying them; as though they were apostates from him, and propagators of a false instead of a divine religion! What an awful exhibition of unbelief, perverseness, and malignity!

Next: The external visible church of the present dispensation is not the kingdom of God. The persons who belong to that church only bear the same relation to those who constitute the kingdom of God, that the persons gathered from the highways into the king's palace bore to those who were actually to partake of the marriage supper. As the invited guest did not by entering the palace—by which he professed to accept the invitation to the feast on the conditions on which it was proposed—secure a participation of the feast, but by refusing the wedding garment the king had provided for him, excluded himself from it;—so those who enter the visible church by a profession that they believe in Christ, and accept his kingdom as their inheritance, do not by that act secure an admission to his kingdom, while they in fact reject his blood as the ground of their justification. This is taught expressly in the announcement with which the parable is closed—For many are called, but few are chosen.

Third: The righteousness of Christ,—a union to him by faith, and reliance on him for pardon and acceptance, are the only means of admission to the kingdom of God. Those who reject that method of acceptance will be excluded from that kingdom, and consigned to an eternal night without, in a state as helpless and hopeless as that of the invited guest, who was bound hand and foot, and cast into the darkness without, where was wailing and gnashing of teeth.

XV. THE TEN VIRGINS.

Matthew xxv. 1-13.

"Then the kingdom of heaven shall be likened to ten virgins who took their lamps and went forth to meet the bridegroom. And five of them were wise [or considerate], and five were foolish [or without forethought]. They that were foolish took their lamps, but took with themselves no oil [that is, no oil besides that contained in their lamps]. But the prudent took oil in their vessels along with their lamps. And as the bridegroom tarried, they all drowsed and slept. But at midnight, a cry was heard: Behold the bridegroom cometh; go ye forth to meet him. Then all those virgins arose and trimmed their lamps. And the foolish said to the prudent, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are gone out. But the wise answered and said: There would not by any means be enough for us and you: go ye rather to those who sell and buy for yourselves: And while they were gone to buy, the bridegroom came. And they who were ready entered with him to the wedding feast, and the door was shut. Afterwards the other virgins came, and said; Lord, Lord, open to us. But he answered and said; Verily I say to you, I know you not. Watch therefore, for you know not the day, nor the hour, in which the Son of Man cometh."

This parable is prophetic, and the period which it is designed to illustrate, is that of Christ's coming in the clouds of heaven to establish his throne on the earth, as is shown by the predictions of the preceding chapter, in which it is foretold, that as the days of Noe were, so also the coming of the Son of Man shall be to men generally, who, immersed in the cares and pleasures of this life, will be taken by surprise. Christ commanded his disciples, therefore, to be watchful, because it is not known in what hour he shall come; and foreshows by this parable, that many who thus profess to be his disciples, and are looking for his coming, will be found unprepared to meet him.

The parable is drawn from the procession and feast that usually followed a Jewish marriage. A Jewish wedding

was celebrated at the house of the bride's parents; but the bridegroom, during the evening that followed the marriage, conducted his bride in a public procession to his own dwelling, where he gave to those who formed the procession, a nuptial feast. Each one who belonged to the escort bore a burning lamp or torch; and the burning of the lamp at their arrival at the bridegroom's house, was a condition of being admitted to the feast. None, it would seem from the parable, were received as guests who had not burning lamps; and none who had lamps, who did not walk in the procession, and enter with the bridal party. They who applied for admission after the attendants of the bride and bridegroom had entered, were rejected as strangers. In order to an analogy between this and the events that are to mark Christ's coming, it is apparent that he is to come visibly, and as the sovereign of the world; that he is to be attended by his bride; that a festival is to follow his arrival; that there are to be persons here who will be looking for his coming, and expecting to partake of that festival; that some of them will be wise and some of them unwise; and that the wise will be admitted to the feast, but the unwise will be excluded. It is accordingly foreshown (Rev. xix. 5-9) that at Christ's second coming and commencement of his reign on the earth, his marriage—by which is meant the inauguration, or institution of the risen saints, as kings and priests in his kingdom—is to take place: and that some who dwell on the earth are to be called to the marriage supper. It is the conduct of those who are to look for his coming, and who propose and expect to attend that feast, which the parable is designed to illustrate.

1. The ten virgins took their lamps and went forth to meet the bridegroom. They were the professed friends of the bridegroom and bride, therefore, and had been invited to join the procession and attend the nuptial feast. They took their lamps—which, like badges, denoted that they belonged to the wedding party and were to partake of the banquet: and they went forth to meet the bridegroom. They did not assemble at the house where the marriage took place, but stationed themselves in the street or way along which the bridegroom was to conduct his bride; that they might meet him, congratulate him on his marriage, probably, express

wishes for his happiness; and then either precede or follow in his train.

So when Christ comes attended by his angels, and brings the risen saints with him, and invests them with the offices they are to sustain in his kingdom on the earth; there are to be persons and probably crowds on the earth, who will be aware that he is speedily to appear, will regard themselves as of those who are called to that great spectacle, and will assume the attitude of expectants who are ready, as the signals of his coming are seen, to go out and meet him, and join his glorious train. It is the object of the parable to show what the character of those persons is to be, and what the issue is to be of their purpose to gain admission to the marriage supper of the Lamb. If there are not to be such persons, the prediction of the parable cannot have a fulfilment. As the going out of the virgins was not simply to meet the bridegroom and witness his passage towards his dwelling, but was in order to join the wedding train, and attend the banquet, of which the train were invited guests; so the object of the parties whom the virgins represent is not to be simply to witness the coming of Christ in the clouds, but to join his train, and attend, what is called in the Apocalypse, the marriage supper of the Lamb—a feast or banquet that is to follow the introduction of the risen saints into their offices as kings and priests in his millennial kingdom. This implies that it is to be known to them that the marriage of the Lamb is about to take place, that a festival is to follow it, and that they are of the class who, they suppose, are to be called to attend it.

2. Five of the virgins were wise; that is, were considerate, and acted with forethought. They knew that there were certain conditions of an admission to the supper of the bridegroom; they must walk in his train, they must bear a burning lamp, and they must enter the place where the feast was to be given, when he entered it; and they took the requisite care to comply with those conditions. But five of the virgins were foolish; that is, weak and unreflecting, and took no care to secure admission to the feast. Though they must have known that their joining the procession and bearing a flaming torch was an essential condition of their being admitted as guests to the banquet, they neglected to

furnish themselves with sufficient oil to keep their lamps burning. Their slight stock was exhausted, and their lamps went out, before the bridegroom had reached the place where they were stationed.

So, the parable teaches, there are to be persons who will propose to go forth to meet the Redeemer, when he comes with the risen saints, who are denominated his bride, join his train, and become guests at his marriage supper, some of whom will be wise, will act with forethought, will comply with all the conditions that are requisite to their reception at that feast, and will be admitted as its guests; while others and probably an equal number will be foolish, will act without due consideration of the conditions of their becoming guests, and at a moment when it is too late to repair the defect, will find themselves without the requisite qualifications for it. The reason that these persons are to remain insensible of their inadequate preparation, the parable represents, is not that they are not Christ's friends, and not that they are invited to be his guests, but that they are unwise, or act without due forethought. The five foolish virgins were doubtless friends of the bridegroom, and were invited to meet him and be his guests; and when they went forth to meet him, there was nothing in their appearance that indicated that they were not to be admitted to the feast. But the burning out of their oil, before they met him, showed that they were unfurnished for the office they were to fill in the procession, in order to their admission to the banquet. So those unwise ones whom they represent, are doubtless to be, like the others, professed followers of Christ, and of the class from whom the guests are to be called, who are to be admitted to the feast; but it is to become apparent before the Redeemer approaches, that they are not prepared for the office they must first fill, in order to their reception at the feast.

8. While the bridegroom tarried, they all drowsed and slept. Notwithstanding the high importance of the occasion, the delay of the bridegroom was such that their interest began to flag, they became drowsy, and fell asleep. Those whom they represent are also to be led, by Christ's delay to appear, to sink into carelessness and insensibility, or become occupied in the usual pursuits of life. That implies

that they are to look for Christ's coming at too early a period; and from the delay their attention is to become weary, expectation is to lose its freshness, and they are to sink into forgetfulness, or become engaged in the pleasures and cares that would naturally occupy them, were they not in expectation of meeting the Saviour, and attending the feast that is to follow his nuptials.

4. But at midnight a cry was heard, Behold the bridegroom cometh: go ye out to meet him. The parable thus indicates, and we are expressly shown by Christ, *Matt. xxiv. 30*, that there is, immediately before Christ's appearance, to be a signal of his approach—a sign of the Son of Man in heaven. Though the world at large will be taken by surprise, and none will know the hour of his coming, his true people will be apprised that it is at hand.

5. The foolish virgins, on being roused from slumber by the heralds of the bridegroom, became aware that they must replenish their lamps with oil, in order to their joining the procession, and endeavored first to obtain it from the wise virgins, and then from those who had it for sale, but were too late. So those, the parable implies, whom the foolish virgins represent, on discovering that they are unprepared to join the Redeemer's train, will endeavor to supply their defect, but will find it too late. Whatever it may be which they may lack, ere they have obtained it, Christ and his train will have entered the scene of the feast, and the door will be shut against the admission of any others.

6. The foolish virgins, after purchasing oil for their lamps, notwithstanding the bridegroom had reached his house and the guests had entered, proceeded there and solicited admission, as though their not having met and accompanied him was no obstacle to their being received as guests at his feast; but they were repulsed with the reply, that he did not know them: the meaning of which is, doubtless,—as they had been invited guests,—that not having met and accompanied him, and entered the house ere the gate was shut, he could not recognise them as the persons who were to meet and attend him—he could not distinguish them in the darkness that reigned without, from other persons who might wish unlawfully to gain admission to the feast.

So the parable implies, those whom the foolish virgins represent, will solicit admission to the marriage supper of the Lamb, after all who are prepared to be guests have entered, and will be denied. Not having had the requisite qualifications at the proper time, not having conformed to the conditions of admission to the banquet, they will not be received and treated as though they had been wise instead of foolish, as though they had complied with the conditions of the feast, instead of having neglected them.

What that is to be which those represented by the foolish virgins are to lack, and the want of which is to be to them what the want of oil was to the virgins, commentators are not agreed. Some suppose those whom the foolish virgins represent are to be unregenerate and hypocritical, or self-deceived in their profession of love to Christ. That, however, seems not to be the indication of the parable. As the foolish virgins, as well as the wise, were invited by the bridegroom to meet him, join his procession, and partake of his feast, and were thus regarded by him as his friends; so those whom the foolish virgins represent are doubtless to be invited by Christ to meet and welcome him at his coming, and partake of his marriage feast, and are therefore to be believers. That that which the foolish virgins lacked was actually obtained by them afterwards, though too late to allow their admission to the banquet, implies that that which those whom they denote are to lack, is something which they are to obtain afterwards, though not in time to allow their admission to the supper of the Lamb. It is indicated, also, by the consideration that it was by a want of prudence or forethought only that the foolish virgins lost the privilege and honor to which they were invited; not from hostility to the bridegroom, a disposition to slight him, or any malignant or selfish affection that made it unsuitable that they should be admitted to the feast. It is the lack of due preparation, therefore, from inconsideration and want of forethought, for Christ's coming and the great scenes of the supper that are to follow, that is the defect of those whom the virgins represent; not an absolute want of penitence, faith, and love; and this is confirmed by the exhortation with which the Saviour closes the parable—to live in perpetual expectation of his coming, and preparation for it—

"Watch, therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour in which the Son of Man cometh;" which implies that a proper watchfulness in respect to his coming, will prove to his disciples, what care to supply themselves with a proper quantity of oil, would have been to the foolish virgins.

The parable thus teaches what is expressly foreshown (Rev. xix 1-9), that at Christ's second coming, the saints whom he is then to raise in glory, are to be constituted his bride; that is, are to be publicly instituted in that relation to him as kings and priests which they are for ever thereafter to sustain, and in virtue of which they are to reign with him: and that after that inauguration there is to be a festival answering to a marriage feast. Beyond this, it teaches also that all living believers are to be invited to that festival, but that a large share of them are to exclude themselves by a want of proper qualifications; and that though they are afterwards to acquire that which they at first lacked, they are nevertheless to be denied admission to the feast.

The great lesson of the parable thus is, that watchfulness for Christ's coming, a special preparation for it by a vivid faith in its vicinity, and a knowledge and cultivation of the affections that are necessary in order to meeting him and joining his train, is essential to an admission to the festival at the inauguration of the risen saints in their kingly and priestly offices. This watchfulness is enjoined by Christ on many occasions, and is urged in a very emphatic manner in the Apocalypse, by indicating, like the parable, that those who neglect it will be exposed to shame. "Behold, I come as a thief. Blessed is he that watcheth and keepeth his garments" on, ready to go forth—"lest," if unrobed—"he walk naked, and they see his shame" (Rev. xvi. 15). This implies that if unrobed, as it were, and slumbering; if inconsiderate of his coming; if given up to ease and thoughtlessness—if not in absolute expectation and watchfulness for his appearing, they cannot be prepared for it; nor for the honors and joys to which they are to be admitted, who are waiting and longing for it. What the state of those who are to be admitted to the festival is to be in other respects, compared to that of those who are excluded from it;

whether they are to be changed to immortal, and are to be caught up together with the risen saints to meet the Lord in the air; and the others are to be debarred from that change for the time, though perhaps probable, is not made known.

XVI. THE TALENTS.

Matthew xxv. 14-30.

"Moreover," the kingdom of heaven "is like a man who, travelling abroad, called his servants, and delivered to them his property: and to one he gave five talents, to another two, and to another one; to every one according to his peculiar ability; and immediately he departed. And he who had received five talents went and wrought with them, and made other five talents. And likewise he who had two, he also gained other two. But he who had received one, went and digged in the earth and hid his lord's money. And after a long time the lord of those servants came and reckoned with them. And he who had received five talents, brought other five talents, saying: Lord, thou deliveredst unto me five talents. Behold other five talents I have gained in addition to them. And his lord said to him: Well, good and faithful servant. Thou hast been faithful in respect to a few talents; I will intrust you with many. Enter into the joy of thy lord. And he also came who had received two talents, and said: Lord, thou deliveredst to me two talents. Behold two other talents, I have gained in addition to them. And his lord said to him: Well, good and faithful servant. Thou hast been faithful in respect to a few talents; I will intrust you with many. Enter into the joy of thy lord. And he also came who had received one talent, and said: Lord, I knew that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown; and gathering where thou hast not strewed: and being afraid, I went and hid thy talent in the earth. Behold, thou hast thine. And his lord answered and said to him: O wicked servant and slothful, thou knewest that I reap where I have not sown, and gather where I have not scattered? Thou oughtest then to have placed my money with the money dealers, and when I came

I might have received mine own with interest. Take therefore from him the talent, and give it to him who has ten talents. For to every one that has shall be given, and he shall abound. But from him who hath not, even that which he has shall be taken : And cast the unprofitable servant into the darkness that is without. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."

Though this parable is not declared by Christ to be an exemplification of the kingdom of God, yet that is undoubtedly its office, and he and those of his disciples whom he intrusts with the care of his kingdom here, are the persons in whom the master and his servants have their parallel.

The lord of the servants, when he committed his property to their care, was about to travel into a distant country. The corresponding period in Christ's administration, was that of his commanding his disciples to preach the gospel and make disciples in all nations, immediately before his ascension to heaven.

The persons to whom the lord committed his property, were his own servants ; who belonged to him, as slaves, or were bound by express engagement to his service, over whom, therefore, he had authority, and who were justly responsible to him for their conduct. Those to whom Christ at his ascension intrusted the care of his interests here, were his disciples, whom he had expressly called to his service as apostles and teachers, taught them the work which he assigned them, and given them authority to perform the offices which it involved—to teach all nations, to baptize them, and to instruct and excite them to obey all his commandments. It is the apostles and preachers of the gospel whom the servants of the parable represent ; not believers in Christ generally : teachers and ministers who are intrusted with the preaching of the word, the initiation of believers into the church, and the instruction and discipline of them in respect to the various duties of the Christian life—not the persons promiscuously who constitute the church. They are official persons, who have a special work intrusted to them ; who are called to act in a peculiar sphere.

That which was intrusted to the servants was their lord's money ; his property that was distinct from themselves, on

the supposition that they also were his property, and that might be used directly by them or transferred to others so as to be made to yield an increase. It was not their own persons, it was not their skill in their several spheres, it was not their life, health, cultivation, or happiness. It was his silver, his money ; property that was distinct from themselves, and which they were to employ so as to secure an increase or augmentation of it to him. That which they were to do was the addition of other talents to those which they received. So that which Christ intrusted to his apostles and other teachers of the gospel, is not each one's own person, piety, or salvation ; it is something wholly external to themselves, of which they have the care, and to which they may, by fulfilling the duties with which they are charged, gain an increase. It is accordingly his church, the unofficial company of his disciples, whom the apostles and other teachers were to have the care of, to teach and govern, and to which they were by preaching and baptism to make additions. As the servants of the parable made accessions to their lord's money by using it according to its nature and the customs of the age of borrowing and giving interest for the use of money ; so the apostles and other preachers of the gospel were to make accessions to the company of Christ's disciples by the means appointed to that end ; the preaching of the gospel to all nations, the baptism of believers by which they made profession of their faith and became members of the church, and the instruction of them in all the duties which Christ enjoined. This is exemplified by Paul in his exhibition of the church as a field or plantation, and the work of the ministers of the gospel as that of husbandmen, some of whom sowed the seed, and others watered the plants, while God gave the increase. The lord of the servants distributed his property to his servants according to their several abilities. Each one had as much as his powers and skill qualified him to employ, and no one had more. So Christ intrusted to each of his apostles, and now intrusts to his ministers, a share of the interests of his church that equals their several abilities. There is no one who has not a sphere of activity and influence that demands all his powers. There is no one, though weak, who, if he make a proper use of his powers, will not find himself,

by the blessing of God, equal to the care of the interests with which he is intrusted.

Two of the lord's servants who were upright and laborious, used his money for the ends for which it was intrusted to them, and added large gains to it; while the third, who was wicked and slothful, instead of using the sum committed to him, hid it in the ground. So the upright and faithful ministers of Christ devote themselves to the work with which they are charged; preach the gospel to men, gather large accessions of believers into the church, and labor to form them to that character which Christ requires of his disciples; but the wicked and slothful refuse the proper duties of their office. The gospel which it is their business to preach they keep out of sight; no believers are added to the church by their instrumentality; and no efforts are made by them, by instruction, warning, and example, to purify those who bear Christ's name and cause them to walk worthy of the gospel. These two classes are now seen in the sacred office, as broadly distinguished by their respective characteristics as the servants in the parable who are their representatives were.

After a long time the lord of the servants returned and reckoned with them. He held them responsible for the money he had committed to their charge, and for the use they had made of it. So Christ after a long period is to return and call the ministers of his word to account for the manner in which they have exercised the office with which they have been charged. He will hold them responsible for the trust he has committed to them.

As the good and faithful servants had, during the absence of their lord, acted in their sphere as his, and with a proper regard to his interests, so when they appeared before him at his return, they presented to him as his, both the talents they had received and those they had gained. They set up no private claims in contravention of his; they uttered no intimations that in committing the talents to them and departing to a distant country he had resigned to them the ownership of the property, and left them as its masters to act in its use independently of him. As they had received the money from him in their relation as his servants, so on his return they recognised him as their lord, and the owner both of the

property with which they had been intrusted and of the gains they had added to it. So the faithful preachers of the gospel regard themselves as the ministers of Christ, and proclaim the word, and fulfil the various duties of their office with a supreme reference to his will. The churches that are committed to their care, and the believers who are added to them by their instrumentality, they regard as his property, not as their own, and will, at their appearance at his tribunal, present them to him as his. On the other hand the wicked and unfaithful servant, though he did not claim the talent intrusted to him as his own, assumed that he was under no obligation to employ it for his lord's benefit, and claimed the right of appropriating his time and labor exclusively to his own interests. The very reason which he offered for burying the talent was, that his lord was a hard master, reaping where he had not sowed, and gathering where he had not scattered; which was equivalent to asserting that his lord had no right to exact a use of his money from the servants to whom he intrusted it; but that in taking the profit of it obtained by their labor he reaped where he had not sown and gathered where he had not scattered. He openly held, therefore, that the servant was the proper owner of all the gains that were made by him from his lord's money; and that if his lord were not a hard and unrighteous master he would allow him to hold it as his. As then he denied the right of his lord to any gains he might make from the use of the talent, and was resolved not to work for his benefit; while yet he was afraid if he appropriated any gains he might make from the money to his own use, his lord would exact them from him; he thought he could escape the difficulty on the one hand by preserving the talent, and on the other by not earning anything from it, under the persuasion that if no gains were made from it, his lord could not demand any; and thence, that in returning the talent, he would give all that was due to his lord and evade all liability to punishment. So unfaithful and unprincipled ministers of Christ, while they admit that the church with which they are intrusted belongs to him, in effect assume that they are under no obligation to devote themselves to his service in preaching his gospel and winning believers to him; but claim the right of acting independently of him, and of appropriating their labors exclu-

sively to their own benefit; and maintain that all that they can be held responsible for is the preservation and return of that which is committed to them as they received it, without either accession or diminution. To wear the badges of their office, to keep up an organization, to go through the routine of public services, is all, they assume, that can be demanded of them.

The good and faithful servants the lord approved and commended. He promised to intrust to them still greater sums of money, and invited them to enter into the joy of their lord. They were admitted to the feast which he made, and shared in the exhilaration and pleasure which he felt from the prosperous condition of his affairs. So the faithful ministers of Christ are to be approved by him, and intrusted with still more important offices in his kingdom. They are to be admitted to his presence also, and to share in the joy which the glory of his kingdom and the progress of the work of redemption yields him.

The unfaithful servant was rejected and condemned on the very ground which he offered in justification of himself. If he believed that his lord would infallibly, when he returned, demand not only the talent he had intrusted to him, but the interest also or profit it might fairly be made to yield, though he thought it unjust, he should have acted on it as a certainty, and taken care, therefore, to avoid blame and punishment, by using the talent so as to be able to meet his lord's expectation. Instead of that, by his own representation of himself, he took the very course that necessarily brought him into controversy with his lord; for he undertook to justify himself by denying his lord's rights, and accusing him of unreasonableness and extortion. He not only refused to do his duty, but he assailed his lord with insults and calumnies. He was deprived, therefore, of the talent, and instead of being admitted to the feast, the joyous banquet of his lord, was cast into the darkness without, where was wailing and gnashing of teeth. In like manner the unfaithful ministers of Christ will be condemned on the ground which they offer as the justification of their unfaithfulness. In the assumption of the sacred office, they recognise the fact that Christ commissions them to preach the gospel and win disciples to him, and that he will demand

of them the proper fruits of that work. In refusing that duty, therefore, and perverting the office to their own private ends, they take the course that must, by their own profession, draw on them Christ's displeasure, and debar them from a place in his kingdom. The evil servant made it apparent that he was not a proper person to be any longer intrusted with the care of his lord's money. Why should it be continued in his hands after he had openly refused to employ it for the ends for which it was given him, and denied, with insults and calumnies, that his lord had any title to his services? In like manner unfaithful ministers will have given the most ample proof that they are not suitable persons to be intrusted with any further offices in Christ's kingdom. Why should they be continued in offices in which they have not only refused to perform the duties, but have denied that Christ has a right to exact them? Instead, therefore, of being admitted to the rewards of his kingdom, they will be cast into the darkness without, where is wailing and gnashing of teeth.

This parable is prophetic, and its prediction of the character of the classes of the ministers of the gospel has received a conspicuous verification in every age. The good and faithful ministers have devoted themselves to the great ends of their office, in preaching the gospel, in winning believers to the profession of their faith, and in instructing and perfecting them in holiness, and making them meet for his kingdom; and they have been crowned in all ages with a measure of success, very much in proportion to their fidelity. The wicked and slothful ministers, on the other hand, have been equally distinguished for omitting to preach the gospel, and gather believers into the church, for contenting themselves with merely keeping up a church organization, and a round of rites and external worship, and for a perversion, of their office to their own ends, as though they owed no responsibility to Christ. They are eminently without the spirit of their Master, and are formalists, worldlings, or false teachers, who in some form set up themselves in the place of Christ, or substitute a false and selfish system in place of the gospel of his salvation.

The parable teaches that the faithful ministers of Christ are to be rewarded for their fidelity here by being exalted

to still more important offices in his kingdom at his second coming. As the faithful servants were to be rewarded for their fidelity and success by being intrusted with many talents; so the faithful ministers of the gospel whom they represent, are to be rewarded by being advanced to higher offices as teachers and rulers in Christ's kingdom. This prediction of the parable is thus in harmony with the Apocalypse, which foreshows that the holy dead are to be raised at Christ's coming, and constituted kings and priests unto God, and to Christ, and are to reign with him on the earth, Rev. xx. 4-6; v. 9, 10. It accords also with Dan. vii. 18, 22, 27, in which it is revealed that the saints are, at the period of Christ's receiving the dominion of the earth, to take the kingdom, and to possess it for ever and ever. And as that kingdom is to be a kingdom over all people, nations, and tongues, under the whole heavens, it indicates that men are still to exist in the natural life, and that it is over them that the saints are to reign as kings. If not, over whom is it that they are to reign? If there are to be none in the natural life—if all are to be risen saints, or saints changed to the same glory, according to the doctrine generally held—who are to be their subjects? How can they reign, if no intelligent beings are placed under their authority? How can they be one another's subjects, if they are all glorified saints, and all glorified saints are kings? This part of the parable, like those prophecies, is inexplicable, unless the doctrine taught in every part of the prophetic Scriptures, though generally overlooked and rejected, is true, that men are to continue in the natural life after Christ's coming and commencement of his millennial reign on the earth.

ART. II.—NOTES ON SCRIPTURE, EXCERPTS, SHORT
COMMENTS.

Isaiah, chap. iv.—This chapter has respect to a time “when the Lord shall have washed away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall have purged the blood of Jerusalem from the midst thereof.” This time has not yet come.

Jerusalem is still trodden down by the Gentiles. A Turkish mosque is erected upon the site, it is said, of the temple of Solomon,—and the Jews are still in their dispersion and unbelief. But when the predicted time shall come, “then the Lord will create (or re-produce) over every dwelling-place of Mount Zion, and over the places of her solemn assemblies, a cloud and a smoke by day, and the shining of a flaming fire by night,” &c.

This passage clearly alludes to the pillar of fire that gave light to the camp of Israel in the desert by night, and to the pillar of cloud in which he went before them by day. Such a visible token of the divine presence, the prophecy seems to say, shall at the time predicted become stationary over the holy mountain of Zion. Will this be literally fulfilled? or is it an allegory? Time will show.

Isaiah viii. 16. The chief advantage of Israel was (as the apostle Paul assures us (Rom. iii. 2) that to them were committed the oracles of God. But when the Lord Jesus went to them and was a stone of stumbling and rock of offence, &c., and the nation stumbled and fell (see Isaiah viii. 14, 15), then this advantage was taken away. Israel was cast off, and the Gentiles were called. This is introduced in the passage above referred to. “Bind up the testimony, seal the law among my *disciples*.” The first followers of Christ were called *disciples*. The sacred records were to be bound up and sealed, and committed to this new people as complete. The next verse describes the prophet (who personates in this passage the humanity of the Messiah, as is proved by Heb. ii. 13), as waiting for Jehovah, who *hideth his face from the house of Jacob*, and as *looking for him till the appointed time of Israel’s rejection shall be accomplished*. This period is now current—when will it terminate? Of that day and that hour knoweth no one. Yet the first disciples earnestly desired, and intently looked for that event as the blessed hope. (Tit. ii. 13; Rev. xi.; Acts i. 6.)

Isaiah xi. 4. With the *breath of his lips* shall he slay the wicked. This passage is supposed to refer to the same event as 2 Thess. ii. 8: “And then shall that wicked be revealed whom the Lord shall consume with the *spirit of his mouth*, and shall destroy by the brightness of his coming.” This

passage in Isaiah is followed by a description of that happy state of the earth which is commonly called the Millennium. "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them," &c. (See the whole context.) Is this an allegory? If so, can we understand by it less than the extinction of all natural evil, and of all moral evil too? But is it not to be literally fulfilled? Are we prepared to say that the lion, the wolf, the leopard, the tiger, fed in paradise as beasts of prey now feed? Is it not more probable that their ravenous propensities came upon them as a part of the curse? Is it not more strange that one animal *should* prey upon another, than that Christ (when he shall come again as the Lord from heaven and assume the dominion of the earth as the second Adam) should *restore the primæval peace* which prevailed during the period of Adam's innocency? Our early notions are so deeply impressed upon us that it is difficult to remove them and to substitute others in their stead. But whatever be the meaning of this passage, this much is clear, that it is descriptive of a state of things which will follow upon the destruction of the man of sin, and of that wicked which Paul teaches us will be accomplished by the brightness of the Lord's coming. These verses, then (viz. the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th of the 11th chap. of Isaiah), may be read as the sequel to the first twelve verses of the second chapter of 2 Thess.

Isaiah xiii., verses 4 to 13. A learned writer says: this passage illustrates the meaning of the expression, "Jehovah Sabaoth," translated, Lord of Hosts. We are not to understand it of the Deity absolutely, or of the Father personally distinguished, but of the Son as announced to come with his "holy myriads," as in the prophecy of Enoch, Jude 14, 15, or in the 149th Psalm, with which he says this passage (in Is. xiii. 4-13) is parallel. These holy myriads will consist, as he supposes, of "angels and glorified men," which are called the armies, or *shining hosts* of heaven. In this character he revealed himself to Joshua as captain of the Lord's hosts. Josh. v. 14; see Matt. xxv. 31. When the Son of Man shall come in his glory and all the holy angels with him, &c.

Jeremiah xxxi. 35-37. The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah was entire: no remnant was left. Such also was the destruction of Babylon of old (Isaiah xiii. 19), and such will be the destruction of mystical Babylon (Rev. xviii. 21). Such it is predicted also will be the destruction of the kingdom of the image (Dan ii. 35) and of the kingdom symbolized by the fourth beast. (Dan vii. 11.) But the leaving of a *remnant* under every dispensation was to distinguish the judgments which should befall the Jews. Thus far we have seen it verified, and it will be found true to the end of time (Jer. xxvi. 28). "Fear not, O Jacob, saith the Lord, . . . for I will make a full end of all the nations whither I have driven thee. Yet I will not make a full end of thee."

In the prophetic writings "the world" generally signifies that part of the human race with which the church of God is concerned—the nations among whom God's people are mingled—in whose temporal interests they are involved—among whom they are exposed to temptation and corruption, if not to hatred and persecution. The expression of Paul in Acts xvii. 31 is peculiar: "Because he has appointed a day in which he will judge the (οικουμένη) earth (which is inhabited). In the time of this apostle, the Romans called their empire *Imperium orbis terrarum*; and Augustus Cæsar is said to have taxed the whole (οικουμένη) world (Luke ii. 1), which of course can mean only that portion of the world which was subject to that power. "The reason," says Jurieu, "why God takes no notice of so many great events that happen without the bounds of the Roman empire; of the great empires that are established, the nations that are overturned, the bloody wars that are everywhere; and insists only on the fourth monarchy, or the Roman empire, is because God reveals not future events, but with respect to the church which he loveth, and which he conducts, and which he will instruct concerning his will. Now, the church was to be inclosed within, or very nearly within, the bounds of the Roman empire. I know that there were Christian churches in Persia, and it may be in some of the Indies. But all this 'was but a small matter. Euphrates 'was the bound of Christianity,—it spread very little beyond it. The church therefore had no need to know what should happen beyond it," &c. On this ground many suppose

the day of the Lord's advent will be especially terrible to apostate Christendom, or the Roman empire symbolized by the fourth beast in the prophecy of Daniel.

Isaiah xxxii. 5. The word which in this place is translated *vile person* (Nabal) signifies literally "that which is fallen," "faded," or "decayed"—(*proprie emarcidus*). It sometimes signifies "an impious, wicked man" (*homo impius, sceleratus*) 1 Sam. xxv. 25. This term probably gave rise to an expression we find in 2 Thess. ii. 3, "Man of Sin."

Isaiah xlv. 18. In this place it is said God formed the earth to be inhabited; and see Isaiah xlviii. 18, 19. But the apostle Paul tells us, Rom. viii. 20, that this creation is now subjected to vanity, not willingly, indeed, but through him that subjected it in hope. The earth does not now answer the end and design for which it was created. An enemy has usurped the dominion over it, and led captive at his will the greater portion of the human race. In numberless instances the noblest productions of the earth are perverted to evil. Man's prevarication has disordered the course of nature, and all inferior animals have been made to participate in the evil which has come from that source. Surely the earth was very different from its present condition when God pronounced it very good. Consider the disorder in the elements experienced in a greater or less degree in every climate. Consider again that the fairest parts of the earth to this day lie desolate. See whole races of men pining in want, in ignorance—appearing scarcely human—savages, some of them even cannibals. And what is worse, look at man in those countries where his intellect is most cultivated. How many abuse their superior advantages to dishonor God, and establish more firmly the dominion of sin. And are things always to remain thus? Will God be frustrated of his purpose? If he has made the earth to be inhabited, to be subdued by man, and to be replenished by him to its utmost capacity, will not that purpose some day be realized? Listen to the apostle Paul: "The earnest expectation of the creature (or of creation) waiteth for (*i. e.* is directed to) the manifestation of the sons of God." But why? because the creature (*i. e.* the creation or this earth of ours) shall (at that time) be delivered from the

bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God (Rom. viii. 19, 21). This abuse, therefore, is permitted *only for a season*. It will continue only while Satan is permitted to retain his power in this world. When he shall be expelled, the disorder, which came in with him, will also cease. The earth cursed of God, and cursed by being subjected to the dominion of Satan, will for ever be delivered from such debasing bondage. Man, being placed under a new dominion and under holy influences, will be allowed to multiply and replenish the earth in its restored condition, and made subject to the kingdom of God, which then will have come.

How long, dear Saviour, oh, how long
Shall thy blest hour delay ?

Isaiah xlv. 11. "Thus saith the Lord the Holy One of Israel, and his maker: Ask me of things concerning my sons, and concerning the work of my hands command ye me." Or as Bishop Lowth has it, "Do ye question me concerning my children? and do ye give me directions concerning the works of my hands?" The preceding context of this passage is cited by the apostle Paul in Rom. ix. 20: "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" In the next verse (v. 12) of this passage also, God refers to his relation and right as creator: "I have made the earth and created man upon it; I, my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded."

The doctrines of grace and election must all be resolved into this—Man is lost, and he who thus deals with him is his creator and the creator of all things. Verse 13, "I have raised him up in righteousness, and I will direct all his ways. He shall build my city, and he shall let go my captives not for price nor reward, saith the Lord of hosts," refers to a greater than Cyrus, and a far greater redemption than that of old from Babylon, in which a part of one tribe only returned. The sons and captives here spoken of are all the redeemed of the Lord. They are his elect people. These, wherever and however scattered abroad, shall all be gathered together in one, and not the Jewish nation only

(John xi. 52). The Jewish people, or the race of Israel, are in this place called Sons of God, and all those from among the Gentiles who devote themselves to the God of Israel are called the Israel of God (Gal. vi. 16). Israel according to the flesh, was an elect people, and they were the only elect people, until God cast them off for a time, on account of their rejection of the Lord Jesus Christ. Now God is gathering another elect people, and putting them in the place of his ancient elect people, which Paul compares to the operation of grafting branches taken from a wild-olive tree into a good olive tree (Rom. xi. 17-24). That is to say, the sons whom God is gathering now from among the Gentiles, are put into the place which originally belonged to the natural posterity of Israel. God is in fact doing a wonder equal to that which John the Baptist told the Jews he was able to do—namely, to raise up of the stones children unto Abraham (Matt. iii. 9). Yet in doing this we see (as in the choice of Israel) the mystery of God's election. The gospel has been published among comparatively only a few of the nations of the earth. Why is this? And in the nations where it has been published, many are called and invited, yet few believe and come. Why is this? "Do ye question me, says God, concerning my sons? I have made the earth and created man upon it." God is not to be interrogated concerning the children of his love. We have no right to ask why few and not many—why this and not that is chosen. Let God be true, though every man be a liar. But there is no greater mystery in the facts on which these questions turn, than there is in the fact that Israel should have been elected as a nation, while all other nations were passed by. In fact, Israel is still an elect people, and, though now dispersed, will at last be gathered upon the mountains of Canaan. "For there shall come a deliverer, who shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob" (Rom. xi. 26; Isaiah lix. 20), and then shall they be gathered and restored as a nation. But previously to this time, God will have completed another elect nation—that, namely, which he is now gathering during the dispensation of the gospel to the Gentiles, into the place which Israel according to the flesh lost. This elect nation is the church (1 Peter ii. 9). Then there will be two elect nations, viz. the Israel of God

in the resurrection state—a glorious people, clothed in bodies of glory and irresistible strength,—immortal and angelic also, which, having been gathered to meet the Lord at his coming, will be for ever with their adorable head. Of this body our Lord spake when he said, “Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory which thou hast given me,” John xvii. 24, which compare with 1 Thess. iv. 17. This body will compose a nation of kings and priests (Rev. v. 10; xx. 6). They will reign, perhaps visibly, perhaps sometimes invisibly ministering to men in the flesh, as angels now do to them. The other elect nation will be restored Israel in the flesh, to whom shall then be given preëminence among the nations of the earth, but through whom all other nations shall be blessed. We speak now of the world to come, or the economy of the kingdom of God, which we pray for when we say “Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” Thus election marks the dealings of God with the lost race of man. Israel according to the flesh, was the elect nation for many centuries before the coming of Christ; but proving unfaithful, God took away from them the kingdom which he had conditionally promised to them (Exodus xix. 5), and for these 1800 years and more has been gathering another elect people to take their place as heirs of the kingdom, out of a few of the nations of the earth. When this work shall be accomplished, then a new economy, or order of things, on earth shall begin. Israel, now fallen from his high vocation as a nation, shall be restored to God’s favor again, and shall acquire preëminence as the elect nation among all the nations of the earth, but shall not be admitted into that glorified nation of kings and priests which, during their unbelief, the Lord is now calling and collecting chiefly from among Gentiles, which shall then literally reign as *glorified men* under Christ their head over this lower world, according to the predictions in the eighth Psalm.

These views are irreconcilably at variance with Arminianism as a system, and also with the expectations of those Calvinists who anticipate a time during the present economy of grace to the Gentiles, when it will no longer be true that “the many are called but few are chosen.” Yet what reason

have such persons to expect that the gospel will be preached with better success among the Hindoos or Chinese than it has been among the nations of Europe? Is not human nature the same in all countries and times? Were not the Scriptures we have designed to serve the church until the second coming of Christ? Are not their declarations, exhortations, injunctions, promises, anticipations, &c., as applicable in one age of this dispensation as in another, even until the time of the end? Will the *true church* on earth, during this dispensation, cease to be a *little flock*? Will it cease to have tribulation in the world? Will the world and the devil cease to be adversaries of the church till the Head of the church appears and summons his saints with the Archangel's trump? Are not then these interpretations of prophecy which teach us to expect the calling and conversion of *all* nations, and of *all* men of every nation, and also universal righteousness over all the earth during this economy, at least questionable? True, all things which have been written in the law and the prophets shall be literally fulfilled; the question is merely as to the time, whether they will be fulfilled in this dispensation, or whether there is not a world to come whereof these things have been written. Is not the doctrine of election true, and will it not be exemplified by God's dealings with our race till Christ shall appear in his glory to establish his kingdom with power over this world which he has redeemed?

Isaiah, chap. lx. "Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee," &c.

Scott admits that the prophecy recorded in this chapter has not yet been fulfilled, but he considers it a figurative prediction of the purity and enlargement of the church. Bishop Horsley remarks, "The images of the prophecy so far exceed anything that has yet taken place, that it is reasonable to think the accomplishment is reserved for the second advent of our Lord. This even Jerome is obliged to confess, though from his great aversion to the Chiliasts of antiquity, he was very unwilling to admit any other restoration of the Jews than their conversion to Christianity." But if the epoch of the fulfilment is yet future, the second verse intimates a season of darkness (gross darkness), immediately preceding its accomplishment. Accordingly commentators have found in the prevalence of Mahometanism,

and the idolatry and superstition of large branches of the Christian church a fulfilment of the prediction; and Scott anticipated a still more gloomy scene just before the Lord shall arise in his meridian brightness most gloriously to irradiate mankind with his beams of truth and righteousness. Other commentators expect the same gloomy scene, which they suppose will be broken only by the brightness of the Lord's appearing in person. The difference arises from different principles of interpretation. Many persons suppose this prophecy refers to restored Israel, and not to the Christian church. Scott applies it to the church, and he cites Bishop Lowth to prove that "nothing is more usual than for the prophets to describe the state of the Christian church by representations taken from the Jewish temple and service." But it cannot be the Gentile church which is here addressed. Let the reader turn to the twentieth verse of the preceding chapter, where this should begin; there he will see the seed of Jacob is addressed. Or if he will consult the Septuagint, the Vulgate, or the Arabic versions, he will find Jerusalem expressly named. Besides, the distinctive marks between the Gentile and Jewish churches are precise and insuperable. For example, "Light is risen on *thee* (v. 1) while gross darkness shall cover *the people* (v. 2). *Gentiles* shall come to *thy* light (v. 3). *Thy* sons shall come from far (v. 4), i. e. be gathered from their dispersion among the nations. The forces of the *Gentiles* shall come unto *thee* (v. 5). The *sons of strangers*, i. e. Gentiles, shall build *thy* walls, and *their kings* shall minister unto *thee*, for in my wrath I smote *thee* (v. 10), thy gates shall be open continually that men may bring unto *thee* the forces of the *Gentiles*, and that *their kings* may be brought (v. 11), for the nation and kingdom (of the Gentiles) that will not serve *thee* shall perish (v. 12)." Somehow the ships of Tarshish are to be employed (and the ships of Tarshish *first*, implying that the ships of other countries will also be employed) in bringing *thy* sons from far, their silver and their gold with them, which, to say the least, is a very awkward figure to express the introduction of converts into the church, though (without a figure) a very proper means of restoring the dispersed Israelites to their land (v. 9). Again, there is to be a sanctuary which is to be beautified by the fir tree, the pine tree, the box, the glory

of Lebanon. This sanctuary shall be the place of Jehovah's feet, and will be made glorious (v. 13). This cannot refer to the heavenly Jerusalem, which John saw descending from heaven; for in that he *saw no temple* (Rev. xxi. 22). Again, the sons of them that afflicted *thee* (that is, of their Gentile oppressors) shall come bending to *thee*, and *they* that despised *thee* shall bow themselves down at the soles of *thy* feet and call *thee* (what?) the city of the Lord, the Zion of the Holy one of Israel (v. 14). Thou shalt suck the milk of the *Gentiles*, and shalt suck the *breast of kings* (v. 16). *Thy* people shall be all righteous, and shall *inherit the land* for ever (v. 21). And passing on to the sixty-first chapter, verses four to seven, it is said, they shall build *old wastes*, they shall raise up the *former desolations*, and they shall repair *the waste cities*, the *desolations* of many generations, and strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of the alien shall be your ploughmen and your vine-dressers; but *ye* shall be named the priests of the Lord, and *men* shall call *you* the ministers of our God, and *ye* shall eat the *riches of the Gentiles*, and in *their* glory shall *ye* boast *yourselves*.

There are many more points of contrast. He is a bold interpreter who can construe all these expressions to signify the prosperity of the Gentile church. Is there not something fearfully wrong in a system of interpretation which deals thus with the word of God? Did the reader ever reflect upon the probable influence which such a system of interpretation must have upon the mind of an unbeliever or upon one that is unlearned? And yet prophecy is designed for the conviction of such, 1 Cor. xiv. 24, 25. What can such interpreters answer (which may not be retorted) to the chimeras of Origen or the extravagances of Swedenborg? Is not the one system as defensible as the other? How can we believe that the multitude of camels, the dromedaries of Midian and Ephah, which the prophet says shall cover *thee* (*i. e.* Jerusalem), refer to the Gentile church? (v. 6.) By what rules of interpretation more rational than those of Swedenborg can it be shown that the flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together unto the Gentile churches, and that the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto the Gentile churches? But when understood with reference to the sacrifices upon the altar of God at Jerusalem, the expressions are intelligible. Let the reader turn to the

sixtieth chapter, twentieth verse, and apply the same spiritualizing system—horses, chariots, litters, mules, swift beasts, are very inapt instruments to be employed in bringing converts into the Christian churches, but very proper for gathering a dispersed people like the Jews into their own land. But leaving these topics, a word or two may be added upon verses nineteen and twenty of this sixtieth chapter. “The sun shall be no more thy light by day,” &c. This may be understood of Jerusalem when it shall be restored. The passage does not teach that the sun and moon shall be destroyed. It may mean that the light of the Divine Shechinah in its cloud of glory shall rest over Jerusalem, and supersede the necessity of these luminaries, as we know it did to the journeying Israelites in the desert. See Isa. iv. 5. It was probably this light which shone around Paul when he was on his way to Damascus. Would such an event be a greater wonder than has been? If not, why spiritualize it on the ground that if understood literally it would be incredible? John, indeed, describes a city (Rev. xxi. 23) which had no need of the sun, but that is not the city described in this chapter, for that will have no temple (Rev. xxi. 22), but this will have a temple (v. 13). That city will be of no earthly material or structure. It is not to consist of restored Israel in the flesh, but the risen and glorified and immortal saints, the Israel of God, the church of the first born. They who are to constitute it are called joint heirs with Christ, his brethren, his friends, his redeemed, the children of his Father, his own children, his witnesses, his bride, his members, members of his body, of his flesh, of his bones, his fellow sufferers, fellow kings, fellow priests. They stand in the most affectionate relation to him; they are one with him, they are like the angels, equal to the angels, clothed with irresistible strength, each having power over all the power of the enemy, greater power even than the arch fiend. They will be rulers with Christ in the kingdom of God, inheriting a glory infinitely transcending that which will be conferred upon restored Israel in the habitable earth to come.

In what manner this glorious body will have intercourse with men in the flesh is a mystery of which the scene upon the mount of transfiguration was a type. There were Moses and Elias and the transfigured Saviour in glory; and there were Peter, James, and John in tabernacles of flesh. Per-

haps the intercourse between the Lord and his disciples during the forty days after the resurrection may serve as an example of the mysterious intercourse which will subsist between the risen saints and men in the flesh. But though the manner of the intercourse be inexplicable, the fact appears to be clearly revealed. "The error of the ancient Chiliasts arose from not distinguishing between the risen saints of the first resurrection and the nations in the flesh, which will be continued on earth after the second coming of Christ and the first resurrection," and the judgment which will then be inflicted upon apostate Christendom. The same error is made by some nowadays. But this distinction, which is clearly marked, opens plainly a thousand Scriptures which, without it, must be mystified. To the nations in the flesh earthly enjoyments are promised. They will build, plant, propagate their species, and fill the earth. Satan will deceive them no more for a time. The curse will be in a great measure, if not entirely, removed from the earth. The inferior races of animals will be deprived of their ferocious propensities. In the fullest and happiest sense which can be predicated of it, the earth will be for the habitation of man. These things, however, are not said of the risen and glorified body of Christ's redeemed. They will not marry nor be given in marriage, nor will they die any more; they will need no earthly house or earthly city to inhabit. The vast fabric of creation will be open to them, their new natures and powers giving them easy access. They will not be *subjects* like the nations in the flesh, but *rulers* in the kingdom of God, being conformed by the body of the glory of Christ their first-born brother. Whether these views be according to the Scriptures or not, they serve to discriminate those who hold them from the Chiliasts of Jerome's day as well as from some of the present day who hold similar opinions.

THE ACCEPTABLE YEAR OF THE LORD.

Isaiah lxi. 2. "To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." Our blessed Lord, at the commencement of his public ministry, applied to himself the passage in which this expression occurs, as appears by Luke iv. 16, 19. He added, "this day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears."

It follows, that as the Lord Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision (Rom. xv. 8) and sent *only* to the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matt. xv. 24), *the meek*, to whom he was anointed to preach; *the broken-hearted*, he was sent to bind up; the *captives* and prison-bound, to whom he was sent to proclaim liberty; and those to whom he was commissioned to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, were of the Jewish nation. He preached to no other people, and as the Lord Jesus Christ only was the *anointed one* here spoken of, this prophecy must have terminated with his personal mission to that people. It would be interesting to inquire how the Jews were poor captives, prison-bound, and in what sense these epithets must be understood of them; but the purpose of these observations is to inquire what we are to understand by "the acceptable year of the Lord," for this, too, must have had a special reference to the Jewish nation. The word in the evangelist, here translated "acceptable," occurs in the following places, which the reader may consult, but it is sometimes translated *accepted* (Luke iv. 24; Acts x. 35; Phil. iv. 18; 2 Cor. vi. 2). No great light, perhaps, will be thrown on the passage by the comparison of these texts. Some suppose, and have endeavored to prove, that our Lord began to preach at the opening of a year of jubilee, and the commission of the preacher would agree with the objects for which that year was appointed. The opinion is probable; yet many years of jubilee had occurred between the prophecy and the advent of Messiah, none of which were acceptable in the sense of the prophecy; and the meaning of the expression appears to be, that the year appointed of God for the redemption of Israel had come. During the captivity, the prophet Daniel was apprised of an appointed time for this purpose. "Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the most holy (Dan. ix. 24). This period having expired, the period for the fulfilment of these glorious purposes had come, and the year was acceptable, because appointed in the divine counsels for that purpose. Nothing was wanting on the part of God. The

divine word had become incarnate, the kingdom of God had come nigh, and God was ready to execute all his glorious promises in behalf of his elect people. The time was fulfilled, and the appointed and therefore the acceptable year had come, and the kingdom of God was preached as come, and all its blessings were offered to that nation for acceptance. We cannot conceive why one year should be more acceptable to God than another, except that it had been *appointed* for some purpose. The Sabbath is now acceptable to God for his solemn worship only, because he has appointed it for that purpose. Abel's offering was more acceptable than Cain's, because it was appointed by God. The idea may be illustrated by the parable of the marriage recorded in Matt. xxii. 4. In that parable the kingdom of heaven which the Saviour preached as come nigh to that nation, is compared to a marriage a king made for his son. "And at the time, he sent forth his servants to call them that were bidden. . . . Behold, I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and fatlings are killed, and all things are ready. Come to the marriage." The time appointed for the marriage was the accepted time. Even an invited guest who should have gone before the time appointed or after it, would not have gone at a time acceptable to the king for the purpose named. The sense, then, in which we are to understand the acceptable year of the Lord, appears to be this—the year had come which God had appointed for establishing the kingdom of God, or Messiah's kingdom, over his chosen people—the year appointed for the redemption of Israel had come.

Yet Israel did not regard the time. The nation suffered the year to go by without heeding the glorious objects for which it was appointed. The incarnate word went to his own (*his own*) but his own (*his own*) received him not (John i. 11). The parable before cited represents the whole body of guests invited to the marriage as refusing to come, and the Lord at the close of his ministry most pathetically laments over Jerusalem, because she knew not that it was the time of her visitation (Luke xix. 41, 44), or the season acceptable to the Lord for the gathering and redemption of all her children (Matt. xxiii. 37, 38). The appointed and therefore acceptable year of the Lord, failed of its purpose,

not because God neglected anything on his part—it was impossible that he should do so—but because Israel failed in everything which the appointment required on their part. The kingdom, therefore, which had come to them, and was offered to them exclusively of all other people, was taken from that nation to be given to another (Matt. xxi. 43). The *elect* nation, God's chosen people, who are still precious, were permitted to stumble and fall save only a few, or an election out of this elect people (Rom. xi. 7). The word translated *year*, should perhaps be understood in a general sense. The whole period of our Lord's preaching occupied, it is supposed, three and a half years. It may be intended to comprise the whole or principal part of that period—perhaps till the death of John the Baptist. We know too that God spared the nation near forty years afterwards, and the apostles were directed to offer the gospel first to Jews,—in fact, to preach it at Jerusalem. And Peter seems to say (Acts iii. 19–21), in a public discourse to the Jews after the day of Pentecost, that if the nation would even then repent, God would send Jesus Christ to them again.

However this may be, the failure of the Jewish nation to improve the acceptable year of the Lord, became the occasion of proclaiming an acceptable *season* (καιρος) to the Gentiles. A new order of things was then commenced, in which it should come to pass that every man of every nation who feared God and wrought righteousness should be acceptable with God. This Peter declared to Cornelius (Acts x. 35). Paul speaks of this fall of the Jews as the riches of the world, and the diminution of them as the riches of the Gentiles (Rom. xi. 12), as if their fall was the indispensable pre-requisite of salvation to the Gentiles (Rom. xi. 11). In 2 Cor. vi. 2, the same apostle alludes to this mercy thus shown to the Gentiles, under the expression of *a time accepted*, probably in allusion to the acceptable year of the Lord which had been appointed for the Jewish nation (as well as to Isaiah xlix. 8). This accepted time appointed for the Gentiles is still current. How long it will continue is not revealed, but we have no reason to believe that the Gentiles, who neglect and abuse these periods of mercy, will be always spared, seeing that God visited the Jewish people with signal judgments, issuing in their entire

national destruction for the like sin. Indeed, Paul settles this point in Rom. xi. 21.

It is remarkable that the words immediately following the words quoted by our Lord, declare that his commission was also to proclaim "the day of vengeance of our God." By not citing these words, he intimated that this portion of the message with which he was charged, was not yet to be delivered. By referring to the context, the reader will see that our Lord was now just beginning to exercise his public ministry. His great business was to proclaim and offer the kingdom to that people. The day of vengeance could not be proclaimed till the nation had been tried—till they had shown by their conduct that they were despisers of the kingdom and of their king. At a subsequent period, viz. near the close of his public ministry, our Lord did proclaim the day of vengeance. (See Matt. xxi. 33, 44; xxiii. 34, 38; Luke xix. 41, 44.) God foreknew the result, indeed, but still it was needful that the acceptable year of the Lord should first be proclaimed, and be despised by the nation, before the day of vengeance should be announced as having come nigh. This could not be done till the kingdom of God had been rejected and virtually taken from them. Had the Jews accepted the kingdom, and yielded to him universally, both nationally and individually, the obedience of faith, the day of vengeance would have been a day for their enemies, Ps. lxxxix. 13, 16; Matt. xxiii. 37. He would have exercised upon the Roman oppressor the vengeance threatened in Ps. ii. 9. But the Jewish nation proving unfaithful, the day of vengeance to their enemies was deferred, while a day of vengeance soon overtook them; and instead of the vengeance threatened to their Roman enemies and oppressors, a time of mercy was opened, an acceptable time for them, and for the purpose of taking out of them an elect people, to supply the place of fallen Israel. It was an astonishing exhibition of mercy that God should purpose to take out of the nations composing the very power that put the Lord Jesus to death, this subrogated nation, as the elect church. Yet so it was; and in fact the gospel has been confined chiefly within the geographical boundaries of that power. Human reason would ask, why did not God, instead of deferring the day of vengeance, rather hasten it,

and execute his threatened judgment with the utmost severity upon the Roman power as well as upon the Jews who conspired with the Romans to put to death the Lord of glory? Why did he not send the apostles unto the nations which had taken no part in the awful sin? Why were not China and the other countries lying eastward of the Euphrates selected for the promulgation of the gospel, and for the gathering of the church? We can give no other answer to such inquiries, than the sovereign pleasure of God, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." Yet we may see a reason for the discrimination between the Jews and the Romans, though the Romans were the ruling power. The Jewish nation had enjoyed the greater privileges, they were abusers of greater mercies, and hence their guilt was greater. Hence the heathenish Romans were spared, and their national existence prolonged, while the Jewish nation was swept from their land as with a flood. By parity of reason we may expect a still severer vengeance on the nations of Christendom than that which fell on the Jews, or will fall at the coming of Christ on the unevangelized nations. We enjoy the administration of the Spirit, which was not given during the personal ministry of Christ to the Jews. The nations of Christendom have been, and still are, flagrant abusers of God's mercies, notwithstanding the better light and more precious gifts they enjoy. Hence, then, a discrimination will again be made at the winding up of this economy of the providence and grace of God between apostate Christendom and the Jews. The latter having suffered the appointed vengeance, a remnant of them will be gathered, and they shall restore the ancient desolations, and repair the ruins of former times. And they shall rebuild the cities that were destroyed by the Romans, Saracens, and Turks, which have lain waste from generation to generation (Isaiah lxi. 4, 5, the context of the passage which is the subject of these remarks), while the apostate Roman power will suffer a judgment, of which that which befel Sodom and the cities of the plain was a type, Isaiah lrv. 17-28.

"For behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind," &c., &c.

Commentators differ very widely in the interpretation of this passage. Clarius, on the words "new heavens," says, "they signify that all things are to be removed by Christ, so that we shall seem to live in a new world." On the words, "infant of days," v. 20, he says, they seem to be explained by what follows—"an old man who hath not filled his days"—that is, they shall live to the longest age, by which words what else is signified but eternity, which eternity, if he had intended to express it *oblectis verbis*—obscurely—what more apt expression could he have used? (See Critici Sacr. in loc.)

Foverius interprets the passage thus: "I have decreed (says God) to found a new world—for this is what is understood in the Scriptures by *heavens*. The reign of Christ is a new world, much more august, much more beautiful, *infinitis partibus*, than this which we see; more ample also, and more ornate. Moreover, the invisible things even of the new world far surpass in dignity and glory the most excellent things in this. Are not Paul and Peter more beautiful and dignified than the moon and the sun? Would it not be preferable that the world should be shrouded in darkness, than be deprived of the doctrine of these men?" On (v. 20) the words, "For the child shall die a hundred years old," &c.—quia puer, filius centum annorum aufertur—he says *aufferi* (to be taken off or to die) is, to be condemned by the church, &c. (See Critic. Sacr.)

Grotius glosses the words "new heavens" thus: "Not as before cloudy, but serene," and the words "new earth" thus: "As not desert and sterile, but inhabited and fruitful." He applies the prophecy to the time of the Maccabees, which he contrasts with the times in which Antiochus persecuted the Jews.

Clericus quite agrees with Grotius, both in the interpretation of the words and the application of the prophecy. Calovius, on the other hand, thought it carnal to apply these expressions to the land of Judea and the times of Antiochus. Houbigant, after citing the interpretations of Clarius, Foverius, and Grotius, remarks: "In these three commentaries of learned interpreters the reader perceives how great is the discord. Clarius understands 'new heavens and new earth' to signify eternity, which Isaiah

wished to veil under obscure words. Foverius understands by them, the visible and invisible world which Christ created by the efficacy of the gospel; and Grotius, the prosperous state the Maccabees enjoyed. One of them denies that the prophecy is to be fulfilled, except in eternity. Another of them will have it that the words of the prophet were fulfilled at the very beginning of the Christian church. The third insists that they were fulfilled before the gospel was preached. They agree, therefore, neither concerning the events predicted, nor the time of the events. In one only do they agree, viz. that the words 'new heavens and new earth' should be interpreted allegorically; but in doing this they desert, from the start, the words and the sentiment of the prophet, each in his own way." (Houbigant, *Pref. ad Prophetas.*) *Ludificant omnes quisque suo more.*

We must not suppose that the foregoing are all the opinions advanced by commentators on the passage. Dr. Whitby (on 2 Peter iii. 13) gives a paraphrase of the words of the apostle, of which it is sufficient to cite the following: "But before this conflagration, or rather, besides this conflagration"—spoken of in the tenth verse—"we expect new heavens and a new earth; as if the apostle had said, I have hitherto answered this question of these scoffers, &c. This I think fit to add also in answer to them, that we Christians expect the coming of our Lord to make such a moral change in the affairs of the church, as will amount to the new creation of heaven and earth promised to the Jews (Isaiah lxxv. 18), so that these scoffers shall have no cause to doubt of our Lord's coming, &c. &c., since he will come to raise his church by his calling the Jewish nation to the faith, and so to such a glorious state." This is a fourth interpretation. It differs from Foverius and Grotius in referring the words to the future, and from Clarius in referring them to a future condition of the church on earth. Scott agrees very nearly with Whitby. He says, "the context requires us to interpret the words in this place of that state of the church on earth which shall most resemble the world of glory in knowledge, holiness, and felicity, and which will terminate in it," &c.

Professor Bush, in allusion to this passage, advances another interpretation, though agreeing with the foregoing

in this, that no physical event is intended by the language of the prophet. The words indicate, according to his view, "the occurrence of some *new subjective condition of believers*, which enables them, with comparative ease, to pass from the sphere of the natural into the spiritual, and contemplate with unclouded survey the grand realities of that world. This will be a *virtual* abolishing of the old heavens and earth, and the opening of a new world to the wondering gaze of the illuminated spirit."

Dr. Alexander, after citing the interpretations of Aben Ezra, J. D. Michaelis, and Burnet (all differing from each other), says: "Better than all these, &c., is the explanation of the verse, as a promise or prediction of entire change in the existing state of things, the precise nature of the change and the means by which it shall be wrought forming no part of the revelation here."

We wonder greatly that learned men should thus differ in the interpretation of such plain words, and the more when we recollect that the apostle Peter (2 Peter iii.) evidently understood them in their literal sense. What shall the unlearned believe, seeing that each of these learned commentators is an authority against the opinion of every other? Rather shall he not abide by the letter, as we all do when reading Gen. i. 1—In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Behold I create new heavens and a new earth, &c. (Isaiah lxxv. 17).

PHILO.

ART. III.—THEISM: The Witness of Reason and Nature to an All-wise and Beneficent Creator. By the Rev. John Tulloch, D.D., Principal, and Primarius Professor of Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's, Scotland. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1855.

MR. BURNETT, a merchant of Aberdeen, Scotland, made provision towards the close of the last century, for premiums of £1800 and £600, to be paid at intervals of forty years, for two Essays on the Evidences of the Existence, the Wisdom, and the Goodness of God. The first were paid, we

believe, in 1814 or 1815. The present work is of the second series, and was awarded by the adjudicators, Mr. Isaac Taylor, Mr. Henry Rogers, and the Rev. Baden Powell, the smaller premium £600. It is written in a style that makes it easily intelligible by readers of all classes; treats the question with ability; and will happily subserve the ends which the benevolent founder contemplated in instituting the Prize.

The object of the first part of his work is, to determine the principle of the argument, for the existence and perfections of God, or what are genuine and infallible signs of his being, wisdom, and goodness: in his second section he presents a series of those signs from the various departments of the material: and in the third, from the intellectual and moral world. The fourth is devoted to the consideration of difficulties. Of these, the first is far the most important and the most intricate, chiefly from the vague notions, the subtle errors, and the perplexed controversies which have prevailed in respect to it: and though less disembarrassed of perplexities, and less lucid and demonstrative than those that follow, it yet seizes the great points of the question with a vigorous grasp, and sets them forth in a strong light.

He presents his "theistic argument" in the following syllogism:

Order universally proves mind.

The works of nature discover order.

Therefore, the works of nature prove mind.

By order he means that which takes place by a law, which has reference to an end; and which, therefore, as it is the embodiment of an idea which preceded itself, bespeaks design. Whatever is the expression of an idea, the realization of a thought, the accomplishment of a purpose, must have been preceded by a mind, and is a proof therefore of its existence, and of its skill and power. Mr. Tulloch accordingly shows, in his second chapter of the section, that our idea of a cause is, in its most essential element, the idea of an intelligent agent; a mind acting with forethought to the effect which it produces—in contradistinction from the theory of Hume, Brown, and Mill, that the idea of causation is a mere idea of antecedence and sequence, or a relation of time. This is the most important position in the

discussion, and though handled with much ability, and presenting the main truths very distinctly, especially when reperused after the other sections of the volume have been read, has not quite the boldness of outline and clearness of features we could wish.

The difficulty of the argument for God's existence and perfections does not lie at all in a want of evidence of his Being and attributes. They are literally, to our powers of enumerating and weighing them, infinite; infinite in number; exhaustless in variety, subtlety, and delicacy; boundless beyond our grasp in greatness, the vastness of their combinations, and the grandeur of their results. The whole intricacy lies in presenting the key to them; in unfolding the principle of the argument; and setting it forth in so natural and clear a form, that all shall recognise its truth and feel its power.

What, let us consider, is requisite in order to the possibility of a manifestation of God to intelligent creatures through his works, so as to form the basis and the media of a natural religion?

1. There obviously must first be an external universe, a system of works created and upheld by God, that are distinct from him, and from the intelligences who contemplate them, in order to be the media of a manifestation of his being and character. If there is no nature, no system of material works that can be the means of manifesting him, there can be no revelation of him through a nature; and, therefore, no proof of his being. The mere idealist accordingly, like Kant, Schelling, and Coleridge, denies the reality of any evidences of God's being in the natural world, and sneers at the attempts to find God in works that, according to his theory, are the mere figments of our own minds, and sink from existence when they vanish from our thoughts.

2. There must be in that external universe an actual manifestation of God's being and character. His works must be of such a nature as to show by their being what they are, that they are the product of a Divine Creator. If there is nothing in them that is a natural and infallible sign of their having proceeded from him, there can be no evidence in them that he is their author.

3. The intelligent creatures whom the question, Whether God has manifested himself in his works? respects, must be inhabitants of that system of nature, and must have the power of perceiving whether there are, or are not, any clear and ample signals in it that he is its author. If they have not the power of perceiving such signs, if they exist, and of seeing that there are none, if they do not exist, then they are not competent to try the question. Their not perceiving any signs that the universe owes its existence to him, or not discovering that no such signs are perceptible, is no evidence whatever that they are not his works, and do not carry in their very nature the most ample proof that he is their creator.

Now, the first of these necessary conditions of a proof in the realms of nature of the existence of God, we indisputably possess. There is an external universe, transcending in greatness our grasp of thought, and presenting a theatre for the display of God's being and perfections, commensurate in a measure with his own infinitude, and the grandeur of his attributes. And this universe is perpetually present with us. It is the scene of our existence, the object of our continual perception, engaging our ceaseless attention and interest, and exerting on us the most momentous influences. Our bodies are made of it: we see it with our eyes, we hear it with our ears, we feel it with all our organs of touch, we taste it in our food, we enjoy or suffer from it in heat and cold; we derive from it in a large degree our pleasures, and owe to it our sorrows; and can no more escape from its ceaseless agency on us, than we can escape from ourselves. That some persons deny this, does not impair its truth and self-evidence at all. Their denial is merely speculative, not practical. Not one of the philosophers who has maintained that the universe is merely ideal, has ever been able to act on the conviction that it is such, for an instant. Instead, they have confuted their theory by the very arguments which they have framed for the purpose of demonstrating it. For why should Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Coleridge, and others, have written and published their numerous volumes to unfold and sustain their idealism, if they were truly satisfied that there were no intelligent fellow-creatures in the world who could read their speculations; if there were no

external material world, indeed, in which such creatures could exist? Those absurd and impious men, notwithstanding their philosophical dreams, acted at every moment of their lives under as full a conviction of the reality of the external world of matter and of intelligences, as they did of their own individual existence; and their scepticism, instead of striking away any of the proofs of the being of God, only augmented the demonstration of their blindness and perverseness. For our nature compels us to regard the external objects which we perceive by our senses as having a real existence without us, and as being essentially what they appear to be to us. No sophistry can prevent us from that conviction. It is not in the power of our intellects or wills to act for a moment except on the persuasion of its truth. And our believing and acting on it is as much a condition of our happiness as it is a law of our nature. It is, in fact, an infinite mark at once of the being and of the wisdom and the goodness of God, that our nature compels us to act on it as a fact; as to doubt it, and to attempt to act on the opposite belief, would instantly prove fatal to life as well as safety and enjoyment. Who would avoid fire or water if he did not believe in their existence? Who would take food or rest, if he did not believe he had a body that needs nourishment and repose? Who would watch over offspring, if he did not believe in their reality? Truly to disbelieve in the reality of the external universe, would be to be wholly insane: to rave with idiocy and delirium.

Have we then the second of those indications in the external universe as a proof of the being of God? Is it of such a nature as to show from its being what it is, that it is the work of a divine author? Are there in it any clear and infallible signs that it proceeded from such a cause? And in order to answer this question, let us ask what are such signs? What characteristics must God impress on a universe, in order to make it the medium of a manifestation of his being? What, in such a system of works, is a clear and infallible signal of an intelligent creator? And the answer is, that which indicates something prior to and higher than dead matter itself; that which bespeaks mind; a form, an organization, a life, and an appropriation which shows that it is a copy, an expression, an embodiment of an idea that

preceded it. Anything that forms such an expression of mind; anything that, from its nature, could not have existed if it had not been formed by a Being who previously conceived of it and gave it existence as an embodiment of that idea and for the end contemplated in it, is a proof that there is an intelligent Creator; a Being of divine power and skill. To deny it, is to deny it to be possible that a divine Being should manifest his existence through a universe he may create; for if he cannot manifest himself by making his works expressive of the fact that he is an intelligent existence, how can he make it the vehicle of a manifestation that he is God? How can an effect show that its cause has a character of which it presents no indication whatever? If the universe presented no indication that its author is an intelligent cause; if it can be accounted for without the supposition that its author is an intelligence; how can it be the means of proving the existence of a God who, by the meaning of the term, is an intelligence of infinite attributes? It is a self-contradiction also, for it is to affirm that the fact that an effect bespeaks intelligence is no proof that it is the work of an intelligent cause, which is nothing else than to say that that which indicates intelligence is still no indication of it. Whatever then in the universe is an expression of mind, whatever indicates intelligence by showing that it is the copy or embodiment of an idea which its author had of it before it was called into existence, and was created for the end which that idea contemplated, is a proof of the existence of a divine intelligence, a God of infinite attributes.

Are there then in the universe any such manifestations of mind, any such signals that it is the work of an infinite intelligence? The answer is in the affirmative. There are two great classes: one that are direct expressions of mind, that have their whole object in that office; and one that indicate mind by the fact that they are copies or embodiments of ideas which must have preceded them, and are the work, therefore, of an intelligent author.

Of the first of these, are all the forms and modifications of the human countenance that are indicative of the thoughts and feelings of the mind within, such as smiles, frowns, blushes, pallor, agitation, distortion from pain, the mild glow of the eye, its flashes, its wild rolling, and its suffusion with

tears. These, and the countless other shapes and hues which it assumes, are direct and pure expressions *to the spectator* of the mind within. That is their special and sole office, and they fill it perfectly. They paint every species of emotion and passion that agitates the soul within with the utmost exactness and distinctness. Not a shade of thought or feeling passes through the spirit but they delineate it in the most vivid colors; and no one fails to contemplate them as filling that office and interpreting them aright. And they are designed, not for the information of the persons who are the subjects of them, as they ordinarily do not see the varying lights and shadows that flit over their faces, and being conscious of the processes that are passing within, do not need a sight of their countenances in order to know what their thoughts and affections are. Their sole end is the information of others, the manifestation to those who witness them of the thoughts and passions of the minds of which they are the effects. And as they take place in a large degree involuntarily, and are produced by processes of which the subjects of them have no comprehension, they are manifestly the work of a different and higher intelligence than that of the individual of which they are the immediate effects, and are signals and manifestations, therefore, of a divine author.

Another class of direct expressions of mind are the accents of the voice, which are the vehicles of thought and emotion. That is their express office. They have no other object. Were not that their function they would have none whatever. And they fill that office perfectly. They are means of uttering every shape of thought and every form and degree of feeling that occupies the mind; and they, like the expressions of the countenance, are designed, at least mainly, for others than the individuals who utter them. And all hear and understand them as indicating the precise thoughts and emotions which they express.

There is a great variety also of attitudes, gestures, and movements of the body that are direct expressions or immediate consequences of certain states of the mind, and are, to those who behold them, infallible signals of those mental states, such as a gloomy silence, a morbid restlessness, agitation, and a variety of gestures and acts.

Written and printed language is another large species of

effects that is a direct expression of mind, and has in that its sole function. It differs from the modifications of the countenance, the accents of the voice, and gestures and attitudes, in that it is exterior to the bodies of those who produce it, and continues to exist after the acts of the agent are over by which it is wrought.

The physical nature of each individual in these operations and effects is but an organ, as it were, of expressing the mind that dwells within, from which a ceaseless current of signals and utterances proceeds of thought, emotion, and passion, that have their express and sole function in that, and that are proofs of the existence and agency of a supreme and infinite intelligence. That that is their nature and office no one denies or doubts, nor can. It is a fact of universal consciousness. It is recognised and acted on by all mankind as individuals and as communities. It is constitutional and unavoidable. To evade it is as impossible as it is to evade existence. To ascribe to them any other function is as impossible as it is to ascribe to our senses a different office from that which they perform; as impossible as it is to divest ourselves of our intelligent nature.

There is a still larger class, that indicate mind, by showing that they are copies or embodiments of ideas that preceded them, and proving, therefore, that they are the work of an intelligent author. Such are all those combinations and forms of matter that take place by a law, that involve something beside the matter of which they consist—such as crystallization, organization, life, motion; things that do not necessarily belong to matter, but are superinduced, and are the work of design. Such, for example, are our organs of sense, which involve something far beyond the mere matter of which they consist;—a form, a structure, a life, an adaptation to the light, the air, or the other matter that acts on them, that shows that he that made them had a perfect comprehension of the office they were to fill, and knew what nature must be given to them to fit them for that office. No higher certainty can be conceived than they present, that they are the work of an intelligent author. For they are not only adapted to the ends for which they are used: and in such a manner, that our constitution impels us to use them for those ends and no others: but they

are indispensable to our very existence as corporeal beings. Without them we should be incapable of active pursuits: we should be utterly helpless. Indeed, we should immediately perish from inability to exert the agencies that are necessary to the preservation of our lives. And as they thus involve something immeasurably above the matter of which they consist, they cannot be the work of that matter: and as we do not ourselves fully comprehend them, nor the principle on which their effects take place, and we are conscious that we are not ourselves the authors of them; their nature and office form the most indubitable proof of the existence of an infinitely more intelligent and efficient mind who is their author.

All organized forms of matter that have life, such as animals and vegetables, present a similar proof. For all that distinguishes them as living organizations, is something in addition to and above the matter of which they consist, and is in order to an end, and is the work, therefore, not of the matter of which they are constituted, but of an independent and infinite mind, that is their contriver and cause. And their adaptation to the pressure of the atmosphere, the force of gravity, the chemical properties of the air, light, water, and the earth and its products, from which they draw their nourishment, shows that the being who made them has a perfect comprehension also of the world in which they live, and gave them a nature that suits them at once to the peculiarities of that world, and to the ends to which they are appointed. He is the author of that world, therefore, in which they exist, as well as of them, and is therefore infinite in intelligence and power. To say that we do not know that they, as well as ourselves, have a nature that is precisely fitted to the world in which we live, is to contradict our consciousness. To say that though their adaptation to the gravity, soil, atmosphere, and other elements of the earth implies that their author had a perfect knowledge of the nature of the world, and was therefore of infinite intelligence, yet there is no certainty that that adaptation was designed, is equivalent to saying that there can be no proof of design; for if adaptation to an end in such a perfect manner as to secure it, and the appropriation of an infinite number of things having such an adaptation to the end for which they

are fitted, is no proof of design, how can design be shown? There, plainly, is no other medium by which it can be manifested. But to deny that design can be shown by the execution and accomplishment of the end which it contemplates, and in an infinite number and variety of instances, is a self-contradiction! The adaptation and use of means to an end, is the very definition of a designing act, and is a direct exemplification and proof of it. But there is no room for dispute on this point. Mankind universally regard animals and vegetables as designed for specific ends; and they cultivate and appropriate them on a boundless scale to such ends. The whole of their food, the whole of their clothing, a large share of their dwellings, and a large proportion of the utensils and conveniences of life, are formed of them. To deny that they are designed for these uses by their author, and that his creating them for them is a proof commensurate in its greatness with their infinite multitude, of his intelligence, is to offer the gravest contradiction possible to the common sense and consciousness of mankind.

We might specify other forms of matter, such as air, water, soil, rocks, minerals, which from the offices they fill in the life of vegetables, animals, and mankind, and the uses to which they are voluntarily appropriated by men, show that they were designed for the ends which they subserve. But the motions of the bodies of the solar system, such as the revolution of the planets on their axes, and their motions round the sun, are manifestly in order to the life of such vegetables, and such animals, and such intelligences as have their existence on them. They are, so far as the earth is concerned, adaptations to the organized natures that spring from the soil, or people the air, the water, and the land; and especially man. They are in order that we may exist here, and be of the natures that we are. And as those motions are not inherent in the matter of which the orbs consist, such as their revolution on their axes, and their projection by which their gravitation towards the sun is arrested, and they are driven round their orbits—but are adventitious, and in order to their being fit habitations for the animated beings that people them; the whole solar system is thus stamped with the most indisputable and stupendous marks of design, and presents majestic proofs

that it is the work of an intelligence of infinite understanding and power.

There are thus in every part of the universe the most conspicuous and ample manifestations of Mind. It is replete in all its various realms with signals that it is the work of an all-wise and almighty author.

The last question is, whether men have the power of perceiving these signals of mind in the world in which they exist: these proofs that it is the work of a divine author. And the answer is affirmative. They are not only able to discover them, but their perception and belief of them are unavoidable. They are irresistibly borne by their *nature* to the recognition and acknowledgment of them. They proceed in all their agency on the knowledge derived through these displays, that they are surrounded by fellow-intelligences: they found all the pursuits and aims of life on the conviction that all effects have causes, and that effects that bespeak intelligence—as all effects do—have intelligent causes; every labor, every scheme of enterprise, every aspiration after happiness, is built on the fact that all the objects of utility and desire in the universe, are such, because of their adaptation to subserve our happiness; that they are formed, therefore, with a reference to our nature as sensitive and intelligent beings. Their whole active life is thus based on these proofs of the being of God. Every pulse of desire for the objects around them, every scheme of activity that engages their thoughts, every volition to pursue and grasp the good which they desire, is founded on and involves a recognition of the fact that the universe bears in all its elements resistless proofs that it is the work of an all-wise and almighty author.

Thus mankind universally recognise the modifications of the human countenance that are caused by the thoughts, affections, and purposes of the mind, such as smiles, frowns, blushes, the pallor of fear, the distortions of anger, as expressions of the mind within, and as having no other function. Not an individual ever failed to see that that is their office; and to act on the conviction that it is. Not an individual ever undertook to ascribe to them any other meaning or design. That interpretation of them is the work of nature, and is unavoidable. It can no more be shunned or reversed,

than the perception of light by the eye can be prevented, or than the effects which it produces on the retina and the mind can be intercepted or reversed. By this beautiful provision of our nature and the external world, it is thus not merely made possible to us that by the due culture and use of our powers, we should be able to discover that there are other intelligences like ourselves around us; but we are carried by the natural and unavoidable processes of our nature to the knowledge and the perception of the forms, the lineaments, the actions, the mental states and dispositions of these intelligences towards us!

In like manner, the accents of the voice, the articulate sounds which are utterances of thought and emotion, are direct and express signals of the presence and agency of fellow intelligences. They have their whole office in that expression by one mind of its views, affections, and purposes to another, or other like intelligences, and they are universally employed, and accepted by the hearer, for that purpose. No individual ever assigned to them any other end. No one ever refused to accept that as their function. And the use of the several accents to express the particular thoughts of which they are the signs is the result of convention and imitation, not of necessity. There is no more natural adaptation in the sounds that are employed to denote intelligence, wisdom, forethought, body, earth, or any other substance or quality, than there is to signify any other objects; as is seen from the fact that there are several thousands of languages in which different sounds are employed to denote the same objects of perception and thought. The particular appropriation of those sounds, as well as the use of them for the purpose of expressing thought, is thus a proof of the existence of intelligences as numerous as the individuals are who utter, or hear and interpret them.

To these are to be added the letters and combinations of letters (which are mere colored figures on paper or some other substance) of written and printed language; whose whole office also is to represent thoughts and emotions.

These vast classes of effects—as well as many others of a kindred nature which we cannot pause to enumerate—are thus direct and immediate expressions and indications of mind, and have in that their whole function. And they are

proofs not merely of the existence of the created intelligences whose thoughts they immediately express, but also of an infinite intelligence by whom these dependent minds are contrived and created. For we are conscious that we are not the contrivers of those parts and powers of our bodies by which our minds reveal themselves through the modifications of the countenance and the voice. We are not aware, except in a very slight degree, of the means by which they are produced. Though the enginery of nerves, muscles, blood-vessels, and other organs by which they are caused, is in a measure under the control of our wills, yet what that enginery is, or what the subtle power is by which it is set in motion so as to accomplish its effect, is as completely unknown to us and out of the sphere of our consciousness, as though it had no existence. This enginery, then, working thus distinctly and infallibly to its end in a manner that is not comprehended by us, is at once a proof of a contriver antecedent to and infinitely superior to ourselves, and therefore of an all-wise and all-powerful God. There is no escape from this conclusion. We cannot deny that these effects are indications and expressions of mind, without contradicting consciousness, and the convictions on which we instinctively and necessarily act. We might as well attempt to maintain that we are not the subjects of the thoughts and feelings of which we are conscious; as to maintain that we do not naturally and by the irresistible impulse of our constitution regard these effects as effects and expressions of mind. We cannot, without contradicting our consciousness and convictions, deny that the organs by which they are wrought are expressly contrived for the production of these effects, and with infinite intelligence and skill—inasmuch as it is their sole office, and they produce the effects for which they are formed with unfailing certainty and ease, although we have no comprehension of their exact nature, or the manner in which they act; for if not conscious that they are expressly designed for the production of these effects, why do we naturally and instinctively use them for that purpose, and interpret that as their office when used by others! If our nature does not necessarily and truly carry us to regard that as their express function, why is it that no one is ever found to doubt it, to refrain from the use of them for that

purpose, or ascribe to them any other object? Nor can we deny that these and all other manifestations of mind are expressions and effects of an intelligent agent, not of a mere abstract quality. No mental qualities or attributes exist abstractly from conscious intelligent agents. The wisdom displayed in an effect, is the wisdom of the intelligent cause who produced that effect—not of an abstraction that produces no effects, and has neither any activity nor any existence. We cannot, therefore, without an equal contradiction of our reason, our consciousness, and our knowledge, deny that these effects are proofs of the existence of an infinite intelligence as their author. For as they are indubitably the work of an intelligent designer, and we are conscious that we are not the contrivers of the organs by which they are produced, we are forced by the necessity of our nature to regard them as the work of an independent and superior intelligence, and therefore of God. The atheist himself cannot escape this result. For if he does not regard them as purposely made for the end for which they are employed, why does he every moment of his life proceed on the assumption and feeling that they are, by using them for that purpose? How is it that no doubt of their adaptation and express appropriation to that end ever enters his thoughts? that his use of them is not the result of self-persuasion against objections and uncertainties, but is natural, instinctive, unavoidable, and with the perfect concurrence of his reason? He cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that they demonstrate the existence of a divine author; for he is aware that men themselves are not their contrivers. He is aware that the contrivance, execution, and preservation of the organs by which they are wrought, bespeak a wisdom and a power that immeasurably transcend those of man: and he is equally aware that the wisdom and power which gave them existence, are the wisdom and power of an intelligent agent: not an abstraction; for agents alone produce effects. Abstractions are not real existences, and do not exert themselves in the production of effects. He cannot deny that they are effects, without contradicting his consciousness. He cannot deny that they are the effects of an intelligent agent, without contradicting his reason; nor can he deny that that intelligent agent must be infinitely superior to men

in wisdom and power, without an equal contradiction to his consciousness and reason. Turn whichever way he will, he is confronted by the instinctive and resistless testimony of his own nature to the being of God. He cannot attempt to silence or rebut that testimony, except by disowning his consciousness and reason, and contradicting and belying the facts and convictions on which he acts as indisputable realities every moment of his agency? Thus Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Coleridge, and the whole tribe of modern idealistic atheists, while denying that there are any evidences in nature of God, any external universe, or any fellow-creatures, still acted every instant, when framing and uttering that denial, on the fact and conviction that there is an external universe, and that there are fellow intelligences; that design is the act of an intelligent agent; that vocal, written, and printed words, are signs and effects of intelligent agents; and that the intelligence and powers of the contriver and author of those effects, are proportional in greatness to the greatness and skill of the effects he produces. No human beings can be named who more openly showed that they expected the speculations they put forth to be taken as the measure of their intellects, and anticipated an influence and a homage as much beyond that which others attained, as they deemed themselves superior to others in genius and learning. Why else did they employ their lives in discussing their favorite systems orally: in delivering lectures in universities, and to popular audiences; and in writing and publishing books! In all these acts they contradicted their scepticism, and proceeded on the consciousness and acknowledgment of the facts from which, as premises, the conclusion follows clearly and irresistibly, that there is a God of infinite intelligence and power.

Another class of manifestations of mind and proofs of a divine author, which men are able to see, are the adaptations of objects in the natural world to the uses of our corporeal life, such as of the soil, water, air, the alternation of day and night, and the succession of the seasons, to the growth of the various organized bodies that form our food; the adaptation of the vegetables and animals on which we subsist, to the nourishment and health of our bodies; the adaptation of certain methods of culture and care to the growth of those

vegetables and animals; the adaptation of wool, flax, cotton, silk, skins, and other substances to protect us from cold, and of dwellings to shelter us; and the adaptation of certain powers in the natural world, such as of water, wind and steam, to subserve our convenience in wafting us from place to place, turning engines for us, and working other similar effects. The great fact that we regard these several objects as designed by their nature for the uses to which we appropriate them, is shown by our desiring and toiling for them for that use, and our actually appropriating them to it, and that the use of them is indispensable to the continuance of our health and life. Why should we toil to clear up the earth and fit it for cultivation, if we do not regard it as fitted and designed for that purpose? Why should we labor to rear and harvest the various grains from which bread is made, if we do not regard them as adapted and designed to yield us the nourishment we need? Why should we eat bread thus provided by our toil and skill, if not aware that it is fitted to yield the support to our bodies which is requisite to us? In all these and other similar pursuits and arts, which comprise a large proportion of our agency, we proceed on it as a known and undisputed fact that these several objects are expressly adapted to and designed for the uses to which we appropriate them; and that knowledge is the ground of all our desires and endeavors to obtain them, and their whole supposed value to us. We recognise too, and carry with us at every step, the conviction that the contrivance and creation of these several objects with their peculiar natures, fitting them for the uses to which they are applied, is the work of an intelligent agent. We act on that as a self-evident truth in every effort we make to gain our end. We proceed in the whole of our agency on the conviction that every effect has a cause; and that all effects, an idea of which must exist in the cause anterior to their production, and the production of which therefore involves a knowledge of the adaptation of means to the end and forethought, must have an intelligent agent as their author. That is the definition of a contriver. The use of our own intelligent agency to produce effects would be absurd on any other principle. Why should we use a peculiar species of agency for an end, if that end is not of such a nature that none but that

special agency can produce it? We therefore cannot deny that the contrivance of the objects that have these adaptations is the work of an intelligent creator, without contradicting our reason, our consciousness, and the principle on which we act in all the agency in which we aim to gain an end. But we are conscious that we are not ourselves the contrivers of any of the objects which have this adaptation to our uses. We are compelled, therefore, to regard them as the work of a supreme and infinite intelligence.

The sceptic himself cannot escape this conclusion. If he denies that these objects are designed and adapted to the uses to which we appropriate them, he contradicts the consciousness and convictions on which he acts in desiring and seeking them by contrivance and toil, that he may apply them to those uses. If he denies that adaptation is the work of an intelligent agent, he contradicts his reason, his consciousness, and the convictions on which he acts in employing means to get possession of them. If it is not the peculiar office of an intelligent agent to act with design to an end, and contrive and use means that are adapted to produce it, what is the proper function of an intelligent agent? Can he give any other definition of one? And why does he exert his own power as an intelligent agent to gain these objects, and not rely on any thing else to attain them? He must belie his own nature and disown the principle of his own agency, or else admit that such a contrivance and use of means is the work exclusively of an intelligent agent; and if he admits that the objects formed with these adaptations are the work of such an agent, he must then of necessity admit that their author is a being of infinite intelligence; for man confessedly not only is not their real author, but his wisdom and power are infinitely inferior to that which they display.

And finally, besides these objects, which, from their adaptation to our use, we voluntarily appropriate to ourselves, there are others that lie beyond the sphere of our agency, that present equal marks of a designed adaptation to our life and well-being, and exert an equal influence on us, such as the sun, the moon, and the planets. That they are contrived with an express reference to our world is seen from the fact that they are parts of the same system and exert on

it an immense influence. Without the light of the sun the earth could not be inhabitable. Without the moon we could not have the tides of the ocean. Without the other planets our globe could not be kept in its present orbit; and we are indebted to the motion of the earth on its axis and round the sun for day and night, seasons and years. And these adaptations of these vast orbs and their motions show that they are the work of an intelligent author of infinite knowledge and power. This the atheist himself cannot deny, without denying his own reason and contradicting the convictions on which he founds all his actions. He cannot deny that these orbs and their movements and influences are adapted to our life, without contradicting facts of which he has a perfect certainty and regards as indisputable; for he cannot deny that the sun is adapted to give us light and heat, without denying what he and every one knows to be a fact, that his light and heat are indispensable to our existence; and he cannot deny that they are the work of an intelligent agent of infinite wisdom and power, without contradicting the consciousness which he exhibits in all his agency that design in an effect is a proof of intelligence in its cause, and of a greatness proportional to the largeness and wisdom of that effect. Why does he act with forethought and contrivance in all his agency, and expect that the effects he produces will bear a proportion in the skill they display to the intelligence and power he exerts in producing them, if no such connexion necessarily subsists between the nature of an effect and the character of the agent who produces it?

These considerations thus show that God both manifests himself, and on a vast scale, in his works around us; and that our nature carries us directly and resistlessly to the perception of those manifestations, and to act in all our agency with a consciousness and a conviction that necessarily lead us to regard those displays as proofs of his existence and perfections. The same consciousness, the same intuitive perceptions, the same reason, that force us by the necessity of our nature to believe in the existence of the external universe and fellow-creatures, and that constrain us to regard a designed and skilful effect as the work of an intelligent cause, constrain us with an equal force to regard the intelligence and power that are displayed in the realms of nature,

with which we are conversant, as proofs that they are the work of an intelligence of infinite skill and power.

And our perception of these proofs of God's existence and perfections is not the result of intricate inquiry, and long and perplexed reasonings. It is natural, instinctive, and unavoidable. It is involved in our consciousness and perception of one another, our sight of the external world, and pursuit of the various objects in it which are the means of our sustenance, protection from the elements, and all the comforts of competence and wealth. The facts and principles from which we deduce the existence of God from his works, are the facts and principles on which we act in all our agency towards one another, and towards the objects of the physical world; and we cannot deny that they prove his being and perfections, without denying and contradicting our own consciousness, and the most indisputable and important facts of our experience and agency. In reaching the conclusion that the works of nature prove God's existence, we only proceed on the felt and self-evident truths on which we act in all our ordinary agency: we only reason on the convictions and principles on which we found our conclusions in our reasonings respecting the existence and nature of other external agents and objects. God has so framed our minds and bodies, and the world in which we exist, that the perceptions that are unavoidable to us, and the consciousness and convictions on which we necessarily act in all our agency towards physical objects and fellow-creatures, are the premises from which, proceeding on the same principles, we are borne resistlessly to the perception and belief of the existence and perfections of God.

The fact that men do not in all cases perceive and acknowledge these evidences of the divine existence, is no proof that they are not real, easily perceptible, and adequate, when properly considered, to produce the most undoubting faith in God's being. The question we are debating is not whether all mankind are believers, or not, of God's existence, because of the manifestations he has made of himself in his works? but whether there are not such clear and indisputable manifestations of his being and perfections in his works, within the direct and unavoidable observation of men, that, if properly considered, they must naturally convince them of

his existence : proofs so perceptible and ample that they cannot avoid the conviction that he exists, and is infinitely wise and powerful, except by contradicting their consciousness, and disowning the convictions and principles on which they proceed in all their other agency? The proofs of the divine existence to each individual, indeed, far transcend those to which we have thus far referred. For as all the countless effects that take place in each one of us every day are the work of an intelligent cause—for as we ourselves are the work of such a cause, all the agents that act on us, being designed for the office they fill, are also the work of that cause,—the whole of the ceaseless array of effects that are wrought in us from hour to hour, are so many proofs of the intelligence and sovereignty of the being who formed us, and the instruments of these effects. And to what an incalculable number do they rise every day! Every image formed on the eye is to be counted among them: every impulse on the ear; every feeling of touch; every sensation of smell, taste, or muscular irritation; and all the emotions, desires, and passions that are awakened by them. And they transcend the power of enumeration. The external world is, in truth, a vast complication of instruments that act on us incessantly, and convey to us every moment, through the various channels of our senses, a vast array of proofs of the existence and perfections of God. The process is invested with grandeur by the rapidity with which these effects take place, and the vastness of their multitude. It is worthy of his wisdom and his power, in the noiselessness with which they are wrought, and the skill which they display. What consternation will seize the atheist, when, roused by death from his dream, he finds that instead of never having had any evidences of the being of God, every effect that was ever produced in him, every sensation, perception, and emotion, of which he has been the subject, was wrought by the finger of that Almighty Being, and is a proof of his presence, dominion, and perfections!

Many of Mr. Tulloch's exemplifications of adaptation in the realms of nature are very tasteful and impressive. We quote the following as among the most pleasing :

"Clearly marked as is the highest kind of inorganic order which we have considered, it is yet, so to speak, a mere outward order, pro-

ceeding from external junction of parts. It is the result of force from without, and dependent upon the direction and degree of the compulsory application. On the first view of organic phenomena, we are struck with their essential difference in this respect. We contemplate no longer merely a combination of outward relations, but a product of inward forces. The material object is no longer merely, as even in the case of the crystal, the result of aggregation, of the external juxtaposition of particles; it is a living production forming itself from within. A new power is seen stirring in matter—a power not only of selection or of adaptation, but of assimilation, and, moreover, of reproduction. Inorganic matter, it has been well said, ‘only finds, organic makes, what is added to its structure; recasting the inert substance, and exhibiting it in new unions, not of binary merely, but of ternary and quaternary combinations. The inorganic changes that on which it acts chemically; the organic vitalizes, and imparts to the matter which it vitalizes the power of acting in the same way on other substances. This is the end and object of that series of functions which, beginning with absorption, conveys the absorbed matter through the stem into the leaves, then subjects it to a process of exhalation, submits the rest to the action of the atmosphere, conveys it back into the system, elaborates it by secretion, and ends in assimilation. The plant is also generative. The inorganic mass can only increase by cohesion, by agglomeration from without. But the plant hath its seed in itself. It exists in generations. Besides vitalizing that which is necessary to the conservation of each of its own parts, it is endowed with the power of giving existence to a new whole, and of providing the germ with the nourishment necessary for it, in order to commence its independent being.’

“These two attributes of assimilation and reproduction mark off and determine organic matter, in its lowest forms, from inorganic. They are the distinctive attributes of life in its feeblest developments. Our knowledge of life begins with them; and beyond such manifestations of the vital element—unsearchable in its hidden depths—our knowledge will probably never reach. Whenever matter is found to possess these properties, in contradistinction to the mere properties of chemical attraction or crystallization, it is said to be organized. If we inquire more particularly for a definition of organization, that given by Kant seems to be acknowledged to be the best. ‘An organized product of nature,’ he says, ‘is that in which all the parts are mutually means and ends.’ It is not only, it will be observed, the idea of dependence among the parts which is here expressed; this would not form an advance beyond the formerly considered phenomena of matter. There is a beautifully coherent dependence be-

tween the several particles of a crystal. But the definition of Kant expresses further an adjustment or dependence between all the different parts of an organized body, so as to subserve the definite purpose of maintaining the whole body; and not only so, but the further idea that the maintenance of the whole is essential to the maintenance of any of the parts. It expresses, in short, the fact, of a constantly subsisting relation between all the parts on which the subsistence of the whole depends. Such an interacting relation does not exist between the several parts of an inorganized body. We can, on the contrary, break up a crystal, as we have seen, even indefinitely, without destroying its primitive constitutive form. But let us take to pieces a plant, and, destroying the living relation between the parts, we destroy the organism. Organization, in its simplest appearance, presents, therefore, a more complex and delicate—so to speak—a more subtle and essential species of order than any which we have hitherto contemplated.

"In this mere fact of organization furnishing us with a further and more refined example of order, we have an additional illustrative evidence of Divine intelligence. We recognise, with impressive force, the artist, in the higher specimen of art before us. To the query, Whence? which immediately arises here, as in the contemplation of all order, we are carried, in answer, irresistibly back to a supremely intelligent Will.

"The two great characteristics of organic phenomena, in their lowest forms, we have, in the last chapter, pointed out to be assimilation and reproduction. The plant, down to its least developed specimen, exhibits these properties in contradistinction to any specimen of inorganic matter. Organization analysed to its finest point—the minute cell, which it requires the highest powers of the microscope to detect—is marked by a forming power, quite distinct from any thing in the inorganic creation. While the inorganic, at the highest point of development, is, as it has been said, a mere carrier of force, the organic is essentially a centre of force.

"It is deserving of notice how complete is the structure which the microscope reveals in the elementary cell. Reaching to the rudimentary source of organization—the hidden workshop, may we call it!—of the beautiful forms of life that teem all around, we are here, as everywhere, in the presence of order. The forming hand appears in the most signal manner, although we cannot trace its action, save by the delicate scrutiny of the microscope.

"The general process of assimilation or nutrition in plants is of a highly interesting description. The various organs concerned in the process—the root, the stem, and the leaves—are all so many struc-

tures of the most exquisite delicacy and beauty, furnishing, in their study, a continued illustration of the Divine wisdom. We cannot now, however, dwell upon the simple construction of these organs. Their functions, in the discharge of the nutritive process, are for our object even more interesting; and to the consideration of these, therefore, we readily pass.

"The root at once gives stability to the plant in the soil, and, by the fibrils which it sends forth in all directions, collects materials for its food. For this latter purpose, the fibril roots, with the main root itself (caudex), are provided with soft porous terminations, called spongioles, from their peculiar efficacy in imbibing the surrounding moisture. When the moisture, holding different matters in solution, has been absorbed, it ascends through the stem—by modes which vary, and which are not yet in all respects thoroughly understood—to the leaves, where it is partly exhaled, and partly undergoes an important chemical change, rendering it fit for becoming assimilated. The leaves are the peculiar seat of what has been called vegetable digestion, though the entire process of this and even the nature of the action of the leaves, are still involved in considerable obscurity. It is certain, however, that during the day, and pre-eminently during bright sunshine, they are ceaselessly inhaling from the atmosphere carbonic acid, decomposing it, appropriating and assimilating its carbon, and exhaling its oxygen. It is, indeed, believed that during darkness this process is inverted; that oxygen is absorbed, and combined with waste or superfluous carbon, and carbonic acid exhaled; but still we know with certainty, from its own continued increment, that the plant appropriates more carbon than it rejects; that it therefore removes from the atmosphere more carbonic acid than it throws out into it; and thus that the permanent influence of these changes upon the atmosphere is in the highest degree favorable, the assimilating functions operating much more powerfully to purify than the respiratory to vitiate it. Plants are thus, in contradistinction to animals, the great conservators of atmospheric purity.

"The sap, strengthened and enriched in the laboratory of the leaves, is sent back from them to the various parts of the plant for assimilation, for which it has now become exactly fitted. The same degree of uncertainty prevails regarding the precise character of the sap's descent as exists regarding its ascent. In dicotyledonous plants its main current is through the *liber*, or inner portion of the bark, but it also descends through the alburnum or most recently formed wood, through which, in the same plants, flows the main current of the ascending sap. In monocotyledonous plants its passage is through the innermost layer of the structure, which is also the most recently

formed. The sap in its descent deposits the materials of fresh growth in the plant, as well as of the different well-known products—gum, sugar, oils, and resin, so useful in domestic economy and in the arts. At the root, whence the nutritive process started, it terminates with imparting hardness and tenacity to the fibrils, and bringing matter to form new spongioles, while the old are gradually covered with an impervious cuticle.

"It is impossible to contemplate this process without being impressed with its marvellous fitness and beauty. What a busy scene of orderly activity is thus every plant around us, from the noble forest-tree to the lowly lichen. And when we contemplate all the successive and interwoven adaptation conducing to the result, and again how the life, which is the result, alone gives impulse and continuance to the whole, we cannot, surely, doubt the Wisdom which directs and controls so finely adjusted a series of phenomena.

"The phenomena of vegetable reproduction are even more strikingly manifestive of creative design. Passing by the simpler facts displayed by the cryptogamous vegetation, we have in the reproductive organs of the higher classes of plants some very curious and complicated adaptations.

"These organs are all embraced in what is botanically called the flower. Its parts consist of four series or whorls, as they are technically termed—1, the calyx; 2, the corolla; 3, the stamen; 4, the pistil. These are all now regarded as merely transformations of leaves, altered so as to suit the particular functions which each performs. They sometimes appear in the form of true leaves, without any marked modification. The calyx is the outer covering of the flower—the symmetrical cup in which it commonly rests. It is usually of the same green color as the leaves, but sometimes also, as in the fuchsia and Indian cress, it is differently colored. Its several parts are termed sepals. The corolla is the flower, popularly so called; its parts, which are sometimes distinct and sometimes united in various ways, are termed petals. 'The petals are composed of a congeries of minute cells, each containing coloring matter and delicate spirals interspersed, all being covered by a thin epidermal coat or skin. The colored cells are distinct from one another, and thus a dark color may be at one part and a light color at another. How exquisitely are the colors of flowers diversified, and with what a masterly skill are their varied hues arranged! Whether blended or separated, as Thornton remarks, they are evidently under the control of a taste which never falls short of the perfection of elegance.'

"The two latter or inner organs, upon which the production of seed essentially depends, show a peculiarly minute and delicate struc-

ture. The pistil consists of a hollow tube called the style, terminating at one end in a kind of spongiole named the stigma; at the other, in the seed-vessel or ovary. The stamens, which commonly, as in the rose, inclose the pistil, consist of a stalk or filament supporting a rounded oblong body called the anther, the cells of which are filled with the fine fecundating powder termed pollen, which is sometimes little more than visible to common inspection, but presents, under the microscope, multiplied distinct forms.

"There is a singular and highly interesting numerical order found to characterize the relation of all these different organs of the plant to one another. 'Thus, if a flower has 5 parts of the calyx, it has usually 5 of the corolla alternating with them, 5, 10, 20, etc., stamens, and 5, or some multiple of 5, in the parts of the pistil.' And equally so when the parts of the calyx are 3—the numerical bases of 3 and 5 being the most generally prevailing in the vegetable kingdom, although the numbers 2 and 4, with their multiples, are also to be found. 'It is worthy of notice,' adds the author from whom we borrow these facts, 'that flowers exhibiting 5 or 4, or multiples of these numbers, in their whorls, usually belong to plants having two seed-lobes or cotyledons, and which, when they form permanent woody stems, exhibit distinct zones or circles, and have separable bark; while flowers having 3, or a multiple of 3, in their whorls, present only one seed-lobe, and when they form permanent woody stems, exhibit no distinct zones nor circles, and have no separable bark. The numbers 2 and 4, or multiples of them, are seen also in the parts of fructification of flowerless plants which have no seed-lobes, such as ferns, mosses, sea-weeds, etc. The processes which project from the urn-like cases of mosses are arranged in the series of 4, 8, 12, 16, 32, 64, etc. The parts of fructification of scale-mosses (*Jungermannia*) are in fours, as also the germs of some sea-weeds. Thus the numbers 5 and 4, and their multiples, prevail among dicotyledonous and exogenous plants; the number 3, and its multiples, occur among monocotyledonous or endogenous plants; while 2 and 4, and multiples of them, are met with among acotyledonous or acrogenous plants.'

"The theistic conclusion undoubtedly receives confirmation from these and all other evidences of exact numerical relations in nature. They express very clearly the Divine plan everywhere stamped on it.

"Let us now mark the reproductive process as subserved by these organs. Fecundation is the immediate result of communication between the stamens and pistil—the former, which produce the pollen, being the active or male, the latter the receptive or female organs. In the great majority of cases the stamens and pistil are found on

the same plant, the former overtopping the latter—an arrangement which gives the most simple mode of fecundation, by enabling the stigma readily to receive the falling pollen as it bursts from the anther. In order to secure this purpose more effectually, the stigma exudes a slightly glutinous fluid, to which the grains of pollen adhere. These grains, whose manifold structure, as seen under the microscope, has been already noticed, have each two coats, one of which bursts when the grain is ripe, and the other, in touching the stigma, elongates itself into the shape of a slender tube, passing downward through the style into the ovary, and so conveying to the germ the vivifying fluid. 'The cells of the stigma are beautifully contrived to admit the passage of these tubes, as they are long, and extremely loose in texture, at the same time so moist and elastic as to be easily compressed when necessary. It is so contrived that the minute particles contained in the grains enter slowly to the ovary, as it seems necessary that the fecundating matter should be admitted by degrees. It is also necessary that the tube should enter the foramen of the ovule; and as the ovule is not always in a proper position to receive it, it will be found to erect itself or to turn, as the case may be, while the granules of the pollen grains are passing down the tubes.'

"In drooping flowers, such as the fuchsia—where it would be obviously no longer fitting that the stamens should exceed the pistil in length, as thereby the pollen would be scattered on the ground instead of reaching the stigma—the relation of the parts is found inverted in correspondence with the altered character of the plant. And, in fact, nothing can be more beautiful and impressive than the great variety of adaptations by which, in special cases, communication is secured between the pollen and the pistils. 'In the common nettle the stamens have elastic filaments, which are at first bent down, so as to be obscured by the calyx; but when the pollen is ripe, the filaments jerk out, and thus scatter the powder on the pistils, which occupy separate flowers. In the common barberry, the lower part of the filament is very irritable; and whenever it is touched, the stamen moves forward to the pistil. In the stylewort (*Styliidium*) the stamens and pistil are united in a common column which projects from the flower; this column is very irritable at the angle where it leaves the flower, and when touched, it passes with a sudden jerk from one side to the other, and thus scatters the pollen. In the hazel, where the pollen is in one set of flowers and the pistil in another, the leaves might interfere with the application of the pollen, and therefore they are not produced until it has been scattered.' In Dioecious plants, such as the willow, where the flowers are not only unisexual, but the stamen-bearing are on one tree and the pistil-bearing

ing on another, the process of communication is effected in some cases by the winds, but in other cases, after a more complicated and ingenious manner, by insects. The bee, while providing food for its young, is at the same time aiding in the dispersion of the pollen. The peculiar shape of some flowers—the Orchids especially—seems to form an attraction for certain insects which are helpful in the same office. One of the most remarkable examples of this insect-agency in the distribution of the pollen is furnished by the birthwort (*Aristolochia*). In this plant the ‘flower consists of a long tube in a chamber, at the bottom of which the stamens and pistils are placed, completely shut out from the agency of the winds. It is frequented, in its native country, by an insect which enters the tube easily, and gets into the little chamber. On attempting to get out, it is prevented by a series of hairs in the tube, which all point downward. It therefore moves about in the little cavity, and thus distributes the pollen on the pistil, soon after which the flower withers and the insect escapes.’

“When impregnation is completed, the other parts of the flower decay, ‘while the gravid seed-vessel’ increases in bulk, till it becomes, under very diversified forms, what is called the fruit. All these forms, many of which are so familiarly known and useful, would seem to have one prime object in view, viz, the preservation of the seed. The production of this seed has been the great end of the process hitherto described; and, this end accomplished, the flower dies, while the energies of the plant are turned to the nursing of the little embryo which it has left behind, and which is destined in its time to advance into new forms of floral beauty. ‘Nothing,’ adds Paley, ‘can be more *single* than the design, more *diversified* than the means. Pellicles, shells, pulps, pods, husks, skin, scales armed with horns, are all employed in prosecuting the same intention.’

“When the seeds reach maturity, their dispersion is provided for in various interesting ways. In some cases the fruit falls without opening, and gradually decays, forming a sort of manure with the soil in which the plants sprout. In other cases the seed-vessels open and scatter the seeds. ‘In the common broom, the pod, when ripe, opens with considerable force; so also the fruit of the sandbox-tree, and the balsam, which is called Touch-me-not, on account of its seed-vessel bursting when touched. The squirting cucumber, when handled in its ripe state, gives way at the point where the fruit joins the stalk, and the seeds are sent out with amazing force. The common geranium seed vessels curl up when ripe, and scatter the seeds. In the case of firs, bignonias, and some other plants, the seeds are furnished with winged appendages; while in the cotton-plant and ascle-

pias they have hairs attached to them, by means of which they are wafted to a distance.' 'The plant called Rose of Jericho becomes dried up like a ball, and is tossed about by the wind until it comes into contact with water, when its small pods open, and the seeds are scattered; and a species of fig-marigold in Africa opens its seed-vessel when moisture is applied.' 'In the dandelion, the leaves which surround the clusters or heads of flowers are turned downward, the receptacle becomes convex and dry, the hairs spread out so as to form a parachute-like appendage to each fruit, and collectively to present the appearance of a ball, and in this way the fruit is prepared for being dispersed by the winds.'

"The seed being deposited in the soil, the process of germination takes place under the influence of heat, air, and moisture. The embryo sends forth, in one direction, a number of fibrous threads, which fix the plant in the ground. The radicle, in short, becomes the root. The plumule on the other side elongates itself, rising into the air in the form of the stem, frequently accompanied by one or more cotyledons or seed-leaves, according to the nature of the plant.

"And thus the great processes of nutrition and reproduction again proceed in the same varied and beautiful round, proclaiming the Wisdom which guides and which guards the whole."

The chapters that follow on Man, on Moral Evidence, and on the Difficulties that attend the existence of moral and physical evil, are in general learned and judicious, and will yield the reader more than an ordinary share of instruction and entertainment.

ART. IV.—HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME. BY WILLIAM DEANS. A. Fullerton & Co., London and Edinburgh. 1854.

BY THE REV. J. FORSYTH, JR., D.D.

THE Turkish empire, once the terror of Christendom, at this moment engages the profound anxieties of European statesmen, and has given occasion to a contest, in which, recent as is its origin, a vast amount of blood and treasure has been already expended. Of the war now in progress, the

most sagacious politician can neither predict the end, nor anticipate its ultimate results. We confess that a feeling of wonder comes over us when we think of the suddenness with which Turkey has become the object of so much interest to surrounding nations. Many persons were indeed well persuaded that the calm which succeeded the revolutionary outbreak of 1848 could not last very long; but we apprehend that even to this class of thinkers, nothing seemed more improbable than such a war as that in which Eastern and Western Europe are just now engaged. We venture to affirm that, two years ago, no one dreamed of such a contingency, unless it might be the statesmen who were actually carrying on the diplomacy of Britain, France, and Russia. And he must be among the blindest of the blind, who in reviewing the history of European politics during the last four years, or in contemplating the existing state of things on that continent, does not recognise that Divine Hand which can defeat, in ways the most unexpected, the best laid schemes of the wisest cabinets, in spite of all their efforts to the contrary, sending upon the nations the dreadful scourge of war, and again, having accomplished the purposes of Divine Wisdom, calming the tumults of the people.

The Turkish empire itself, whether regarded in its internal structure or its external relations, we are inclined to pronounce one of the wonders of the world. Indeed, we are sometimes surprised that the Christian nations of Europe have not long ago united in a fresh crusade for the overthrow of the Crescent, and with the fixed resolve to banish the semi-barbarous Turk from the glorious regions cursed by his misrule. The world does not contain a nobler empire—an empire endowed by nature with richer or more varied resources, than that which the descendants of the mountaineers of Turkistan gradually subdued, and over which their sway was completely established by the capture of Constantinople. It stretched from the Euphrates on the east to the shores of the Adriatic on the west, from the Ukraine on the north to the upper waters of the Nile on the south; thus comprising within its limits the fairest portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the magnificent regions where the human race was cradled, which witnessed the earliest development of human power, the rise and progress of the

mightiest monarchies of the ancient world. Within its borders are found the sites of the oldest and most famous cities of the earth, Nineveh, Babylon, Damascus, Memphis, Thebes, Jerusalem, and the spots upon which were transacted the most memorable events recorded in the past history of man. It enjoys almost every physical advantage which the bounty of nature can confer, every diversity of climate combined with every variety of surface and of soil. Its mountain ridges, among which are Caucasus, and "that goodly Lebanon," whose lofty peaks glisten with perpetual snow, abound with the finest species of the oak and the fir, while the gentler slopes of their lower spurs are covered with the olive, the orange, the citron, and the vine. Its vast plains are capable of sustaining countless flocks and herds, or with tolerable culture would yield the husbandman wheat, barley, maize, and rice in exuberant abundance. In a word, the countries whose annals constitute the staple of ancient history, whose cities were the earliest centres of commercial enterprise, and where we find those stupendous monuments of primeval art, which have resisted the wasting influence of time, and still excite the awe or the admiration of mankind, nearly all these lands belong to the domains of the Sultan. And yet various and exquisite as are the charms with which they are bedecked by nature's hand, though yielding every product that can minister to the comfort and the luxury of their inhabitants, they everywhere exhibit marks of the desolation and decay which invariably result from a weak and oppressive government. Many districts, which, as we are assured on unquestionable authority, once supported with ease and in plenty a population counted by millions, whose trade sufficed to enrich numerous large towns, are now occupied by a few miserable wandering tribes, or are fast returning to a state of nature.

An empire so extended as the Turkish, including provinces which once flourished as independent kingdoms, must contain a very mixed population—tribes differing widely in race, language, and religion. Thus we have Wallachians, Bulgarians, Servians, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, besides other *minores gentes*. In a religious view the grand division is into Mahometans and Christians; the latter, in many districts, amounting to two thirds, and every-

where to fully one-half of the population. Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of the case is the comparatively small number of Turks within the countries subject to their rule. Thus in the European provinces they are reckoned at three millions, and in the Asiatic at four millions, or seven millions in all, out of perhaps twenty-five millions. So long as the Turks maintained their old military spirit, and their intense religious fanaticism, it was comparatively easy for them to keep their Christian subjects under the yoke; but after they had begun to feel the enervating influences incident to a residence in a land so luxurious as that in which they had planted themselves, their position might have become very insecure, if the bitter hatred which the several Christian sects bore to each other had not rendered their union against their common oppressor a simple impossibility.

The original home of the Turk was among the Altai mountains of Central Asia. These mountains abound in iron, and our earliest accounts of the Turks represent them as employed in working the mines and manufacturing the metal, as the slaves of a kindred tribe. About A. D. 540, however, headed by a bold and energetic leader named Bertezena, they made a successful stroke for freedom, overthrew the empire of their old masters, and on its ruins established one of their own. During many subsequent ages, the annual ceremony of heating a piece of iron, which was struck with a smith's hammer by the king and his nobles, recorded at once the humble origin and the honorable pride of the Turk. The period reaching from the first appearance of the Turks on the field of history, down to the establishment of the Ottoman branch of the race in Asia Minor, is a long one, and in such an article as this it is hardly possible to notice, even in the most cursory way, the leading events belonging to it. We content ourselves with simply mentioning the fact that the Turkish kingdom which arose in the original seat of the race, rapidly grew, and reached such a point of power as to awaken the anxieties of the Roman empire of the East. In A. D. 1038, a body of Turks, under Tongruel as their leader, subjugated Persia, and held possession of it for 170 years, when they were in turn driven out by fresh hordes of Tartars, under Zinghis. They then precipitated themselves upon Asia Minor, and

taking advantage of the feuds among the Christians, they established the kingdom of Roun, with Nice as its capital. It subsisted for about a century and a half, and was finally broken into fragments, partly by internal causes, but chiefly through the ravages of the Tartars. One of its provinces, during this period of confusion, was seized by its former emir or governor Othman, who erected it into an independent principality, and with his reign the history of the Ottoman empire properly begins.

The province thus changed by Othman into a kingdom, was originally one of the smallest of those which had constituted the old empire, but under his vigorous administration it became the nucleus of a mighty state. With the valor of the soldier Othman combined the wisdom of the statesman, and skilfully availing himself of the broils in which the Greeks were perpetually involved, he rapidly enlarged his territories. Even the Christian population, whom his arms had vanquished, were completely reconciled to his government by its liberality and impartial justice. The Christian princes at length becoming alarmed by the growth of Othman's power resolved to join their forces, and by one decisive blow to crush the ambitious Turk. The armies met near the confines of Phrygia. Othman was victorious. The city of Broosa soon after submitted to his son Orchan, who, in 1328, made it the seat of the Ottoman empire. The prince last named was every way qualified to carry forward the designs of his father, whom he succeeded in 1326; he laid siege to the cities of Nice and Nicomedia, of which he soon became master; he defeated a large Christian army under Andronicus, and before his death the whole province of Bithynia was incorporated with his dominions. Orchan introduced various changes into the military organization of the Turks, to which, in connexion with those made by his son Amurath I., the founder of the famous body of troops called Janizaries (or new soldiers), are mainly to be ascribed those surprising conquests which rendered the Turks during so many succeeding centuries the terror of Christendom. The reign of Orchan is also a memorable epoch in the history of the Turks, since during it they first established themselves in Europe, A. D. 1353. Under his son and successor Amurath I., who, besides being a general of the highest order,

was a prince distinguished for noble generosity, modesty, and justice, the whole province of Thrace was subdued from the Hellespont to Mt. Hæmus, and Adrianople was made the seat of his religion and his government. Constantinople was thus completely surrounded by the armies of a hostile and mighty monarchy, by hordes of conquerors flushed with a long series of successes, and who were alien to the Greeks alike in religion and in race. Its fall seemed inevitable, and perhaps it might have been easily accomplished, but Amurath, either through a politic moderation or the pressure of circumstances, delayed the seemingly easy conquest, and thus the venerable capital of the East, with its narrow strip of surrounding territory, continued for more than a century to bear the imposing name of the Byzantine Empire.

Amurath died in 1389, and was succeeded by his son Bajazet, who was famous alike for his crimes, his triumphs, and his misfortunes. He gained the throne by the murder of his brother, and thus set an example which was too faithfully copied by many who came after him. He bore the surname of *İlderim*, or the lightning, to express the fiery energy of his soul, and the rapidity of his destructive march. He was incessantly engaged in hostilities in Europe or in Asia, now on the banks of the Danube, and again on those of the Euphrates. Serbia and Bulgaria were subdued. Moldavia was invaded. At Nicopolis (1396) he met and vanquished, with immense slaughter, a French and Hungarian army under the command of Sigismund. The way seemed open to the very heart of Germany, and Bajazet threatened to carry thither his victorious followers, to conquer Italy, and to feed his horse on the high altar of St. Peter's at Rome. But man proposes and God disposes; these magnificent purposes were defeated, and the terrors of Europe were allayed by means of a sudden and severe fit of the gout.

It was natural that a prize so splendid as that of Constantinople, and one apparently so easy to be won, should fix the regards and shape the policies of such a man. Bajazet had, in fact, set his heart upon it, but his fond hopes were doomed to a bitter disappointment, and the very existence of his empire was endangered by the sudden appearance of another conqueror more savage even than himself,—the mighty Timourlane. Military ambition, like avarice, is usually ren-

dered more insatiable by each new acquisition. To conquer fresh fields becomes a passion; and hence when two such heroes as Bajazet and Timourlane appeared upon the stage at the same time, each of them bent upon making himself master of the world, a collision was inevitable. The conquests of the Ottoman and of the Mogul first touched each other near the banks of the Euphrates, and as neither could endure a rival, much less recognise a superior, an angry correspondence was speedily begun which was carried on for two years, and in the course of it the most insulting messages were interchanged. "What," said Timourlane, "is the foundation of thy insolence and folly? Thou hast fought some battles in the woods of Anatolia. Contemptible trophies! Thou art no more than a pismire." "What," retorted Bajazet, "are the arrows of the Tartar against the scimitars and battleaxes of my Janizaries? If I fly from my arms may my wives be thrice divorced from my bed." At length the crisis came. Timourlane moved forward his immense force through Armenia and Anatolia with great caution, maintaining the utmost order and discipline during his march. He resolved to fight in the very heart of the Ottoman dominions, and dexterously avoiding the camp of Bajazet, who was awaiting his approach, and comparing his motions sarcastically to the crawling of a snail, he rapidly traversed the desert and invested Angora. Bajazet, so soon as he heard of Timourlane's advance, returned on the wings of indignation to relieve the city and chastise his enemy. The armies met on the plains of Angora, the scene of a memorable battle destined to immortalize the glory of the Tartar and the shame of the Ottoman. Bajazet suffered an ignominious defeat. "For this signal victory," says Gibbon, "the Mogul emperor was indebted to himself, to the genius of the moment, and the discipline of thirty years." On that terrible day Bajazet personally displayed the highest qualities of a soldier and a chief, but he found himself in the presence of one superior to himself in both respects; and yet his disasters might have been perhaps avoided or diminished, if he had not by his own rigor and avarice awakened a spirit of disaffection in his camp, thus causing the greater part of his troops to fail him at the decisive moment. The unfortunate Bajazet fled from the field, but was pursued and captured. His conqueror was

at first inclined to treat him with the respect due to fallen greatness, but he afterwards subjected him to the greatest indignities, and even confined him in an iron cage. He died on the 9th of March, 1403, having survived his captivity only nine months, and furnished history with one of the most marvellous examples of the instability of fortune.

The overthrow at Angora gave a tremendous shock to the Turkish power, and for a while it seemed as if the empire, founded by Othman, was destined to disappear far more rapidly than it rose. Almost all Asia was in the hands of Timourlane, and he looked with eager eyes towards the shores of Europe as an inviting field for new conquests; but the sea which separated the two continents presented an insuperable barrier to his further progress, unless he could secure the aid of the Christians or the Turks. On this great occasion both parties forgot their differences of religion, and refused the transports which Timourlane demanded. He then entertained the romantic idea of marching through Egypt and northern Africa, crossing the Straits of Gibraltar, imposing his yoke upon the nations of Christendom, and returning to his distant home through the deserts of Russia and Tartary; but having finally resolved upon the invasion of China, he set his face towards the east, and after some months of festivity in his capital, started on the campaign, in the course of which he died, in his seventieth year.

We pass over the reign of Amurath II., who set himself with singular vigor and success to retrieve the disasters which had overtaken the empire during the last days of his father, and hasten to notice the next great triumph of the Turkish arms—the capture of Constantinople, and the final extinction of the empire of the east, under Mahomet II., the grandson of Bajazet. Many of our readers are so well acquainted with the physical features of Constantinople, from personal observation of them, or from the descriptions of the numerous travellers of recent times, that it is scarcely necessary to dwell upon them. It may suffice to state that the site of the city is in the form of an equilateral triangle, having water on two sides, while the landward side, at the time of which we speak, was defended by a very deep ditch, two hundred feet broad. At that day the city was deemed

impregnable, and if its inhabitants had been disposed to avail themselves of its various capabilities of defence, they might have defied the assaults of their enemies, though they numbered 300,000 men. But Constantinople was at that very moment the prey of intestine strife, civil and religious, and hence, out of 100,000 inhabitants, hardly 5000 were found willing to man the ramparts. In the hope of obtaining aid from the pope, the Greek emperor had consented to a union of the Greek and Latin churches—a measure which was to the last degree unpopular among the citizens. The pope found it much easier to dispatch a legate to congratulate Constantine on the removal of the long-standing schism, than an army to defend his capital against the hosts which beleaguered it. When one of the Latin priests appeared at the altar of St. Sophia, the Greek clergy and populace fled from the venerable edifice as from a polluted temple, and rushed to the cell of a noted monk, whom they were wont to consult as the oracle of the church. His answer was—"Miserable men! why, instead of confiding in God, do you put your trust in the Italians? In losing your faith, you lose your city." From the monastery the devout mob ran to the taverns, where they drank confusion to the pope, and valiantly exclaimed: "What need have we for help, for union, or for Latins? far from us be the worship of the Azymites." The fate of such a city could not be doubtful, when besieged by such an enemy as the Ottoman sultan.

The first hostile movement of Mahomet consisted in the erection of a formidable castle on the Bosphorus about five miles from Constantinople. As the two nations were ostensibly at peace, the Greek emperor protested against the procedure of Mahomet; but the latter, who was seeking for a decent pretext of war, sent back the haughty message that the empire of Constantinople was bounded by the walls of the city, and that her next ambassador would be flayed alive. Constantine, with a spirit worthy the last in a long line of emperors, at once resolved to unsheathe the sword, and drive the Turks from their dangerous position; but he was overruled by his timid counsellors, or his efforts were paralysed by the feuds of his capital. War was at length begun by the Greeks in the rural districts resenting the

insults offered them by the Turkish soldiery. Mahomet put his troops in motion, and halted at the distance of five miles from the city; from thence advancing in battle array, he planted his standard before the gate of St. Romanus, and on the 6th April, 1453, the memorable siege of Constantinople was commenced. The main dependence of Constantine for the defence of the city was upon a small body of foreign auxiliaries, who nobly sustained the honor of western chivalry, and whose partial success showed that the besiegers might have been ignominiously driven back, if their deeds of valor had been seconded by the mass of the population.

The principal attack of the Ottomans was directed against the land side of the city. Their approaches were pushed up to the very edge of the ditch, which they attempted to fill, and thus prepare a road for the assault, but their progress was rendered very slow by the activity of the Christian engineers; the injuries done to the defences of the city during the day were quickly repaired by night. However, the city was at length invested by sea as well as by land; a Turkish fleet of three hundred vessels stretched across the Bosphorus in the form of a crescent from shore to shore. But this vast navy was more formidable in appearance than reality, since the thousands who manned it were unaccustomed to the sea. Five Christian ships of war laden with troops and provisions for the relief of the city, approached the fleet, and in the view of thousands of spectators who lined the shores of Europe and Asia, speedily sent the ill-built and worse managed vessels of the Turks to the bottom. It was a moment of intense perplexity to Mahomet, who had reason to fear the total failure of his cherished design. He conceived and safely executed the bold plan of transporting his lighter vessels by land from the Bosphorus into the higher and shallow parts of the harbor, and thus attacked the city by sea and land. The walls which had stood for centuries were dismantled by the Ottoman cannon; many breaches were made; four towers had been levelled, and the grand assault was finally fixed for the 29th May (1453). At daybreak it began by sea and land. The defence was indeed desperate, and the voice of the Greek emperor was everywhere heard encouraging his small but heroic band; unfortunately, however, their ammunition and strength were

exhausted in the tremendous struggle. Constantine fell covered by heaps of the slain. John Justinian, whose counsel and courage were the firmest rampart of the city, pierced by an arrow, was forced to fly from the conflict. The Greeks were overwhelmed by numbers, and the victorious Turks poured like a resistless tide into the devoted city. Upon the horrors that ensued, it is needless to dwell; they were such as invariably accompany the sack of a large town; they have been repeated many times since, and even in our own age, in various parts of the old world. It is enough to say that Constantinople was lost to the Christians, and on that sad day became—what she has been ever since—the seat and centre of the Ottoman empire.

The capture of Constantinople was an event well fitted to make a profound impression upon Christendom, and one cannot but be amazed that the help so eagerly sought by Constantine, from his brethren of a common faith, and which, rendered in time, might have prevented the great disaster, was either denied or delayed until the fate of this noble city—the queen of the east—was fixed. And yet the benefits which the nations of Western Europe derived from the fall of Constantinople were probably greater than any advantages that could have accrued to the cause of Christianity, if the city had remained in the possession of its old masters. The rich treasures of Greek poetry and philosophy so long hidden in the libraries of Byzantium became accessible to the world at large; and many of those scholars whose culture bore little fruit within the narrow limits of their native city, in the homes they were compelled elsewhere to seek, helped to give a fresh impulse to the new intellectual life developed among the nations of Europe, just then aroused from the slumber of ages. By the capture of Constantinople the Turks added only a single city to their territory, but it was a city “glorious for situation;” it had been for centuries the abode of the Cæsars, it supplied them with a magnificent capital for their magnificent empire, and as a consequence, they obtained the command of the Euxine, the Bosphorus, and the eastern half of the Mediterranean. Our limits forbid us to dwell upon the subsequent triumphs of Mahomet, whose ambition was stimulated by each new success, and to whose invincible sword is ascribed the conquest

of two empires, twelve kingdoms, and two hundred cities. He greatly enlarged the boundaries of his empire westward; he took the city of Otranto, which he fortified with a view to the subjugation of the Italian peninsula; but death put an end to his career in 1481, and perhaps saved Italy from the Mahometan rule.

During the greater part of the century subsequent to the death of Mahomet, and especially under the reigns of Selim, his grandson, and of Soliman II., the Turkish power continued to grow until it reached a height which justly spread alarm among the Christian governments of Europe. Selim, though he reigned only eight years, overran the Archipelago, Syria, Egypt, and in short, added more territory to the Ottoman empire than any one of his predecessors. Soliman ascended the throne in 1519, just as the Reformation was beginning to dawn upon Europe, and the timely submission of Persia and Egypt enabled him to turn his whole force against the Christians. Belgrade, the bulwark of Hungary, and before which the Turkish arms had been so often discomfited, was obtained by treachery, after a siege of four weeks; and if his troops, whose term of service had expired, could have been induced to remain, in the then divided state of Christendom, Soliman might easily have planted the crescent upon the walls of Vienna. The way to the very heart of Europe was open, but the unseen hand of the church's Divine Head kept him back, while he at the same time employed him as an instrument for preventing the execution of the bloody schemes of pope and emperor against the faithful yet feeble confessors of the truth.

The attention of Soliman was turned to the island of Rhodes, long occupied by the Knights of St. John, the avowed enemies of the Ottomans, and the chief defence of Italy against their fleets and armies. For the conquest of this small island, defended by a garrison of only five thousand men and six hundred knights, under the command of the Grand Master, Soliman collected an army of two hundred thousand, with a fleet of four hundred sail. The Grand Master, whose wisdom and valor rendered him worthy of his post, sent messengers to all the Christian courts of Europe imploring immediate aid. Pope Adrian seconded his request, and besought the contending parties to lay aside their

quarrels and unite in the defence of Rhodes—the bulwark of Christendom in the east; but so implacable was the animosity between Charles V. and Francis, that regardless of the dangers to which they exposed Europe, they allowed the Sultan to carry on his operations undisturbed. The Grand Master, after a siege of six months, during which he displayed a courage, patience, and military conduct that awakened the respect and admiration of the Sultan, was obliged to yield before overpowering numbers, and obtained an honorable capitulation. Charles and Francis, after the deed was done, attempted to throw the blame upon each other, but Europe, with justice, imputed it equally to them both. However, by way of reparation, Charles made over to the knights the island of Malta, where they fixed their residence, retaining, though with less splendor and power, their ancient spirit and implacable enmity against the infidels.

The long reign of Soliman, surnamed the Magnificent, extending from 1519 to 1566, constitutes the golden age of the Ottoman empire. He was the contemporary of Charles V., Francis I., Henry VIII., and of those still more illustrious men whom Providence raised up to dissipate the darkness which had rested for centuries upon Europe, and to inaugurate that ever-blessed Reformation, whose influences have been perpetually widening, and are now felt in every quarter of the globe. In several respects Soliman was not unworthy to be ranked among the greatest men of a period singularly prolific in splendid names. Known in general history chiefly as a conqueror, he is celebrated in Turkish annals also as a lawgiver, who first brought the finances and military organization of the empire into order. He divided the military force into two classes,—the standing army, and the soldiers appointed to guard the frontiers, who in return for their service received grants of land. He fixed with great accuracy the extent of these lands, the amount of service to be rendered, the number of soldiers which each grant should bring into the field, and regulated their discipline, their arms, and their pay. He compiled the various maxims and rules of his predecessors on the subjects of political economy, defined the duties, privileges, and powers of governors, commanders, and other public functionaries, and assigned to each his rank at court, in the city, and in

the army. Soliman has been styled the glory of the Ottoman empire, but with him that glory may be said to have departed, for while the tide of civilization set in among the nations of western Europe, enriching every land which it reached, from the vast regions over which the Sultan ruled it was driven back, or turned aside, by the immovable barriers of Ottoman pride.

But though the decline of the Turkish power may properly be dated from the death of Soliman, yet in the course of the following century several important conquests were made, and occasional victories attended the Turkish arms, like gleams of their ancient glory, and spreading a momentary terror over the larger part of continental Europe. Under the reign of Selim, the successor of Soliman, the large and beautiful island of Cyprus was won from the Venetians, by means, however, marked by all the perfidy that belonged to that age. This island, the largest of the Levant, until 1570, was in a state of the highest culture, abounding in riches, and sustaining a vast population considering its size, but under the horrible rule of the Turk its valuable products have disappeared, and the sites of the numerous cities and villages which once embellished it are now to be traced chiefly by their ruins. Selim's invasion of it in a time of peace was such a base violation of public law that even his own Grand Vizier earnestly opposed the scheme. Nicosia, the capital of the island, was carried by assault after a siege of fourteen days, and 26,000 Christians of both sexes miserably perished. Other portions of the island, however, held out long enough to have allowed the Christian powers of Europe to interpose; but, forgetful alike of their interest and duty, they shamefully permitted this bulwark of Christendom in the East to be subject to Mahometan dominion. Yet the fall of Cyprus roused the western states from their slumber, and a sense of common danger subduing for a moment their mutual jealousies, a league was formed between the pope, the king of Spain, and the republic of Venice.

The first important result of this alliance was the memorable sea-fight in the roadstead of Lepanto on the 7th October, 1571, near to the scene of the battle of Actium between Antony and Augustus, which decided the fate of the Roman

world. On this occasion the allies gained a complete victory—the most splendid of any recorded in that age; while the Turks met with a defeat equalled only by the overthrow of Bajazet by Timourlane, their fleet having been almost annihilated. If the allies had energetically followed up their triumph, and instantly sailed for Constantinople, that city might again have passed into the hands of Christians; but the time for action was allowed to slip away unimproved, and the only fruit of the victory was the temporary destruction of the naval power of Turkey. From this blow it never fully recovered.

The closing years of the century subsequent to the battle of Lepanto were signalized by the last conquest of the Turks, and by their last advance towards the heart of Europe,—by the conquest of Candia, and by the siege of Vienna, during the reign of Mahomet IV. The island of Candia belonged to Venice, and the history of its defence forms one of the most illustrious chapters in the annals of the Queen of the Adriatic. The incidents of the siege of Candia, the capital of the island, would alone fill a volume. More than 100,000 Ottomans perished before its walls, and so vigorously were they repulsed that frequently they threw down their arms and refused to return to the attack. But their courage and fanaticism finally prevailed. On the 4th October, 1670, the Grand Vizier entered Candia, which had sustained a siege of the unexampled duration of twenty-four years. The conquest of Candia shed a temporary lustre on the Turkish arms, and if the throne had been occupied at this time by a Soliman or a Bajazet, a large portion of Europe might have been added to the dominion of the Crescent. Hungary and Poland, by the fury of their factions and intestine strifes, had laid themselves open to invasion, and even invited the invasion of the conquering Ottoman. All Germany lay prostrate under the exhaustion, and in many districts the utter desolation produced by the terrible Thirty-Years' war; and if the Turkish power had not been already touched by the hand of decay, if the old military spirit of the Ottomans had survived in undiminished energy, perhaps Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, and even Austria, might have been brought under Mahometan rule. As it was, the Turks overran a large part of Poland, nearly the

whole of Hungary, and in July, 1685, the Grand Vizier Mustapha appeared beneath the very walls of Vienna at the head of an army of 180,000 men.

The siege of Vienna is on many accounts one of the most memorable events of modern history. The spectacle of a great capital situated almost in the heart of Europe, beleaguered by the mighty hosts of an Oriental power, was well fitted to fix upon itself the earnest gaze of the nations of the west, and to awaken their profound anxiety, if not to spread among them universal alarm. Yet the result of it was, on the one hand, to consolidate the ill-connected provinces of Austria into a compact monarchy, and on the other to deprive Turkey of no small share of her hard-won conquests, and to inflict upon her the first of those territorial losses which she has been since called so frequently to suffer. As the enemy approached near to Vienna, the Emperor Leopold with his court retired first to Lintz and then to Passau, followed by 60,000 of the citizens. Happily he had concluded a treaty with John Sobieski, the illustrious Polish hero, on whom the hopes of Austria and the eyes of Europe were centred; but his forces were at a considerable distance, and it was for a while doubtful whether he could interpose in time to prevent the grand disaster. The Vizier having opened his batteries, pressed the siege with the utmost vigor; his mines had been successfully sprung, and under the incessant fire of his batteries large sections of the walls had been levelled, so that the body of the fortifications was laid open. Heroic as was the defence, Vienna was on the brink of destruction. The besiegers impatiently awaited the order for a general assault, which could not have failed to have been decisive, but to the amazement of the combatants on both sides the order was not given. For some inexplicable reason the Vizier just at this moment relaxed his operations, and even made no effort to hinder the Polish army from effecting a junction with the Imperialists. At length three blazing fires on the summit of the Calenberg conveyed to the besieged the joyful news that their deliverers were near. The next morning 65,000 combatants, including the far-famed cavalry of Poland, recognised even from the distant battlements of Vienna by the flashing of the sunbeams as they fell on their superb armor, were seen pouring down

the mountain side like a mighty torrent, the whole under the orders of Sobieski. The Vizier at once drew up his forces in battle array, but the first discharge of cannon threw them into disorder, and in a few moments the entire Ottoman host, as if seized with a sudden panic, fled in disorder from the field. Indeed Sobieski was so amazed at the scene that he suspected some snare and halted his army for the night. The next morning confirmed the total rout of the Turkish army, whose camp, filled with an immense booty, fell into the victors' hands. This great disaster was followed by others which compelled the Sultan to sue for peace, and to purchase at the price of 6,000,000 of gold the surrender of Hungary and full satisfaction to the allies of Austria. Within the brief space of four years Turkey thus lost her entire territory west of the Danube, parts of which she had held for a century and a half.

At the close of this war, the relations between Turkey and the nations of Western Europe were placed upon the footing on which they have, in the main, ever since stood. Christendom ceased to dread the Turk; and the energies of the Turk were henceforth expended, not in the conquest of new fields, but the preservation of those he had already won. He was indeed a stranger on the soil of Europe, an alien from the Christian faith; but the old crusading spirit had been long dead; and if the western princes, by their united strength, had been enabled to drive the Turk beyond the Bosphorus, they could never have agreed among themselves about the disposal of his forfeited inheritance. Commerce and diplomacy gradually established a friendly relationship between the Sultan and the cabinets and kingdoms of the west. Meanwhile a new power, destined to fill a large space in European politics, had been slowly growing up amid the forests of Russia—a power which, through the agency of one of those master-spirits that Providence at rare intervals raises up to give a fresh impulse and a new direction to the life of nations, had just now gained admission into the family of European states. Between the monarchy of Russia, starting upon its career under Peter the Great, with all the energies of youth, and the Ottoman empire over which the decrepitude of premature old age was beginning to steal, there were ample grounds of a rivalry as ceaseless

and unrelenting as that between Rome and Carthage. They were near neighbors. The command of the Black Sea, and free access to the Mediterranean, were essential conditions of the development of the naval power of Russia, and of the commercial prosperity of her richest provinces. Then, too, the established religion of Russia was identical with that which for centuries had held rule in the palaces of Constantinople, and was still professed by many millions of the Sultan's subjects, stigmatized by their Mahometan masters as infidel dogs. And if the free and easy political ethics described by Scott as the "good old rule"—

"That he should take who has the power,
And he should keep who can,"

had continued to prevail among European states, we have no doubt that the standard of Russia would long ago have waved over the ramparts of Byzantium, and that the cross would long ago have resumed its ancient place over the dome of St. Sophia. But one of the fruits of modern civilization is the necessity under which nations find themselves, of having at least a decent pretext for hostilities before they commence a war of conquest.

Peter the Great ascended the throne in 1689, and is properly regarded as the real founder of the Russian empire; which under him acquired an importance hitherto unknown in the scale of nations. He built a new capital, he extended its boundaries to the shores of the Baltic, gaining several valuable seaports; he originated a navy, he reorganized the army, he enacted useful laws, he fostered the arts and sciences, he encouraged trade and commerce, he constructed canals and post roads; in a word, but for his atrocious treachery and cruelty, he would have merited, beyond any of his contemporaries, the reverence and admiration of mankind. During his reign there was no serious conflict with Turkey, but he initiated the aggressive policy which became traditional with his successors; and though his own eyes may not have been turned towards Constantinople, yet it early became the object of their ambition to possess themselves of this magnificent prize, and add to their splendid capital amid the marshes of the Neva, another and still more splendid one on the shores of the Bosphorus. This design

has been pursued with an undeviating constancy, and to the hope of effecting it are to be ascribed all those wars of the last century, by which Russia has profited so largely, and Turkey has been so greatly weakened, that Nicholas did not hesitate to speak of the Sultan as "a sick man"—"a very sick man"—in fact, as a man *in articulo mortis*, whose heirs were consequently entitled to look after his property. The limits of this article allow us only to indicate in the briefest way the successive strides made by Russia towards the end on which her heart was set.

During the reign of that able sovereign and abandoned woman, Catharine II., in spite of the pacific wishes of the Sultan, a war was begun in 1768 which, with a few brief intervals of peace, lasted until the outbreak of the French revolution. Its results were very disastrous to Turkey. On the 7th July, 1770, the whole Ottoman fleet, consisting of twenty-four ships, some of them carrying one hundred guns, through the obstinate stupidity of the admiral in command, was at one stroke totally destroyed. The Black sea then became what it has been ever since (or until 1854), a Russian lake; the passage of the Dardanelles was entirely defenceless, and the Russian fleet might have been safely anchored by the very walls of the Seraglio. But its commander, Orloff, wanted the decisive daring requisite in such emergencies. About the same time the Turks suffered very heavy losses on the banks of the Pruth,—their camp, cannon, and immense military stores fell into the hands of Romanzoff, while the forces of the grand vizier, on recrossing the Danube, scarcely numbered five thousand men. Occasionally, in the progress of the war, the fierce energy of the Ottoman blazed forth with its ancient fury, and even spread a momentary terror through the provinces bordering upon European Turkey, while at other periods the absolute dissolution of the empire seemed inevitable. At the close of the war Turkey was obliged to cede the Crimea and other extensive provinces between the Black and the Caspian seas to Russia, together with the right of a free passage to Russian vessels through the Bosphorus; even her limited command of the Black sea was virtually at an end, her navy was ruined, her military resources immensely crippled, and her power over many of her own provinces materially weak-

ened. The French revolution, however, gave her a short breathing spell, so far at least as the Muscovite was concerned.

We pass over the invasion of Egypt by the French in 1798, with the other events by which Turkey was brought into connexion with the troubled politics of Europe of that day, and the domestic revolution in 1807, which cost Selim III. his throne and his life. In 1810 an imperial ukase appeared, formally annexing Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russian empire, and declaring the Danube to be its southern boundary. The war which followed was waged on both sides with great energy and varying success; the result of it being that Russia was obliged to content herself with the line of the Pruth, and the province of Bessarabia, which gave her the command of the mouth of the Danube.

The resistance which Russia encountered at this period, showed that the Ottoman empire, amid its decay, still possessed elements of strength, which in the hand of a wise and vigorous ruler might become the means of arresting its decline. Such a man was the Sultan Mahmoud II., who at this crisis ascended the throne. With a fearless energy and an undaunted courage that entitle him to be ranked among the great men of his age, he set himself to the task of developing the dormant resources of his empire, and of infusing a new life into its social structure. Bred in the seclusion of the harem, little informed by education, he had yet the sagacity to comprehend the causes of the disease which infected the body politic, and the remedies by which alone its progress could be stopped. At the cost of a long, obstinate, and bloody contest with ancient habits engrafted upon law and sanctified by religion, he originated changes to which are to be ascribed the recent improvements in the military and civil institutions of the empire, and which have led many to think that Turkey may be politically regenerated, and may again become one of the controlling powers of the old world.

But large and liberal as were the views of Mahmoud II., his reign was, in certain respects, one of the most calamitous in the Turkish annals, and was marked by events the tidings of which filled the civilized world with horror. He had resolved upon the entire dissolution of the old military body.

known as the Janizaries,—a body which had been for ages the terror of the government, and more than once had dictated terms to the sovereign. The whole history of the Janizaries, who, if at one time the strength, were at another the weakness of the empire, proves that their existence was wholly incompatible with the independence of the Sultan, and he accordingly took steps to rid himself and his successors of their tyranny. As the plans of Mahmoud approached their consummation the Janizaries became aware of their danger, but they did not feel themselves strong enough to resist them openly. The decree, reorganizing the army, was read in the mosques without disturbance; the new uniforms were given out, and a few selected men were quietly exercised by Egyptian officers. But when the recruits in larger numbers were drilled and marched in European fashion, there were evident signs of discontent. On the evening of June 14th, 1826, the Janizaries broke out into open mutiny, and stigmatized the new regulations as contrary to the law of the Prophet. Rushing tumultuously from the barracks they assailed and plundered the palaces of the Grand Vizier, the Capitan Pasha, and of their own Aga.

The Sultan, however, before venturing upon his experiment, had secured the concurrence of the Muftis, the Ulemas, and of the chiefs of the Janizaries themselves; the latter were consequently left without leaders capable of improving their victory, and after pillaging the palaces they dispersed among the wine-vaults in the vicinity, and perpetrated frightful excesses. The Sultan instantly hurried to Constantinople, and putting himself at the head of the Topgees or artillerymen, and other faithful troops to the number of 10,000, who were followed by a vast crowd of Mussulmans of all ages and sorts, unfurled the banner of the Prophet, and summoned the rebels to lay down their arms. Their only reply was a stern refusal, accompanied with the haughty demand for the heads of the Vizier and their own Aga. Amid loud cheers the fierce bands overturned their camp-kettles—the well known signal of revolt—and retiring to their barracks prepared for a desperate resistance. But an awful fate there awaited them. A perfect storm of shells was directed against the building, which soon wrapped it in flames, while a terrific fire of grape prevented all egress. The rebels now offered to

submit, but it was too late; the shells continued to fall and the grape to be discharged until 4,000 of the wretched insurgents perished in their burning barracks. The triumph of the Sultan was complete, and he followed it up by a war of extermination in all parts of his dominions; 40,000 were put to death, as many more were driven into exile; and by the end of August the Janizaries were extinct. During the same month, while the bloody process of extermination was going on, a disastrous conflagration broke out in Constantinople, supposed to have been the work of incendiaries, by which 6,000 dwellings were consumed, and property valued at more than 20,000,000 dollars was destroyed.

Then there was the Greek Revolution, a history by itself, extending from 1821 to 1829, into the details of which we cannot enter. Whether the horrible atrocities perpetrated in the course of this memorable contest at Adrianople, Salonica, Scio, Cyprus, and other places, were sanctioned by the Sultan, is not certain. Probably the chief share of the guilt belonged to the fierce, fanatical, and unruly Janizaries. Mahmoud, indeed, met the overtures of the European powers, who were shocked by the dreadful scenes so often enacted, with the obstinate assertion of his right—a right claimed by each of themselves—to put down rebellion in his own dominions. He consequently repelled their friendly advances, and at length brought down upon himself the banded navies of Europe. At Navarino the gallant fleet, which had cost him millions of money, was annihilated in a single day, and he was ultimately compelled to consent to the erection of one of his own provinces into the independent kingdom of Greece.

The troubles in which Mahmoud was involved with the Janizaries and the Greeks were not ended, when he was forced to grapple with a mightier foe—with the Emperor Nicholas. In 1828 the war with Russia was begun, and in 1829 the Russian army penetrated to the very heart of European Turkey, to a point where the face of an invader had never been seen since the day when the Ottoman established himself on the soil of Europe. A large army under Diebitch crossed the mountain barrier of the Balkan, who fixed his head-quarters in Adrianople, the ancient capital of the Ottoman empire. The success of the Russians was, however, mainly owing to the want of co-operation among

the Turkish generals, and not to a deficiency either in the number or the bravery of their soldiers. In fact, the army of Diebitch was in a most critical position, and if the campaign had lasted a month longer, nothing could have saved it from ruin.

Austria and England now interposed to arrest hostilities, and entered into a secret convention to prevent the conquest of Turkey, if need be, by force of arms. But Nicholas hastened to allay the awakened jealousy of Europe, satisfied for the time being with the advantages he had gained, and which were very great. The Sultan Mahmoud, with tears in his eyes, signed the famous treaty of Adrianople, by which Turkey agreed to pay £5,750,000 to Russia, to transfer to her various fortresses of great military value, to leave in her hands the islands at the mouth of the Danube, and to make Wallachia, Bulgaria, &c., virtually independent Principalities governed by their Hospodars, who, while nominally the subjects of the Sultan, were really under the protection of the Czar. The moment when Mahmoud signed this treaty must have been one of the most bitter he ever experienced, not only because it cost him so much money and so many fortresses, and placed some of his fairest provinces under the virtual control of Nicholas, but also because he must then have known the whole extent of the peril which threatened the armies of Russia, and that if his own generals had made one energetic and combined attack, they must have beaten a disgraceful and ruinous retreat. But the disasters of Mahmoud's reign were not yet ended. His vassal, Mahomet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, had been for many years the real sovereign of that country; he had developed its resources by measures characteristic of a Moslem ruler, yet with uncommon energy and success he had increased the military and naval power of Egypt to a surprising extent; his army numbered 155,000 disciplined troops, besides 40,000 irregulars, while his fleet consisted of twenty-one ships of the line, nine large frigates, and various smaller vessels. The obvious aim of his policy was to raise the land of the Pharaohs and of the Ptolemies from the vassalage of ages, and to erect it into an independent kingdom. In 1838 he ventured upon the decisive step, and unfurled the banner of rebellion. Russia, with a specious generosity,

offered her help to the Sultan, and even pressed its acceptance with a singularly benevolent pertinacity. But the benevolence of Russia was well understood both by the Sultan and the other great powers of Europe. The latter, with a view to preserve the balance of power, resolved, on the one hand, that Russia should not be allowed to interfere alone, and on the other, that Egypt should continue to be an integral part of the Turkish empire. But before the final adjustment of the eastern question, as it was called, the Sultan Mahmoud, whose health had been long declining, died, 25th June, 1839.

The length of this historical sketch of the Turkish empire leaves us very scanty room for speculation in regard to its probable future. As was intimated in the outset of this article, the subjugation of those vast and magnificent regions, which may be fitly named the garden of the world, under the paralysing and wasting dominion of the Moslem, is one of the mysteries of Providence. The merely philosophical historian in vain attempts its solution. Why should lands so exuberantly rich in everything that can minister to human comfort, have been brought and kept so long under the blighting influence of Ottoman rule? The Christian student of the past can furnish a reply to the question. It is the doing of Him who ever and anon "cometh forth from his place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquities," converting the disorders and seeming anomalies of the present time into visible and palpable proofs, that "verily there is a God that judgeth in the earth." It is the result of that great moral law, applicable alike to nations and to individuals, by which the abuse of privileges works their forfeiture—a result, in this case, distinctly predicted centuries before its actual accomplishment. This same sure word of prophecy casts the light of its revelations respecting the lands of the crescent, far into the future; and while it is not, purposely, strong enough to enable those even who "give heed" to it to predict the occurrences of this or that year, they nevertheless can discern the grand outline of those stupendous scenes which are yet to be enacted there. No one can doubt that the glory of the Crescent is on the wane, and will ere long totally disappear. It is equally certain that the *Greek* cross can never regain its ancient supremacy. To

exchange the crescent for such a cross would be simply to deepen the darkness and degradation of the east. Hitherto there have been no direct efforts made to win the Moslem to the faith of Christ, but various causes are at work tending to abate the fierce and bloody fanaticism which has been so long an insuperable barrier in the way of the herald of the gospel. Already Mahomet has lost his hold on many minds; the spirit of inquiry is abroad; the Mosque, on which a Christian was hardly allowed to look, is now freely entered by Americans and Englishmen; the Turk is beginning to discover that Christians are not idolaters, and that the gospel with which he was familiar, whether in the hand of the Greek or the Latin, is a miserable caricature of the true and glorious gospel of the blessed God. The largest liberty is secured to the missionaries laboring in various parts of Turkey; "the word of the Lord is not bound," and the press enjoys a measure of freedom that is denied it in other countries boasting of a higher civilization. In fine, while we indulge in no predictions nor even conjectures in regard to events in the near future, the possible dismemberment of the empire, the possible amalgamation of its diverse races, we nevertheless have a strong confidence, that before the armies of France and England, which, hand to hand with the Ottoman, are aiming to curb the boundless ambition of Russia, shall bid adieu to the scenes of their conflicts and triumphs, the revolution already begun, and bearing in its bosom vast moral as well as political consequences, will have made great progress.

Of the volume, whose title is placed at the head of this article, we have only to say that it is an unpretending but well digested compend of Turkish history.

ART. V.—PROFESSOR LEWIS'S SCRIPTURAL COSMOLOGY—THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION: or the Scriptural Cosmology, with the ancient idea of Time Worlds, in distinction from Worlds of Space. By Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek in Union College. Schenectady: G. Y. Debogert. 1855.

ONE of the most serious obstructions which Christianity

has to encounter, is a disposition in those who profess to receive it, to find in it the peculiar speculative or philosophical systems which they entertain; or to mould its doctrines into harmony with what they deem the dictates of their reason. It was in that spirit that the Gnostics, soon after its promulgation, endeavored to inweave with it their monstrous errors. It was that disposition that in the third century betrayed Origen especially, and others of the Alexandrian church, into the fancy that the doctrines of the Scriptures, and their Platonic theories respecting the universe, were essentially the same; and led them to promulgate a vast brood of false notions under the garb of Christianity, that contradicted and perverted it, and infused pernicious elements into the faith of the church, from the blight of which it has not yet fully recovered. The pantheism that is now taught from the pulpit in Germany, and is diffusing its poisonous principles in Great Britain and this country, had the same origin; and from that prolific source have sprung nearly all the false views that have been propagated as doctrines of revelation. They lie within the domain of the philosophy of the material world, or of metaphysics, and belong to that science, that is falsely so-called. It will surprise our readers and excite their regret, to learn that Professor Lewis has joined the long train of those who persuade themselves that they find their philosophical notions graven on the pages of revelation; and that the Cosmology which he ascribes to the Spirit of inspiration is, in its main features, that of Plato.

The principal elements of Plato's philosophy—besides the doctrine of a supreme self-existing being who is the creator of all—are, that matter existed in a chaotic state anterior to the work of creation;—his language, indeed, in the judgment of many, indicates that he regarded it as self-existent; that the work of creation consisted, not in giving it being, but simply in moulding it into the forms in which it now exists, such as the earth, the sun, the moon, and the subordinate structures—minerals, plants, and animals, into which it is wrought in our world; that all these structures are framed after archetypes or ideas that existed in the divine mind, and that each of them—such as the sun, the planets, and all organized forms, is animated by a soul, a vital

and self-moving power ; that these vital essences, or principles, existed antecedently to the worlds, plants, and animals, in which they are embodied ; that the creation of those forms, therefore, especially of plants and animals, was their evolution by a natural process from their essences or vital principles, much like that by which plants and animals now advance from the seminal state to maturity, and was accordingly a growth, a gradual formation, not an instantaneous production.

The main elements of this cosmology, Professor Lewis adopts, and maintains that it is the cosmology of the Scriptures. He holds that the creation recorded in Genesis did not include the gift of existence to the matter of the heavens and earth, but was a mere subjection of it to the forces or laws under which it assumes the animal, vegetable, crystallized, and other forms which it now bears ; that that matter, therefore, existed anterior to that creation, and in a chaotic state ; that each of the various forms which God then created had an essence and principle which was its vital or formative power, that existed antecedently to, and independently of, the material form in which it developed itself ; that those invisible essences, or formative powers, are ideas or types of the material forms in which they become incorporated, were directly called into existence by God, and are copies of his ideas ; that his work, therefore, recorded in Genesis, was a mere formative process, or a growth like that of the evolution of a plant from a seed, and necessarily occupied long periods ; and thence, finally, that the six days of the creation, and the seventh day of rest, instead of being ordinary days of the revolution of the earth on its axis, were times or ages of vast and indeterminable length. Besides these main views, he advances a variety of subordinate speculations that are of a kindred nature. The volume displays his usual characteristics—much knowledge, much ingenuity, much ardor, but, unfortunately, a subtlety that is near-sighted, and without comprehensiveness ; and learning that is under the dominion of fancy and whim, rather than reason. His work, accordingly, instead of being the product, as he persuades himself, of a keen and impartial philology, is, like his notion of the creation of organized forms, in its vital principle but a false and absurd preconception derived from Plato, which he has endeavored to de-

velope, and by very unwarrantable means attempted to clothe with a body from the ideas and language of the history of the creation by Moses. We shall not pursue him through all the various topics of which he treats, but shall simply try the validity of his views on a few of the main points of his system.

We shall first notice his representation that the creation which is recorded in the narrative of Genesis i. and ii., was not an absolute creation of the matter of which the heavens and earth consist, as well as the gift to it of the various forms into which it was wrought, but was a mere moulding into those forms of matter that was previously existing. Thus, he says:—

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The word *beginning* here, may be taken in a relative as well as in an absolute sense; and the context, together with extrinsic considerations, can alone decide which is the true interpretation. It certainly is not the absolute beginning of all being. . . . Was it, then, the absolute beginning of the organized worlds, or of the matter of which they are composed; or does it refer simply to our own world with its immediate celestial system; or, finally, does it denote only the fashioning or forming of our world into its present state, without its being intended to give us any information respecting its more ancient elimination from absolute nonentity?

"Now, in respect to all these questions, there is only *one* that can be answered from the *record* with perfect confidence. It most surely does teach us the fashioning or forming, in some way, of our present world into its present state. All else is left uncertain and undetermined. Those who think that there is taught here an absolute *origination* of the earth's matter out of nothing, would regard the first verse as severed from the others, and as having special reference to the primordial act. But high as are the authorities who have defended this view, we cannot agree with them. Whatever may be believed in respect to this first origination of matter, whether of the earth or of all worlds, there is good reason for doubting whether it is actually meant to be set forth either in the beginning or in any other part of this account. . . . The language seems not to denote a separate primordial act, but to cover the whole process that follows. It suggests to us *the fashioning* of something which, as far as the material is concerned, is already in existence as the subject of the operation, or series of operations afterwards described.

The beginning, then, is *the beginning of this fashioning.*"—Pp. 44–46.

This construction of "the beginning" is, however, manifestly erroneous. The beginning is presented as contemporaneous with the act by which God created the heavens and the earth. It was, therefore, either the beginning of the heavens and earth which were created by that act, or else it was the beginning of his agency towards them. But if it was the beginning of the heavens and earth, then the matter of which they consist cannot have existed previously; and therefore it must have been by that creative fiat that they were called into existence. If, on the other hand, it was the beginning of God's *agency* towards them, then, also, either they must have commenced their existence at that moment, or else the matter of which they consist must have been self-existent. For if that was his first act towards them, and yet they did not owe their being to that act, but existed previously, then the ground of their existence must undoubtedly have lain within themselves, not in him; and thence they must have been self-existent and eternal. Professor Lewis's construction accordingly implies, that the chaotic matter, of which he holds the heavens and earth were framed, was self-existent. For in denying that the beginning, which was the date of the divine act, was the beginning of the heavens and the earth, and asserting that instead it was the beginning of God's agency towards them, he in effect asserts that the matter on which that act was exerted was self-existent, and therefore eternal. He cannot evade this by assuming that the beginning which the text denotes, was simply the beginning of God's agency in *fashioning* the heavens and earth; as that not only erases the *date* from the passage, but converts the proposition into an unmeaning tautology. For it is made by that construction to declare simply, that in the beginning of God's fashioning the heavens and earth, he fashioned them—which is simply saying, that when he fashioned the world, he fashioned it. But that senseless announcement is not the announcement of the passage. If the beginning, therefore, denoted by the text, was, as Professor Lewis contends, the beginning of God's agency towards the matter of the heavens and earth, and yet was not

employed in giving existence to that matter, then it must have been self-existing, and thence eternal. But to ascribe that nature to the matter of the heavens and earth, is in effect to deny that God has exerted any fashioning agency on it. For that which is self-existent must necessarily be as independent of all extraneous causes for the *form* of its existence, as for its existence itself. The cause within itself of its existence, must unquestionably determine the *mode* of its existence, as well as the fact. The supposition that the whole ground of the existence of matter lies within itself, but that the reason of its existing in the *mode* or form in which it does, lies in an external cause, is as self-contradictory as it were to suppose that while the ground of God's existence lies wholly in himself, the reason that he exists in the form in which he reveals himself as Father, Son, and Spirit, lies in some being external to himself. To imply, therefore, that the matter of the world is self-existent, as Professor L. does, is to imply that God never exerted any fashioning agency on the matter of the heavens and earth; and thereby to deny that he ever exerted any such creative acts as Professor L. regards the first verse of Genesis as ascribing to him.

So much for the first expedient by which he attempts to force the inspired history of the creation into the mould of his Platonic philosophy! He must either give up his interpretation of the beginning, and admit that it denotes the date of the act by which the heavens and earth were called into existence, and thereby relinquish his whole cosmological scheme; or else he must maintain that matter is self-existent, and therefore deny that God ever gave it form, or exerted any agency on it whatever.

He endeavors to confirm his view of the act of God as a fashioning of pre-existent matter, instead of speaking the heavens and earth into existence, by the fact that the verb translated *create*, sometimes denotes to cut and shape. He says:—

“Its primary meaning is to cut, hence to shave, shape, form, or fashion. . . . It is that idea of making which consists in cuttings, separations, and arrangements, by division of what previously exists in a confused and disorderly state, rather than a combining or a constructing of new and scattered elements. No reader can avoid

seeing how applicable this is to the greater part of the process; especially the work of the first five days, or until we come to the creation of man."—P. 48.

But this, in the first place, assumes that the matter which was the object of the creative act already existed; which implies, as we have already shown, that it was self-existent, and, in effect, therefore, denies that God could have exerted on it any such shaping agency as that which Professor Lewis ascribes to him. If the matter of the heavens and earth was self-existent, it would be as inaccessible to a formative agency from God, as God himself is to such an agency from any cause external to himself. By maintaining that the matter of the world existed antecedently to the beginning of God's agency towards it, he precludes himself as effectually from holding that God gave it the forms in which it now exists, as he would if he directly denied the power of God to exert any influence on it.

But, apart from this consideration, his reasoning from the verb translated *create*, is mistaken. Admitting that the verb, when men are the agents, sometimes means to cut and shape with an instrument, that is not uniformly its meaning; and Prof. L. himself will not pretend that it is used in that sense when God is the agent. It is used synonymously with our verbs to form, to make, which, when applied to God, denote a making and forming that are appropriate to him as a purely spiritual Being, who produces his works by his mere power, or omnipotent will, not, like men, by the use of instruments in the hands. Its use, therefore, to denote his giving existence to things by his omnipotent volition, is perfectly legitimate. And that sense, moreover, is proper or literal, not metaphorical. It is not used in the sense of creating, nor even of fashioning and shaping by a metaphor, as there is no analogy between creating, nor between merely cutting, shaving, and separating into parts, and forming, shaping, or making a thing. Cutting may be in order to destroy a shape or form, as well as to give one. It is a mere means to an end, and that means may be either unmaking or making, as the agent happens to will. The sense of making, and of creating, or giving existence to a thing, is a literal sense of the word, therefore, not a metapho-

rical one; just as in our language, manufacture, which literally denotes to make with the hand, is now used to denote the production of things by processes in which the hand has no immediate part—as the manufacture of salt by the evaporation of the water in which it is held in solution, by artificial heat, or the action of the atmosphere; and the production of fabrics by machinery. The Hebrew verb drew its sense of making and creating very likely from the fact that the cutting, dividing, and shaping, which Prof. L. holds it primarily denoted, was usually in order to making, as of implements and garments; in the same manner as the use of manufacture to denote the production of things by machinery and other agents, independently of the hand, sprang from the fact that it was by the hand alone originally that implements and fabrics were made. But the sense, though thus derived, is a literal, not a metaphorical sense. Professor Lewis might as well undertake to prove from the primary sense of manufacture, that everything which it now denotes must be produced by the hand, in contradistinction from machinery or other agents, as to attempt to prove that the word translated create, in Genesis i. 1, denotes simply the fashioning of a thing by moulding and shaping materials that previously existed, because it was originally used to denote the cutting and dividing, by men, of material things by an instrument.

The sense of absolute production, or giving existence, is the true sense of the verb, therefore, in the passage, and is the only sense in which it can be employed, when, as in this instance, the object of God's agency had no previous existence; as the heavens and earth which were produced by his fiat must, as we have seen, have been created by him out of nothing, or else, as they must have been self-existent, they could not have been the objects of his agency in any form.

That this is a legitimate, and the true sense of the term, is shown, moreover, by the fact that it is used to denote the creation of man's spiritual nature, which Prof. L. himself admits then received its first existence. "And God said, Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness. . . . So God created man in his image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them."—v. 26, 27. As Adam's and Eve's intellectual natures were not cut and

shaped by an instrument in the hand of God, nor by his mere will, out of a preëxisting subsistence, but were then spoken into being, the verb demonstrably, when God is the agent, truly and legitimately denotes the gift of existence, and is used, therefore, in that sense in the announcement that in the beginning he created the heavens and the earth.

Professor L. endeavors to draw support to his interpretation also from the unfurnished state of the earth anterior to the creation of light and air, dry land, and vegetables, and animals. He says—

“For the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.’ Our common version has ‘and’ instead of *for* as the connecting particle. The difference may seem *slight*, and yet there may be connected with it quite an important modification of the general sense. The Hebrew is very scanty in its conjunctions, and therefore the particle (*vau*) is often employed, not only to denote sequence or connexion in order of time, but to show *the ground, reason, or motive*, of what is said. In one view of the passage, the first verse contains an action separate from those that follow; in another, it only expresses the same events in a condensed titular form. According to this latter interpretation, the conjunction shows *the ground, or reason*, of the proceeding. *In the beginning God created*, that is, *fashioned, formed, reduced to order*. And why? Because the earth which was to be created was then without form and void. It was a fit subject for such a process.”—P. 56.

This is a specimen of the slight and merely assumed ground on which Professor Lewis often founds the most momentous conclusions. Why, as he is so enamored of the primary signification of a word, does he not adhere to it in this instance?—*For* is not the first and most usual meaning of *vau*. It cannot be assigned that meaning, indeed, except when the connexion shows that “and” is not its proper rendering. But there is nothing here that indicates that *for* and not *and* expresses its true meaning. Instead, with “and” the sense of the passage is natural and perfect. “And the earth was without form” or unfurnished, “and void” or waste, in place of being occupied by vegetables and animals, like the declaration that next follows, “and darkness was upon the face of the deep,” is descriptive of its condition when it was spoken into existence. And Prof

Lewis treats the latter as describing that state, not as a reason for the creative act which, in the first verse, God is said to have exerted. But if his reason for translating *vau*, for, in the first statement of the verse is legitimate, he should have translated it by that word also in the two other instances of its occurrence, and made the passage read, "*For* the earth was without form and void. *For* darkness was upon the face of the deep, *For* the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters;" and thus made the Spirit's moving on the surface of the waters the reason that darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the existence of darkness upon the face of the deep, the reason that the earth was without form and void; precisely as he now makes this last the reason that in the beginning God, according to him, *fashioned* the heavens and earth. The same reason may be given for rendering the particle *for* in the second and third instance as in the first. Can Prof. L., however, persuade himself, to say nothing of Hebrew scholars, that any reader of ordinary intelligence will acquiesce in such a rendering of the passage?

But his translation is not only without any just philological reasons; it is against the true meaning of the passage, and makes nonsense of it. For it represents the sacred writer as saying: In the beginning God *fashioned* the heavens and earth, because they were not fashioned!—for that is the meaning of *tohu* and *bohu*. But does not the supposition that he fashioned them in the beginning imply that they were unfashioned, and that thence there was a necessity for his giving them a form? Why should he fashion them, except that without it they could not have a form? Would an architect, who was narrating his erection of an edifice, state it as the reason of his erecting it, that antecedently the materials of which it consists did not exist in the form of an edifice? Would such an announcement be natural? Could it be necessary in order that his hearers or readers might understand what his motive was in erecting it? Would it not be wholly unnatural and absurd? Yet Professor Lewis, in substituting *for* instead of *and*, represents the Spirit of inspiration as giving precisely such a senseless reason for God's *fashioning* the heavens and the earth in the beginning. And this perversion of the passage is veiled

under an air of profound knowledge of philology ; a philosophic and reverential regard for the primitive meaning of terms ! Instead of aiding his cause by resorting to expedients of this kind, which unfortunately throng at every stage of his argument, he has weakened it by revealing the superficiality of his views, and impairing the confidence of his readers in his judgment.

He proceeds in confirmation of his views to represent that the time when the earth was waste and unfurnished, was anterior, not subsequent, to the creation announced in the first verse. Thus he says—

“ We cannot lay much stress on the scanty Hebrew tenses, but unless the context forbids, it may just as well be understood in the præter-past : ‘ and the earth *had been* without form and void.’ How long no one can know, for the account does not deign to give us any information. Even, however, as commonly rendered, the substantive verb certainly seems to imply the existence, in some elemental way, of the mass or matter in which this creation was then beginning to take place.”—P. 57.

But if Professor Lewis renders that verb in the præter-past, he should, for the same reason, translate the first verse in that tense, and make it read : “ In the beginning God had fashioned the heavens and the earth”—or, “ In the beginning the heavens and the earth had been fashioned by God.” But that involves it in the grossest self-contradiction. For if the beginning is the beginning of the earth’s existence, then it affirms that the heavens and the earth had been fashioned by God, before they existed. If the beginning is the beginning of God’s agency towards the heavens and earth, then it affirms that they had been fashioned by him before he began to exert any agency towards them. If the beginning is the beginning of his fashioning the heavens and earth, then it declares that they had been fashioned by him before he had fashioned them ! Is Professor Lewis prepared to involve the text in these bald contradictions ? If not, he must relinquish his attempt to sustain his theory by converting “ was,” in the second verse, into “ had been.” He can offer no reason for it that is not equally good for a similar change of the verb of the first verse. Moreover, if he renders the verb in the first clause of the second verse in “ the præter-past,” he should those also in the second and third, and

make the passage read: "For the earth had been without form and void: for darkness had been upon the face of the deep: for the Spirit of God had moved upon the face of the waters." But that, according to his construction of *vau*, implies that the reason that the earth had been without form and void, was that darkness had been upon the face of the deep; and that the reason that darkness had been upon the face of the deep was, that the "Spirit of God had moved upon the face of the waters!" This, however, is not only without a shadow of ground in the text, but is absurd. The darkness that was upon the face of the deep was not the cause or reason that the earth was waste, that is, unfurnished with vegetables and animals, and without hills, vales, and plains. Its removal by the creation of light was indeed a necessary preliminary to converting the world from a waste, and fitting it for the growth of plants and the life of animals; but it was not the reason that it was not furnished with them. The earth was a waste, because God had not yet made it a paradise, and peopled it with plants and animals. Nor was the Spirit's having moved upon the face of the waters, the reason that darkness was upon the face of the deep. But darkness was upon the face of the deep, because there was no sunlight to illuminate the face of the waters. It was removed accordingly by the creation of light, not by the Spirit's ceasing to move upon the face of the waters. By this attempt to give color to his theory, Professor Lewis thus grossly perverts the passage, and involves it in revolting self-contradictions and absurdities. It is not a good omen that he resorts to such expedients to accomplish his object. He proceeds to represent that the earth in this condition was a chaos.

"And the earth *at that time*, or that beginning, was without form and void. It was *tohu* and *bohu*, confusion and emptiness, or as Luther admirably renders it, *waste and desolation*. The Vulgate translates it, *inanis et vacua*. In this state it was not a *creation*, if we can place any reliance on the clearest primitive sense of words; for the Hebrew, as well as the Latin and English radicals, presents, as we have shown, the very opposite ideas. How it came in such a condition no one can say. Whether it was the result of a progress or a deterioration, we have no means of knowing, either from nature or from revelation. It may have been at some time a *direct* work of God, or

it may have been produced by him through a causality which may well be described by the word *natural*. If, however, we are right in our philological view, it was not in either way a *creation*. The ideas associated with this word belong wholly to the subsequent process. The *tohu* and *bohu* may have been a *rudimentary chaos*, which had never yet assumed order—such as we may suppose to have been the condition of perhaps many an elemental world; or it may have been a *chaos* to which some world or system had been reduced from some previously better state. It may have lain long in ruins; it may have gone through an immense number of older cycles; or it may be that it was now for the first time made the subject of *creation*, that is, according to the Latin word, an orderly *growing* through harmonious laws; or according to the Hebrew conception, a *separating*, a *dividing*, a *clearing up*, or bringing into order, an arranging of outward relations, by which it comes in harmony with the exact measurements of universal, objective time, and is thus prepared for the abode of life, happiness, and rationality.

"But what, then, was this ancient chaotic condition of our planet? Science can tell us nothing about it. The chasms that part us, whether wide or brief, can never be securely traversed by her slow-moving steps. From the other side of the wild abyss, and across the intervening period, comes wafted to us by the breath of inspiration our only image, and that human mind to which it was first revealed, has represented this image or conception to other human minds, by those two Hebrew words, in which is pictured all that can be thought, or imagined, or understood of this primeval mystery. It was *tohu* and *bohu*."—Pp. 57, 58.

We have quoted this passage, partly that our readers may see the mode in which Professor Lewis argues, and the means by which he endeavors to lead his readers to an acquiescence in his theory;—the unhesitating assumption, on the one hand, that his mistaken and arbitrary philology gives the true meaning of the text; and on the other, wordy declamation, and sometimes pompous assertions, that no knowledge on the subject can be derived from any other source. When the faith of the reader is to be won, and he has no other expedient to gain it, he asserts and proclaims in the most confident terms the truth of his position. When his views, however, appear at variance with facts, the laws of matter, or what is generally held to be the meaning of other passages of the Sacred Word, and the eye is to be withdrawn, if possible, from difficulties and objections, he is then

equally adroit in his protestations of ignorance, and equally showy in his harangues against science and philosophy! Whether he blows hot or cold, depends entirely on the exigency of the moment. We are sorry to feel obliged to point out this feature of his work, but it is so conspicuous a characteristic of it, that no reader, we think, can fail to see it; and that no one, without discerning it, can form a just judgment of the worthlessness of his argument. He appears to have written his work under a full belief of the geological theory respecting the immense age of the earth, and the nebular hypothesis respecting the origin of worlds; and *especially under such a conviction, that, if the geological theory cannot be reconciled with the narrative of the creation in Genesis by philology, they cannot be reconciled at all, and the inspiration of Moses must be rejected*, that his eagerness to maintain the views which he advances swayed him from his impartiality, and caused everything that seems to favor the point he wishes to establish to assume the air of truth and dignity; and invested everything that makes against him with the odious hues of unscholarly and narrow-minded error.

What now was that state of waste and desolation which is affirmed of the earth immediately after its creation? The history itself of the six days' creation furnishes the most ample proof that it was no such chaos as Professor Lewis represents. No more wild and preposterous extravagance can be imagined. He defines it as "the immense unformed mass, in which," antecedently to its being wrought into a globe, "everything lay commingled; earth, air, fire and water, light and darkness, cold and heat, not yet parted from each other—

Rudis indigestaque moles—

a rude unorganized bulk;" speaks of the terms in which it is described as denoting "*the measureless, the unfathomable*," and says—

"Before this, as we have said, or for ages before this, *it may have been an immense floating nebulousity*, or part of some still larger nebulousity, but at this period it is a wide fluid mass or waste of water, without a shore, without a bottom, without a sky above, or any terminating solid bound."—P. 63.

But that the earth was no such chaos then, but was as

solid a globe as it is now, and of essentially the same dimensions, is shown by the fact that it was enveloped at every point by the waters which were afterwards gathered into seas, and were the waters of our present oceans. It was upon the face of the waters that the Spirit of God moved, and they formed the deep upon which the darkness brooded. They were in existence, therefore, at the time that the earth was waste and unfurnished, and they were the waters that continued under the firmament on the creation of the atmosphere on the second day, and were gathered into seas on the third. They are spoken of at those dates as already existing, not as then created. The earth therefore must then have been of its present shape, an oblate spheroid, and of its present dimensions; as otherwise the waters would not have been adequate to envelope it at every point and form a deep over it. Had it been of the vast dimensions Prof. L. ascribes to it, they would not have covered it to the depth of an inch; and had it been a perfect sphere of as great diameter at the poles as at the equator, its whirl on its axis would have thrown the waters towards the equator and left the poles uncovered.

That the earth was then a solid globe, not a mere "fluid mass," is shown also by the fact that the land, which was raised out of the waters on the third day, was already in existence, not then created, and was made dry land simply by elevation from the waters. It was what before had formed the bottom of the deep, on which the darkness rested; the solid ground on which the waters rested anterior to their being gathered into seas. As then that ground existed when the waters formed the deep on which the darkness rested and the Spirit of God moved, the earth was not a chaos of fluid elements, a crude nebulosity of boundless dimensions floating at random in space.

That the waste and desolation that are predicated of the earth were confined to its surface and had no reference to its interior, is seen from the creative acts of the six days, which were employed in changing the earth from its waste and unfurnished to a habitable state, and replenishing it with organized and living forms. Thus the act of the first day was the creation of light, and of the second the creation of the atmosphere, both of which are exterior to the earth;

while that of the third was the collection of the waters into seas, the elevation of a portion of the surface of the ground into the atmosphere, and the creation of vegetables; that of the fifth was the creation of fish and fowls, and that of the sixth the creation of beasts and of man, of all of which the surface of the earth was the subject and scene. The act of the fourth day was that adjustment of the earth and the other bodies of the solar system by which the sun and moon became the determiners of years, seasons, months, and days; and, so far as our world is concerned, consisted, there is reason to think, simply in a change of the earth's axis from a perpendicular to its present inclination to the ecliptic; and though it affected the whole mass of the earth, it involved no change in its structure or the relations of its parts to one another.

The change of the earth therefore from its *tohu* and *bohu* state, its uninhabitableness and destitution of organized forms, to habitableness and occupation by vegetables and animals, was not a change in any degree from such a huge floating chaos or nebulosity, as Professor Lewis imagines, but was a mere enlightening it with the light of the sun, investing it with an atmosphere, gathering its waters into seas, raising a portion of its surface into the atmosphere, giving its axis such an inclination to the ecliptic as to divide the year into seasons, cause the days to vary in length in different parts of the year, and making the sun and moon the determiners of its periods, and finally the creation of plants, animals, and man, to people and enjoy it. Professor Lewis's "immense unformed mass," "rudimentary chaos," or "immense floating nebulosity," is a mere creation of his fancy. There not only is not a trace of it in the text, but the description which is there given of the earth as it was spoken into existence by the Most High, and of the several creative acts that follow, shows decisively that it never existed in any such chaotic state as he imagines.

So much for his attempt to show that the creation of the heaven and earth announced in the first verse of Genesis, was no creation or gift of existence to that which had no being before, but was a mere fashioning or giving form to that which pre-existed. And we think our readers cannot avoid feeling with us, that he not only has wholly failed of his

object, but that he has resorted to expedients to maintain his point so inadmissible and rash, as to leave a deep impression that, notwithstanding his respectable learning, his critical opinions are of little authority.

We shall now proceed to notice his theory of the origin and nature of light, and of the period denoted by the first day.

He maintains that the light with which the earth was at that time illuminated was neither then created nor was the light of the sun, but was simply evolved from the chaotic matter of the earth in which it had been held. He says:—

“‘And God said—Let there be light, and there was light.’ It will be at once inferred that we do not regard this as denoting the creation of light for the first time as an absolute substance. The mention of the previous darkness of the chaos suggests a simpler and yet a no less interesting and sublime meaning. And God said—*Let there be light, and light was THERE. Let there be light on that dark chaos.* Or it may be used, as the word *light* is sometimes employed in English for an adjective,—*Be it light, and light it was.* This was the first separation of the blended elements. The most ethereal form of matter was parted from the dark watery mass. Light was the first born. The language would indeed suit either conception—that of a first creation or of an evolving or manifestation; and either might stand as a representative of the ineffable truth.”—P. 68.

The reader has here again an example of Prof. L.'s disposition, which reveals itself at every step, to vary and twist the sacred word into harmony with his preconceived theory. There is not the slightest hint in the language that the light was evolved from what he calls “the dark watery mass” of the earth, a “rudimentary chaos.” The supposition is, indeed, on his theory, infinitely contradictory to the laws of light and of matter; for though the light was produced at its first appearance by an act of omnipotence, yet he maintains that it continued to shine through the long round of unmeasured ages, which he holds revolved antecedently to the creation of the sun, and shone with such amplitude as to furnish all the light and heat that were necessary to the growth of plants. But that such an exhaustless stock of light should have been treasured up in the chaotic elements of the earth, cannot be assumed by Professor Lewis without

proof, and is wholly incredible. The quantity of latent light in any portion of matter, except that which is combustible, is, as far as is known by us, extremely slight, and that which is evolved from combustible matter by burning, is exhausted by the process of combustion. To suppose, therefore, that there was such a quantity originally latent in the matter of the globe as to shine uninterruptedly through myriads and millions of years, and with such warmth and splendor as to meet all the necessities of the plants and trees that, according to Professor Lewis, existed and flourished uncounted ages before the creation of the sun, is to suppose that the quantity of light originally latent in the earth was millions of millions of times greater than now exists in it!—a more unauthorized, unphilosophical, and monstrous assumption, we think, than we ever before met in any of the writers who attempt to bend the word of God into harmony with their theories! What right has Professor Lewis to assume that the nature of the matter of the globe was then so immeasurably different from what it now is? that the earth, then, in fact, instead of being an opaque body, was a light-giving one, and for aught that appears, of as much brilliance as the sun! What right has he, we ask with still greater emphasis, to pervert and desecrate the language of the sacred text, by the pretence that this monstrous assumption is favored by philology? But apart from that, his notion is contradictory to the laws of light and of matter. No latent light, so far as is known, is ever evolved from matter, except by a chemical process that issues in combustion. No light is ever developed from water—for example—the various common earths, or even from carbon, sulphur, or any of the substances with which they are mixed, except by a passage from one chemical state to another, by which heat is evolved and combustion produced. The supposition, therefore, that light continued to be developed from the matter of the earth, watery, earthy, and combustible, through a vast round of ages, and on such a scale as to supply all the light and heat that are needful to vegetables, is a supposition that the whole surface of the earth, during that immense period, was under the action of chemical agents of such power as to keep it in a continual combustion! But that is not only impossible, inasmuch as a

globe of inflammable matter, of no greater dimensions than the earth, would have undoubtedly burned out in such a measureless period; but it would have been wholly inconsistent with the subsistence of vegetables on the land, which, according to Prof. L., existed during a large share of the period. Is Professor L. acquainted with any species of vegetables that live either on land or in an ocean in such violent chemical activity as to be covered perpetually with flames? Such are the portentous implications which his theory involves.

He hints, however, that he should find no serious difficulty in supposing that light is self-existent and eternal. He says—

"In fact, of the essence, or primal force, or fount of light, we know nothing. All that science has done falls infinitely short of this. All that it has to say of rays, or fluids, or vibrations, or undulations, gives us only the phenomenal conditions under which this mysterious substance may be supposed to manifest itself. However paradoxical it may sound, yet it may be affirmed that light itself, *per se*, is invisible. Its primal force, or entity, is one of the things that are unseen."—P. 69.

This is one of the instances to which we have referred, in which he eagerly decries our knowledge, and represents the subject he is treating as lying wholly beyond our grasp, when he wishes to inspire his readers with the feeling, that whether his assumptions and assertions are sustained by adequate evidence, or not, there at least are no means in the hands of his opponents of confuting him. He proceeds:—

"What is light? We know it as an effect, as a sensation; we analyse the phenomena through which this unseen entity manifests itself, or appears in the world of sense; thus far has science travelled towards the far distant place of its abode. But the Bible tells us more than this. With a sublimity which immeasurably transcends all science, it represents light as the raiment of God. 'Thou clothest thyself with light as with a garment.' 'Who dwelleth in light—in light unapproachable and full of glory.' This is merely a figure, it may be said, but then it is a figure which must represent some unutterable reality. . . .

" 'His robe is light.' "

Was it eternal, then? Did it thus ever form the divine abode, the secret place of the Most High, the innermost shekina in which God dwells? On such a question we would not turn over a leaf to get the answer of science or philosophy. If the Scriptures had declared in any way the absolute eternity of that substance whose motions are the cause of vision in sentient beings, we *should have no hesitation in believing it*, and no fears on the ground of any supposed pantheistic tendency. But they tell us nothing on the subject. From the glorious similes, however, which revelation employs, as well as the rank which science assigns to light, we should not be rash in regarding it as, at least, among the first things that came out of nonentity. If we shrink from declaring it to be absolutely eternal, still may we view it as, of all physical entities, the nearest related unto Deity."—Pp. 69, 70.

This is surely very wild declamation. The Scriptures "tell us nothing on the subject" of the origin of light, whether it was created or eternal! An extraordinary declaration, really. So far from its being true, they expressly teach that God created the light. "He said, let there be light, and there was light." Was not the production of the light that then appeared the work of omnipotence? Was not the act that produced it a creative act—an act that gave the light its existence? It must be a very bold and inconsiderate theorist that can deny it. Professor Lewis himself admits that the language of the fiat is suitable to express a first creation: but it is not only suitable to that; it is not suited to anything else. The command is a command to be, to exist—not a command to become active instead of inactive, to shine instead of continuing latent. The effect of the fiat, accordingly, was that light *existed*, which before had no being—not that light *shone* which before was latent in the matter of the globe—effects that are infinitely different. The Scriptures, therefore, in place of telling us "nothing on the subject," tell us in the most explicit manner, not merely that the light which flashed upon the world at that fiat was not eternal, and that it was not in being before in a latent form, but that it then sprang into existence, so that it was then for the first time true of it that it *was*. The pretext that the effect of the fiat was, not that light was called into existence, but simply that it was developed from a latent state, in which it already had being, is as unauthorized and

inconsistent with the verb *let be*, and *was*, as it were to pretend that the effect of the command was the obscuration or annihilation of light.

Professor Lewis seems to imagine that there is nothing solecistical or revolting in the supposition that light is eternal; and that the Scriptures should have declared it to be such. But if it is "absolutely eternal," it plainly cannot have been created, but must be self-existent. But if self-existent, it must be independent of God, and as completely exempt from his control as he is from the control of anything that exists exterior to himself. If light is self-existent, the reason of its existing in the *mode*, or having the form it does, must lie wholly within itself, as well as the ground of its existing at all. It is a solecism to suppose that the reason that a thing exists lies wholly in itself, but that the reason that it exists in a particular form, and exerts itself in a particular activity, lies wholly out of itself in another cause. If light, then, were self-existent, it would be self-active also, and determine for itself the place and mode of its being and activity; and God could have no more control over it than though he had no existence. The supposition of its self-existence, therefore, is in the utmost degree unjustifiable and unbecoming. How is it that Professor Lewis did not see this self-evident truth? He makes an awkward figure, indeed, in uttering his depreciatory declamations against science, while crowding his pages with such monstrous self-contradictions!

Professor Lewis persuades himself that "some unutterable reality" lies couched under the representation of the Psalmist, that God clothes himself in light, as with a garment; and of Paul, that he dwells in light that is unapproachable and full of glory; as though the divine essence or being in all its greatness were ever enshrouded in an ocean of dazzling light. We are surprised that Professor Lewis should have allowed himself to indulge such a singular and contradictory extravagance. As God is omnipresent, to suppose him everywhere clothed in a dazzling effulgence, is to suppose that every part of the universe, every point of space, is filled with that unapproachable splendor. How is it, then, that it is not visible? If such a flood of glory perpetually filled our atmosphere, it were solecistical to suppose that we should not.

see it. If he is clothed in such a light, if it is unapproachable by mortals because of its infinite splendors, it cannot be latent; it cannot be shrouded in impenetrable darkness. The two suppositions are contradictory to each other. But those and other similar passages, instead of referring to God's infinite essence, refer to the human form which he assumed in revealing himself to men, and to the dazzling light, the illuminated clouds, the flaming fires, in which he then invested himself;—as to the Israelites at Sinai, and to the prophets, David, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and John. Those dazzling theophanies, which were but suited to the majesty of God, do not indicate that light itself is something very nearly related in its nature to the deity, and is, like him, "an ineffable reality." How is it that Professor Lewis has indulged in these wild and contradictory notions? Why is it that he is so eager to exhibit light as of a peculiarly inscrutable nature, closely approaching to the divine, and as mysterious as God himself is? Is it that he is lost in an abyss of crude and wild conceptions, and unable to distinguish between what is true and what is false; and puts down whatever he thinks will surprise and startle by its novelty? Or, is it that he is desirous to make on his readers the impression, that light is of an extremely mysterious nature, and as completely beyond our grasp as the nature of God himself; and thereby induce them to acquiesce in his representation, that that which God spake into existence, when he commanded light to be, was developed out of the dead matter of the globe, where it had previously existed latently—though that supposition is not only without any support, but is infinitely contradictory both to the text and to the known nature and laws both of light and of the matter of which the earth consists? Can anything be more absurd than to speak of light as being more nearly related to God than any other "physical reality?" Can anything be more preposterous, than to talk of its being "among the first things that came out of nonentity," when it is clear from the sacred narrative, that it was not called into existence till after the earth, with its ocean, had been created?

This notion, then, that the light which God called into existence was merely developed light that had been latent in the matter of the earth; and that the earth was converted,

in order to its development, into something like a blazing comet, a flaming meteor that continued to flash a flood of splendor from its bosom into the surrounding space through a vast round of centuries, and that, nevertheless, while in that state, the waters were not evaporated from it, nor the land, after its emergence from the sea, rendered uninhabitable, but that vegetables sprang from its soil, and flourished through ages anterior to the creation of the sun—this preposterous notion must be rejected as an outrage on the text, and an opprobrium to the science which it was invented to shield from the charge of contradicting the inspired history of the creation.

And that notion being set aside, it remains that the light which God spake into existence was the light of the sun. If the whole surface of the earth, wrapped as it was in the ocean, was not put under the action of such powerful chemical agents as to kindle it into a general combustion; if it was not converted into a blazing comet; then the light with which it was illuminated must have been the light of the sun. There is no other that it can have been. There is no other that can have lighted up the earth from pole to pole through the succeeding ages. There is no other the period of which was ever called day, in distinction from night, and the commencement of which formed a morning, and its decline and disappearance an evening. Of what grosser outrage on the sacred word can a critic be guilty, than, in the presence of these indisputable facts, to deny that it was the light of the sun; and assert that it was produced by a combustion of the earth's surface, of which he not only has no evidence, but which is in infinite contradiction to the laws of matter? If the light was developed out of the earth by a chemical process producing combustion, and converting the orb into a glaring comet, how can there have been any evening while the fire raged? Would not the combustion have continued throughout the period of the earth's revolution on its axis? How could such a fire have been kindled when there was no atmosphere to yield the oxygen that was necessary to sustain the combustion? What was it that put an end to the conflagration, and changed the earth from a fiery meteor to its present condition? If it blazed on, as it must, according to Professor Lewis's theory, through an

uncounted series of ages, how happens it that no notice is given in the sacred narrative of the period of its termination? The error of these senseless fictions becomes the more glaring the further their relations to the text are traced; and they must be renounced by all who have not lost their reverence for truth, and become enamored of extravagance and absurdity. How much to be regretted that Professor Lewis—instead of wasting so much of his time in ostentatious protestations of his faith in the word of God, and airy declamation against science,—had not taken the trouble to look a little at the results to which his constructions and speculations carry him? A glimpse of the flaming meteor into which he has converted the world, should have led him to check his lawless fancy, and withhold himself from offering such a violation of the sacred narrative, and such a contradiction to the laws of nature.

That the light which was thus created, was the light of the sun, is apparent, moreover, from the characteristics that are given of it. It was light that was divided from darkness, so that the period of darkness was called by God night; and the period of light was called day. That division was caused, therefore, by a revolution of the earth on its axis; as that is the only cause by which night and day are separated from each other; and, therefore, the light which caused the day must have shone on the earth from an orb external to itself. If it had been developed from its own bosom, there would have been no such division of night from day. If the earth had been enveloped in flames it would have been lighted up by the fire as much on the side turned from the sun, as on the side turned towards it. There would have been no period of its revolution on its axis that could have been absolutely dark. The light that illuminated it, shone, therefore, on but one of its hemispheres at a time, and thence it was the light of the sun, as that is the only orb that ever illuminates it in that manner, or gives it day at all.

It was a light that at its commencement formed a morning, and was followed by an evening. That succession was produced, therefore, by the revolution of the earth on its axis, and thence it was the light of the sun that formed the morning and day; as no light, except from a distant orb,

could have lit up the different parts of the earth in succession, so as to cause a morning, a day, and an evening; and there is no orb but the sun that lights the earth in that manner. To pretend that these terms, day, night, morning, evening, are used by a metaphor, and that the effects or events which they denote were of a wholly different nature from what the words properly denote, is an abuse of the text and of language. Professor Lewis admits throughout that the word light means real, literal, physical light, "that substance whose motions are the cause of vision in sentient beings." The morning, therefore, which was produced by its presence, was a morning of light, literal physical light—"that substance which is the cause of vision in sentient beings"—not a morning of something else: and the day which was caused by its presence was a day of light, not a day of something else. The evening also, and the night which followed that day, and were separated from it so that they followed each other in a regular succession, as they now occur alternately, were an evening and a night caused by the discontinuance of that light. To maintain that while the light which caused the morning and day was real literal light, the morning and day which it caused were not periods of light, and a literal morning and day, is to plunge into the grossest self-contradiction. Does Professor Lewis know of any morning and day that are produced by the light of the sun, that are not periods of sun-light, and literally a morning and day? Does he know of any metaphorical morning or day which the sun produces by its light? If not, he must abandon his pretext that the morning and day produced by the light which God created, were not periods of illumination by that light, but periods of something else—no one knows what. He plainly, in claiming that the morning and day caused by the light were not periods of illumination, but only a metaphorical morning and day, tacitly assumes that the light which produced that imagined metaphorical morning and day, was not a literal, but only a metaphorical light! Let him extricate himself from that palpable self-contradiction, and adhere to his admission and to the text, that the light which caused the morning and day was real physical light, which is the instrument of our vision, and he will find himself obliged to admit that the morning and day were a

literal proper morning and day, caused by the light of the sun and the revolution of the earth on its axis.

He proceeds, nevertheless, to intimate his belief, that both the word day, and light, are used in the narrative in a metaphorical sense. He says:—

“There is no difficulty in regarding these expressions, day, light, etc., as borrowed from their applications at a much later period, and carried back to denote *the ineffable things they most resemble*. It is, however, a better view, as we shall attempt to show, that we have here the primary idea of the word, in respect to its nature or quality, in distinction from its quantity. A day is not so much that fixed duration which is afterwards determined by settled modes of measurement, as a periodical time, be it longer or shorter, marked by the opposite successions of light and darkness, or *what may be supposed to be analogous to them*.”—P. 73.

This is certainly a very unfortunate judgment in respect to the word *light*; inasmuch as the whole of his discussion in respect to it proceeds on the fact that it denotes real light, —“that substance whose motions are the cause of vision in sentient beings.” For if that is not its meaning, then he has wholly missed the real object of the divine command, and thrown away alike his dissertations on the primitive meaning of words, and his declamation on the ignorance of science, on a topic that has no place whatever in the text! This is an awkward predicament truly. He surely, after writing a whole chapter on the subject, ought to have known what it was of which he was treating—a real substance, with which we are familiar, or instead, “the ineffable things” which it “most resembles.” He intimates that he views “it as, of all physical entities, the nearest related to Deity.” If, then, he holds “that it denotes the ineffable things” which it “most resembles,” he must hold that it is used in the passage as the name of the Deity. Does Professor L., then, wish to be understood as maintaining, or as ready to maintain, that God is the ineffable entity that is named light; and that his command, “Let there be light,” was addressed to himself, and that the effect was, that his ineffable nature, his physical entity, became visible, or shone forth like light? Let him decide this point, that his readers may at least know what

the subject is of which he is treating: and let him decide it which way he pleases, it will be equally fatal to his theory. For if he maintains that God himself is the light which he spoke into manifestation, and that constituted what is termed day—who, after that, can place any confidence in the Professor's judgment? But he has undoubtedly forgotten himself. He did not use the word as the name of the deity. What, on that supposition, is the meaning of his criticism and declamation on the passage, in which light is said to be the garment of God, and the element in which he dwells? Though his notions of what physical light is, are dreamy, mystical, and absurd—treating it as nearly related to the deity, and as conceivably self-existent—yet he unquestionably uses the term to denote literal physical light, such as emanates from the sun, and is the instrument of our vision: and this meaning of the word overturns his theory as effectually as the other could. For if literal light, as that of the sun, was the cause of the morning and day, then the morning and day caused by it must have been mere periods of illumination by physical light, and therefore a natural morning and day; not “analogous,” mystical, or ineffable ones.

He proceeds, however, to maintain that they were of a wholly different nature:—

“*And there was an evening, and there was a morning—one day, or first day.* This is the most simple and literal rendering of the Hebrew. [He should have omitted the article. The exact rendering is—*And there was evening, and there was morning—one day, or first day.*] And in the right view of it we think we have the key to the great biblical question whether these are indefinite unmeasured periods, or what we call natural days of twenty-four hours. In favor of the former opinion, there has been drawn an argument from the Hebrew use of the word יום (yom) for any period of time presenting a completed course or unity of events irrespective of precise duration. There can be no doubt at all of such usage. It belongs to the Hebrew, as it does to most languages. The word for day is much more frequently used in this manner than year, or *month*. But this is by no means the strongest proof of the position. It makes it possible that the word may be so employed here. It makes it even highly *probable*, when we take into view the peculiar nature of the events recorded. Still there is another and a better, and we think unanswerable, argument to be derived from the fact that in this stage of the

creative process *there were no regular phenomenal measures of time*. We must interpret the writer in consistency with himself, whether we suppose him inspired or not. The revelation is made to us *through the conceptions of Moses, and although such conceptions are not binding on us as the absolute truth, yet they are the medium, or one stage in the medium, through which it is conveyed, and by whose aid, therefore, it must be exegetically studied*. On either view, then, we must look for a harmony of representation in the writer's own mind. He certainly could not have had in his own thought a common day in *the sense of one measured by an earthly revolution, or by the apparent circuit of the sun*. Of the first, or the revolution of the earth, it is evident he had no conception : and it was not until the fourth period, according to his own statement, that the great luminaries were either actually created, or optically set up in the heavens to be signs or measures of seasons, and *days, and years—one to rule or measure the day, and the other the night*. This unmeasured period, then, whatever its length, could not have been a common or *natural day*, as we call it, unless arbitrarily divided without any reference to measuring by celestial phenomena. Not only are there wanting the most important elements of the thought, as connected with such celestial phenomena, but what is left of the conception of a common day in its mere length, is of such a kind that it can hardly be presented on the canvass of the imaging faculty. For nothing is more difficult to conceive of than simple determined duration, in the absence of all the common measures by which it is determined.

"From this consideration alone we may say, with a good degree of confidence, that Moses had not in his mind, in his thought, in his conceptive faculty, any such image. He had just what he has given to us—the idea of a period commencing in darkness and ending in light, a bounded period, measured by chaos on the one hand, and the birth of a higher organization on the other ; a period to which for these reasons there is given that name, *yom*, which is afterwards used of the cyclical solar succession of light and darkness. But of the duration of the day he has not told us, because there was no revealed conception of it present to his own mind ; for so we must judge in the absence of all opposing proof."—Pp. 73–75.

These very confident statements depend for their truth on the views he has advanced in the preceding chapters, respecting the work of creation, chaos, and the nature and source of the light which God had called into existence ; and as they have already been confuted, fall along with them to the ground. If the light which God spoke into being was as

Professor L. implies—not in fact a light, but a fire produced or continued at all events by a chemical agency on the surface of the earth—as the illumination which it produced could not have been a morning and day that were measures of time, it is plain that what is called morning and day cannot have been such. But that which God called into being by the fiat, “Let there be light”—“was light,” pure, unsophisticated light, not a *fire*. If it had been a mere fire that was kindled, it would have been called such, not designated by a name that completely misrepresented its nature. And as it was light, and not a fire, it was light radiated from an orb that is distant from the earth; for no pure light is ever developed from the matter of the earth. It is only by combustion or fire that light is produced from the matter of the globe. And as it was radiated to the earth from some other orb, it must have been from the sun, as there is no other orb that ever produces morning and day on the earth by its light. And that they were a natural morning and day, is certain therefore from the fact that they were produced by the light of the sun, and were preceded and followed by darkness; as that succession of morning, day, evening, and night, shows that it was produced by the revolution of the earth on its axis under the light of the sun. There is nothing else that could produce such a succession by the revolution of the earth on its axis; and as that revolution takes place in twenty-four hours, the morning and day which the light of the sun produced on it, must have been a natural morning and day, both in kind and in duration. Professor Lewis may declaim as much as he pleases about the ignorance of Moses, and the impossibility that he could have had any conception of a natural morning and day—though that prophet lived twenty-five hundred years after the epoch of the creation, and probably knew as well what morning and day, evening and night are, as any who live in the present age—he can never, except by a violation of the text, set aside or controvert these plain and indisputable truths. If he maintains, as his theory implies, that it was not light which God called into existence by the command, Let there be light, but a fire, then he directly contradicts the sacred narrative. If he denies that it was by the light which God caused to be that the morning and day

were produced, then he openly contradicts the text also; for that expressly declares that it was the *light* which God called day. If he denies that the light which produced the morning and day shone from an orb at a distance from the earth, and that thence by the revolution of the earth on its axis the darkness was divided from the light, so that the one was night and the other day, then he contradicts the sacred history also; for that declares that the darkness was divided from the light, so as to produce night and day, and that God for that reason called the darkness night, and the light day; and there is no other light but that of the sun shining on the earth revolving on its axis, so that night and day travel round it in succession every twenty-four hours,—that produces that division of darkness from the light that is called night and day. If he denies that that separation of darkness from the light, and the succession of morning, day, evening, and night, were produced by the earth's turning on its axis in the light of the sun, then he offers an equal contradiction to the sacred record, inasmuch as there is no other cause by which that succession could be produced.

Professor Lewis is wholly mistaken, therefore, when he asserts that at "this stage of the creative process there were no regular phenomenal measures of time." This passage carries the most unanswerable proofs on its front that the light, the creation of which it relates, was the light of the sun; and that the succession of day and night which was produced by that light, was caused by the revolution of the earth on its axis in the light of the sun; and therefore that the day which was formed by an evening and morning, or the period of darkness and the period of light of which the day consisted, was a natural day of twenty-four hours. There is not a solitary hint in the narrative that the light was not the light of the sun, nor that the day was not a natural day, such as is now produced by the turning of the earth on its axis; and there is no other conceivable hypothesis on which the statements of the passage can be explained. The whole pretence that the light was not the light of the sun, but was the fire of a chemical combustion on the bosom of the earth itself; and that the morning, day, evening, and night, were not natural, produced by a revolution of the earth, is a mere fiction, got up in the boldest

violation of the laws of language, to force the history into such a shape that it shall not contradict the doctrine of modern geology respecting the age of the world.

Professor L. is equally in error also in asserting that according to the statement of Moses, "it was not until the fourth period that the great luminaries were either actually created or optically lit up in the heavens." The work which Moses assigns to the fourth day was not the creation of the sun and moon, but simply their being so set in the firmament—that is, so adjusted to the earth, or the earth so adjusted to them, that they became determiners of seasons, and days, and years: "Let the luminaries in the firmament of the heaven be to divide the day from the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years." This is as exact a translation of the passage as can be given, and it presents the luminaries or light-giving bodies as *already existing*, and simply wills such an adjustment of them to the earth that they should divide the day from the night, and be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years; and that adjustment may have been produced either by such a movement that the ecliptic assumed its present angle to the axis of the earth, or a movement of the earth's axis from a perpendicular to its present inclination to the ecliptic; as it is the inclination that causes the variations of the days and nights in length, and that and the motion of the earth round the sun that renders the sun and moon the determiners of days, seasons, and years.

Professor Lewis imagines that the fact which he asserts, that Moses had no conception of the revolution of the earth on its axis, is a proof that he could not have regarded the day which was produced by the light God created as a natural day. But that is singularly mistaken and absurd. Whether Moses knew that the earth turned on its axis or not, or whether he had any notion, true or false, of the process by which the succession of day and night was produced, is not of the slightest consequence. It was not necessary that he should be an adept in modern astronomy in order to his knowing the fact that day and night existed and followed each other in succession; but that he knew as well as Professor Lewis or any one else now knows it. And it is that fact that he declares, not the means by which it was

produced. For what he states is, that God spake light into existence, and that he divided the light from the darkness,—a division which still continues,—not as Professor L. implies—that lasted no one knows how long—perhaps not longer than a flash of lightning gleams athwart the firmament—and a division therefore that was then produced, as it is now, by the earth's revolution on its axis in the light of the sun, so that as it shines at the same time only on the hemisphere that is towards him, the other hemisphere is wrapped in darkness, and the light and darkness accordingly fly before and follow each other as the earth whirls, so that the illuminated and the darkened spheres are always separated from each other. Next, the sacred historian states that God called the darkness night, and the light day; and lastly he declares that there was evening and there was morning, one day, or the first day. The several facts which he narrates are those facts of the reality and nature of which he had as perfect a knowledge as we now have; and his statements are as literally true of the nature and office of light, of its producing by its shining on the revolving earth a lasting separation of night from day, and giving birth to morning, evening, and day, as any statements which Professor Lewis himself can frame to express those facts. The fancy that he must have known that the earth wheels on its axis in order to know what day and night, evening and morning are, is absurd. Are there not millions at the present moment on the earth who know perfectly well what day and night are, and that they follow each other in regular succession, who yet never had a "conception" of the revolution of the earth on its axis?

This notion that Moses could not have stated any fact unless he had a conception of the mode of its production, is sufficiently extraordinary in a critic who professes to be governed exclusively by the laws of philology; yet, in the teeth of it, in the sentence that immediately precedes that in which he advances it, he asserts the still more wide-reaching and startling doctrine, that the conceptions Moses, in fact, expresses of the creation, are not binding on us; but that we are to construe his language by our knowledge or conception of the things of which he speaks! He says: "The revelation is made to us *through* the conceptions of Moses,

and although such conceptions are not binding on us as the absolute truth, yet they are the medium, or one stage in the medium, through which it is conveyed, and by whose aid therefore it must be exegetically studied," p. 74. The meaning of this plainly is, that the acts which Moses states God exerted on the first day, and the effects which were produced by those acts, are not the acts which God really exerted and the effects which he wrought by them, but are merely expressive of "*the conceptions*" Moses had of them, and consequently that they are to be taken by us as the mere media of indicating a wholly different set of acts and effects, which were the real acts and effects of the creative agency of that day! And this doctrine he advances in the opening of his volume, and represents it as the leading principle of his construction of the sacred narrative, and key to his scheme of thought. He says:—

"The key-note, or the suggestive thought that pervades the whole argument, comes from the distinction which is believed to exist between the language of Paul, Hebrews xi. 3, and that of the account in Genesis—the one referring to the *essential*, the other to the *phenomenal*; the one addressed to the faith apprehending directly, without sense and without induction, *the invisible* divine powers, or *the unseen forces* from which are *made* the things that are seen; the other addressed to the sense, or rather to the faith *through* the sense, and making use of the things that are seen, as *the names* or *representatives* of the *primal entities*, that are not only far removed from the senses, but away back of science itself and its most interior discoveries."—Pp. 7, 8.

"We have God's eternal *facts* of creation revealed to Moses in their chronological order, *through conceptions* familiar to Moses, and expressed by him in articulate Hebrew words, which give birth to the same conceptions in the minds of others. . . . By the term *facts* or *acts*, may be denoted any *physical agency*, as *represented* in the most outward phenomena; that is, those appearances which terminate in the individual world of each man's own sensorium. The *appearance* is not the *fact*, but *representative* of it."—Pp. 36, 37.

By the primal invisible entities of things he means "the invisible, immaterial vital powers, principles, laws, sper-matic words or ideas call them what we will, which are

themselves the first and immediate creations of the divine word, going forth *before* any new agency of nature, whether the universal or any particular nature," p. 224; that is, the immaterial souls which he holds dwell in, animate, and are the vital active forces of everything which has a material form and is perceptible by the senses.

And, what he here maintains, accordingly is, that we are to interpret the narrative of the creation as denoting the creation of these vital immaterial principles of things, and not the material visible things themselves, of which he holds they are the principles.

This doctrine however, of immaterial essences, or souls in all material things, which was a conspicuous element in Plato's philosophy, and was reproduced by Origen, and incorporated in his theology, is not only without any sanction either from the word of God or from science, but, whether true or false, is wholly out of place here; as is the distinction on which Professor Lewis builds so much of his exegesis and his philosophy. For the question, what the interior nature of the several things is which God created in the six days, has nothing whatever to do with the question what the objects are which are meant by the names which Moses employed to designate them in his narrative of that work. The objects which he names are the great objects of nature, which are known to us through our senses; and the facts which he states are, that God created those objects; and that certain phenomena characterized them as they came from his hand, or followed their coming into existence. All that it concerns us to know in order to understand his history is, that the Hebrew names by which he designates those objects and phenomena, are exact equivalents of the English names by which the translators of the Pentateuch designate them: that is, that the orb which he names by the Hebrew word that corresponds to our noun sun, is the same orb as we denominate the sun: that the Hebrew noun translated earth, denotes the same world as our word earth; that the Hebrew words, rendered in our version, light, darkness, day, night, morning, evening, heaven, waters, seas, herbs, trees, fish, fowls, beasts, men, and other names of material things, denote the same objects respectively as the words in our language, by which they are rendered, signify. What

the interior nature of those objects is, is a question with which the interpretation of his language has nothing to do. If the earth means the earth, if the waters mean the waters, if light means light, if the sun means the sun, then we know what he represents as created, when he relates that God created them; whether we know what the elements are, of which they consist, or what their interior nature is, or not. The word sun, for example, means that orb in the heavens, which illuminates our world, and produces morning and day,—whether that orb is an opaque body invested with a light-giving atmosphere, or whether it is a mass of light itself, or a world in combustion. In the whole of his discussion on this subject, Professor Lewis appears to have completely bewildered himself; while the doctrine on which he has chiefly founded his volume, that that which is phenomenal—namely, the realities and facts which we discern by our senses, such as the earth, atmosphere, light, water, clouds, plants, animals, morning, evening, the sun, moon, planets, and stars—is merely representative of primal, invisible, and immaterial entities, and that we are to interpret the Bible as treating of these entities, although its language denotes only the phenomenal realities which are representatives of them, is as anti-scriptural and as monstrous, as that of Origen, from whom it is drawn, who ascribed a three-fold sense to the divine word; that of Swedenborg, to which it bears a very ominous resemblance; or that of Bushnell, or any other person who openly maintains that the Scriptures are to be interpreted by his philosophy. Yet this portentous doctrine, which undisguisedly rejects *the language* of the Scriptures as the medium of the revelation that is made in them, and exhibits the phenomena which that language signifies, as *representative* of the real subject of the revelation, professes, with a loud and forward ostentation, to be founded on *philology*; and to owe its brilliant achievements to its adroitness in that branch of knowledge! If this is a blunder, was it ever transcended? Was ever a more fatal blow aimed at the word of God?

He resumes this subject in a subsequent chapter, and alleges the use of the word day, in some instances in the Scriptures, to denote longer periods than twenty-four hours,

as a proof that it may have been used in that figurative sense here. He says :—

“The term *day* did not always convey to the Israelites a distinct and positive idea of a certain duration of time equivalent to twenty-four hours. In Scriptural passages, too numerous for citation, it is applied to an indefinite moral, political, or physical period, far exceeding that duration. There is the day of the Lord, the day of justice or of mercy, the day of particular nations, the day of Israel, the day of Jezreel, the day of salvation, the day of Jerusalem, the day in which the Lord created the heavens and the earth, mentioned in Genesis ii. 2, or the day of days, which the succeeding context clearly shows, was meant to include all the periods, whether long or short.”—P. 82.

This fact, however, in place of yielding any support to his theory, that the word *day* in the narrative of the creation denotes a long and indefinite period, confutes it. For in all the instances in which it is used by synecdoche to denote a longer period than a natural day, it is accompanied by some epithet which indicates that it has a peculiar characteristic which has no reference to the revolution of the earth on its axis; and that it is, therefore, used in the general sense of *time*, or period, without any consideration of its relation to the revolution of the earth; such as the day of salvation—which is not a period of the earth's turning round on its axis, and has no relation whatever to that, but is a period, the characteristic of which is, that salvation is offered and granted in it. In like manner, the day of wrath is a period, whether long or short is of no consideration, in characterizing it—in which God visits men with his wrath. So the day on which the Lord God made the earth and heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew, is defined by his acts, as the six days of the creation, and shown by that characteristic, not to be a single natural day. And in like manner, every instance which Professor Lewis cites, and every other in the Scriptures, in which it is used in that figurative manner, the characteristic by which it is distinguished, defines it expressly as a different period from that of a mere natural day. And the use of these defining terms to distinguish the period which it denotes, when

employed in that figurative sense, implies, that if no such qualifying terms are applied to it, it would, as a matter of course, denote a natural day. But there is no such characterization of the six days of the creation as periods that had some peculiarity by which they were distinguished from natural days. So far from it, the days of the creation are expressly characterized as consisting of an evening and a morning, and as divided into a night and a day; and it is expressly declared, that the characteristic of the day, on the ground of which God gave it that name, was the *light* which caused it; and that the characteristic of the night, which was the reason that God gave it that name, was, that it was darkness. And, finally, it is expressly declared, that the separation of the darkness from the light, by which night and day were caused, took place by means of the light which God created. All these are thus distinguishing characteristics of a natural day, produced by the light of the sun shining on the earth, and the earth's revolution on its axis; and they are characteristics that belong to no other period. They form as perfect a definition of a day of the earth's revolution on its axis, as any language can express; and a definition that is absolutely exclusive of any other period. It is not within the scope of human ingenuity to point out any other characteristic, or frame any description within so brief a compass, that shall form so perfect a definition of an ordinary day of twenty-four hours, and which it shall be so wholly impossible to make a definition of any other period.

He alleges the use, also, of evening and morning by a figure to denote other periods, as a proof that they are employed with that signification here. He says:—

“There are many passages in which they, too, are employed in this extended sense. It is the case, moreover, in other tongues beside the Hebrew, that the evening is used for the period of decline, of inactivity, of repose; the morning for the sudden introduction of something new, of something higher and better. As we have traced these words, this old pictorial sense, which is entirely independent of any ideas of duration, is even more marked in their etymologies, than in the primitive word for *day* and *night*. Again, they are distinctly applied to other portions of astronomical time of greater extent than the solar diurnal period. There is the morning of the

year. The spring is so called as its season of awakening, of reviving, just as winter is its evening or night of torpor and repose. So, also, there is the morning of life, the morning of a nation's history, the morning of the world, and of the human race. But this, it may be said, is poetical. We deny it, in the sense in which the epithet is meant to be employed. These words, thus used, are pictorial, as all language is more or less, but no more poetical than the common English words Spring and Fall, in their more common use as applied to different seasons of the dying and reviving year. It is all a matter of use. Had we been as much accustomed to a similar application of morning and evening, there would have been the same easy harmony in the association required, and we would have been the more easily prepared to feel the right application of the same expressive terms to the longer antithetical periods of rest and awakening that constitute the Mosaic *yom* or age. The Hebrews were accustomed to it, and we may feel ourselves therefore on strong ground, when it is maintained that, in the reading of Genesis, the larger cyclical ideas would come as naturally to them, as the smaller do to us."—Pp. 157, 158.

In this, as on almost every theme which he discusses, Professor Lewis, while making an ostentatious display of his philology, betrays a sad inacquaintance with the most fundamental laws of language. In the first place, whenever morning and evening are used, as in the examples he here cites, they are used by a metaphor. When Judah is denominated a lion's whelp, every one knows that he was not really such, but was called a lion's whelp, simply to indicate his courage, or commanding air, by which he resembled that animal. So when the early part of life is denominated its morning, every one knows that it is not in fact a morning, but is merely denominated such, because of its having such a relation to life, as its commencement, as morning bears to the day. And this fact sets aside Professor Lewis's fancy. To allege its use in such relations by a metaphor, as a proof that in the text it is used literally to denote, not a literal morning, but some analogous period of a long and undefined length, is a very unfortunate blunder for a professed linguist and philologist. But in the next place, as in the use of the word day by a synecdoche, so in the use of morning and evening by a metaphor, there is always a designation of that of which they are denominated the morning or evening, which shows that they are not used in a literal, but in a

metaphorical sense. Thus, in the expressions the morning of *life*, the evening of *life*, the morning of the *world*, the morning of *history*, the morning of the *year*, and other similar phrases, as the dawn of *science*, the dawn of the *arts*, the sunset of *life*, the night of *death*, the subjects of which, morning and dawn, and evening, sunset, and night, are predicated, indicate that they are used by a metaphor, and distinguish the sense in which they are employed, in the clearest manner, from their literal meaning. But no such foreign subject is mentioned in the text, as that of which the evening and morning are predicated, showing that they are not used in their natural sense of evening and morning of the earth's revolution on its axis. On the contrary, it is expressly declared that they constituted the first *day*, which is a direct and explicit definition of them as a natural solar morning and evening; so that all pretext for assigning them any other meaning is cut off; as there is no other evening and morning of a day, and a day caused by the sun's light shining on the revolving earth, than a natural evening and morning. And in such a day there would have been an evening and a morning at every point on the globe. For let us suppose that the sun, when his first light shone on the earth, was setting at the garden of Eden, there would have been an evening and a morning at that meridian in the twenty-four hours that followed; or let it be supposed that on its light's first shining it was on the meridian of Washington, there would have been an evening also and a morning at that place in the period of the earth's revolution, that brought that meridian again under the sun.

Not only, however, does the text define the evening and morning of the first day in the most effectual manner that is possible, as the evening and morning of a literal day, but it is obviously impossible, from the order in which they are named, that they should be employed in any other than their natural sense. The evening *preceded* the morning in the day which the two constituted, according to the sacred historian; and that was the mode in which the Hebrews reckoned their days. It is impossible, therefore, that they can have been employed to denote any analogous times or conditions of some other subject, such as "the longer antithetical of *rest* and *awakening*, that," according to Pro-

fessor Lewis, "constitute the Mosaic *yom* or age," p. 158. Because in all periods, such as the life of an individual; the development, maturity, and decay of an art; the birth, growth, and decline of a nation; the youth always precedes the maturity and old age; the morning always goes before the noon and the night: that is the order of nature. But here the evening goes before the morning, the night precedes the day. To use them, therefore, by analogy, would imply that that to which they were applied had its old age before its youth; that its progress was in the order directly opposite to nature, from the decay of age to the maturity of the meridian of life; and from that meridian to youth and infancy! Is Professor Lewis acquainted with any Hebrew *yom* that revolved in that direction? Is he aware of any cyclical periods of which that is the natural order? This mode of reckoning the day thus renders it impossible that evening and morning should here be used by a metaphor, as names of analogous portions of longer periods.

There are other positive proofs that the word day denotes a literal natural day of the earth's revolution on its axis. Thus it is indisputably used in that sense in the narrative of the creative act of the fourth day, when God said, "Let the luminaries in the firmament of the heaven be to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years: and it was so. And God made two great luminaries: the greater luminary to rule the day, and the lesser luminary to rule the night: the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness. And God saw that it was good. And there was evening, and there was morning, the fourth day."

This passage confirms, in a very decisive manner, the construction we have placed on the creative acts of the first day. Thus it is simply related that God said, "Let there be light, and there was light." Here it is stated that God made it the office of the sun and moon to light the earth. There it is said that God divided the light from the darkness. Here it is said that he commanded the luminaries to make that division. There it is said that he called the light day; and the darkness he called night. Here they are spoken of as

already having those names; and it is made the office of the sun to rule the one, and the moon to rule the other. Can any one doubt that the light which God spoke into existence on the first day, was the light which it is declared to be the office of the sun and moon to give the earth? Can any one doubt that what God then called light, was identically the same element which it is here said to be the office of the great luminaries to shed on the earth? Can any one doubt that the light which he then called day, is the same as the light which he here calls by that name; and that that which he there called night, is the same as that which he calls by that name here? Can there be any doubt that the evening and morning that are mentioned there, and said to be the first day, were identically the same in nature as the evening and morning that are here said to be the fourth day? Can anything be more idle and reasonless, than to pretend that there is anything in the terms, the circumstances, or the manner in which they are used, that shows that they are employed, not to designate the same, but different things? Can anything be more groundless and monstrous than the pretence that philology shows that the sense in which they are used, and the objects that are designated by them, are of the utmost dissimilarity? Yet they are indisputably employed in this latter passage to denote natural light and darkness, natural day and night, and natural solar days. This Professor Lewis himself admits. "*These certainly were natural days, in the common usage of the term, our common days of twenty-four hours.*"—P. 151.

As then these were solar days and nights, and the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh day revolved, after the sun and moon were set in their stations in the heavens, by which they became determiners of days and nights, seasons and years, it is clear that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh days must have been natural days of the earth's revolution on its axis; and thence that the evening and morning of which they severally consisted, were also a natural evening and morning. It is to offer a direct contradiction to the passage; it is to assume that the sun and moon did not fill the office that was assigned them of ruling the day and night, and determining their length, to assert that the days that immediately passed after they were appointed to that office, were not ruled

by them, and determined in their length by their shining or not shining on the revolving earth. Can such an assertion, not only without a shadow of ground in the passages to warrant it, but against their clear and necessary meaning, be justifiable? Can it spring from anything but a blind and fanatical determination to sustain a preconceived theory, though it be at the cost of violating the Sacred Word, and forcing on it a feigned and arbitrary sense? We think not. Professor Lewis himself cannot—should he spend days and years in the effort—give a reason for denying that these days were natural solar days, that will not be in effect a denial that the sun and moon discharged the function that was assigned them as rulers of the day and night, and determiners of their length. For they were indisputably mere periods of time, that were divided into light and darkness, evening and morning. If, therefore, their division into light and darkness, and thence their length, was not determined by the sun and moon, then, plainly, the sun and moon did not fill the office and accomplish the ends for which they were placed in the firmament, but their office was usurped and filled by some other orb or power. No impartial person surely, no ordinary fanatic even, will undertake to maintain such a preposterous position. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh days, then, which revolved under the rule of the sun and moon, after they received that adjustment to the earth by which they were made the determiners of the length of the days and nights as they now occur, must have been natural solar days of twenty-four hours. The evenings and mornings, therefore, of which they consisted, were natural evenings and mornings produced by the revolution of the earth on its axis, which caused day and night to travel round the earth in twenty-four hours. And if the evenings and mornings of those days were natural evenings and mornings, those of the first, second, and third days were undoubtedly such also, and those days also natural days; and the whole fabric of Professor Lewis's fanciful and arbitrary philology, and rash and contradictory speculation falls to the ground. For as the four last of the seven days were demonstrably natural days, and their evenings and mornings natural evenings and mornings, who will be so weak and

contentious as to maintain against this mass of resistless evidence, that the others were not also?

This is confirmed by the fact that the seventh day, which God set apart as a day of rest, was a natural day. "And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made."—Gen. ii. 2, 3. His sanctifying the day, was his setting it apart, devoting, dedicating, consecrating it to rest; and this consecration of it to rest was not in order to his resting on it, but because he "*had rested*" on it. It took place, therefore, after God had rested, whether it was while the day was passing, or after it had passed, and was a consecration of it exclusively for *man's* rest, not for God's. With all his facility of imagining anything that seems to give a color of probability to the theory he endeavors to sustain, we can hardly think Professor Lewis will go so far as to maintain that God consecrated the day for his *own* rest; and made it obligatory on himself to abstain from creating new works, or upholding and governing those that were already in existence. The supposition is in contradiction to his office as the upholder, benefactor, and governor of all, without whose ceaseless agency the whole fabric of his empire would instantly vanish from existence. God's rest was a mere discontinuance of his work of *creation* in this world; it was not a discontinuance of his agency towards the world, and the living beings with whom he had peopled it. This consecration of the day to rest, therefore, was a consecration of it for *man* exclusively, not for himself. And as the sabbath which he consecrated as a day of rest for man, was indisputably an ordinary day of twenty-four hours, extending from evening to evening, the seventh day was of that length, and therefore the six others that preceded it were also.

This is shown also with equal clearness in the fourth commandment: "Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy;" that is, consecrated. "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work: for in six days

the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the seventh day and hallowed it."—Ex. xx. 8–11. Here the seventh day is indisputably the same as the seventh day of Gen. ii. 2, 3, on which God rested; and that seventh day is as indubitably the sabbath day which God consecrated to rest and hallowed. But the sabbath of the commandment was unquestionably an ordinary solar day of twenty-four hours, and that was the only day that God consecrated to rest and hallowed. He did not consecrate it *for himself*, as a sabbath which he was for ever to hallow to religious purposes, by abstaining from all agency in upholding, supplying, and governing his works. The supposition is infinitely contradictory and absurd. God does not owe any obligations the discharge of which demands a remission every seventh day of his agency towards his works! Yet on this preposterous fancy Professor Lewis founds his notion—if he sticks to the etymology—that God consecrated the seventh day of Gen. ii. 2, 3, for *his own observance*, not for man's! Instead of that revolting solecism, however, God expressly declares (both in Gen. ii. 2, 3, and in the commandment, Ex. xx. 8–11) that it was *after* he had rested, and *because* he had rested on the seventh day, that he consecrated it as a sabbath; and the commandment expressly represents, and owes all its validity to that representation, that he consecrated it as such, expressly and exclusively for *man*. How could it be binding on men if it was not set apart and consecrated as a sabbath expressly for them?

Such is the issue of Professor L.'s attempt to make out that the days of the creation were not natural days, but periods of a vast and unknown length. If there was ever a question in which all the evidence and certainty were on one side, and that evidence and certainty were of the most indisputable and ample character; and all on the other side was mere pretence, false assumption, and wild, perverse, and contradictory special pleading—this is it. Professor L. has not on his side one solitary consideration that is valid. The whole is factitious, far-fetched, and shallow in the extreme, and forced upon the text by the grossest disregard of its plain and unequivocal meaning. He begins by denying that the light which God created was the light of the sun,

though the office it filled in separating the light from the darkness on the earth, constituting day, and producing a succession of evening and morning, are effects which sunlight alone could cause, and are effects which it is expressly stated in the history of the fourth day, it is the office of the sun to produce. He next assumes that that light, instead of being then created, was developed out of the matter of the earth by a chemical process, which must have converted the globe into a blazing comet—although it continued to be enveloped by the ocean, till the third day, and its dry land was then clothed with trees and plants; and notwithstanding that if the light emanated from the bosom of the earth, it could not have caused a separation of darkness from light, nor a succession of evening and morning, day and night. And finally, he assumes, that the nights and days, the evenings and mornings were not really such, and were not called such with any reference to darkness and light; but were vast and indefinite periods; and called days, and evenings, and mornings, merely by a figure, or on some ground of analogy, to indicate that they were periods of growth and decay—a spring-time or beginning of a fresh and flourishing existence, and an autumn or wintery period of decline and dissolution; although from the Scriptural method of reckoning the two periods, of which the days consisted, the decay must have gone before the growth—the old age must have preceded the infancy and youth. The only consideration which he alleges to support his theory, that has the slightest degree of speciousness, is the fact that the words, day, evening, and morning, are sometimes used by a metaphor to denote other times than natural evenings, mornings, and days. But he is divested of this pretext by the fact that in all those cases the words are accompanied by defining terms, which show in the clearest manner that they are used by a metaphor; while in the history of the creation, instead of being accompanied by any such terms, they are used in their proper sense, as names of periods that are determined by the sun's light shining on the revolving earth. Such are the groundless, unphilosophical, and unphilological reasons on which he builds his theory—not only without a particle of authority from the text, but against its plain and indubitable teachings!

On the side against Professor Lewis, instead of unwarrantable assumptions and wild conjectures, we have a series of proofs that do not admit of any reasonable disputation, which no ingenuity can set aside, and which cannot be questioned except by involving the text in the most palpable and fatal inconsistencies and absurdities—that the days of the creation were common solar days of the period of the earth's revolution on its axis. If any position we have ever advocated has been established beyond all reasonable question, it is, that this was the period of the days of the creation.

Professor L. employs himself largely in his chapter on the second day's creation in descanting on the distinction between the scientific and the phenomenal, in order to shield Moses from the charge of having given a representation of the heavens that is inconsistent with fact. "And God said, Let there be a firmament"—that is an expanse—"between the waters, and let it divide the waters. And God called the firmament heaven." In reply to the objection that—"here we have most palpably presented the old erroneous conception of a material sky, or solid firmament, with a reservoir of water above separated from the waters below," he says—

"The amount of it is, that the language presents *appearances*, and not *the interior truths and facts*, whatever they may be. Certain facts in the process and order of creation are to be narrated, and these facts are named from the phenomena they outwardly present; and these phenomena again are named in the use of the articulate language, whether direct or metaphorical, which custom, or accident, or knowledge, or imagination, or any other cause had attached to them. Perhaps we may venture the opinion, that Moses knew that his words were phenomenal. He may have used the language of his day very much as we use it, or as we use our own, without feeling himself called upon to enter a caveat against mistakes of its conceptional meaning. Or he may have been partially ignorant, knowing less than we do about the matter, and more than the primitive men from whom came down the language he was compelled to employ; or he may have been wholly ignorant, and known no difference between the absolute *fact*, or truth he was made the medium of setting forth, and the phenomenal *conception* by which it was *represented* in his own mind, or the mind of his age. The

principle is still the same, whether there be a wide difference between the *fact* and the *conception* of the fact, or a less difference; for difference there will be to the highest science, and it cannot be a matter of degree."—Pp. 103, 104.

In this and a crowd of other passages in which he treats of this distinction between the real and the phenomenal, he seems to us to have had but a very obscure apprehension of the direction in which he was drifting. He professes to found the great doctrines of his volume on philology, and alleges that the sense he ascribes to the language of the sacred narrative is its true, because, as he asserts, it is its primordial sense, and expresses the genuine ideas of the writer. But in his perpetual reiteration of the statement that the language of the history is phenomenal, not descriptive of the interior and absolute fact, his object is to set aside the primordial meaning of that language, so far at least that the sacred writer shall not be regarded in using it as having affirmed anything that is strictly in contravention of fact! He is thus battling with himself through a large part of his volume, and fights now on this side, and now on that, as the object he has in view at the moment seems to demand. When his theory of the pre-existence of the matter of the globe requires that he should exhibit the creation of the heaven and the earth as a mere shaping, he treats the word rendered create as denoting a mere cutting, whittling, and moulding, and claims that this is the true meaning of the verb, on the ground that that is its primitive meaning, and that all other senses are secondary and derivative. When, however, he imagines that to adhere to the literal sense of the word rendered firmament would imply that Moses regarded the heavens as a solid arch or mass, in which the sun, moon, and stars, are set, he resorts to his distinction between the phenomenal and real, and maintains that the language merely expresses the *conceptions* of the sacred writer, not the absolute fact, and that his conceptions are not binding on us; but that we are to regard the language as merely representative of the genuine facts. Thus he says—

"Now, in the Mosaic account, the phenomenal is everywhere and everything. It is addressed directly to the senses, or to the intellect

through the senses. It sets forth the origin, not of what is in itself, but of what we see, and as we see it—*τα βλεπόμενα, τα φαινόμενα*, the things that are seen, or the things that do appear, as *representative* των νοουμένων, of the powers that are *understood* or believed to exist back of them, and which will still exist back of them, however much our phenomenal language may be changed or improved by the progress of science.”—Pp. 105, 106.

Is not this a complete surrendering of the philological ground, the primordial signification of words, on which he professes to found his whole doctrine respecting the creation? Is it not, as we shall have occasion ere we close this article to show, infinitely worse;—a point-blank representation that neither the language of the sacred narrative, nor the things which that language either literally or figuratively means, is of any determinative significance, but is only a mere *representative* of absolute facts that lie back of appearances, or the objects that are seen, and facts that are “ineffable,” and wholly beyond the grasp of our powers? Thus he says—

“The articulate or written words *present* the phenomena; but the phenomena too are a language; and they present, or rather *represent* to those who *understand* (however partially or obscurely they may understand them, and whether by faith or science) the otherwise *ineffable* fact or facts that stand behind; far behind, it may be infinitely behind *these primal appearances*, these first universally known letters in the alphabet of God’s speech to man.”—P. 106.

But if not only the language of the sacred narrative is a mere show, but the objects which it is employed to denote are so too—that is, are mere representatives of something that lies behind them and out of the sphere of our vision, have we anything of which we have either any absolute knowledge, or any conception left? Professor Lewis has plainly drifted not only out of the sphere of philology and revelation, but out of the realms of legitimate philosophy also, and involved himself in a chaos more fathomless and confused—more *tohu* and *bohu*—than that out of which he persuades himself the earth was formed.

But this attempt to save the word of God from the dis-

credit of being unscientific, by forcing on it a philosophy that blots the whole history from the sacred page, and leaves nothing but the dreams of a wild and contradictory fancy in its stead, is altogether out of place here. We have nothing to do with the question what notions Moses had of the "interior nature of the expanse," that is, the atmosphere, which is rendered in our common version after the Latin, firmament. All that it concerns us to know is simply what that is which he *calls* the expanse, or arch of heaven; for that is the literal meaning of the Hebrew word rendered firmament. Did he mean what we mean by the firmament, or the illuminated expanse above us and around us, in which the clouds float and the birds fly—that is, the atmosphere? And that he did is made certain by the fact that God expressly called the firmament heaven; and a part of that heaven or expanse is said to be *below* the vapors and clouds, and the expanse is represented as dividing the waters below from the waters above, which indicates that it extended from the ocean, which then formed the surface of the globe, to the higher regions in which the vapors and clouds float. The expanse was undoubtedly therefore what we denominate the atmosphere. But in ascertaining that fact, we learn all that we need to know in order to our understanding what it was that God created on the second day. His fiat was, "Let there be an atmosphere, and let it separate the waters so that a portion of them shall float at a distance above the earth;" and the effect of its creation was, that a portion of water was evaporated from the sea, and raised into the heights of the air, so as to float as naturally there as the remaining water continued to lie on the surface of the earth. Whether Moses knew what the constituents of the air were, or what the elements are of which water consists, is a question with which, in expounding the history, we have nothing to do. He does not profess to indicate what his philosophy of God's work was. He simply relates to us what it was that God did on the second day. Professor L. says—

"The *fact* which God's wisdom deemed it necessary to reveal to mankind was this—that in the period after a first division or separation of light or *fire*, the next supernatural or creative step in the series was the *evolving* from the yet semi-chaotic world, of what we

now call the atmosphere, but which Moses describes by language less scientifically correct, although, in fact, no more *phenomenal* than that which we are still compelled to use. *The chronological order of the fact was the great truth*, and to the knowledge of *this* no science ever has attained, or would have attained without revelation. The event itself was the origination and completion of that apparatus of *physical law*, or that *physical state of things*, be it scientifically whatever it may—for we do not yet know in all respects what it is—by which were produced the combined appearances of the clouds, the rain, the blue heavens, together with other *outward revealing phenomena*, connected with and representative of such interior causality.”—P. 104.

What a paraphrase of the acts of the Almighty! Was there ever a sadder plunge into the *bathos*, and the lowest bathos of Origenism? By “the interior causality” which *revealed* itself in those “*outward phenomena*” he means the “vital immaterial principle,” which he holds is the animating power or soul of every substance to which God gives a form; “invisible, immaterial vital powers, principles, laws, spermatogenic words or ideas, call them what we will, which are themselves the *first and immediate creations* of the divine word *going forth before* any new agency of nature,” and from which “the outward or phenomenal entities were (are) generated or born,” p. 224, that is, before there were any “combined appearances of the clouds, the rain, the blue heavens,” or “other *outward revealing phenomena*, connected with and representative of such interior causality;” which means in so many words, that it was an “immaterial animating principle or soul of the atmosphere which God created, not the atmosphere itself! The atmosphere indeed seems to have vanished from Professor L.’s philosophy, though fortunately it left the clouds that float in it, the rain, refracted light, the blue sky, and other outward revealing phenomena that represent that “interior causality!” That “to the knowledge of *this* no science has ever attained, or ever could without a revelation,” we certainly shall not dispute; and we are equally sure that it will never be revealed. “*The chronological order of the fact was the great truth*,” he avers, that is revealed in *this* history! That God created *the atmosphere* it is of little consequence, it seems, that we should know. The great object in announcing it is simply to apprise us that it took place between the creation of *light* and the gathering of the *waters*

into *seas* and formation of dry *land*! How did Mr. Lewis discover that "the great truth revealed" in the history of the second day, is not the act which God exerted, the work which he wrought, but simply the chronological relations of that act to those of the first and third day? These extraordinary attempts to mould the text into harmony with his philosophy, form but an ill match to the lavish professions he obtrudes on his readers of profound respect for the sacred word and a conscientious adherence to its simple teachings! As he finds it so easy to settle questions on which the text furnishes no information, we regret that he has not explained to us the philosophy of the chemical fire which he holds was developed from the chaotic ocean, and was the source of the light which God created. That he regards that light as a flame produced by a chemical agency, is seen from the passage last quoted from him, in which he speaks of it as "the light or FIRE" that was separated from the darkness. As according to him the light was not then created, but was merely developed out of the matter of the earth in which it had previously been latent; as by his philosophy that development must have been the effect of immaterial vital principles or powers in the matter from which the light was evolved, and in the light itself; and as there is no known process by which fire and light are evolved from matter except by chemical action producing combustion;—it is a question of great interest how a chemical action could have been produced by the inherent *immaterial* vital forces of nature of such a kind as instantly to have covered the bosom of the ocean, which enveloped the whole globe, with a bright flame! Is Professor Lewis aware of the existence now of any "spermatic ideas," "invisible immaterial principles," or "vital powers," that are capable of giving birth to such effects? Has he ever seen the ocean enveloped in such a spontaneous flame? Has he ever beheld any phenomena that can fairly be considered as "representative" according to his theory of such an "interior causality" in the matter of the ocean? Let us suppose that a flame were now to burst instantly from every point of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans, and all the great inland seas and lakes, and were to burn on, glow, and flash its light up into the vault of heaven from age to age; are the philosophers of the pre-

sent day aware of any *immaterial* "vital powers, principles, laws," or "ideas," by which they could account for such a phenomenon? Would it not be felt as absolutely to transcend and contradict the present known powers and laws of nature, as the creation of light itself could? Mr. Lewis ought not to have left so important a point in his system shrouded in darkness as thick as that which brooded on the primeval abyss. We are entitled to ask some elucidation of it. He ought to shoot over it at least some of the random flashes of his genius, with which he is so ready at times to assist our apprehension of other subjects which lie out of the sphere of our observation.

He should have informed us also how he ascertained that the atmosphere, instead of being then created by the Most High, was merely evolved "from the yet semi-chaotic world." The divine command was—"Let there be an expanse, an atmosphere;" and that is precisely equivalent to the command, Let an expanse, an atmosphere exist, by which vapors shall be formed from the waters of the ocean and float at a distance above the earth; which is as expressive of a creation of what before had no existence as any terms that can be chosen. There is not the slightest intimation that the elements of the atmosphere were before incorporated with the ocean or earth, nor is the supposition of it consistent with the fact, which is a command to be, to exist, not to take a new form or to occupy another locality. The supposition of such a development is inconsistent also with the laws of matter. If the atmosphere was evolved from the semi-chaotic world, it must have been by a chemical process, and a process therefore by which there was an evolution of intense heat and a flaming combustion. But if combustion evolved the atmosphere, how is it that it did not evolve it during the vast round of ages of the fire which Mr. Lewis maintains sprang from the chemical process spoken into activity on the first day? How did this fire that evolved the atmosphere differ from the fire that constituted or gave the light of the first day? Is Professor L. acquainted with any chemical combustion by which oxygen and nitrogen are evolved from the matter that is fired so as to unite and form atmospheric air? Besides, is it not the law of combustion that the oxygen that is consumed in it enters into combina-

tion with the matter that is burned, instead of being separated from it, so that in every case of fire in the air it passes out of its atmospheric state or union with nitrogen, and assumes a solid form with the material that is burned? What sort of chemistry was it, then, by which this law of combustion was reversed, and oxygen set free along with nitrogen, so that they entered into combination with each other and formed an atmosphere? How is it that Professor L. could permit himself to allow the light he enjoys on this important question to remain latent in his own bosom?

In his chapter on the third day, he employs himself chiefly in endeavoring to show that the collection of the waters into seas, and the production of dry land, were mere natural processes, extending through periods no one knows how long—not the immediate effect of the divine fiat; though he gives no reason for that view, except that to suppose it was wrought immediately by the power of God, is to suppose that it was not the work of vital immaterial essences or powers which he maintains are the immediate causes of the processes of nature. He postpones his notice of the creation of vegetables to his chapters on the fifth day, saying nothing whatever to meet the curiosity which his readers will doubtless generally feel, to know how the vegetables which were created on the third day, could have lived and flourished in a world which, according to him, was wrapped during the period which he regards the third day as denoting, in an ocean of flame! This seems to us an ominous omission. Why did he not meet this difficulty frankly and fully? The creation of vegetables on the third day plainly confutes his theory of the origin and nature of the light created on the first, and of the origin of the atmosphere; unless he can prove that the vegetables which God created on the third day, were of such a constitution that they could subsist in an intense flame as their natural element. Instead, however, of attempting this, he seems willing even to lead his readers to believe that it was not in reality till the *fourth* day that vegetables were brought into existence; for he says, on the work of the fourth day:—

“The earth at this stage is *preparing* to become the supporter of *vegetable organizations*, and the abode of animal and rational life.

But for the perfect development of these, if not for their *origination*, there is needed the orderly arrangement of *seasons*, and the regularly adjusted light and heat of some great luminary. . . . The creation of such seasons was to be the work of the fourth period, immediately after, *if not simultaneously with, the first birth of vegetation*, and before the production of the reptiles, the earthly animals, and man."—Pp. 133, 134.

But if the third day was, as he maintains, a vast and indeterminate period, of perhaps thousands of years, or even ages; and yet, as he states, a part, and it may have been much the largest part of this creative day, was occupied with the production of vegetable existences from the earth, after it had become dry, p. 128, how is it that the first birth of vegetation can have been *simultaneous* with the creation of the fourth day? Have these startling difficulties escaped the notice of Professor Lewis—or how is it that he has made no effort to relieve his theory from the formidable perplexities in which they involve it?

He proceeds, in his chapter on the work of the fourth day, on the assumption, that the various points of his system he had already endeavored to maintain—that the creation of the heavens and the earth was a mere fashioning of matter that previously existed; that the light of the first day was developed from the ocean and earth by a chemical process; that the days were long and indeterminate periods—are indubitably established; and accordingly holds that the great work of the fourth was, to cause the sun, moon, and other orbs to shine upon the earth. The sacred record is:

"And God said, Let the luminaries in the expanse of the heavens be to divide the day from the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years. And let them be for lights in the expanse of heaven to give light upon the earth: and it was so. And God made two great lights: the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night: the stars also. And God set them in the firmament of heaven to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness. And God saw that it was good. And the evening and the morning was the fourth day."

The command, "Let the luminaries in the expanse of

heaven be to divide the day from the night, and be for signs and for seasons, and for days and for years," assigns that office to the luminaries jointly, without specifying which was to rule the day, in contradistinction from the night, and which was to rule the night in contradistinction from the day. But the object of the narrative that follows is, to show which were the chief luminaries that were to fill that office, and which was to rule the day, and which the night. The latter part of the narrative is merely explanatory of the first, not an announcement of new facts. The fiat contemplates the luminaries as already existing in the expanse of heaven, where they seem to be stationed, and simply enjoins that they should divide the day from the night, and be for signs, for seasons, for days, and for years, and should be for luminaries in the expanse of heaven, to give light upon the earth. On this, however, Professor L. says:—

"In this passage there is perhaps the greatest difficulty in the whole Mosaic account. The writer would not seek to disguise it from himself or his readers. It is a difficulty, however, which must grow out of every attempt to conjecture by what process the phenomenal result is brought about. As far as regards the appearance itself, or the statement by which it is set forth, the interpretation is of the simplest and easiest kind. But have we really anything to do with such process, or with any substances or causes that might have existed, or might not have existed, anterior to the phenomenal arrangement? Did the matter of the sun have a being before the fourth period? Was it covered with some obstructing veil which prevented its shining upon the earth? Had it yet become luminous? Were there obstacles in the earth, or the earth's atmosphere, to the reception of its light? *Had our planet been yet connected with the solar system*, or commenced its revolution upon its axis? We cannot answer any of these questions, either in the affirmative or the negative. We cannot affirm the irrationality or deny the rationality of any theory grounded upon any one of them. Science is dumb, and revelation says nothing about it."—Pp. 135, 136.

These are bold and comprehensive denials, and may mislead inconsiderate readers. They will not be likely, however, to meet the acquiescence of any who comprehend their import; as they are not only in open contradiction to the sacred narrative, but with some of his own admissions.

We have cut off his pretence that day, evening, and morning, are used to denote long and indefinite periods, of which something else than a duration distinguished and measured by the presence, the rising, and the setting of the sun, are the peculiar characteristics; by showing that there are no such marks here in the use of these terms, of the nature of those periods, as always attend and define the application of them, when the period they are employed to denote, is not a literal day, or a literal evening and morning. The day, in the history of the creation of light, of the atmosphere, of the collection of the waters into seas, the formation of dry land, and the creation of vegetables—is not defined and distinguished as the day of youth or of age, of progress or decline, of life or death in contradistinction from a natural day; but it is expressly defined as a day of light in contradistinction from night, and as consisting of an evening and morning, which are the special and peculiar characteristics of a natural solar day, and of that alone. We have cut off that pretext also, by showing that day and night and a succession of evening and morning could be produced only by the earth's revolving on its axis in a light shining on it from a distance, and a single light, or light from a single orb, illuminating but one of its hemispheres at a time, and that the sun is the only orb that ever shed such a light on the earth. We have as high a certainty therefore as language can express, that the day and night, and evening and morning of the first, second, and third days were natural, and that the light in which the earth revolved so as to produce their succession was the light of the sun. To deny it is as weak and perverse as it were to deny that the relations of the numbers of the multiplication table to each other are what they are, or that the sun is the sun. Professor L. may spend years in the effort, and he cannot frame an expression that shall more clearly and exclusively define a natural day, evening, and morning, and distinguish them from all other periods, than they are so defined and distinguished in the sacred narrative of the first day. If he were to say that by a common solar day he means a day that is produced by the sun's shining on the earth, we have only to remind him that the word sun is used in various senses; that there is not only the sun of our planetary system, but there is the sun of

righteousness, the sun of prosperity, the sun of youth, and the sun of old age. There is a sun also that goes down while it is yet day; a sun that is turned into darkness, and a sun that shall no more go down; and, according to his method of dealing with words, his definition fades into utter vagueness and uncertainty. He has not approached a hair's-breadth towards determining what his natural day is. If, to escape that difficulty, he says that he means by a natural solar day, a day of twenty-four hours; we have only again to remind him that the word *hour* is used in as great a variety of senses as the word *day*; that there is the hour of gladness and the hour of sorrow, the hour of hope and the hour of despair, the hour of health and the hour of sickness, the hour of life and the hour of death; and he is as far from determining the sense of his solar day as he was before. If, to evade that difficulty, he says that by a solar day he means a day that is measured by the revolution of the earth on its axis; we have only to respond that the word *revolution* means sometimes a political, sometimes a religious, sometimes a social, sometimes a commercial, sometimes a physical change; that *axis* sometimes denotes a massy iron shaft, sometimes a small iron bar, sometimes a piece of wood to which wheels are attached, and sometimes a mere imaginary line connecting two opposite points: and finally, that the term *earth* has an equal diversity of meanings, denoting sometimes the whole globe, sometimes the land in distinction from the ocean, sometimes the loose materials which form the surface of the ground, and sometimes the dust of which the ground consists, as in the expression, "earth to earth, ashes to ashes;" and so through every series of definitions which he may choose to frame. We have only to treat his language as he treats the sacred text, and if his method is legitimate, we put it out of his power ever to advance a step towards determining what he means by a solar day. The game which he plays consists in little else than assuming that because a word in *certain cases* has a figurative sense, therefore it may have that sense in the text; then asserting that its sense there is and must be figurative; and finally, in assigning it the vague and illimitable meaning that suits the preconceived theory which he wishes to corroborate or establish by it. That in the text there are none of the marks that

always attend it when it is used figuratively, and show that it is employed in a new relation ; that the relation in which it is used is such as to make it certain that it is not employed in a tropical but in its literal sense, is no obstacle at all to his assuming and treating it as indubitably used with a figurative meaning!

We have cut off his pretext that the days of the creation were unlimited periods also, by showing that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh, revolved after the sun was made the determiner of the length of the days, and must therefore have been determined in their length by him, and been true solar days. And, finally, we have shown it by the fact that the seventh day, which was consecrated for man's rest, was a natural solar day. Professor Lewis offers a contradiction to the sacred narrative, therefore, when he avers, that "revelation says nothing about" whether "the matter of the sun had a being before the fourth day," whether it had become "luminous," and whether "our planet" had "yet commenced its revolution upon its axis." The facts announced in the narrative of the first day—the shining of light, the division of the light from the darkness, the formation of day by the light, and of night by the darkness, and the succession of evening and morning, are identically the effects which, in the narrative of the fourth day, are said to be produced by the luminaries in the expanse of heaven, and especially by the sun; and we know that they are produced by that orb, because of the revolution of the earth on its axis; and that there is no other light but that of the sun shining on the revolving earth, by which they could have been produced. He could have scarcely uttered a more palpable contravention of the narrative, had he denied that the earth itself, the sun, day, evening and morning, are the subjects of which it treats.

He is inconsistent with himself also, in averring that no answer can be given to the question whether "our planet had yet been connected with the solar system." To suppose that it was not yet connected with the solar system, is to suppose that it was not subject to the gravitating force; for if it was subject to that force, it must undoubtedly have felt it in reference to the sun and planets as much as it does now. But if it had not been subject to that force, the

elements of which it consists would have been wholly without weight, and would therefore have been thrown from its surface by its violent whirl on its axis. Instead of that, however, Professor L. admits that the ocean lay on the outside of the globe, and was therefore of less weight than the solid rocks or earth on which it rested; and admits also that the atmosphere, when created, rested on the surface of the ocean, and was therefore of less specific gravity than the water that supported it: and finally, he admits that the vapors that were formed on the creation of the atmosphere, rose to a height in the air, and floated there in the form of clouds, which would not have taken place, if it had not been specifically lighter than the lower strata of the air. So far, then, from being unable to answer the question, whether "our planet had been yet connected with the solar system, or commenced its revolution upon its axis," we have in these facts as absolute evidence that it was subject to the law of gravity, which extends to all worlds, and turned on its axis, as we have that it now revolves on its centre, and is a member of the solar system. Can anything be more absurd and contradictory than to maintain that the various effects detailed in the sacred narrative that now take place only from the law of gravity, the light of the sun, and the revolution of the earth on its axis, may, and must then have been the result of wholly different causes?

The whole ground on which he proceeds in these denials, and the theory which he founds on them that the light of the sun and moon first shone on the earth on the fourth day, is thus swept-away from him. The sacred narrative plainly teaches that the whole of our solar system was created on the first day; that the light which was then called into existence and shone on the earth, was the light of the sun; that the division of the darkness from the light, and the succession of night and day, evening and morning, commenced then, which continue to the present hour; that the earth, therefore, then revolved on its axis as it does now; and thence that the days, and evenings and mornings, were natural days, evenings and mornings antecedently to the fourth, precisely as they were from the fourth to the seventh, and are at the present time.

But if the sun existed and shone on the earth, and by the revolution of the latter on its axis caused the succession of

day and night, what was the creative act of the fourth day, by which the sun and moon became the determiners of days, and seasons, and years? The divine command, "Let the luminaries of the expanse of heaven be to divide the day from the night, and for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years," indicates that they were thereafter to fill those offices in the manner in which they have since done; and therefore that the axis of the earth was to stand at that angle to the ecliptic, by which it is that in wheeling round the sun, a diversity in the length of the days and nights, and a succession of the seasons, take place, and the year forms its round. If, accordingly, we suppose that the earth had previously had no inclination to the ecliptic, but then received its present adjustment, that determination by the sun of the days, seasons, and years, would follow that now takes place. There may have been other changes, such as the distance of the moon from the earth, or of both from the sun, and the first may have extended to the other planets of our system, all of which are inclined to the ecliptic, so as to cause a difference in the length of the days in different parts of the year, and a succession of seasons.

We now proceed to his chapters on the creation of vegetables and animals, in which he advances the doctrine that the production of those organized forms was not by a creation, but by a natural growth; and that that which was created by the Almighty, was that which he calls the "invisible, immaterial, vital principles or powers" of the plants and animals, which he holds existed anterior to, and independently of, the plants and animals of which they became the living souls. He says:—

"A common opinion is, that the first vegetable and animal formations were direct acts of God; and most of those who hold it think, perhaps, that they have derived it from the Scriptural statements. Some would maintain that, as in the origin of man, they proceeded in each case from a primitive pair. . . . Another theory would regard them as created in numbers, and assigned to their positions in all quarters of the globe, thus constituting a great many centres of production. In both cases the original plants and animals would be direct creations, coming immediately from the ab-extra plastic power, or mechanical shaping of the Deity. But certainly the account does not tell us anything like this. *There is no language from which we*

could infer it. There is nothing in any other parts of the context that would shut us up to it. . . . There are no words containing the germ of ideas which could possibly be expanded so as to embrace such a conception."—P. 195.

"The passage . . . in its general effect, and still more in the conceptions which lie at the roots of its most important terms, forces upon the mind the idea of *a nature in the earth*, acting through *a real dynamical process of its own*, and in periods which, whether longer or shorter, contain, within themselves, all the changes and successive stages which we find it impossible to dissociate from the thought of birth and growth."—Pp. 211, 212.

"When we are once led to admit that the work of the third and of the fifth period was through such a process as we may fairly call *nature*, or the natural, we may regard ourselves as having *the simple conception as it lay in the mind* of the writer, and the question of longer or shorter duration becomes one altogether of secondary consequence. . . . Our views, however, of such duration, would be modified in no slight degree, according as we adopt one or the other of two theories of growth or development. Assuming that there was a *real nature* or production out of the earth, the question might still be raised, Was it a growth, in the first place, of *individuals*, or of *species*? . . . In the one case we must suppose the Divine Word energizing in as many specific acts or beginnings, as there are *species* of vegetable and animal life. . . . In the other view, the original divine power may be supposed to have *originated* the new order of life in its most *generic* or *universal germ*, and all subordinate genera and species to have been *developed* from it, and from one another, by the action of *nature* under this new power."—Pp. 213, 214.

"It is enough for us to learn, without doing any violence to the language of the account, that the production of the vegetable and animal races are set forth as having been originally a *φύσις* or *growth*—a growth out of the earth, and by and through the earth; in other words, a nature with its laws, stages, successions, and developments."—P. 216.

"*These are the generations* of the heavens and the earth, in the day in which the Lord God made the heavens and the earth, and every tree of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb before it grew.' . . . This might strike some minds as favoring the idea of immediate or direct creation,—that is the making of the tree as a tree, or of the very thing which came up out of the earth, before it was in the earth. The first objection to this—with all reverence be it said—is its apparent absurdity; not its marvellousness, or supernaturalism, but its apparent want of all meaning and consistency.

Something else, then, must be meant by his 'making the tree before it was in the earth.' If we refer it to the seed, we have the same difficulty in kind, if not in degree. The seed itself, as much as the tree, is an outward organization, the apparent product of a living power lying back of it as a *real entity, per se*, and in fact better entitled to the seminal name than the material seminal organism, because it is this living power which builds the outward matter of the seed into its peculiar form and structure, thus constituting its *essence*, or making it what it is. Besides, if we search for this *previously existing* thing, by going back of the tree to the seed, there is no reason why we should not recede a step farther to the *vitality* that dwells in the seed itself, and which, *in the order of nature*, as well as in the order of ideas, is anterior to the material organization. IF SUCH A DOOR MAY BE OPENED IN THE INTERPRETATION, or if we depart at all from the ultimate *outward product*, there is not only AN EXEGETICAL LIBERTY which we may rationally employ, but an *imperative consistency* that will not permit us to stop short of the *vital and immaterial principle*."—P. 223.

He thus maintains, that "the outward, or phenomenal entities, were generated, or born from the invisible immaterial vital powers, principles, laws, spermatoc words or ideas, call them what we will, which are themselves the first and immediate creations of the Divine Word, going forth before any new agency of nature, whether the universal, or any particular nature."—P. 224. "The birth of these seminal principles was independent of all natural agency. . . . The creation of these seminal types, or principles, was wholly supernatural, immediate, divine."—P. 231. He says:—

"We do not hesitate to use the sublime expression of Plato, 'God is the Maker of types : he is the architect of ideas ;' but not as barren thoughts or speculative theorems. Along with the law, and constitutive of it, there is *the plastic and formative power*, the ruling or directing energy. This, there is no absurdity in saying, *was put in the earth to grow* ; for it means by a new power then given, the *earth* was made to bring it *forth* or *out*, that is, give it birth in *outward material form*. This was the *genesis* of the first vegetation : The earth brings it *forth*.

"There is a *spiritual reality*,—shall we shrink from using the term ? or, at least, an *immaterial* entity in all, even the lowest forms of vegetable, as well as animal organization. It is a power which no

chemistry ever created or can destroy. It is that which, in one sense, may be said to reappear in every new germination of the plant—the same *one* in *many*, ever living on though its individual manifestations die, and ever repeating itself, from the first appearance of the vegetable genera upon the earth, down to the *specific* exhibitions of the same old life that annually bud and bloom around us. Call it law, idea, power, principle, whatever we may, it is *a reality*, a *high* reality, the *highest* reality connected with the material organization; and that it is which God made, before the tree was in the earth, or the herb grew, or rains had fertilized the seed, or the careful hand of man had supplied the conditions of a rich and genial soil.”—Pp. 231, 232.

This heathenish theory, however, notwithstanding the confidence with which it is advanced, and the variety of pretexts that are alleged to sustain it, is mistaken, and altogether unworthy of an expositor who professes to be governed in his interpretations by the laws of language, and makes so many ostentatious and vehement protestations of his reverence for the word of God. It is nothing else than a bold attempt, without a shadow of reason for it in the narrative, to fasten on the word of God one of the most monstrous figments of heathen philosophy.

In the first place, Professor Lewis does not offer a particle of proof of the existence of the invisible immaterial entities which he alleges were created by God, and exist in, and are the “vital powers” of, all “forms of vegetable” “organization.” He takes the whole point for granted which he affects to demonstrate! This is a serious obstacle to the success of his argument.

In the next place, he cannot prove their existence. The supposition is a monstrosity. An “immaterial” “spiritual” entity, must, undoubtedly, have consciousness, and, therefore, have perceptive powers, or be susceptible of being acted on by external objects so as to produce impressions that will touch its consciousness. Does Professor Lewis know of any “immaterial spiritual” entity that is not conscious? Are not all immaterial existences, are not all spiritual entities, spirits? Undoubtedly; and Mr. Lewis’s theory implies, therefore, that the immaterial spiritual entities, which he ascribes to all vegetable organizations, are conscious spirits that have perceptive powers!

In the third place, he totally misrepresents the object of the divine command; "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, the fruit yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth; and it was so. And the earth brought forth grass—herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit; whose seed was in itself, after his kind. And God saw that it was good." Here that which was commanded into existence, was grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit, after his kind, whose seed is in itself; that is, these several forms of vegetable organization. According, however, to Professor Lewis, these forms of organization were not the objects of the divine fiat; but that which that fiat called into existence, was a set of invisible immaterial spiritual entities, that preceded these material organizations, and were, together with the earth, the real causes of the being of the grass and trees:—things as different as spiritual conscious entities are from those which are merely material and unconscious! As certainly, therefore, as the representation of the sacred writer, that the herbs and trees were the objects of the divine fiat, is correct; so certainly, Professor Lewis's representation, that immaterial and spiritual entities were its object, is not.

In the fourth place, his construction of the passage, instead of having any ground in philosophy, is overstrained and unnatural. The meaning of the command is plainly the same as it would have been had its language been: "Let grass be formed out of the earth—the herb yielding seed, and the tree yielding fruit." The relation of the earth to the fiat, was simply, that it furnished the materials out of which the herbs and trees were formed; and that it was in its soil that they stood. This is clear from the fact, that the earth had no power of itself to shoot up herbs and trees, when they had as yet had no existence. It had no more power to originate plants in its bosom, than it had to originate immaterial and spiritual entities. It is seen also, from the fact, that God is expressly said to have made them. (Genesis ii. 4, 5. Exodus xx. 11.) The same expression was used in calling the beasts into existence. "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth

after his kind : and it was so." Does Professor Lewis hold, that that means anything else than the fiat would if the language had been, Let the living creature be formed of the earth, after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind? Can it mean anything more than that the matter of which they were to consist was to be taken from the earth? Does he hold, that instead of the beasts and reptiles themselves, as organized living forms, the object of the divine fiat was a set of immaterial spiritual entities that were to animate them, and that those entities were deposited in the earth, and by virtue of their vital powers, drew to themselves, like plants, particles of the ground in which they were imbedded, and by a gradual process, like that of an embryo—grew into their respective organizations and natures? He must, if he adheres to his theory. How happens it that he scarcely bestowed a glance on this branch of the subject, but devotes his whole disquisition to the origin of vegetables? Such a method of interpretation as that which he here employs, would force a meaning on a great number of passages that is wholly false and contradictory. It is said, Rev. xx. 13, "And the sea gave up the dead which were in it, and death and hades gave up the dead which were in them." Does Professor Lewis maintain, that the sea, death, and hades, exerted the power by which the dead were raised to life? Does he hold that their resurrection was a natural process, because it was out of the sea, death, and hades, that they were raised? Why not, if his pretext in respect to the meaning of the command, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb, and the tree, is legitimate? The cases are parallel.

In the fifth place, whence is it that the immaterial spiritual entities are derived, which are, according to Professor Lewis, the vital principles of the new plants that are formed? Were they all spoken into existence by the Most High when he spake the first plants and trees into being? If so, how is it that those of all future herbs and trees have hitherto remained inactive? Or are they generated by the plants that bear the seeds from which they spring? Does Professor Lewis hold that herbs and trees universally have the power of generating hundreds and thousands of *immaterial spiritual*

entities? What becomes of the immaterial spiritual entities, that, according to him, are formed to animate the millions of millions of millions of grains of wheat, corn, rice, and other grains, that, instead of being sown, are annually converted into bread and eaten by man? Are they devoured also?

In the sixth place, his theory contradicts the fact known to all human experience, that the production of new plants is by the seed simply, not by an immaterial spiritual principle, of whose nature and existence we know nothing. It is by the seed, a material organization, that the new plant is produced, not by an immaterial spiritual entity. All that the husbandman does to produce a new crop of plants, is to put the seed of the species at the proper season into the ground properly prepared. He does not sow spiritual entities; he does not inquire whether such entities of the right species are already lodged in the soil in which he places his seed. Were Professor Lewis's theory true, sowing or planting seed would be no certain or probable means towards a crop of new plants. That would depend on the previous existence in the soil of the immaterial spiritual entities, which Professor Lewis avers are independent and yet essential to the germination of the new plant!

His theory is shown to be wholly erroneous by the statement of the sacred writer, that, in the day in which the heavens and the earth were created, the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew; the plain meaning of which is, that the plants and herbs which God created were not made by a growth in the manner in which they are now formed, but by a direct creation, and before they were formed as they now are by a germination and growth from roots and seeds. Professor Lewis, however, endeavors to make out that that which is meant by making the plant or tree before it was in the earth, and the herb before it grew, is not that God made the real tree and herb, that is, "their outward organization," but instead, that he made the "vital and immaterial principle," which Professor Lewis avers was a "living power lying back" of the tree and herb, and preceding their existence. But that is a gross violation of the passage. It is to change the proposition of the sacred writer, and represent him as uttering

a wholly different affirmation. What Moses declares is, that God made *every plant of the field* before it was in the earth, and *every herb of the field* before it grew; which were real plants or trees and herbs; that is, the outward visible organizations which bear and which alone bear those names. But Professor Lewis, in his interpretation, strikes out "*every plant of the field*" and "*every herb of the field*," and substitutes every "immaterial spiritual entity," that, as a living power, lies back of every plant and every herb; and thereby makes the latter the object of the creative agency instead of the former! What an admirable exemplification of his philology! What a beautiful method of establishing a philosophical theory! Yet of the exegetical feats with which his volume abounds, there is none, perhaps, on which he rests with higher confidence than on this, in which he endeavors to force his theory on the text in such open defiance of its language and meaning. He says in regard to it:—

"In a higher and truer sense, however, the making of the formal distinction from the material cause, was the real making, and this the thing made—that is, the law, idea, or principle in each thing—that by virtue of which it can be truly called a thing, and which alone can be said to make it what it is. In no other way can the two passages be brought into that perfect harmony which is so evidently intended. *In no other way could it be said, God made the plants before they were in the earth, and yet have this consistent with the idea, so expressly given, of their mediate production through the earth.* Instead of being far-fetched and unnecessarily metaphysical, it is the only easy way in which we can form any notion of the process that will not destroy the supernatural on the one hand or the natural on the other,—throwing all meaning out of a portion of the terms employed, or reducing them to a mere figure of speech, which there is no evidence or intimation that the writer intended to employ."—Pp. 230, 231.

His theory is confuted also by the representation of the apostle, Heb. xi. 3, that by faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God, so that "not from phenomenal, that is, apparent things, were the things that are seen made;" the plain meaning of which is, that the things which are seen, the material worlds, were not made out of pre-existing material things, but were spoken into ex-

istence in their substances as well as forms. This text also Professor Lewis endeavors, by arbitrarily changing it, to force into harmony with his theory. The Greek of the text is, *οὕτως ὅτι μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλέπομενα γιγνέσθαι*, which is literally, "so that not out of things that appear were the things that are seen made;" which is a declaration, in so many words, that the things that are seen were not made out of things that appear, that is, material elements that had a previous existence; the direct converse of Professor Lewis's theory. How now does he convert this point-blank testimony against his system into a testimony to its truth? By boldly placing *μὴ*, not, after *ἐκ*, out of, so as to make it qualify *φαινομένων*, instead of *γιγνέσθαι*, and translating it, "so that the things that are seen were made from things that do not appear;" declaring positively therefore that they were made from *things*, and then assuming that, as those things were not apparent, they were invisible things, and consequently were the immaterial spiritual entities of his theory! It is by an alteration of the text therefore, not by its interpretation, that he endeavors to make it subserve his object. As often happens, however, with those who take such liberties with the Word of God, his expedient confutes itself, by contradicting his theory as palpably as it violates the text. For he makes the passage declare that the things that are seen, the things of the material universe, were made out of things that are invisible, immaterial, and spiritual. But it is the grand doctrine of his theory that the things that are seen, the material worlds, were made out of pre-existent *matter*; that the work of creation was a mere shaping and fashioning of that matter; and that the office of his imaginary "immaterial," "spiritual" entities is simply that of a law, idea, or vital force, by which the material things which they animate assume their forms. That the things that are seen are actually made out of those invisible, immaterial entities by a conversion of them into matter, is a wholly new doctrine, and the converse of that which he has made it his aim, through the entire course of his volume, to teach. How delicate and veracious the perspicacity he displays! To which now will he adhere—this new theory by which he overturns the whole fabric of his Platonic philosophy; or the other, and relinquish the violation of this passage by which he attempts to support it?

And, finally, his theory is confuted by the fact, which we have proved, that the day of the creation of plants was an ordinary day, and afforded no time, therefore, for a natural growth of the herbs and trees that were then brought into existence.

This branch of his system thus not only has no ground in the Word of God, but is a monstrous figment of heathenism, and owes all the show of truth in which he has endeavored to invest it, to unauthorized assumptions, or misapplications and perversions of the Sacred Word.

Professor Lewis says very little of the production of animals by a process of natural growth, in distinction from a creation, although the commands by which they were called into existence were, like that by which vegetables were created, addressed to that out of which the elements of which they were formed were taken. "And God said: Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowls that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and *every living thing that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly* after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind." Here Professor Lewis's fancy, professedly founded on philology, that the trees and herbs of the third day were brought forth by a natural process, because the command to bring them forth was addressed to the earth, is overturned by the express declaration that God *created* the whales, and *every living thing* which moveth, which *the waters brought forth*, and *every winged fowl* after his kind. It was by the creative power of God, therefore, exclusively, that they were called into existence, not by immaterial, spiritual entities, infused into the waters that generated them by a natural process. The waters were wholly passive in the work. The relation they sustained to it was simply, that it was from them that God took the matter of which the creatures were formed, and in them as the element in which they were to live, that they received their being. The bringing forth of the fish and fowl by the waters was thus the direct creation of them by God in the water and from the water. Why is it that Professor Lewis did not meet this difficulty fairly, and show how, according to his theory, a gradual growth of the fish and fowl from the waters, and beasts from the land,

took place? Why did he attempt to evade it by representing that the explanatory passage had an object that is wholly contradictory to its meaning, as in the following declaration in respect to the statement, "God *created* great whales"?

"It may mean that *some* of those huge creatures now extinct, and whose relics so much astonish us, were *special* formations, like man in a subsequent period—so specially formed, perhaps, because like him they were intended in their period to hold an analogous though somewhat inferior species of dominion over the *other vegetable and animal tribes!*"—Pp. 219, 220.

The declaration that God *created* not only "great whales," but "every living thing which moveth, which the waters brought forth, and every winged fowl after his kind," "*may* mean that *some* of those huge creatures now extinct were *special formations*, and like man were intended to hold an *analogous*" "species of *dominion* over the *other vegetable and animal tribes!*" What an ingenious suggestion! What a scrupulous adherence it indicates to the primordial signification of the terms of the text! And what a flood of light it reflects on the mysteries of zoology! Who ever before heard that whales or other huge creatures are, like man, invested with "a species of dominion over the *other vegetable and animal tribes!*" Who ever was before aware that whales or other "creatures of the leviathan class" have a touch of the "*vegetable tribes*" in their constitution! Yet with these senseless assertions, that are in direct contravention of the passage, Mr. Lewis represents himself as quite satisfied, and flatters himself, it would seem, that nothing more can be necessary to satisfy the scruples of his readers!

Of the land animals that were created on the sixth day he scarce utters a syllable, except to express his belief that they, like the vegetable tribes, were formed by a natural growth out of the earth. Man, however, he admits, though seemingly with reluctance, was directly made by the Creator, not produced from the earth by a natural process; though the terms used in narrating his creation are the same as those which are employed in relating the creation of the heavens and earth, the vegetables, the fish, the fowls, and the beasts of the earth. If the grounds on which he proceeds in all the earlier parts of his volume are correct, they undoubtedly

required him to put a similar construction on the creation of man.

From this subject he passes to treat of the Sabbath, which he regards as a vast and indeterminate *olam*, age, or series of ages, and of several other topics; but we have already pursued him as far as our space will allow, and have shown, we think, that the peculiar views he maintains on all the themes we have reviewed, are not only without any ground in the sacred narrative, but enormous misrepresentations and perversions of it; and that the means which he employs to establish his theories are as exceptionable as his theories themselves. Instead of endeavoring, by an impartial examination of the inspired history of the creation, to ascertain what it teaches, and receiving it as indubitably the truth; he brings to it a preconceived theory drawn from a heathen speculatist, and exerts all his powers to force the Word of God into harmony with his philosophy. He alters the text; he gives false translations; he assumes what he attempts to prove; he makes assumptions to suit the exigencies of the moment, that if carried to their legitimate results, involve him in hopeless conflict with the text; he denies or questions the plainest facts and truths when they stand in the way of his theory; he advances false notions in philology, and erroneous views of the principle on which figures are employed; he treats literal language as though it were figurative; he accumulates all the specious arguments he can invent to sustain his peculiar views, and all the objections he can muster to those which he rejects; but as far as possible keeps the difficulties that embarrass his system out of sight. Numerous and startling as they are, he has not given a candid consideration to one of them. They usually are not noticed at all, or only faintly alluded to. If they present themselves so glaringly that they cannot be altogether evaded—as in respect to the creation of whales and every living thing that moves, instead of their natural growth—groundless and deceptive suggestions are thrown out that are adapted to mislead the reader, and beguile him into the impression that he has mistaken the meaning of the sacred narrative. Of all the volumes we have ever critically examined, we think this is one of the most unreliable. If it displays much knowledge, it is without a sound judgment, and

is sadly misapplied. If much ingenuity is shown in the invention of pretexts and arguments for the support of the author's theories, it is without any consideration whether the results to which his assumptions lead are not fatal to his system. If frequent and loud professions are made of respect for the Word of God, and an implicit adherence to its teachings, they are generally either a preface or an exordium to a violent attempt to wrench from it its true meaning, or force on it some doctrine that is infinitely foreign and contradictory to its genuine sense. In short, it seems to us to bear the marks throughout of a mind deeply possessed of a set of mistaken and extravagant misconceptions, and false theories, and presuming that if true, the Bible must accord with them, is determined, at all hazards, to make out that they have its sanction. We are much surprised at this; as though aware in a measure of Professor Lewis's cast of mind, we had entertained a far more favorable estimate of his candor and judgment. We deeply regret that he has given to the public a work which is so adapted to disparage the Word of God in the estimate of the young, and to strengthen the hands of the numerous class who are already disposed either to reject it as without authority, or to torture and pervert it into the sanction of their unscriptural theories. Of the various forms in which it is assailed, there is none that bespeaks a more sad alienation from its spirit, or is more mischievous, than that of one who, like Professor Lewis, while making forward and ostentatious protestations of respect for it, in fact treats it as having no clear and determinable meaning, but as susceptible of any sense, no matter how false, how absurd, or even how blasphemous, which the passions or the fancy of the interpreter chooses to ascribe to it. The truth has no worse enemy than such a professed friend; and infidelity has no more effective propagator.

ART. VI.—THE WAR OF THE GREAT NATIONS.

THE great tragedy in the East is still in progress, without any certainty what the catastrophe is to be in which it is to

terminate, though appearances seem to indicate that the Allies may ere long achieve the conquest of Sebastopol. The most remarkable of all the unexpected and extraordinary events that have signalized the war is, that the success of the Russians in repelling the besiegers, has arisen from their having adopted a method of defence almost wholly unknown till the present conflict, by which the Allies have been divested of the peculiar advantages besiegers have usually enjoyed, and on which they relied for a speedy conquest of the place.

Heretofore those who were intrusted with the defence of besieged places, such as walled towns and fortresses, have relied mainly on artillery on the walls, or fortresses themselves; and as whatever their form might be, there were always points which the attacking party might with little exposure approach so near by sapping, that a small number of guns would in a few hours beat down the walls, and open a way for the entrance of the besiegers in numbers greatly exceeding those of the garrison, the fall of a fortress constructed of masonry was considered as ordinarily certain after a siege of a few weeks. Another important advantage of besiegers was, that as the line or segment of the circle on which they acted, was of greater length than that of the fortress they assailed, they were able to concentrate on any point which they attacked a much greater number of guns than the besieged could bring to bear on any point in the line of the besiegers.

These advantages ordinarily enjoyed by the assailing army have been snatched from the Allies in the siege of Sebastopol by the relinquishment by the Russians of the old method of relying for defence on the artillery of their fortresses constructed of masonry, and the erection of earth batteries exterior to their forts and walls, with a deep ditch in front and embankment in the rear, precisely like those of the besiegers, and at so many points and on such a scale, as to enable them to mount as many guns and bring as many to bear on any point on the line of the Allies, as the Allies have been able to mount against them. The consequence has been that instead of a conflict between a besieging army on the one side entrenched behind earth batteries, and on the other a garrison fighting from walls and structures of masonry, the

contest has been between two armies stationed on the ground, occupying nearly equal areas, fighting from trenches, earth batteries, and rifle pits, each of which has space for as many guns and as many troops to fire them as it desires, and has been gradually approaching the other by sapping and the erection in front of fresh batteries. It is this method of repelling the enemy which was first employed by the Turks in the defence of Sillistria, and was adopted from them by the Russians, that with all their mighty enginery has baffled the Allies in their efforts to take the place, which in the old method of procedure would naturally after a short struggle have fallen into their hands.

To add to the emphasis of this unexpected cast of the contest, it is the work mainly of a Jew, engineer-general Todleben, who, although almost unknown in the Russian army until the present war, has displayed in the defence of Sebastopol extraordinary invention, judgment, and activity. An obscure descendant of Abraham has thus been made the instrument of determining the most remarkable contest the world has ever seen, and affecting the interests on a vast scale of the great nations of Europe and Western Asia.

How obviously these great powers are made the instruments of inflicting the vengeance of God on each other! What an appropriation they are making of their high cultivation, their unequalled skill in the arts, the vast enginery by which their power is augmented, and their boundless wealth! What proofs they are exhibiting in the eyes of the universe that they are in revolt, and that they are under the dominion of malevolent affections. And what exemplifications are they presenting of the perverseness, the debasement, the ferocity, and the misery which sin brings in its train! Could we fully contrast the spectacle they present with the peace, the order, the justice, the goodness, and the blessedness that reign in unfallen worlds, we should be overwhelmed with a sense of the depth of alienation, sinfulness, and wretchedness to which our race has fallen.

What effect on the issue of the war would result from the fall of Sebastopol, should the Allies conquer it, it is as difficult to foresee as at the earlier stages of the conflict. What side Austria and Prussia may ere long take in the strife may depend on very slight events. If a necessity or motive

to join the belligerents should spring from the tendencies of their own people towards a popular government, it will more probably prompt the rulers to seek an alliance with Russia than with England and France. That would convert the war in the West into a struggle between the despots and their subjects under the co-operating armies of France and Great Britain for free governments, that would undoubtedly end in the overthrow of the present dynasties of Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria, and lead to a like revolution in Naples and Spain. The population of Italy, Germany, and the Peninsula is in a ferment, and need apparently but the patronage of France and England to induce them to rise and wrest the power from their present rulers, and endeavor to hold it in their own hands. Who would now be surprised at such a change? It is anticipated very generally, and vast as the interests are it would effect, momentous as are the destinies it would determine, the world is preparing for its occurrence.

May God shelter his people in that awful hour! May he breathe his Spirit into the hearts of his witnesses, and fit them, with an unfaltering voice, to proclaim and vindicate his truth!

ART. VII.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. **MEMOIR OF ALEXANDER McLEOD, D.D., New York.** By Samuel B. Wylie, D.D., Philadelphia. New York: Charles Scribner. 1855.

THIS volume presents, along with the narrative of the events of Dr. McLeod's life, a history also, in a considerable measure, of the Reformed Presbyterian Church—in which he exercised his ministry—from its organization in this country to the time of his decease. He held a conspicuous place among the ministers of this city for a long period, both as a preacher and a writer, and exerted over the denomination especially to which he belonged, a large and useful influence. A chapter of the memoir is devoted to an analysis of his work on the prophecies—in which he maintained, that the events foreshown under the seals and trumpets took place in the order in which they are revealed; that the vials were fulfilled, in a measure, in the judg-

ments of the French revolution, and the wars that followed; that the antichristian governments and churches are soon to be overthrown; and that the Millennium is then to be introduced, and by the means mainly that are now employed for the spread of the gospel. Among the most important acts of his life, was the projection of the American Colonization Society, the plan of which, the narrative states, originated with him, and its constitution was drawn by his pen. The volume, which is from the hand of his contemporary and friend, Dr. Wylie, presents a pleasing picture of his religious and social character, and will be read with pleasure, especially by those of the Reformed communion, in which he was an object of high respect and affection.

2. **A HISTORICAL VINDICATION of the Abrogation of the Plan of Union by the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.** By the Rev. Isaac V. Brown, A.M. Philadelphia: W. S. & A. Martien. 1855.

THIS volume consists, in a large degree, of official documents and other publications that were issued during the controversy between the Old and New Schools, with such statements and narratives as the author deems essential to present a just and full view, on the one hand, of the doctrines that were held by the New School party, and the means by which they endeavored to accomplish their objects; and, on the other, of the doctrinal belief of the Old School body, and the measures they adopted to counteract the system their opponents were propagating, and preserve the church in the faith, order, and discipline, for which it had before been characterized.

3. **THE ROBERTSONIAN SYSTEM: The Whole French Language.** By T. Robertson. Edited by Louis Ernst. New York: Roe Lockwood & Son. 1855.

- A **KEY TO THE WHOLE FRENCH LANGUAGE.** By T. Robertson. Edited by Louis Ernst. New York: Roe Lockwood & Son. 1855.

THESE volumes, tasteful in paper and type, appear to present all the aids to an easy and accurate knowledge of the French language that the learner can desire.

4. **NATURAL GOODNESS, or Honor to whom Honor is Due :** Suggestions toward an Appreciative View of Moral Men, the Philosophy of the Present System of Morality, and the Relation of Natural Virtue to Religion. By Rev. T. F. Randolph Mercein, M.A. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1855.

THE writer's aim in this volume is, on the one hand, to show that there are some elements in our nature, such as the domestic affections, that are not morally evil; and on the other, that none of the affections or moral actions of unrenewed men, however amiable and useful, have a religious excellence that entitles them to acceptance with God. In discussing these points he treats of some of the characteristics of moral men, the general unconsciousness of deep guilt, temporal rewards of morality, the natural virtues, the relation of morality to religion, the religious element in our nature, religious experience in conviction, repentance, and faith, and the criterion of virtue—themes requiring, to be handled successfully, fine discrimination, a profound knowledge of our nature, and an intimate acquaintance with the teachings of the Scriptures. If treated too diffusely and vaguely in this volume for either a philosophic or a theological work, the reader will still find in its pages many just and striking thoughts, presented in a style usually easy and graceful, and sparkling not unfrequently with a fresh and elegant image.

5. **THE DEAD IN CHRIST: Their State, Present and Future.** By John Brown, D.D. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1855.

THIS little volume presents many just views on a subject of great interest, on which the knowledge of believers generally falls, there is reason to think, far below that which is communicated in the Scriptures. He first maintains that the souls of the holy dead are conscious, active, and happy, in the period intermediate between death and their resurrection; and that they dwell in the presence of Christ. Next, that they are to be raised in glory at Christ's second coming, which, however, he holds with antimillenarians, is not to take place till after the thousand years of the saints' reign; and finally, that they are thereafter to dwell for ever with Christ—though in the heavenly world, he thinks, rather than on the earth—in perfect wisdom, holiness, and blessedness. These views are interspersed with many appropriate practical thoughts.

6. THE BRITISH PERIODICALS. Republished by Leonard Scott & Co., New York.

THE *Quarterlies* for July and August treat of a great variety of important topics, and with more than an ordinary share of ability.

The *Westminster* opens with an article on Spinoza, in which the writer expresses, in our judgment, far too favorable an estimate of his talents and his philosophical speculations. His system is built on postulates that are both gratuitously assumed, and that are false; and in his attempt to trace them to their results, in which he adopted a false method of proof, he displayed a mind that plods, works by narrow rules, and imposes on itself by a show of demonstration instead of the reality, rather than a keen and comprehensive intellect. He owes the lavish eulogies that have been bestowed on him of late years to the fact, that the modern German pantheists, in the paucity of authors to whom they could refer as authority for their doctrines, have found it convenient to cite his name, and to invest him with such a rank in genius, learning, and virtue, that he might reflect a measure of glory on themselves.

The writer of the article on Earth and Man, employs himself in repeating the doctrine of modern Geology, that the earth was originally a chaos; that it passed from that to a state of fusion; that a granite crust was formed over the molten ocean as its surface cooled; and that it was from that granite crust that the materials of the present strata of the earth were derived. That there is an utter want of proof to sustain that notion;—that it offers the most enormous contradictions to the laws of matter, he has not carried his investigations far enough to discover.

In the article on Contemporary Literature, high commendation is bestowed on Professor Powell's late work on the Philosophy of Creation, in which, while he maintains that the creation recorded by Moses was but a shaping and fashioning, he openly repeats the judgment he expressed several years since, that Genesis is irreconcilable with geology.

The *Edinburgh*, in a highly interesting article on the Tauric Chersonese, or Crimea, traces the history of that region from the establishment of Greek colonies there, which had, in the age of Herodotus, long been distinguished for their commercial prosperity—to its acquisition by the Russians. After the lapse of many ages it passed from the Greeks into the hands of Mithridates, king of Pontus. It soon after fell under the dominion of the Romans. About the middle of the third century of the Christian era, it was overrun by the Goths, whose descendants have continued there to the present time.

Towards the close of the fourth century, it was invaded by the Huns, and spread with devastation. It continued to be a dependence of the Byzantine empire for a long series of ages. In the thirteenth century, it passed into the hands of the Genoese, and rose again to commercial importance. It was conquered towards the close of the fifteenth century by the Turks, and remained under their dominion more than three hundred years; when, in 1783, it was transferred to the Russians. Though it has thus been in the hands of the most cultivated and commercial nations of the world for a large part of two thousand and five hundred years, it has been but an outpost on the skirts of civilization. The light that has successively been kindled there by the ancient Greeks, the Romans, the Roman-Greeks of the Byzantine empire, the Genoese, instead of shooting a ray into the dark regions at the North and East, has itself been extinguished by savage hordes from the wilds of Asia; and its present population, a mixture of the descendants of its ancient colonists, and of Tartars and Russians, are but half civilized.

The article on Modern Fortification, presents a full description of the novel method employed by the Russians in the defence of Sebastopol, and contrasts it with the mode in which garrisons of cities and fortresses have heretofore repelled besiegers. Of the revolution in the art of siege and defence, which the war has wrought, as exemplified in the bombardment of the sixth of April, the reviewer says: "The fire of the Allies commenced from two hundred guns, and one hundred mortars, throwing a heavier weight of metal than was ever thrown by a siege-train since the invention of gunpowder. The batteries opened at day-break, each gun firing about one hundred and twenty, or one hundred and forty rounds per day, and was continued without interruption, for ten days, though at the end of that time it was reduced to about one hundred rounds per day; it afterwards fell off to thirty, and at last ceased almost entirely.

"The Russians were at first taken by surprise, but soon replied vigorously, and continued to fight us on at least equal terms during the whole time. Sometimes they did not fire a gun for hours together, and then again their fire flared up, as if they had suddenly awakened from a trance; but they did us as little damage as we did them; and it is by no means clear that the better policy for them would not have been to close their embrasures, to withdraw all their guns, except those for defensive purposes, and let us waste our shot and shell on their invulnerable ramparts.

"The result of this stupendous operation was absolutely nothing. It is true, we occasionally gained a superiority of fire over the Redan, the Mammelon, and the Flagstaff batteries, for the simple and obvious

reason, that these works partook more or less of the bastion trace, and though they could not be exactly enfiladed, they were opposed to a cross raking fire which was very destructive. Still, we never silenced even them, and at the end of the combat they were repaired, and rearmed, and were as efficient as before. On the other hand, we never silenced nor gained any superiority of fire over those works which directly faced ours, and whose guns could only be attacked by direct fire.

"It was an experiment on the largest scale, and proved, beyond all cavil, the proposition—that when the guns of a fort are equal in number to those of the attack, *and are placed behind earthen parapets facing the attack*, they cannot be silenced by the besieger. During the fire we were not able to seize a single position, to destroy a single work, nor to advance the sap beyond the snail's pace at which it had been creeping for months past; and it now remains to be seen what science can do to restore to the attack its vaunted superiority over the art of defence."

The Review of the Life of Sydney Smith indicates that there were many defects, as well as much to admire, in the endowments and career of that singular man. He was odd, as well as witty, and as superficial in many of his views, as he was far-seeing and profound in others: and appears in the highest sphere to which he attained, to have been but a generous, light-hearted, and sparkling man of the world.

The *London Quarterly* also presents a very sprightly and entertaining notice of him. The portrait it draws in its article on Archdeacon Hare, is of a very different cast, and though by the pencil of an admirer, is equally distant from that of an evangelical and devoted minister of the gospel. With a memory that retained everything that came within its grasp, he seems to have been ambitious to acquire knowledge, especially the knowledge of books, rather than to make a wise use of it; and with neither judgment nor taste, his large acquisitions, especially in modern German literature, were an incumbrance instead of a qualification for the sacred office in the secluded scene where he exercised his ministry.

The articles on Advertisements since their first introduction into newspapers, about two hundred years ago, presents a curious picture of the manners of the period. The writer confines his specimens to a few subjects. He gives no examples of advertisements of ecclesiastical benefices, or sermons.

The Quarterly has a highly entertaining article on the Supply of Paper. There is something ludicrous in the complaints of the most cultivated nations of a famine of rags; but such a famine is nearly

as serious in the literary, as a scarcity of corn is in the bodily world. The great increase of readers in the last thirty years, and the immense augmentation especially of periodical literature, has caused a consumption of paper that far outstrips the supply of linen and cotton rags, which heretofore have been the chief materials from which it is made.

Of the immense consumption by the daily newspapers, some judgment may be formed from the quantity used by the *London Times*. "Of that journal there are published 60,000 copies a day, and on extraordinary occasions the number reaches 70,000. The paper, as it is received dry from the mill, or rather from the three mills that feed this enormous consumption, weighs 82 lbs. per ream. In the 60,000 copies there are 240 reams, weighing 19,680 lbs., or nearly nine tons; a quantity which, if the sheets were laid open and piled upon each other, would rise to a height of fifty feet." The quantity consumed in this city by the daily press is enormous—probably not less than 150,000 sheets; and at least an equal number is weekly used by the religious newspapers.

As the quantity of rags is not likely to be largely increased, it is a question of great moment whence materials can be obtained to supply the demand, and at sufficiently cheap rates. Paper can be made from a great variety of vegetables, but it is an obstacle to their use that the cost of manufacture is too great. "The search after new materials for paper, is not by any means a novelty. The industrial world of France has been on the alert since the commencement of the present century. In 1801 Seguin patented his paper made of straw mixed with other vegetable substances; in 1817 Beretta made paper with potato-refuse, after the starch had been extracted; in 1820 Podenzac manufactured both paper and pasteboard from straw only; in 1821 Jaubert of Marseilles made paper of hempstalks and liquorice root; and in 1825 Laforest proposed to make paper from hempstalks, flax, nettles, hops, and maize. In 1828 Bernardet brought out a paper made from the cuttings of hides; and Brard another made from rotten wood. In 1829 Rondeaux and Henne made pasteboard from leather, while Jullien prepared it from hay only. In 1830 Bazy of St. Omer made paper from the pulp of the beet root. Prior even to all these, a German who had a special mania for paper-making exhausted almost every material within his reach, and published an account of his performances in a book containing no less than sixty specimens of paper formed of different substances. He manufactured paper from the bark of a variety of trees, from the down and stalks of a great number of weeds, and from moss, shavings, and sawdust. These random attempts are so far valuable that they prove the fact that paper can be made from

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almost everything; but they are fruitless in producing a commercial substitute for linen rags."

A great quantity of waste from cotton mills is now devoted to the manufacture of paper, and a vast amount of cotton that is now lost in the field from its being stained, or from other causes, might be appropriated to it, if it can be afforded at a sufficiently cheap price.

The *North British* for August does not fall behind its compeers in the variety and attractiveness of its subjects. The articles on the Life of Sir Isaac Newton, Alexandrian Christianity, Mahometanism in the East, and the Life of Dr. Thomas Young, are especially instructive and entertaining.

Blackwood for the quarter presents its usual variety of stories, racy criticism, and ultra politics, and continues its graphic descriptions of the campaign in the Crimea.

ERRATUM.

On page 105 of the July No. (No. XXIX.), 16th line from the top, for interpret read interrupt.

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NUMBER III.

ART. I.—PROFESSOR SANBORN'S ESSAY ON MILLENARIANISM.

MILLENARIANISM: An Essay read to the Pastoral Convention of New Hampshire, June, 1855. By Edward Sanborn, Professor in Dartmouth College. Reprinted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1855. Andover: W. T. Draper, 1855.

THIS Essay owes whatever consequence may for the moment attach to it, to its having been prepared by the appointment of the Pastoral Convention of New Hampshire, read before that body, and published at its request. It has no merits of learning, good sense, or candor, but is superficial, declamatory, and discourteous, and attempts to make Millenarianism, and those who entertain and teach its doctrines, the objects of distrust and scorn, by denunciation, caricature, and sinister insinuations; and bears the marks throughout of a mind discredibly unacquainted with the subject, rankling with bitter prejudices, and making its own crude notions and fallible reason its guide, rather than the word of God. We regret this. We are weary of contend-

ing with men like Brown, Gilbert, and Rankin, who, to say nothing of their want of fairness on points in respect to which they had ample means of information, entered on the discussion of the theme without understanding the principles by which its questions are to be determined. If Millenarianism is to be assailed, we wish it might be, not by incompetent and prejudiced antagonists, who, in endeavoring to overturn its doctrines, would overthrow the word of God also, and drive the church into a mere fanatical rationalism, nearly related in principle and spirit to the infidelity of the day; but by the ablest of those who dissent from it, the most learned, the most deeply imbued with the spirit of the gospel, and the most just and comprehensive in their views of the great aims of God's administration over the world. The chief points of which we have to treat in responding to such declaimers as Professor Sanborn, would have no place in a controversy with parties of that cast. Instead of resorting to bluster, false assumption, and gross misrepresentation, and wasting their labors on points of secondary importance, they would address themselves in earnestness and impartiality to the great principles on which the questions between us turn, would try them by the word of God, and would yield, as well as receive, assistance in our endeavors to unfold the purposes he has revealed. Men of that class, however, it is observable, do not take a part in this controversy. They who have looked far enough into the subject to discern what the doctrines of Millenarianism are, and what the grounds are on which they rest, see very clearly that it is not to be put down by sneers, abuse, or dogmatism, and that it is to discredit themselves as well as desecrate the subject, to resort to such weapons to overthrow it. Their own theory, they see also, is perplexed with formidable difficulties. Instead of being sustained on the grounds on which it has been generally held, they find that if it is to be vindicated, either a new set of principles must be invented for the purpose, or else the theory of spiritualization on which it now rests, must be subjected to a new analysis, and laws evolved from it, that have hitherto remained unknown, by which Antimillenarianism can be deduced from the sacred word. They are disposed, therefore, to regard the subject as demanding fuller investigation.

to wait for further light, and to welcome a calm and thorough discussion of its principles and doctrines from writers on each side, rather than attempt to determine them by crude speculations, or noisy assumption and dogmatism. As, then, the able and judicious of the Antimillenarians stand aloof from the controversy, and leave it to such writers as Professor Sanborn, who embark in it only because of their ignorance and rashness, we must submit, we suppose, to the unpleasantness of answering his random harangue, and exposing his blunders and folly.

He begins his discussion by denouncing the study and explication of the prophetic Scriptures as not only utterly useless, but as more mischievous than any other work on which men have ever wasted their powers. He says :

"The literature which bewilders and misleads the humble inquirer after Divine truth, is *infinitely more pernicious* than that which caters to the passions of the carnal heart. There is hope that the 'very chief of sinners' may be converted and saved ; but the state of those fanatics, 'whose little reading and less meditating hold ever with hardest obstinacy that which they took up with easiest credulity,' is truly desperate. Of all the books that have

'Escaped decay's effacing fingers,'

none are more worthless than commentaries on prophetic symbols. It is our honest conviction that, if every theory and speculation advanced by scheming theologians respecting the future history of the world, and based, as they pretend, upon the dark imagery of the Apocalypse and the book of Daniel, were obliterated from the minds of men, sound doctrine and true religion would be promoted."—Pp. 3, 4.

He offers as the reason of this "honest conviction," the deeper belief that not only the symbolic prophecies, but the doctrinal portions of the word of God, are wholly unintelligible, and lie out of the proper sphere of human investigation.

"How does it happen that the labors of learned men so often prove utterly worthless, and rather encumber than aid the honest inquirer after truth ? It is *simply because they mistake the proper objects of human inquiry, and exceed the limits which God has set to the under-*

standing of man. They investigate subjects that cannot be known, and attempt to solve questions that cannot be answered."—P. 3.

And he gives as examples of the inexplicable subjects on which they thus waste their powers, philosophy, theology, and the interpretation of the symbolic Scriptures. Thus he says :

"It is probable that one-half at least of the works of philosophers and theologians might be annihilated in a moment, without abridging the means of human improvement, or injuring the cause of true science. 'Our public libraries are cemeteries of departed reputation ; and the dust accumulating upon their untouched volumes speaks as forcibly as the grass that waves over the ruins of Babylon.' Fortunate would it be for mankind if the Babylon of *controversial theology* were sleeping side by side with its great prototype ; but modern enthusiasts build again the tombs of the old prophets, and those potent heresiarchs, who ruled among the nations in former ages."—P. 3.

Then follows his denunciation, before quoted, of the works that have been written on those portions of the prophecies which are conveyed through symbols. The reason he gives for this sweeping anathema, not only against all works on those parts of the Scriptures, but against all theology also, whether doctrinal or controversial, and all philosophy, intellectual and natural,—for he makes no discrimination between them,—thus is, that in his judgment, they are not "proper objects of human inquiry," that they "exceed the limits which God has set to the understanding of man," and that in teaching them, men undertake to "investigate subjects that cannot be known, and attempt to solve questions that cannot be answered." The point from which Professor Sanborn commences his assault on Millenarianism thus is, the open and loud-voiced assertion, that not only the book of nature—the sphere of philosophy—but the whole of the symbolic and doctrinal Scriptures, are entirely unintelligible, and improper subjects for human investigation. The writers who have attempted to treat them, have failed, he represents, and given birth to books that have been infinitely mischievous, necessarily from the incomprehensibility of the subjects ; not from any fault in their method of investigation which they might have avoided, nor from a neglect or mis-

use of any means of knowledge that lay within their reach. His denunciation of the *prophetic* Scriptures is not confined, it should be observed, to those which are symbolic, but extends, though less openly, to all the others; first, because those portions of the prophetic Scriptures in which the revelation is made through language instead of symbols, are also doctrinal: for in them the great truths are taught of our future existence, of Christ's second coming, of the resurrection, of the judgment of the living and dead, of the eternal happiness of the holy, and the endless punishment of the wicked, of Christ's everlasting priesthood and reign, of the renovation of the earth, the continued existence of the race here, and their perfect redemption; and next, because most of the great purposes of God revealed in the symbolic Scriptures, that are yet to be accomplished, are also foretold in the mere language prophecies,—such as the coming of Christ at the time when the Jewish tribulation terminates, the great trials to which the true worshippers are then to be subjected, the gathering of the anti-christian hosts to fight against him, his visible descent to destroy them, the resurrection of the holy dead at that period, the conversion of the nations immediately after, the reign of Christ on the earth, and the reign of the risen saints with him. As the subjects of these two modes of prophecy are thus in a great measure identically the same, if the topics of which they treat, as Professor Sanborn maintains, render those that are conveyed through symbols unintelligible, they must, for the same reason, make those that are conveyed through mere language equally so. He thus, in fact, represents the whole body of the didactic and prophetic Scriptures as improper “objects of human inquiry;” as lying out of “the limits which God has set to the understanding of man;” and as presenting “subjects that cannot be known,” and “questions that cannot be answered.” And this asserted unintelligibility of the Scriptures (a stride in rejecting them, which the openly infidel in the church have not had the boldness to take; for even the commentators and theologians in Germany and this country, who deny their inspiration and authority, have not had the folly and audacity to declare them unintelligible); this dismissal of their themes as lying out of the scope of our faculties, is

the basis of his attack on Millenarianism. A very extraordinary, and a very embarrassing commencement, we think. In the first place, it is a direct attack on the Bible and its author, rather than on Millenarianism and its advocates. It is an impeachment of God's wisdom. For how can he be justified, if the revelation he has made, both in its doctrines and in its predictions, is, as Professor Sanborn so boldly declares, wholly inexplicable; if its very themes are of a nature that preclude the possibility of our understanding them? It is a denial, also, of the authority of the Scriptures; for how can their teachings possess any authority; how can we be under obligation to receive and obey them, if they lie wholly beyond the scope of our faculties;—if an attempt to master them will necessarily plunge us into errors "infinitely more pernicious" than the profligate principles which they promulgate, who "cater to the passions of the carnal heart?" Next, it is as sweeping a denunciation of all theology, and especially "controversial theology," as it is of "commentaries on prophetic symbols;" and that includes not only nearly all the great works that were written by the Reformers, but by far the most important of all that have followed. There is not a single leading work of any of the most conspicuous theological writers of this country, for example, such as Edwards, Bellamy, Witherspoon, West, Strong, Griffin, Miller, Woods, that is not controversial. The volumes of Emmons and Dwight are largely of that cast also. Thirdly, it is as unsparing a condemnation of Antimillenarian writers on the prophecies, as it is of Millenarians; for they have written as frequently and as largely on "prophetic symbols," and are included as truly as Millenarians, among those whom Professor Sanborn denominates "scheming theologians," who have "advanced" "theory and speculation" "respecting the future history of the world, based, as they pretend, upon the dark imagery of the Apocalypse and the book of Daniel." Has not Mr. Barnes, for example, written commentaries on both of those symbolic prophecies? Did not Professor Stuart? Has not Hengstenberg? Did not the late Mr. Faber? Did not Scott and Henry? Have not a crowd of others, also, who were not Millenarians, written on one or other, or both of them? His own party are as much the objects of his

denunciation, therefore, as Millenarians are. And, finally, his embarrassment is raised to a climax by the consideration, that if his assertion of the unintelligibility of the Scriptures is authorized, it is impossible for him to demonstrate that Millenarianism is not, in fact, taught in the prophetic Scriptures. His assertion of their inexplicableness must, at least, be taken to be true in respect to himself. By his own avowal, then, they lie wholly out of the sphere of his faculties, and are not proper subjects for his investigation. He is disqualified, therefore, to speak of the revelations which are embodied in them. He is in no condition to testify to anything beyond the fact of which he professes to have an absolute knowledge; that *he* has not the requisite faculties to grasp them; that they are impenetrable to his eyes; that they lie out of "the limits which God has set to his understanding." How, then, is he to prove that they do not present precisely those views of God's future government of the world, which Millenarians find in them? How is it that he has undertaken to decide what is, or is not, revealed in them? Was ever a rash and pretentious declaimer in a more awkward predicament?

Of the embarrassment in which he had involved himself by these extraordinary assertions, a faint glimmer seems to have crossed him; for he proceeds to ask—

"Do we by this declaration" respecting the worthlessness of commentaries on Daniel and the Revelation, "disparage the study of prophecy? By no means. The predictions of the Bible already fulfilled, present a field of research broad enough and ample enough to employ the best thoughts both of men and angels, who 'desire to look into these things.'"—P. 4.

But if the prophecies are utterly uninterpretable, as he represents,—if, from their very nature, they transcend our understanding,—if, the subjects of which they treat can never be brought within the grasp of our faculties, how is it to be known that any of them have been fulfilled? If there are no possible means of knowing what it is that they foreshow, how is it to be discovered that certain events that have occurred are those which they foretell? Besides, whence is it that Professor Sanborn has learned that no

prophecies have any claim on our consideration and study, except those that have already been fulfilled? Does he find any authority for that opinion in the Scriptures, the didactic and prophetic parts of which he nevertheless pronounces to be wholly unintelligible? Have the great predictions that Christ is to come in the clouds of heaven, that he is then to raise the holy dead, that he is to judge the living, that he is to destroy his incorrigible enemies, and that he is to reign for ever and ever, no title now to our study and faith? Are they never to be proper subjects of our thoughts till they shall have been accomplished? He goes on:—

“Besides the pure word of prophecy has other and higher uses and aims, than merely to foretell future events. It has warnings for the thoughtless; reproofs for the erring; threatenings for the incorrigible; instruction for the ignorant; and consolation for the faithful.”—P. 4.

But how is it, if the prophetic Scriptures are so hopelessly unintelligible as he represents, that he has ascertained that they have these other uses, and contain such various warnings, threatenings, and counsels? How is it, that after having proclaimed in so open and forward a manner his utter incompetence to master or catch even a glimpse of the subject, he in the next breath ventures to speak as though he was perfectly intimate with all its intricacies, and instead of a mere vacuum, has found the prophecies an exhaustless treasury of instruction, and is able to designate all the various kinds of information which they present? At his next step, however, he directly contradicts his imputation of unintelligibility to the prophecies, and denunciation of those who study them.

“Certain great truths are so plainly revealed in prophecy, ‘that he may run that readeth.’ Among these we may class the ultimate triumph of Christianity, and the second advent of its founder. But *by what instrumentality will the Church achieve its conquests? And for what purpose will our Lord come a second time?* The answer to these questions concerns our present duty, and every Christian should be fully persuaded in his own mind respecting them.”—P. 4.

Was ever a more complete somerset turned by a mountebank than he has thus made? Did ever a random declaimer involve himself in more palpable and absurd contradictions? If the great predictions respecting Christ's second coming and the redemption of the world, are so plain as to be intelligible to the most cursory reader; and if the question respecting the object for which he is to come, or, which is the same, the nature of the administration he is thereafter to exercise, and the means by which the nations are to be converted, concern our present duty, and should be carefully investigated by every believer, how is it that the prophecies can, at the same time, be, as he avers, wholly unintelligible? How is it that these questions are not proper objects of human inquiry, but lie out of the limits which God has set to the human understanding? How is it that those who have attempted that investigation of them which he now declares to be obligatory on all, merit for it the unmeasured denunciation and scorn which he lavishes on them? In this wretched tirade, however, against the word of God, and those who have devoted themselves to the study and exposition of its teachings, and these pitiable inconsistencies with himself, the reader has a true exhibition of Professor Sanborn's intellect and heart; his principles and his taste; for they are the features that present themselves throughout his *Essay*. It were vain to look to him for truth and sobriety of statement, for consistency, for candor, for calm argument, or for good manners. He appears to have imagined that he should captivate his hearers by dashing and reckless assertions, startling extravagances, pertness, slang, and wholesale abuse; and his *Essay*, accordingly, is little else than an outburst of incoherent, self-confuting, and ill-tempered declamation; inconsistent alike with the spirit of the Christian, the culture of the scholar, and the manners of a gentleman.

After this exordium, he proceeds to state what he regards as the great doctrines of Antimillenarianism.

"The Church of Christ, with great unanimity, in all ages, has taught that *the world is to be converted* by 'the foolishness of preaching,' accompanied by the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven."—P. 4.

So far, however, is this from having been the fact, that except while Millenarianism prevailed during the first, second, and third centuries, it was never the belief of the evangelical church generally, until within the last hundred and fifty or sixty years, that the world is to be converted at all. Instead, the doctrine that was generally adopted on the rejection of Millenarianism, and that prevailed thereafter to near the time of the Reformation, was, that after the overthrow of the Roman empire, Antichrist would arise, and continue his career until the coming of Christ; and Luther, Melancthon, and the other Reformers, who were not Millenarians, also maintained that the church is to remain in a state of extreme depression and trial, and that Antichrist is to continue his reign until the Redeemer comes and destroys him. The doctrine that the apostate church is to be swept from the earth, and the world to be converted by preaching, anterior to Christ's coming, was never taught in the church generally, nor in any portion of it, anterior to the seventeenth century, when it was advanced by Dr. Whitby.

He presents, as a third doctrine of Antimillenarianism, that—

“With the second advent of Christ, the end of all sublunary things, and the final judgment of all men, have been uniformly associated.”—P. 4.

This, however, if not equally mistaken with the first, is very far from the truth. It was not held by the church of the first ages; and until within the last hundred and fifty or sixty years, was not believed by any, except those who supposed that no conversion of the world was ever to take place.

The want of acquaintance with the subject which Professor Sanborn displays in these statements, presents a very unfortunate contrast to the supercilious and dogmatical air with which he utters himself. The doctrine of “the ultimate triumph of Christianity,” and that the world is to be converted by “the foolishness of preaching, accompanied by the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven,” is no peculiarity of Antimillenarianism. It is held universally by Millenarians, and has been in every age, and in a far higher sense than by the

party to which Professor S. belongs; as Millenarians hold that the nations universally are to be converted during the thousand years; while Antimillenarians generally look for nothing beyond the proclamation of Christianity to all the branches of the human family, and its reception by great numbers. There are thousands of Antimillenarians whose views of the conversion of the world would be fully answered, were all nations to become Christianized in as large a measure as New England was a century ago—or indeed is now—notwithstanding the false doctrines and infidel sentiments that so largely prevail there. What admirable qualifications this airy orator displays for the task he has undertaken!

Having presented these doctrines as the great Antimillennarian truths held by the church of all ages, he now proceeds to state the views which he asserts "Millenarians maintain," "in opposition" to them.

"1. That to spiritualize the symbolic prophecies is altogether wrong.

"2. That the slaughter of the apocalyptic witnesses (Rev. xi.) foreshows a real, literal slaughter of the faithful followers of Christ represented—a slaughter which is yet future.

"3. That the antichristian powers are to be destroyed, not converted.

"4. There will be, anterior to the Millennium, a real, literal resurrection of departed saints.

"5. The second coming of Christ will be before the Millennium.

"6. There will be men living in the natural body on the earth after Christ's second coming.

"7. The Millennium is to continue three hundred and sixty thousand years.

"8. A series of the most stupendous events is not very far distant.

"Such is the outline of the new dispensation."—Pp. 4, 5.

These propositions are taken from Mr. Winthrop's *Premium Essay on Prophetic Symbols*, pp. 112, 170. As they are presented by Professor Sanborn as the converse of the doctrines he maintains, he must be regarded as holding their opposites. We regret, that instead of filling his pages with crude and irrelevant declamation, he did not

employ himself in proving those points of his system. It would, for example, have been particularly satisfactory, and thrown new and important light on the subject, had he demonstrated, or pointed out the process by which he would demonstrate the proposition, "That to spiritualize the symbolic prophecies is altogether *right*," and indicated the true method of interpreting them. To spiritualize the symbolic prophecies, is to interpret them on a different principle from that on which many of them are interpreted in the prophecies themselves, and adversely to the analogies on which they are used; and ascribe to them, not their natural and proper, but a fancied and arbitrary meaning. The candlesticks, for example, in the first vision of the *Apocalypse*, are interpreted by Christ himself as symbols of churches; and that is their literal or natural and proper meaning, by the law of analogy on which they are employed; as there is a correspondence between the office which a candlestick fills in sustaining a candle in a suitable position to diffuse its light through an apartment, and that which a church or organized body of worshippers fills, in sustaining a minister in his station, that he may diffuse the light of the gospel around him. The candlestick occupies such a station in respect to the candle, as the body of believers that form a church occupies in respect to the teacher of the gospel whom they sustain; and answers such an end in supporting the candle, as the church answers in sustaining its pastor. The symbolization of churches therefore by candlesticks, is the natural and the literal function of those symbols. It is their legitimate, and their only function, according to the principles on which they are employed. They cannot fill any other office by the laws of analogy. But to spiritualize that symbol, is to deny it this office, and ascribe to it a wholly different meaning, that is inconsistent with analogy, and the mere work of a lawless fancy; such as that it represents the *principles* of a church, instead of a church itself, or its *faith*, *doctrine*, or *worship*, in place of the organized body of professed believers who support the minister of the word in his office as teacher—in a manner analogous to that in which a candlestick supports a candle in a proper position for its diffusing its light through a room. To spiritualize this symbol, is nothing else, therefore, than formally to reject its true

meaning, according to the interpretation the Saviour himself has given of it, and substitute a false one in its place.

In like manner, the fourth beast of the vision, Daniel vii. 7, is interpreted by the Spirit of inspiration as the symbol of the dynasty or body of supreme rulers of the fourth empire; and that is its literal or natural meaning according to the laws of analogy—as there is a resemblance between such a monster brute seizing and devouring inferior animals, and a body of rulers, like those of the Roman empire, assailing, slaughtering, and conquering tribes and nations of men. They correspond to each other throughout. As the beast was a living agent—so were the conquerors whom it represents. As the beast killed and fed on inferior animals, so those slaughtering rulers sustained themselves on the human beings that were inferior in power to them. As the symbol was cruel and bloody to its fellow brutes—so were those conquering rulers towards the tribes and nations that fell under their sway. The symbolization of those rulers is accordingly the natural and only function which the beast fills. It has no other representative office. To spiritualize it, therefore, is to deny that that is its meaning, and exhibit it as symbolizing something else than living men who occupy a place and act a part toward fellow men, like that of the beast towards the inferior animals which it killed and devoured; such as that it denotes *principles* in place of *agents*, or *cruelty* instead of *despots* who exercise cruelty. To spiritualize the symbolic prophecies, is thus nothing else than openly and deliberately to reject their true, and assign to them a false and preposterous meaning; and would, if extended to them all, not only set aside all the interpretations which God himself has given of the symbols, but pervert and misconstrue all the others. A splendid result this of Professor Sanborn's Antimillenarianism! How, now, is it that with this brilliant prospect before him, he did not verify his doctrine that “to spiritualize the symbolic prophecies, is altogether” right? Had he wrought that demonstration, he would have done more than he could by any other means to establish the position with which he commences his Essay, that the themes of the symbolic prophecies lie out of the sphere of the human understanding; that to assume to treat of them, is to undertake “to investigate sub-

jects that cannot be known, and attempt to solve questions that cannot be answered ;" as the principles on which the spiritualists proceed in their interpretations, render it impossible that the true meaning of any symbol should ever be certainly known. For they deny that a general correspondence must subsist between the symbol and that which it represents—such as that agents must represent agents, acts must denote acts, qualities qualities, and effects effects ; and maintain that a mere resemblance in a single particular, is a sufficient ground for symbolization ; and that a ferocious brute, therefore, may represent not only a ferocious agent, as another brute or a human being, or a combination of them, but ferocious acts irrespective of an agent who exerts them, ferocious thoughts and affections, and ferocity itself as a quality. But if mere ferocity itself, as a quality of an agent, or a characteristic of acts, irrespective of the agent who exerts them, is all that the symbol represents ; then, as that quality appears in ten thousand million different agents, brute and human, it can never be determined who the particular agents are by whom the ferocity was to be exercised, which the symbol was employed to foreshow. If the only thing symbolized is ferocity—how can it be shown that it is the ferocity of one age any more than another, or of one individual, or body of individuals, any more than another ?

Why, now, is it that Professor Sanborn neglected this effective means, if it be legitimate, of verifying his doctrine that the prophecies are unintelligible, and confuting Millenarianism ? If he had demonstrated that the symbolic prophecies are to be spiritualized in order to reach their true meaning, he would have overturned the main fabric of Millenarianism at a blow. Why is it that he did not avail himself of it ? It cannot have been a want of self-confidence. It cannot have been the lack of an eager desire to confound and disgrace those whom he assails. Can it have been that he does not know what spiritualization of symbolic prophecies is ;—that with all his affectation of knowledge, he is completely unaware alike of the import of the doctrine which he rejects, and that which he maintains ?

We regret, also, that he did not give us the grounds of his belief of the converse of the second proposition respecting the witnesses, and show that their slaughter does *not* fore-

show a real literal slaughter of the faithful followers of Christ, but a spiritual one ; and that that slaughter, instead of being future, has already taken place. If the death of those whom the witnesses represent is not a literal corporeal death—if the symbol is, as Mr. Sanborn holds, to be spiritualized, then the death that is foreshown must be a spiritual death. But a spiritual death is a total alienation from God ; a passage from love to enmity, from obedience to rebellion, from favor to condemnation. To prove, therefore, that the death which is foreshown is a spiritual death, would be to prove that the faithful followers of Christ, whom the witnesses symbolize, are to apostatize wholly from God, and become unregenerate instead of regenerate, enemies instead of friends, and subjects of condemnation in place of pardon and acceptance. For those who are to undergo the death that is foreshown, are undoubtedly to be the true disciples of Christ. They are to be in their sphere what the witnesses who symbolize them were in theirs. They are to be put to death because of their testimony for the word of God, and for their prophesying against the powers denoted by the wild beast : and as the witnesses were shown to be the true servants of God, by his raising them from the dead and calling them to heaven, so he is to show that those whom they represent are his true servants, by raising them from the death to which they are to be subjected, and calling them to heaven. And they are to comprise all, undoubtedly, who at their period fill the office of witnesses for Jesus. There are not merely two witnesses to be put to death by the persecutors symbolized by the beast, but all, however great the number may be, who utter the testimony for God, which is to provoke the civil powers to persecute and martyr them. To suppose that the prophecy is to be spiritualized, is, therefore, to suppose that all the faithful witnesses for God at the period when the predicted death is to be inflicted, are to apostatize wholly from him, lose every trace of piety, and become as unbelieving, alien, and hostile, as they were before their regeneration. But how is that to be reconciled with the doctrine of the Scriptures, that those who are renewed by the Spirit never apostatize in that manner, nor are ever abandoned by the Spirit, but are kept by his power through faith unto salvation ? How is it to be

reconciled with Christ's representation, that those who once come to him, he will in no wise cast out; and that those who are once given to him, he will never suffer to be plucked out of his hands? How is the supposition that all the faithful witnesses for Christ are, immediately before the seventh trumpet, to apostatize and become unconverted, to be reconciled with Professor Sanborn's doctrine, that the gospel is to continue to spread, and the church advance in fidelity and zeal, until the nations are converted, and the earth is freed from apostates and persecutors? Or how is the revelation that the powers denoted by the wild beast and Babylon are to be for ever swept from the earth soon after the death of those symbolized by the witnesses, to be conciliated with Professor S.'s belief, that the slaughter that is foreshown by the martyrdom of the two witnesses, instead of being future, is already past? Can the Professor designate a period when all the faithful followers of Christ apostatized and became unconverted? Can he verify his construction by pointing to a time when there were no such civil rulers of the ten kingdoms of Western Europe as are symbolized by the wild beast, and when there was no such apostate and persecuting Catholic church as that which is symbolized by Babylon? These are questions of the utmost importance in this controversy. Professor Sanborn cannot verify his doctrine, unless he can prove that such a death of God's faithful people as the spiritualizing theory contemplates, is consistent with the pledges he has given, that he will never suffer them to sink back into unregeneracy, but will cause all things to work together for their good; and show, also, that they have in some past period actually relapsed into total alienation and enmity. How is it, then, that he wholly shunned these essential topics? Would it not have been better to have given them a share of his attention, rather than to have employed himself in uttering the mere rodomontade with which so large a part of his harangue is occupied?

We feel equal regret that he did not discuss the third proposition, and show the grounds on which he holds "that the antichristian powers," instead of being "destroyed," are to be "converted." The demonstration of that point is essential to the verification of his system, and furnishes a fine opportunity for a test of his principles and the display of his

genius. The antichristian powers are the civil powers represented by the fourth beast of Daniel, and the beast of seven heads and ten horns of John, and the ecclesiastical powers symbolized by the woman, and the city Babylon of the Apocalypse. Now the symbols of these powers were indisputably put to death in the visions. The fourth beast of Daniel was slain in the presence of the Ancient of days, before whose tribunal it was arraigned, and its body was given to the flames; and the wild beast of the Apocalypse was taken at the battle of Armageddon, and cast alive into the lake of fire and brimstone. The woman Babylon also was sentenced to be made desolate and naked by the kings—stript of her flesh and burned with fire; and Babylon the city was also thrown down and utterly burned with fire. If the bodily destruction, then, of those symbols is to be spiritualized, it foreshows that the antichristian powers whom they represent, are to be subjected to a spiritual death. The questions, then, which Professor Sanborn should have cleared up in order to sustain his theory, are: First, How the antichristian powers who are already spiritually dead, can be subjected to another spiritual death? To be subjected to a spiritual death is to be deprived of a spiritual life. How, then, can those powers be divested of a spiritual life, when they have none? How can that be taken from them which they have not got? Next, which is a still greater puzzle; If the doom which it is foreshown they are to meet, is a spiritual death, how can that death be their conversion? How can a spiritual death be a spiritual life? This is a knot which it requires all the genius of which Professor Sanborn is master to untie. How is it that with his exquisite mastery of the subject, and with the singular gift—denied to other men—of making even his ignorance inspire him with as unhesitating self-confidence, and as daring courage as knowledge itself could—that he withheld himself from the consideration of these points; that he did not even cast a passing glance at them?

He ought, moreover, to have shown how it happens that he regards the doctrine that the antichristian powers are to be converted, as still a doctrine of Antimillenarianism. It was indeed the current doctrine of Antimillenarians during the last century and the early part of this, but a great change

has taken place within the last few years. The predictions of the destruction of the antichristian powers before the commencement of the Millennium, are so numerous and specific, they have been set forth so clearly by Millenarian expositors, and the events of the last few years especially have indicated so strongly that the Romish church and its civil supporters are declining, and likely soon to be overthrown, that the conviction has become general among Antimillenarians, as well as others, that they are destined to be swept away by the judgments of God, instead of being converted. That issue is anticipated by politicians as well as theologians, and in every part of western Europe, as well as this country. It is indicated in a large share of the letters from Europe published in the secular and religious papers of late; and the prophecies in Daniel vii., and Revelation xviii. and xix., are now interpreted by many Antimillenarians, with as full a conviction as by Millenarians, as symbolizing the literal destruction of the antichristian powers, in order to the redemption of the church from their domination, and the conversion of the world. That is the construction Mr. Faber placed on them. That is the view entertained by Mr. Barnes. How is it that this fact, conspicuous to all eyes, and a theme of conversation in every circle, has escaped Professor Sanborn's notice? Can it be that he is as ignorant of the views that now prevail in his own party, as he is of the doctrines that are held by those whom he assails, and of the teachings of the Bible?

We could wish also that he had given us his proofs of the other propositions which he maintains, and especially, "that there will *not* be men living in the natural body on the earth after Christ's second coming;" and that there is not "a series of the most stupendous events not far distant:" as, to say nothing of other difficulties, it is not easy to see how he can prove them, if, as he affirms, in the exordium of his Essay, "they are not proper objects of human inquiry, and exceed the limits which God has set to the understanding of man." If they are "subjects that cannot be known," "and questions that cannot be answered," how can he demonstrate that the views he entertains of them are correct? But he thought proper to shun these perplexing disquisitions.

After presenting these propositions from Mr. Winthrop's

Essay, as forming what he calls "the outline of the new dispensation," he indulges in the following tirade against recent "writers on the unfulfilled prophecies:"—

"Respecting the internal organization and social economy of this earthly Kingdom, theorists vary indefinitely in their speculations. Scores of commentaries on the unfulfilled prophecies have appeared within the last few years, from the elaborate treatise, in two bulky octavos, which grievously tax the time and patience of those who read, to the flying scroll written in rude hieroglyphics, and distributed as a circular by mail. The mental state of the writers is equally diversified, showing itself now in dispassionate sobriety and quiet mysticism, which often appeal to the best feelings of the Christian; now in the soaring rhetoric and terrific imagery of the heated partisan, causing the ignorant to tremble for the things that are about to come upon them; and now in the enigmas of the confirmed lunatic, who speaks in metaphors and writes in symbols. A collection of the fancy sketches of these dreamers and seers, would form a body of romantic fiction, which in extravagance and absurdity has no parallel in the annals of literature."—P. 5.

The representation here clearly is, that the parties whom he thus describes are Millenarians, and the identical parties who hold the doctrines which he had just presented as the great doctrines held by Millenarians in opposition to the system which he entertains. The passage will bear no other construction. If the books which he so passionately denounces are not the works of Millenarians, why did he refer to them? What has Millenarianism to do with the ignorance, errors, and fanaticism of persons who are not Millenarians? Why, if Antimillenarians were the objects of his denunciation, did he not distinctly say so? Why did he introduce and frame the passage in such a manner that no hearer or reader could possibly place on it such a construction? He wrote and uttered the description, undoubtedly, as a description of Millenarian writers. It reflects, therefore, a far more serious discredit on him than any mere blunder could of interpretation or logic—as a grosser calumny was never uttered. The only parties who have written on the prophecies within a few years to whom his description in any obvious measure applies, are the late Mr. W. Miller and his followers. But they are not Millenarians. They do not hold

several of the doctrines which he had just quoted as the distinctive doctrines of Millenarianism—such as that there is yet to be a real martyrdom of the persons symbolized by the Apocalyptic witnesses; and “that men will be living in the natural body on the earth after Christ’s second coming;” nor that all nations will be converted under Christ’s reign; that the Jews are to be restored, and several other important points that belong to Millenarianism. Is not Professor Sanborn aware of this fact? Notwithstanding the pretence he here puts forth, that he has read the whole series of works that have appeared within a few years on “the unfulfilled prophecies,” is he so ignorant of the views which they advance, as not to know that Millerism differs in at least as many points from the doctrines held by Millenarians, as it does from Antimillenarianism; that it is as great an injustice to confound it with the one, as it would be with the other? If he has read the whole or any considerable part of the works of the two classes without discovering this fact, which is as conspicuous as noonday, what reliance is to be placed on his judgment? What competence has he to discuss the subject? And what authority can attach to the censures which he utters with so confident an air?

We have read nearly all the books published in this country on the unfulfilled prophecies, during the last seven or eight years, whether the works of American or foreign writers, and not one among them that is from the pen of a Millenarian, is obnoxious to the censure with which Professor S. attempts to brand them. Though in some of their views we cannot concur, they are in general marked by sobriety, deep reverence for the word of God, and a firm belief in the great doctrines of redemption. The authors are neither dreamers nor enthusiasts. Those among them most inclined to extravagance are British writers, who do not receive the laws of symbols and figures, which we make our guides in interpretation, but adhere in a degree to the allegorical and spiritualizing principles which Professor Sanborn himself entertains, and owe their errors and extravagances to that system; while the writers of whom it can with any tolerable measure of justice be said, that their “fancy sketches form a body of romantic fiction, which, in extravagance and absurdity, has no parallel in the annals of literature,” are Antimillenarians, who follow

Mr. Sanborn's method of spiritualizing symbols, persons, and predictions, and ascribing to them whatever signification a crude and wild fancy suggests. We might allege examples of this cast, even from Professor Stuart—such as his construction of the living creatures, as symbols of the attributes of God; by which he exhibits them as separate from God himself, and offering him homage, and ascribing to him the creation of all things, independently of themselves! Of the same cast, also, is his interpretation of the wild beast of seven heads and ten horns, as symbolizing Nero; and the woman borne by the beast, as representing Rome, the capital of his empire; by which he exhibits Nero, Rev. xvii., as bearing the literal material Rome on his shoulders. We might cite specimens of equal extravagance and absurdity also, from Mr. Barnes; such as his interpretation of the living creatures, as symbols of the *acts* of God in the government of the world, by which he represents *God as worshipping himself, and acknowledging and celebrating his own redemption by the blood of the Lamb.* Rev. iv. 8.; v. 9, 10. Almost equally revolting is his interpretation of the advent of the Lamb in the clouds, to inflict wrath on his enemies, Rev. vi. 15-17, as representing the hovering of the Goths and Vandals, in the fourth century, on the borders of the Roman empire, preparatory to their invasion of it; thus exhibiting the Almighty Redeemer as the symbol of hordes of barbarian warriors. But “the Apocalypse Unveiled,” an Antimillenarian work, in two volumes, “which grievously tax the time and patience of those who read,” abounds with constructions of that cast, that set all analogy and all decorum at defiance. It will be sufficient to cite its exposition of the “angel,” Rev. x., that “came down from heaven clothed with a cloud, and a rainbow was upon his head, and his face as it were the sun, and set his right foot upon the sea, and his left on the earth,” as the symbol of “*the present age of steam power and the magnetic telegraph!*” Is there anything in the wildest conceptions of the most fanatical of Mr. Miller's followers even, that transcends these antimillenarian interpretations in “extravagance and absurdity?” If Mr. Sanborn's censures are applicable to any of these writers, then, it is not to Millenarians, but pre-eminently to those of his own party, who reject the laws of symbols and

figures, by which we interpret the prophecies, and frame their "fancy sketches" in a large measure by the spiritualizing system which he entertains. The reproaches and denunciations which he breathes out with so much passion against those whom he assails, thus recoil upon himself and the party of which he is the champion.

He offers it as a fatal objection to Millenarians, that they do not agree entirely "respecting the internal organization and social economy" of Christ's kingdom on the earth. But are Antimillenarians any more agreed in their views of the condition of the church, the nations, and the physical world, during the Millennium which they anticipate? Are there not the widest diversities in their views of many of the most important questions respecting what they denominate the spiritual reign of Christ on the earth, and the reign with him of the saints? Were the Antimillenarians of the Pastoral Convention of New Hampshire, who listened to Professor Sanborn's Essay, to present their conceptions of that reign, would any two of them be found to coincide in their speculations? Is there any other subject in theology, in regard to which their views are not equally various? A very moderate share of sense or fairness would have withheld Professor S. from thus offering an objection against Millenarians, which, if it had any force, would equally prove that he and his party are fatally wrong on this and every other subject. The differences in the endowments, the training, and the knowledge of individuals are so great, and the processes by which they reach their opinions so various, that no considerable number can be expected to agree on all the subordinate points of a large and complex subject. No such absolute concurrence was ever known in a church, a denomination, or a party, on any theme. And if they unite on all main points, their divergences on subordinate particulars are no proof whatever of the error of their whole system of belief, and will never be held to be such by enlightened and candid minds.

After having endeavored to prejudice his readers against Millenarians by this gust of misrepresentation, he then proceeds to state the points, by the proof of which he proposes to overthrow their system. He says :

"The key-stone of the whole system is the pre-millennial advent of the Saviour.

"1. This doctrine, tested by the Scriptures, is, in its principles, doubtful and uncertain; in its details impossible.

"2. Tested by history, it is in its infancy an error; in its maturity, a heresy.

"3. Tested by reason, it is absurd.

"4. Tested by the universal belief of the church, it is another gospel.

"5. Tested and known by its fruits, it is 'evil only, and that continually.'—Pp. 5, 6.

The doctrine he thus denounces, it might be expected, were his mind anything but a chaos of confusion, he would now proceed to overthrow, by verifying the points which he presents as proving its error. Instead of that, however, he instantly changes the theme, and directs his argument to a wholly different point; namely, the *nearness* of Christ's advent, in respect to which there is probably as great a diversity of views among Millenarians, as there is among Antimillenarians in respect to the nearness of the Millennium. Thus he says :

"The interest which attaches to this theory, depends, chiefly, upon the *time, mode, and concomitants* of our Lord's second advent. If he is to come *immediately*, nay, if he is *already advancing*, so that the *sound of his chariot wheels is heard by those who 'watch' for his appearing*; if the destruction of the antichristian nations, and the conflagration of 'the earth and the works that are therein,' is [are] *at hand*, 'at the very doors,' then it is in vain for Christians to labor for the conversion of the world, and form plans having reference to a remote future."—P. 6.

! The point which he now represents as chiefly entitled to attention, thus is, not whether Christ's advent is to precede the Millennium, but whether it is *immediately* to take place. And how does he deal with this question? Does he attempt to demonstrate that Christ's second coming is not nigh, but at the distance of at least a thousand years? Not at all. So far from it, he turns a complete somerset, and avers that it is a question of the greatest moment whether his advent is to precede or follow that period; and that the evidence

on the two sides is so nearly balanced, that no one can show certainly whether his coming is to take place before or after the thousand years!

"Viewed in this light, the subject assumes great practical importance; and the question of the pre-millennial, or post-millennial advent of our Saviour takes PRECEDENCE OF EVERY OTHER THAT CAN BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESENT GENERATION OF MEN; for on it hangs the destiny of all the inhabitants of earth now living. STILL, THE QUESTION CANNOT BE ANSWERED BY ANY PARTY, SO AS TO SILENCE OBJECTIONS AND ALLAY FEARS. THE NATURE OF PROPHECY FORBIDS IT."—P. 6.

He thus openly declares that the question, whether Christ's advent is near, is of the utmost moment, and should "take precedence of every other that can be presented to the present generation;" and still assumes that it is involved in so much obscurity, that no one can answer it so as "to silence objections and allay fears;" and alleges that "the nature of prophecy forbids it." But this, in the first place, is completely to vindicate the Millenarians in the interest they feel on the subject. If, as he avers, it is the greatest question that can engage the attention of men, and has higher claims than any other to their earnest consideration, Millenarians are certainly justified in making it the subject of their careful and conscientious investigation; and next, if, as he declares, it is not possible so clearly to prove that Christ's advent is not to take place before the Millennium, but that Antimillenarians, as well as Millenarians, will continue to be agitated with doubts and fears respecting it, then clearly Millenarians are not guilty of absurdity or fanaticism in yielding to the evidence that his coming is to precede the Millennium. What, then, becomes of Professor S.'s reproaches and denunciations of them for entertaining that belief? What a subtle perspicacity he displays! What a nimbleness of faculties, of which he must himself be half-unaware, that he can thus turn round and fire such a dashing volley against his own party, without the slightest consciousness that he has changed sides; but borne on enthusiastically in the conviction that he is making a resistless onset on the very citadel of Millenarianism, and about

to gain a crown for his brow, by entering "the imminent deadly breach!"

He proceeds to attempt to prove that "the nature of prophecy forbids" any certain determination whether Christ's advent is to precede or follow the Millennium; but unfortunately again misses his theme, and employs himself in endeavoring to prove a wholly different proposition. Thus, he says:

"The *time* and *mode* of the fulfilment of predicted events, are not revealed with sufficient certainty and definiteness to warrant the *regulation of our present conduct with reference to them*. God never designed to make prophecy a syllabus of history, so that man could resort to it, as to the table of contents in a book, and read the important events of each succeeding year."—P. 6.

But how does this show that Christ's second coming is not to take place before the Millennium? How does it prove the proposition he alleges it to demonstrate, that from the nature of prophecy, it is impossible to determine whether the second coming is to precede or follow the thousand years? What an exquisite comprehension he exhibits of the point he affects to discuss! He goes on:

"The annals of past ages show beyond a doubt, that neither chronology, nor the exact sequence of events, were [was] known to the most devoted students of revelation until they actually occurred. Such prescience would interfere with man's free agency, and reduce the Divine decrees to a blind fate."—P. 6.

But how, again, does this prove that it cannot be shown whether Christ's coming is to precede or follow the Millennium? And if the question cannot be determined from the prophets, how is it that Professor Sanborn maintains, in the most positive form, that his advent is *not* to take place till after the thousand years? Or how is it that he is justified in so passionately and scornfully denouncing Millenarians for entertaining an opposite belief? He thus confounds the question whether Christ's advent is to be pre-millennial or post-millennial, with the wholly dissimilar question, whether the time and mode of events are so clearly revealed, as "to warrant the regulation of our present conduct with reference to them." After, however, quoting a

passage from Robert Hall, in which he states "that prophecy is not intended to give men such a knowledge of futurity as to enable the most sagacious to predict future events," Professor S. quits that point, and returns to his proposition, that the nature of prophecy forbids the determination whether Christ's coming is to precede or follow the Millennium:

"If this view of prophecy be correct, those who attempt to define exactly *the time, and mode, and purposes* of our Lord's coming, have assumed false principles of interpretation, and are wrong in the essential elements of their theory. A large majority of the Old Testament prophecies have already been fulfilled. The mode of their fulfilment shows that minute specifications of time, and place, and circumstances, could not have been made beforehand, even by the prophets themselves, or the angels who desired 'to look into these things!' Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, the Assyrian king, Judas Iscariot, and others, all fulfilled the purposes of God, while they were pursuing their own selfish ends. With the prophetic biographies before them, the Jewish saints could not determine the time, place, and circumstances of their several actions, till their course was run. The destruction of particular nations and cities is described in prophecy, with all the minuteness and accuracy of contemporaneous history; yet neither the prophets themselves, nor those to whom their messages were delivered, knew *when* or *how* those events were to be accomplished."—P. 7.

But how, if it be so, does it prove that the nature of prophecy forbids the determination whether Christ's advent is to be before or after the thousand years? It surely does not follow from the fact, that the exact day or hour *when*, and the precise mode in which, an event is to happen, cannot be determined beforehand, that it cannot for that reason be known whether it is to take place before or after the thousand years of Christ's reign on the earth. Professor S., however, assumes that the priority of one event to another cannot be known, unless the precise moment is known when it is to take place, the exact form it is to bear, and the circumstances that are to attend it! But what can be more mistaken and absurd? Was it not known to Noah that the flood was to take place during his life, before the *exact* moment was known when it would commence, the *precise*

form it was to assume, or the circumstances that were to attend it? Did not Abraham know that his posterity were to sojourn a long time in Egypt anterior to their receiving the land of Canaan as their possession, without knowing the exact day or hour when they were to go into Egypt, the incidents of their journey, and the mode of their life there? Did not Isaiah and Jeremiah know that the Israelites were to be carried captives to Babylon anterior to the fall of the Chaldean empire, without knowing the hour when their captivity was to commence, the manner in which they were to be conveyed to the Euphrates, or the incidents that were to occur on their march? Did not the apostles know from Christ's predictions, that Jerusalem was to be captured, and its population scattered among the nations before the generation to which they belonged passed away, without knowing the exact day and hour when the city was to fall into the hands of its conquerors? Is it not clearly known from the Apocalypse, that the slaying of the witnesses and the termination of the second woe, are to precede the second coming of Christ, without its being known what the exact time is when the witnesses are to be slain, and the second woe is to end? Professor S., therefore, not only fails to show that the nature of prophecy forbids a determination whether Christ's advent is to precede or follow the Millennium; but he founds his attempt to prove it on the assumption that the priority of one event to another cannot be known, without knowing the exact time when the first of the events is to occur; which is altogether mistaken and absurd.

He next refers to a number of prophecies in which important events are foreshown, without a specification of the exact time in which they were to take place; such as the promise of a Redeemer to our first parents immediately after the fall, and the promise to Abraham of a seed in whom all the families of the earth should be blessed. But how do those revelations prove the point he affects to establish by them, that "the nature of prophecy forbids" such predictions respecting Christ's second coming, that it should be possible to determine whether his advent is to precede or follow his reign on the earth of a thousand years? Is there the slightest connexion between the two? Is the fact that God did not in some instances make known the exact time when the

events he revealed were to take place, a proof that he could not as easily have revealed the time of their occurrence, as their occurrence itself? Can anything be more apparent, than that Professor S. had become completely bewildered in this part of his Essay, and was drifting in the open sea of declamation, without knowing into what whirlpool the winds and currents were bearing him?

The last step in his argument is equally irrelevant and absurd, in which he alleges the predictions in the Old Testament, that Christ is to be a King; that he is to destroy the enemies that are to be arrayed against him at his second coming; that he is to reign in glory at Jerusalem; and that the Lord's house is then to be established there on the top of the mountains; that all nations are to flow unto it; and that sacrifices are again to be offered, as proof that they are not to be literally fulfilled; because, as he mistakingly and preposterously asserts, it would require that Christ should be just such a conqueror and King as David was, and that "the ceremonial law of Moses, and the first dispensation with all its imperfections," should be restored. But supposing it were so, what has that to do with the point which he affects to establish by it? How does it prove that "the nature of prophecy forbids" the determination of the question whether the advent of Christ is to be "pre-millennial, or post-millennial"? Let it be admitted, as he asserts, that the Jews misunderstood many of the prophecies; let it be conceded that Millenarians are mistaken in their construction of the predictions which, Professor S. himself admits and asserts—interpreted according to the literal meaning of the language in which they are expressed—foreshow the offering of sacrifices at Jerusalem, after the restoration of the Israelites—how does that demonstrate that God cannot have made such a revelation of Christ's second coming, that we can know whether it is to take place at the commencement or the close of the Millennium? Is there the slightest connexion between them? Can anything be more certain, than that Professor S. had lost compass and rudder, and was driving he knew not whither?

So much for his rambling harangue upon this topic. Not a syllable has he uttered that has any bearing on the point which he professes to demonstrate.

We have not space to respond at length to the misrepresentations in which he indulges in respect to the views Millenarians entertain of the Old Testament prophecies, and the consequences that result from their receiving them in their grammatical meaning. We shall content ourselves with showing that the assertions and representations he makes in regard to their literal import, and the necessity of spiritualizing them, so far from extricating him from difficulty, involve him in worse embarrassment far, than that even which he falsely ascribes to Millenarianism.

He holds and avers that the ancient prophets, if literally interpreted, teach that the Israelites are to be restored to their land, that a temple is to be erected at Jerusalem to which all nations are to resort, and that animals are again to be offered in sacrifice there. "We are shut up to this," he says, "if we refuse to give a spiritual meaning to prophetic language;" and he represents a spiritual construction as absolutely indispensable. "The truth," he affirms, "is, a literal version is impossible." But if the spiritualization of the prophecies of the Old Testament is thus imperatively necessary, how happens it that neither Professor Sanborn, nor any one else who holds that they are to be interpreted in that manner, has been able to define clearly what that spiritualization is, and state the laws on which it proceeds? If spiritualization is obligatory, it plainly must have a positive and definite nature; and that nature must be known, and the laws also by which it is accomplished, or the peculiar meaning which it unfolds, is evolved. If it is not a positive and definite thing, if it is a mere vague shadow, or fanciful sense that has no necessary or determinable ground in the text, how can the ascription to the text of such a meaning be obligatory? If there are no rules by which it is determined, how can it be known when it is attained? How can it be anything else than an arbitrary fiction? Why, then, is it that Professor S. did not define what spiritualization is, and give the laws by which it is unfolded? Why is it that none of the long series of writers who, like him, assert the legitimacy and necessity of spiritualization, have ever given any formal description of its nature, or presented any system of rules by which the distinctive meaning it ascribes to the sacred word, is to be developed

from it? As long as he has no such rules, his spiritualization of the prophecies must be the work of mere caprice; and his assertion that they must be spiritualized, is nothing else than an assertion that their grammatical sense must be denied, and some other, no matter how baseless, ascribed to them, that conjecture or whim may suggest.

He represents it as infinitely discreditable to God, and unsuitable to man, that animals should be offered even in commemoration of Christ's sacrifice, at the period to which these prophecies refer. He exclaims: "How sensuous! how low, creeping, and revolting to the Christian heart are such literal versions of prophetic language!" But if to offer them, although enjoined by God, were thus "sensuous, low, creeping, and revolting to the Christian heart," how can it be that God has chosen them, as Professor S. assumes and avers, as symbols of *spiritual* sacrifices that are then to be offered? Would God select acts and offerings that are debasing and necessarily shock and revolt the renovated heart, as the most expressive and fit representatives of a pure and spiritual offering that is then to be presented to him? Is not the assumption itself which Professor S. makes, and the imputation it virtually casts on God, revolting to the Christian heart? And is not that impeachment of Him, with which it is charged, a resistless proof of its error?

But if the offering of animal sacrifices, which is foretold in the prophecies, is to be spiritualized, what is the spiritual sacrifice which those animal offerings represent? To spiritualize those predictions, is not simply to assert that their literal, is not their true meaning. It must involve the ascription to them of some specific meaning. Nor is it simply to ascribe to them some specific meaning that differs from the grammatical sense of the language in which they are expressed, without any consideration whether that meaning has any ground in a resemblance of the representative to that which it represents, or of the type to that which it typifies. If there is no analogy between them; if there is no reason in the nature of animal sacrifices, that they should any more signify that which the spiritualist regards them as foreshowing, than anything else which they might be supposed to prefigure, then the meaning ascribed to them by the spiritualist must be wholly the work of caprice, and

arbitrary. There must, therefore, be an analogy or correspondence between such sacrifices as types or representatives, and that which they denote. As the sacrifice of an animal is a real sacrifice that properly signifies the sacrifice of Christ, that which is held to be the spiritual sacrifice which it represents, must also be a real spiritual sacrifice of Christ. As the act of offering the animal is a real act of offering, so the spiritual act which it represents, must be a real act of offering a spiritual sacrifice. And as the animal sacrifice was representative of an expiation by the Redeemer, so the spiritual sacrifice which it betokens, must be an expiation by the Redeemer. There must thus be throughout a correspondence of the one with the other. What, then, must be that expiatory sacrifice which the predicted offering of animal sacrifices represents? It must be a real sacrifice, an expiatory sacrifice, a spiritual expiatory sacrifice, and such a sacrifice of Christ: for there surely is not to be any expiatory sacrifice but by him. As, then, it is not to be bodily, but mental or spiritual merely, what can it be but the offering of Christ's soul afresh, as an expiatory sacrifice for sinners! There is no alternative between this and the exhibition of spiritualization as altogether arbitrary and groundless. If these predictions are to be spiritualized, this is undoubtedly the construction they must receive. But can anything be more false, derogatory to God, or revolting to the Christian heart? Such is the abyss of error and absurdity into which Mr. Sanborn's spiritualizing system plunges him.

After this rambling harangue, in which he accomplishes nothing except to show his extreme confusion of mind, and discredit the cause which he aims to advance, he proceeds to his second proposition, that "The doctrine of the pre-millennial advent of Christ, tested by *history*, is, in its origin, an error; in its maturity, a heresy."—P. 13. And he attempts to sustain this charge, first by a senseless tirade against "men of one idea," imposters and dupes; and next by repeating the false statements and malignant accusations of Jerome and other patrons of asceticism in the early ages, and the inconsiderate and discreditable repetitions of those charges by Neander and other historians.

But, in the first place, the question whether the doctrine of the pre-millennial advent of Christ is true or not, is not

to be determined by the accusations with which hostile and prejudiced writers of the fourth and fifth centuries attempted to blacken Millenarians; nor by the reproduction and sanction of those charges by modern writers. The truth or error of the doctrine is to be determined solely by the Scriptures. If it is taught by them—the malignant insinuations, the false charges, the brutal abuse of such a ferocious devotee of monkery and relic worship as Jerome, cannot prove it to be false. Jerome applied the same epithets to Vigilantius and others who denounced the homage of saints and relics, and charged them with favoring the most unbridled sensualism and profligacy, because they denied that celibacy was obligatory, maintained that the clergy should be married, and appealed as a proof of it to the fact that the married clergy were distinguished for their virtuous lives, while nobody believed in the chastity of the celibates, Epist. lx. adv. Vigilantium. And the Catholic writers of every succeeding age to the present time, have heaped similar charges on all who have dissented from their asceticism and superstition, and denounced their profligate manners. Thus the Paulicians, the Albigenses, the Waldenses, and the Protestants of the Reformation and the three centuries that followed, were represented by their antagonists of the apostate church, as maintaining the most immoral and licentious doctrines, and addicted to the most unrestrained indulgence of their appetites. Those assertions were uttered by writers of the same class as those who originated and have repeated the charges by which Professor S. alleges “history” brands the doctrine of Christ’s pre-millennial advent as an error and a heresy. But does that sort of history prove that the doctrines of those faithful witnesses and martyrs of Jesus were in their origin an error, and in their maturity a heresy? Just as much as the prejudiced misrepresentations and brutal calumnies of Jerome, and those who have repeated his false statements, prove that the doctrine of Christ’s pre-millennial advent is such an error and heresy. The cases are perfect parallels; and if it were a consummate wrong to try the truth of the doctrines of the witnesses of Jesus, by the false and abusive testimony of their enemies respecting them, instead of the Bible, from which they are drawn; it is an equal wrong and outrage to try the doctrine of the pre-millennial

advent of Christ, by the calumnies by which its enemies have endeavored to blacken and crush those who have held it, in place of the Scriptures from which it is derived.

In the next place, he alleges that "history" represents the doctrine as a fable or error, derived from the Jews in contradistinction from the Scriptures. He asks :

"What does history teach respecting the doctrine we are now discussing? It plainly and unequivocally affirms that it originated with the Jews and Judaizing Christians; that it was a part of the false and exaggerated notions of the Jews respecting their Messiah."—P. 13.

By the assertion that it originated with the Jews and Judaizing Christians, and was a part of their false and exaggerated notions respecting their Messiah, he means that *it was invented or fabricated by them*, and was drawn from them by those who held it, instead of being founded on the teachings of the Bible. And he alleges several expressions from Neander to give confirmation to this representation. To this, however, we answer, first, that if history makes any such assertion, it is a sheer misrepresentation. There is not a shadow of ground to sustain it. Their doctrine respecting the thousand years was founded by Papias, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Lactantius, expressly and exclusively on the words of Christ, and the predictions of the Old and New Testament, which are now alleged by Millenarians as teaching it; and that, moreover, is expressly admitted by their great opponents, Origen, Dionysius, and Jerome, whose whole discussions on the subject show in the clearest light that the question between them was a mere question respecting the interpretation of *the Scriptures*, especially the *Apocalypse*, chap. xx., and *Isaiah* lrv., lxvi. They do not utter the remotest hint that the doctrine was a figment drawn from the Jews, or founded in any measure on their traditions or authority. Origen, Dionysius, and Jerome, moreover, openly acknowledge that it is actually the doctrine of the sacred Scriptures, *if they are interpreted according to their literal meaning*; and that the method by which they expunged it from the sacred page, was, by the ascription of a *figurative* or *spiritual* sense to the prophecies respecting the resurrection, the New Jerusalem, the reign of the saints, and

the continuance and multiplication of the race in the natural life during that reign. The only writings indeed that have a Jewish tinge, with which the Christians of Egypt, Carthage, and Asia Minor had any acquaintance, were the book of Enoch, and the 4th of Ezra, which, though written before the Christian era, were interpolated by Christian writers; and the Ascension of Isaiah the Shepherd of Hermas, the Twelve Patriarchs, the Sybilline Oracles, and other works of the kind, which were written after the times of the apostles, and drew their doctrine of the Millennium from their teachings and the Apocalypse. Thus Gieseler says:

"In the character of the spurious writings of this period"—the second century—"we can trace the peculiar features of the age; their purpose being either to encourage the persecuted, or to convince the unbelieving, and not unfrequently to give *the sanction of antiquity to the tenets of a particular sect*. In this way the old spurious writings of the Jews were *interpolated* by the Christians, as the book of Enoch, and the book of Ezra; and others were new *manufactured*, as the *Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs*, the *Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *Shepherd of Hermas*. Of a different character were the books of *Hystaspes*, and the Sybilline Prophecies, which, as well as the *Acts of Pilate*, seem to have been chiefly intended for the Heathen.

"In all these works, the belief in the Millennium is so evident, that no one can hesitate to consider it as universal in an age, when certainly such motives as it offered were not unnecessary to animate men to suffer for Christianity. *This belief rested mainly on the book of REVELATION*. The Millennium was represented as the great Sabbath which was very soon to begin, and to be ushered in by the resurrection of the dead."—Vol. i., pp. 99, 100.

The doctrine thus, instead of being derived by the church from the Jews and Judaistic teachers, in contradistinction from the Scriptures, was drawn solely from the Old and New Testament, and chiefly from the Apocalypse; and the traces of it which exist in the uninspired Jewish writings were drawn from the Scriptures and interpolated into them by Christians of the second century probably; and the other spurious writings current in that century, that indicate the belief of the Millennium, were fabricated by Christians, who had already derived the doctrine from the Apocalypse and

Isaiah. The pretence, then, that it was originated by Jews, and was a fiction, instead of being founded on the word of God, is entirely groundless, and a most inexcusable misrepresentation.

But next; neither Eusebius nor Neander, to whom Professor S. refers, presents any evidence that the doctrine was a Jewish fabrication, instead of a doctrine of the Scriptures. Eusebius, in place of uttering any such hint, says expressly that Papias himself relates that he drew the incidents which he narrates, and the doctrines he teaches, from the testimony of men who had heard the apostles; and states in respect to the doctrine Papias held, "that there shall be a thousand years after the resurrection of the dead, wherein the kingdom of Christ shall corporeally subsist upon the earth—this opinion I suppose he was led into by *misunderstanding the apostolical narratives*; and for want of seeing into those things which they spoke mystically and in figures. For he was a man of no great capacity, as may be conjectured from his writings." And he adds, that *he* was the means of leading a large number of the writers who came after him, to adopt that doctrine, instead of their having drawn it from Jewish tradition. He says, "Yet he gave occasion to a great many ecclesiastical writers after him to be of the same opinion, who respected the antiquity of the man"—that is, his having lived so near the age of the apostles—"as Irenæus and the rest who have maintained that opinion." H. E. Book iii. chap. xxxix. The earliest historian who speaks on the subject, thus represents Papias, the first Christian writer who advances the doctrine, as founding it wholly on the teachings of the apostles, and affirms that he *was* *paraphrasing* in a measure the cause that Irenæus and other Millenarians adopted it; not that it was borrowed by them from the Jews. His representation, however, that it was through the influence of Papias in a measure, that Irenæus and others received the doctrine, is doubtless a mistake, as they do not refer to Papias as their authority for it, but *avow* and maintain it as the doctrine of the Scriptures.

Nor does Neander offer any proof that the doctrine was borrowed from the Jews, instead of being taken from the Apocalypse; although he alleges that many seized an image which had passed over to them from the Jews, "*an idea of a*

Millennial reign, which the Messiah was to set up at the end of the whole earthly course of the world, when all the righteous of all times should live together in holy communion." Instead, he quotes Psalm xc. 4: "For a thousand years are in thy sight as yesterday;" and the fact that the world was created in six days, as the ground on which they founded it, and alleges Barnabas as his authority; who, instead of exhibiting it as a Jewish tradition or fancy, alleges it as taught in the declaration in Exodus, that God created all things in six days, and rested on the seventh; and in the words of the Psalmist, a thousand years are as yesterday. His language is—

"In the beginning of the creation he makes mention of the Sabbath. And God made in six days the works of his hands, and he finished them on the seventh day, and he rested the seventh day and sanctified it. Consider, my children, what this signifies, *he finished them in six days*. The meaning of it is this: that in six thousand years God will bring all things to an end. For with him one day is a thousand years, as he himself testifieth; behold this day shall be as a thousand years. Therefore, children, in six days, that is, in six thousand years, shall all things be accomplished. *And rested the seventh day*. He meaneth this: that when his Son shall come and abolish the season of the wicked one, and judge the ungodly, and shall change the sun, and the moon, and the stars, then he shall gloriously rest on that seventh day."—Chapter xv. Wake's Translation.

Barnabas thus, whether correct in his interpretations or not, founds the doctrine wholly on the word of God, not on Jewish opinions. That the Jews put such a construction on those or any other passages, he utters not the faintest intimation. To assert that he borrowed it from the Jews, instead of the Scriptures, is, therefore, not only without proof, but against the most palpable facts.

Nor has any other writer produced any evidence that the doctrine was originated by Jewish speculation or fancy, in contradistinction from being derived from the sacred word. The notion that that was its origin, though advanced by a number of authors, is altogether groundless. There is as indisputable and ample evidence that it was held by those who taught it in the first three centuries, exclusively as a doctrine of the Bible, and especially of Isaiah and the Revela-

tion, as there is that any other doctrine which they held was believed by them solely because it is taught in the sacred word. Thus Dr. Whitby says—

“It was received not only in the eastern parts of the Church by Papias, Justin, Irenæus, Nepos, Appollinarius, Methodius, but also in the west and south by Tertullian, Cyprian, Victorinus, Lactantius, and Severus, and by the first Nicene Council. These men taught this doctrine not as doctors only, but as *witnesses* of the tradition which they had received from Christ and his apostles, and which was taught *them* by the elders, the disciples of Christ. *They pretend to ground it upon numerous and manifest testimonies both of the Old and New Testaments, and speak of them as texts which would admit no other meaning.*”

Professor Sanborn still further alleges that; “history” “plainly and unequivocally affirms,” “that it was earthly and sensual in its character, and always productive of licentiousness and fanaticism.”—Pp. 13, 14. This charge, over which he seems to gloat, is not only equally mistaken, but recoils on himself with a fatal force, inasmuch as he holds the identical belief respecting the Millennium, which he makes the ground of the imputation of licentiousness to them.

There is not a particle of proof in the early writers, that those who held the doctrine of Christ's pre-millennial advent, were led by it into licentiousness or fanaticism; or that they were addicted in any measure to sensuality. There is no intimation in Eusebius that that was the effect of the doctrine on Papias, Irenæus, and the others who adopted it, or their followers. There is no intimation in Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Nepos, Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, or any other Millenarian, that it authorized, or led to licentiousness. There is no allegation by Origen, Dionysius, Jerome, or Augustine—the great opposers of the doctrine—that those who held it were prompted by it, or were addicted to fanaticism and profligacy. No proof is alleged by Neander, whom Professor S. quotes, that even the fanaticism of the Montanists was the result, in any measure of their belief respecting the Millennium. Instead, he expressly refers it to their persuasion that the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost were still continued, and to be con-

tinued in the church, and that Montanus and some of the most conspicuous of his associates and followers had the prophetic Spirit. Nor does he allege any proof, or utter an intimation, that they were demoralized by their faith; or chargeable in any manner with addiction to sensualism. So far from it, he represents them as prompted by their religious belief to watchfulness and self-denial, and withdrawal from worldly hopes, and as eminently exemplary and holy in their lives. Thus he says—

“Montanus belonged to the class of men in whom the first glow of conversion begat an uncompromising opposition to the world. We should remember that he lived in a country where the expectation that the Church should finally enjoy in the theatre of its sufferings, the earth itself, previous to the end of all things—a millennium of victorious dominion—the expectation of a final millennial reign of Christ on earth particularly prevailed, and where various pictures of an enthusiastic imagination representing the character of this approaching Kingdom were floating among the people. The time in which he appeared—either during those catastrophes of nature which led to the tumultuary attacks of the populace on the Christians, or during the bloody persecutions of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius—was altogether suited to promote such an excitement of feeling, and such a direction of the imagination.”

“He fell into certain states of extatic transport, in which, no longer master of his own consciousness, and made the blind organ, as he fancied, of a higher spirit, he foretold in oracular mystical expressions *the approach of new persecutions*; *exhorted the Christians to a life of MORE RIGID AUSTERITY*, and *to an undaunted confession of their faith*; *extolled the blessedness of THE MARTYR'S CROWN*, and *charged the faithful to stake everything to win it*. He announced the judgments impending over the persecutors of the Church, the second coming of Christ, and the approach of the millennial reign, the happiness of which he set forth in the most attractive colors. Finally, he claimed to be considered as a prophet sent in behalf of the whole Church, as an inspired reformer of the whole Church life. The Christian Church was to be elevated by him to a *higher stage of practical perfection*. *A loftier system of Christian morals*, befitting its maturity, was to be revealed through him; he appealed to Christ's promise that he would by the Holy Spirit make known things which the men of those times were not yet in a condition to understand.”
—Hist. of Church, Vol. i., pp. 513, 514.

He represents the associates and followers of Montanus

also, as holding the same views, and urging the church to a greater strictness of life. He says—

“They hint at the near approach of a new order of things—the final separation which was to be brought about by Christ himself—and the millennial Kingdom to be set up by him on the earth. . . . The God who had determined to bring about the great judgment, called on them by his voice in the new prophets, to prepare themselves for it by a *stricter life*, so that the Lord, at his second coming, which was near at hand, might find them well provided and waiting. With this expectation of the approaching end of the world, stood intimately connected, *the contempt of life and of all earthly things to which the spirit of the prophets called men.*”—P. 515.

The Montanists were thus distinguished for the purity of their morals, and though tinged in a measure with asceticism, it was not of the debased and fanatical cast, that began to prevail in Egypt and Asia Minor, and often ended in extreme demoralization. Neander says—

“Now an ascetic spirit of this sort—(relating to celibacy)—is elsewhere usually coupled with ignorance of the marriage state, as a form for the realization of the highest good; and this ignorance is usually based on a sensuous and barely outward conception of this relation. But Montanism united with this ascetic tendency, a conception of the marriage institution directly opposed to the one just mentioned. We see the influence of the peculiar Christian spirit manifested in Montanism by the prominence it gives to the idea of marriage, *in that view of it which was first clearly suggested by Christianity,—as a spiritual union consecrated by Christ*, of two individuals, separated by sex, in one common life. The Montanists held, therefore, that the religious consecration of such a union was a matter of the highest moment; they reckoned it as belonging to the essence of a truly Christian marriage, that it should be concluded in the Church in the name of Christ. A marriage otherwise contracted was looked upon by them as an unlawful connection. Regarding the institution in this light, it followed again, that *Montanism would allow of no second marriage after the death of the first husband, or the first wife*, for marriage being an *indissoluble union* in the spirit, not in the flesh alone, was destined to endure beyond the grave.”—Vol. i., p. 522.

Such were the eminently pure morals; such the self-denying principles of the numerous body of Christians whom

Professor Sanborn attempts to brand with the charge of sensualism and profligacy : and it is in reference to this very picture drawn by the pen of Neander, that he asserts that "this author uniformly represents Millenarianism as a heresy attended with the gross ideas of a Mohammedan heaven." We leave our readers to judge what estimate is to be formed of *his* morals !

But if there are no intimations in these ancient writers that those who held the doctrine of Christ's pre-millennial advent were chargeable with sensualism, how is it that Neander asserts that the doctrine, as taught by Papias, had the effect "to foster among Christians the taste for a gross sensual happiness, incompatible with the spirit of the gospel, and to give birth among the educated heathens to many a prejudice against Christianity ?" The answer is, he founds that representation on a passage in Origen, which, on the one hand, greatly misrepresents Millenarianism, and on the other, he as grossly misunderstands. It is the following, according to the Latin translation, which gives with sufficient accuracy the sense of the original. *Omnium enim est absurdissimum dicere, præclaris facinoribus præstare divitias et corporis sanitatem : cui nefariæ doctrinæ affixi nonnulli crediderunt, fore ut excitatis corporibus, in vitam reduces juxta primas illas promissiones edamus hos et illos cibos et bibamus : aliqui ut liberos etiam quæramus. Hæc si ad ethnicos pervenerint magnum stoliditatis et stultitiæ probum Christianismo affingent, cum meliora sentiunt a fide alieni.* *Selecta in Psal., Op. tom. ii., p. 570.* "It is of all things the most absurd to say that riches and health are of greater worth than excellent deeds ; conformably to which nefarious doctrine some think that it will befit us after our resurrection, according to the primeval promises, to eat and drink this and that food, and some to procreate children. These opinions, if made known to the Gentiles, would fix the stigma of stupidity and folly on Christianity, since the sentiments those alien from the Faith entertain are more just." In the passage of which this is a continuation, he had stated that if the laws of God are to be obeyed because of the blessings of health and prosperity that result from obedience, then the rewards of virtue are external merely, and good actions are not good in themselves, but only as means

to an end, and that, consequently, riches and the health of the body are of greater worth than justice, holiness, piety, and all the great and illustrious acts of religion; which he says none can maintain, but such as know nothing of the dignity of virtue, and prefer to it the gross and the low; and it is in exemplification of this sentiment, that he utters the passage we have translated.

We remark in regard to it, in the first place, that he does not utter it as a description of the manners or morals of those to whom he refers, but simply as expressing what he deemed the character of their notion of the rewards that are to be conferred on the obedient after the resurrection. There is not a hint in it, that those whom he represents as holding the doctrine which he states, were addicted to sensuality. It is of their *faith* that he speaks, not of their manners. In the next place, it is not absolutely certain that he alludes to Millenarians exclusively, for he does not mention them by name. It is not improbable that he referred to all who held the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, which he interpreted spiritually, and assumed that they who held it, implied that they who were raised would, as a matter of course, have corporeal appetites somewhat like those of the present life. In the third place, if he referred exclusively to Millenarians, he wholly misrepresents them in intimating that they held that the rewards of obedience in the future life are to be altogether external; and that riches and bodily health are of greater excellence than uprightness, holiness, piety, and the various exercises of religion. No such sentiment was held by Millenarians of that age. He does not indeed directly say that they held such a doctrine. He only avers that it is implied in the notion that the commands of God are to be obeyed in order to gain mere external blessings, such as health, and an abundance of the gifts that are needed to supply our corporeal wants. And, finally, it is not, and was not, a doctrine of Millenarians, that those who are to be raised from the dead, are to be raised with natural bodies, that are to need food, nor that they are again to marry and have children.

Origen implies, indeed, in another passage that we are to quote, that the opinion was not common to all Millenarians, that there were to be marriages and births after the resurrec-

tion ; that he meant it of the risen saints, indeed, is not perfectly clear, though possible ; but that that was the belief only of some. There are no proofs, however, nor probabilities that any of them entertained that unscriptural and absurd belief.

It is expressly affirmed by Tertullian that the joys and rewards of the glorified saints after their resurrection are to be of a spiritual nature. *Hanc dicimus excipiendis resurrectione sanctis et refovendis omnium bonorum utique spiritualium copia, in compensationem eorum quæ in seculo vel despeximus, vel amisimus a deo prospectam ; siquidem et justum, et deo dignum illuc quoque exsultare famulos ejus, ubi sunt et afflicti in nomine ipsius.* "This we say God revealed—that the saints are to be raised from the dead, and refreshed with an abundance of all spiritual blessings, in compensation for those things which in this life we either disregarded or lost, inasmuch as it is just and worthy of Him that his servants should triumph there, where they have suffered for his name."

Lactantius also distinguishes, in the most specific manner, between the nations who are then to live in the natural body, and the risen saints, and represents that it is the former who are to have offspring.

"They who shall then be alive in the body, shall not die, but during the thousand years shall generate a countless multitude ; and their offspring shall be holy and dear to God. But they who are raised from the dead shall reign over the living, as judges. The nations, indeed, are not to be altogether exterminated, but some are to be left, at the victory of God, that they may be triumphed over by the righteous, and reduced to perpetual subjection. At the same time, also, the prince of the demons, who is the great contriver of all evil, will be bound in chains, and will be imprisoned during the thousand years of the heavenly empire, when righteousness is to reign in the world, that he may not work any evil against the people of God."*

* Tum qui erunt in corporibus vivi, non morientur ; sed per eodem mille annos infinitam multitudinem generabunt ; et erit soboles eorum sancta et Deo cara. Qui autem ab inferis suscitabuntur, ii præerunt viventibus velut judices. Gentes vero non extinguuntur omnino ; sed quedam relinquuntur in victoriam Dei ; ut triumphentur à justis, ac subjugentur perpetuæ servituti. Sub idem tempus etiam princeps demonum, qui est machinator

He thus expressly teaches that it is those who are to be alive at the time of Christ's coming, who are to multiply, not the risen saints; and not a shadow of evidence appears that that was not the belief of the whole body of Millenarians.

There is nothing in the paragraph from Origen, therefore, to justify Neander in asserting that the doctrine of the Millennium had the effect "to foster among Christians a taste for a gross sensual happiness, incompatible with the spirit of the gospel, and to give birth among the educated heathens to many a prejudice against Christianity." It is a construction which, in his excessive disposition to philosophize in regard to the effects which doctrines and opinions exert, *he* has put on the passage which not only is not required by its statements, but which they will not bear.

But Origen, in another passage, expressly represents those as sensual who held the doctrine to which he here refers:—

"Some, therefore, shunning, as it were, the labor of understanding the divine law, looking at its mere surface, and devoted chiefly to their pleasures and lusts—disciples of the mere letter—hold that the promises in respect to the future life are to be fulfilled in corporeal gratifications and luxuries; and therefore they desire again after the resurrection such fleshly bodies that they may eat and drink, and that they may have the power of doing everything that is proper to flesh and blood—not following the doctrine of the apostle Paul respecting the resurrection of a spiritual body. To this some add, as a consequence, that marriage-unions, and procreations of children, are to take place after the resurrection; fancying to themselves that Jerusalem, the earthly city, is to be rebuilt; that precious stones are to be laid for its foundations; and its walls built of jasper, crystal, and other choicest stones. Moreover, they believe foreigners are to be given to them as ministers of their pleasures, their ploughmen, and the builders of the houses that are to constitute their city; and they maintain that they shall receive the possessions of the nations for their sustenance, and have dominion over their wealth, and that the camels of Midian and

omnium malorum, catenis vincietur, et erit in custodia mille annis coelestis imperii, quo justitia in orbe regnabit, ne quod malum adversus populum Dei molietur."—*Instit.*, Lib. vii., c. 24.

Kedar shall bring to them offerings of gold, and frankincense, and precious stones. And these views they endeavor to sustain by prophetic authority, from the predictions respecting Jerusalem: and the passage in which it is said that the servants of the Lord shall eat and drink, but the sinners shall hunger and thirst; and that the just shall rejoice, but the wicked shall mourn. They allege, also, the words of the Saviour in which he promised wine to his disciples: 'I will not drink henceforth of this, till I drink it new with you in the kingdom of my Father.' They add, also, that the Saviour pronounced those blessed who now hunger and thirst, and promised that they shall be filled; and adduce many more passages which they do not see should be understood figuratively. Moreover, they hold that after the pattern of the present life, and the distribution now of worldly dignities and powers, they are to be kings and princes, as it is promised in the gospel,—'thou shalt have power over five cities.' And to be brief: they wish all things that they regard as promised, to be after the manner of similar things in the present life. This they think who are indeed believers in Christ, but understanding the sacred writings in a sort of Jewish sense, they conceive of nothing in a manner worthy of the divine promises.'*

* Quidam ergo laborem quodammodo intelligentiæ recusantes, et superficiem quamdam legis literæ consecretantes, et magis delectationi suæ quodammodo ac libidini indulgentes, solius literæ discipuli; arbitrantur repromissiones futuras in voluptate et luxuria corporis expectandas; et propterea præcipue carnes iterum desiderant post resurrectionem tales quibus manducandi et bibendi, et omnia quæ carnis et sanguinis sunt, agendi nunquam deest facultas, apostoli Pauli de resurrectione spiritalis corporis sententiam non sequentes. Quibus consequenter addunt et nuptiarum conventiones, et filiorum procreationes etiam post resurrectionem futuras, fingentes sibi metipsis Jerusalem terrenam urbem reedificandam lapidibus pretiosis in fundamenta ejus jaciendis, et de lapide jaspide muros ejus erigendos, et propugnacula ejus lapide crystallo . . . Quinetiam ministros deliciarum suarum dantes sibi alienigenas putant, quos vel aratores habeant, vel structores parietum, a quibus diruta ipeorum et collapsa civitas extruatur; et arbitrantur quod facultates gentium accipiant ad edendum, et in divitiis eorum dominantur, ut etiam cameli Madian et Cedar veniant, et afferant eis aurum et thus et lapides pretiosos. Et hæc conantur auctoritate prophetica confirmare ex his quæ de Jerusalem repromissionibus scripta sunt; ubi etiam dicitur quis qui servit Domino, manducabunt et bibent; peccatores autem esuriunt, et sitient; et quod lætitiâ agent justî, impii vero meror possidebit. Et de

Here, in the first place, is no intimation that the parties to whom he refers were addicted, in any measure, to sensual indulgences that were unlawful and disgraceful to the Christian profession. So far from it, he admits that they were Christian believers: and that which he impugns is, their belief in respect to the life of men on the earth after Christ's second coming and the resurrection of the holy dead: not the rules of action by which they professed to be governed, or the practices to which they were addicted.

Next, he admits distinctly, and states that they founded the belief which he ascribes to them, solely on the word of God, taken in the plain, grammatical sense, in which it is predicted that men are to exist in the natural body, cultivate the earth, rear fruits and eat them, build houses and have offspring, subsequently to Christ's second coming, the creation of the new heavens and the new earth, and the establishment of his kingdom here in the form it is then to assume. He does not represent them as deriving these notions by tradition from the Jews, nor as fabricating or deducing them from the prophecies by unnatural and illegitimate methods. They drew them from the Scriptures simply by interpreting them, as the Jews interpreted the same predictions and others respecting their restoration to their national land and continued existence there in the natural life, after the Messiah should create the new heavens and new earth, and establish his visible reign over them.

Thirdly. He offers no proof whatever that their putting

novo quoque Testamento vocem proferunt Salvatoris, qua discipulis promittit de vini lætitia dicens: Quia non bibam ex hoc jam usquequo bibam illud vobiscum novum in regno patris mei. Addunt quoque et illud quod Salvator beatos dicit eos qui nunc esuriunt, et sitiunt, pollicens eis quia saturabuntur; et multa alia ex Scripturis exempla proferunt, quorum vim figuratiter intelligi debere non sentiunt. Tum vero secundum formam quæ in hac vita est, et secundum mundi hujus dispositiones dignitatum, vel ordinum, vel eminentias potestatum, reges se fore et principes arbitrantur, sicut sunt isti terreni, propter illud videlicet quod in Evangelio dictum est: Eris potestatem habens super quinque civitates. Et ut breviter dicam, secundum vitæ hujus conversationem per omnia similia volunt esse omnia quæ de repromissionibus expectantur; id est ut iterum sit hoc quod est. Hoc ita sentiunt qui Christo quidem credentes, Judaico autem quodam sensu Scripturas divinas intelligentes; nihil ex his dignum divinis pollicitationibus præsumpeerunt."—De Principiis, L. ii. cap. xi. de Repromissionibus.

this construction on these predictions sprung, as he alleges, from a passion for corporeal delights and the indulgence of their lusts, but takes it for granted; assuming that though those parties were Christian believers, they yet could not entertain such views of the life of men on the earth under Christ's reign, even on the explicit testimony of God himself, unless they were prompted to it by a secret passion for corporeal pleasures: and the ground of this judgment doubtless was, first, the fact which he alleges in the passage before quoted from him, that intellectual and spiritual blessings and enjoyments are superior to those which are merely external and corporeal; from which he assumes that the blessings promised under the reign of Christ must be purely spiritual, and exclusive, therefore, of all that belongs to a corporeal life. But that is plainly mistaken. As the fact that spiritual blessings are superior to health, corporeal pleasures, and wealth, does not prevent their co-existing in the present life, it is absurd to assume from their natures that they cannot co-exist also in a higher form in the life of men in the natural body during Christ's reign on the earth. The question whether mankind are to continue to live in the natural body, while the holy dead are to be raised in spiritual bodies and enjoy a far superior life, is to be determined solely by the testimony of the word of God respecting it, not by such groundless and self-contradictory assumptions. But another and far more influential reason of this judgment, doubtless, was, the monkish notion with which he and his contemporaries, especially in Egypt, were infatuated, and which had a deeper practical sway over their minds than perhaps any of the great truths of Christianity—namely, that the appetites of the body are in themselves, and necessarily, degrading to an intelligent nature, and their indulgence in even temperate and lawful forms defiling; that virtue and religion lie chiefly in their stern repression and extinction, if possible; and that, therefore, the supposition that men are to continue with such a nature, and partake of such pleasures under the reign of Christ, is a self-contradiction and absurdity. And here lies the ground, we doubt not, of the whole of the charges of sensualism which he, Jerome, and others, uttered against the Millenarians of their respective ages. They held that celibacy, fasting, vigils,

and the stern denial of all the wants of the body, were the truest and highest forms of virtue and piety, and were obligatory on all; and denounced the temperate and thankful enjoyment of the bounties of providence, marriage, and indulgence in the purest forms of domestic and social happiness, as sensual, polluting, and unfitting the soul for communion with God, and the holy pleasures of his service. They were accustomed accordingly to arraign those who, instead of becoming monks and nuns, married and engaged in the usual pursuits of domestic life, as sensual and enslaved to their animal natures, with as much vehemence as they uttered those charges against Millenarians on the ground of their belief that men are to exist in the natural life during the Millennium. Their imputations against them are no more proofs, therefore, that they were addicted to immoral practices, or held any immoral opinions, than accusations of all others who did not devote themselves to a celibate and ascetic life, were that they were universally unspiritual and licentious. The grounds, in fact, on which Origen and Jerome accuse Millenarians of sensualism, would, if valid, prove with equal certainty that the whole body of the Antimillenarians of the present day who are not pure monks and nuns, are the vassals of their corporeal appetites, and devoted to debased and polluting indulgences.*

* Mosheim regards the ascription of licentiousness to the Gnostic Cerinthus, who held that Christ is to reign on the earth, and over men in the natural life during the Millennium, as in like manner the work of prejudice and malice, as is seen from the following passage from his *Commentaries on the State of the Church before Constantine*:—

“He declared it to be necessary that in all their actions they should strictly conform themselves to the laws of Christ. To those who should continue steadfast in their obedience to these precepts he held out the promise of a future resurrection from the dead—enjoyments of the most exquisite nature during Christ’s reign here upon earth—and subsequently, a life of immortality and endless joy in the blissful regions above. For, adhering to the Jewish way of thinking in this respect, Cerinthus held, that upon the resurrection of our bodies Christ would be again united with the man Jesus, and having founded a new city on the site of the ancient Jerusalem, would reign there in triumphant splendor for the space of a thousand years. . . .

“In the view which I have here given of the Cerinthian discipline, I am borne out by the express testimony of ancient writers. My account, however, amounts to nothing more than an imperfect sketch. For from no ancient author could I obtain that full degree of information respecting the Cerinthian

Such is the nature, and such, as far as we can judge, was the source of the charge begun by Origen, and repeated by

system of religion which alone could enable me to exhibit a complete and satisfactory view of it; a thing which it would gratify me highly to have done, since in point of reason and ingenuity the author of it appears to have possessed a superiority over the rest of the Gnostics. It cannot indeed be denied, that by the generality of those writers who speak of him, he is represented as devoid of understanding, libidinous, depraved, a man who held out, as an allurements to his followers, the promise of a free indulgence in obscene gratifications during the future reign of Christ upon earth. But really, as far as I am capable of forming a judgment on the matter, the blemishes and defects of his character appear to have been very unreasonably magnified by his accusers. In his opinions I perceive, it is true, the marks of a mind not sufficiently purified, and disposed not unfrequently to deviate from the path of sound reason: but nothing whatever bespeaking a propensity to vicious or libidinous indulgences: nothing indicating a love for or pursuit of illicit pleasures: there are even some things in them which make in his favor, and prove him to have been destitute neither of sense nor of spirit. How, let me ask, could it be possible that the kingdom which it was asserted Christ would hereafter establish at Jerusalem, should have been held forth in promise as a sink of immorality, vice, and concupiscence, by one who entertained the highest reverence for the wisdom, justice, and virtue of Jesus of Nazareth, and maintained that it was his superior sanctity and knowledge which induced the Deity to select his corporeal frame as a fit terrestrial residence for his offspring Christ, the chief of the celestial sons? How could this have been done by one who was constantly propounding Jesus as a model of virtue and wisdom to mankind? By one again who inculcated the necessity of strictly observing that part of the law of Moses to which Jesus himself had conformed? Is it to be believed, that Cerinthus could have excited or countenanced in his followers an expectation that in the looked for kingdom of 1000 years, during which, according to him, Christ, the immediate offspring of the Supreme Deity, united to the person of Jesus, the most intelligent and sacred of human beings, was to reign here on earth, every moral tie would be dissolved, and mankind be left at liberty to gratify their inordinate desires without restraint? Or in other words, that the greatest and best of potentates, the immediate offspring of the Deity, would become the instrument of promoting amongst a set of subjects newly recalled to life, the perpetration of all those crimes and flagitious enormities of which he had in times past expressed his utter detestation? To my mind this appears so remote from all probability, that I know not how to account for so many learned men's having insisted on it that Cerinthus held forth to his followers the prospect of their being permitted to riot without restraint in one continued scene of the grossest sensuality during the expected future reign of Christ here upon earth. I am at no loss, however, in assigning this accusation to its proper source. Not a doubt can exist but that it originated with Caius, the presbyter, and Dionysius Alexandrinus, two writers of the third century, as appears from Eusebius *Histor. Eccles.* lib. iii. cap. xxviii. p. 100. To prior ages it was utterly unknown. But at the time when the above

Jerome and Augustine, which Antimillenarians are so fond of reproducing, that the Millenarians were rendered sensual by their views of the predictions respecting the Millennium. The whole imputation is founded on their faith, not on their moral principles, or their lives. There is not the slightest evidence that they were gross in their tastes, or licentious in their conduct. So far from it, there is ample proof that they were distinguished for the strictness of their principles, the purity of their lives, and the courage and steadfastness with which they renounced the world and met the most torturing persecutions for the sake of Christ.

And finally, this charge of licentiousness, brought forward with so much zeal and exultation by Professor Sanborn—if in any measure valid—recoils on himself with a crushing force; as it demonstrates that he must himself be as gross in his appetites, as profligate in his manners, and inflamed with as eager a desire for a Mahometan heaven, as he represents the ancient Millenarians as having been. For he believes, as assuredly as they did, that men are to con-

mentioned authors wrote, the dispute with the Chiliasts, or those who maintained that Christ would hereafter reign upon earth for the space of a thousand years, was carrying on with considerable warmth, and the object of these writers evidently was to repress this doctrine. With a view therefore the more readily to accomplish their end, they made it appear that the original author or parent of Chiliasm amongst the Christians was Cerinthus, a pernicious character, and one who had long since been condemned. And this, perhaps, might be allowable enough: but not content with this, they, by way of still more effectually preventing the Christians from every imitation of Cerinthus, deemed it expedient to augment the popular antipathy against him, and to persuade the multitude that he was a distinguished patron of vice and iniquity; and that it was impossible for any one who was not inimical to the cause of piety and virtue, to approve of or countenance his doctrine respecting the future reign of Christ upon earth. Should it be objected to me, as it probably may, that this case of mine rests merely on supposition, and is grounded on no positive evidence, I confess it. But when it is considered that prior to these adversaries of Chiliasm, no one had ever attributed to Cerinthus so gross an error; when it is remembered that this very error with which he is charged is by no means to be reconciled with the other parts of his doctrine; in fine, when we reflect how utterly incredible it is that any man, not altogether bereft of his senses, should make an unrestricted license to riot in obscenity and filth the characteristic feature of a kingdom over which Jesus Christ was triumphantly to reign; I rather think that but few things will appear to have a greater weight of probability on their side than the conjecture which I have thus hazarded."

tinue on the earth in their natural bodies during the thousand years of the reign of Christ and the saints, and that they will have the same bodily senses and appetites as they now have, and will eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and have children. The only important difference between his faith and theirs is, that they held that Christ will reign in person on the earth during that period, and the risen saints reign with him; while he holds, that Christ will not reign here then in person, nor the risen saints, but that his administration over the world will then be essentially what it is now. If, therefore, as Origen and he assume, the mere fact that the ancient Millenarians believed men are to continue on the earth in the natural life during the Millennium, is a proof that they were gross and licentious; then the fact that he also believes that men are then to continue here in the natural life, is an equal demonstration that he is wholly profligate in his principles and manners! So much for his attempt to dishonor Millenarians by these false and malignant imputations. Did ever a blustering and unscrupulous antagonist involve himself in a more discreditable predicament?

From this theme, he turns to the third branch of his argument, in which he attempts to transfer the question from the sphere of revelation to that of rationalism, and maintains that the doctrine of Christ's pre-millennial advent and personal reign on the earth with the risen saints, is contradictory to reason and unintelligible, and cannot, therefore, even if taught in the sacred volume, be believed. And here he unmasks himself, we doubt not, and reveals the genuine spirit that reigns within him in respect to the word of God generally, as well as to its teachings on this subject. He says—

“III. Tested by reason, it—the doctrine—was absurd.

“It did not, and cannot, commend itself to the sober understandings of men. The new dispensation is essentially miraculous, as all pre-millennialists maintain. Its economy is therefore above the finite reason. Its administration is *supernatural*. All earthly analogies fail to represent it. The second person of the Holy Trinity reigns in person. Mortals know nothing of such a government. The saints have spiritual bodies. Of these we can form no just notions. Their mode of intercourse with the mortal races then

living must be entirely conjectural. The common occupation of the renewed earth by mortal and immortal races is utterly unintelligible. We have no data, no experience, no history, from which we can determine the power of the reigning class, or the subjection of the subject class."—Pp. 18, 19.

He thus boldly denounces the doctrine, on the ground that it represents the administration Christ is then to exercise, as to involve many things of which we now have no experience, and no minute knowledge, and that it is to be supernatural; and proceeds, therefore, on the assumption that we are not to believe that anything is to enter into Christ's future government of the world, that differs from our present experience and comprehension, even though it is expressly foretold in the Scriptures. This is the genuine spirit of modern rationalism, and the ground on which it rejects the word of God. Thus he alleges that the doctrine exhibits the economy of the new dispensation as "above the finite reason," because it teaches that Christ is to appear in person, and produce effects by the direct exertion of his omnipotence. But if that is a proof that the doctrine is false, and ought not, and cannot be believed, is it not an equal proof that his coming in the clouds of heaven in power and great glory, raising the dead, and judging them, and assigning them everlasting rewards, must be false, and ought not, and cannot be believed? His assumptions and assertions contradict the doctrine of Antimillenarians on this subject, as absolutely as they do that of Premillennialists, and would preclude all faith in the incarnation, miracles, and resurrection of Christ, and the fact of a revelation itself of God's will to men, which must of necessity be supernatural, as effectually as it would in the supernatural acts it is foretold he is to exert in his Millennial reign. What, however, can be more absurd than to pretend that his coming in person, and exerting his infinite attributes in the government of the world, is any more above reason, than his reigning in heaven, and ruling the world in his present manner is? It is preposterous to imagine that the one is any more above or contradictory to reason, or any more unsuitable to the divine perfections, than the other is. "All earthly analogies fail to represent it. The second person of the Holy Trinity reigns in person. Mortals know nothing of such a government."

But does not "the second person of the Trinity" now "reign in person" in heaven? And if the revelation of that fact in the Scriptures is a sufficient reason for our believing it, although he is not seen by us on his throne, is not the revelation in the Scriptures that he is hereafter to reign in person on the earth, an equally good reason for our believing that prediction, although we do not yet see him swaying the sceptre of the earth? Our not seeing him, or knowing nothing by experience of his reigning in person on the earth, is no more proof that he is not to reign here in that manner, than our not having witnessed a resurrection of the dead, is a proof that the dead are never to be raised. He goes on. "The saints have spiritual bodies. Of these we can form no just notions. Their mode of intercourse with the mortal races then living, must be entirely conjectural. The common occupation of the renewed earth by mortal and immortal races is utterly unintelligible." But if the fact that we have no just notions of the spiritual bodies of the saints, is a proof that they are not to reign on the earth, is it not an equal proof that they are not to reign or exist anywhere else? Is it not as absolute a barrier to our believing that they are to be raised from the grave, as it is that they are to reign with Christ over the renewed nations of the earth? If our not knowing minutely the mode in which the risen saints are to have intercourse with men in the natural body, is a proof that they cannot exist together, is not our ignorance of the mode in which the risen saints are to associate with each other, and express and receive the expression of their thoughts, an equal proof that they are not to co-exist and communicate with each other, but are to live—if they live at all—in eternal isolation? Can anything surpass the fatuity of such assumptions and arguing in one who professes to make the Scriptures the rule of his faith? Professor Sanborn, in this part of his Essay, has plainly quitted the word of God, and passed into the domain of mere rationalism, and a rationalism as stolid, blind, and depreciatory in respect to reason, as it is faithless and impious towards God. What can transcend the insult he offers to reason in claiming that we are not to believe anything in respect to our race, that does not enter into our present experience; or anything in respect to God, that we

have not already witnessed? None of those now living on the earth have ever experienced the dissolution of the tie that connects the body and the soul; and what that charge is to the conscious spirit that feels it, is as unknown to us as any of the experiences are that take place after death. Are we, therefore, not to believe in the reality of death, or that peculiar sensations and affections attend it? None of the living have ever witnessed those acts of God by which a disembodied soul is sustained in consciousness and activity, transferred to another world, and there given to exist in society with other disembodied spirits. Are we, therefore, not to believe that God exerts those acts, and that the spirits of the dead survive in consciousness, and live in society with each other?

Professor S. continues this dogmatism and declamation, and imputes a number of opinions to Millenarians which they do not entertain—such as that the Bible is to be superseded at Christ's second coming—a notion that is advanced by Dr. Brown, of Glasgow, an ultra Antimillenarian writer, but is not entertained by Millenarians; the doctrine that the covenant at Sinai and the whole Mosaic ritual are then to be re-established, notwithstanding, according to him, the Bible in which that covenant and ritual are recorded is to be superseded; and finally, the doctrine that notwithstanding that system, in which the high priest, in entering the inner sanctuary with blood once a year, was a type of Christ as our priest and intercessor, Christ's intercessions as high priest are to terminate at his second coming—a doctrine that is held by Antimillenarians alone, not by Premillennialists, who maintain that his priesthood is to continue for ever;—contradictions and absurdities which none but Mr. Sanborn would be likely to jumble together. But we have not space to pursue him through these blunders and misrepresentations.

He at length winds up this branch of his argument by endeavoring to prove, that even if it is admitted that Christ is to return and reign on the earth, still "we do not know the time of his advent" with sufficient certainty to affirm that it is "at the very doors." But suppose we do not; how does that prove the point which he professes to establish by it, that "tested by reason," the doctrine that Christ is to come before the Millennium "is absurd?" He appears

again completely to have forgotten the point at which he was professedly aiming, and to have given himself up to a current of random and incoherent declamation.

■ In the fourth division of his argument he betrays an equal measure of ignorance and presumption.

"4. When tested by the universal belief of the church, it is found to be another gospel."—P. 22.

This, in the first place, is in contradiction to fact. It is as indisputable that the doctrine of Christ's premillennial advent was held by the church generally down to the middle of the third century, and continued to be held by great numbers for a century later, as any fact of that period. In the next place, though under the assaults of Origen, Dionysius, Jerome, and Augustine, and the fanatical devotion of the age to celibacy and asceticism, it was generally rejected, and continued to be for a long series of ages, that does not prove that it is not the doctrine of the Scriptures, any more than the rejection by the church at large, through that long tract of centuries, of other great truths of the Christian system, proves that they are not taught in the sacred volume. Does the dogma of saint and angel mediators, and of a continual expiation by the mass, held by the church at large of those ages, prove that it is not the doctrine of the Scriptures that Christ is the only mediator and intercessor, and his sacrifice of himself on the cross, the only expiation for sin?

Professor S., however, attempts to sustain his proposition. Thus he alleges that the general belief of the church in regard to the abode of the spirits of the holy dead anterior to Christ's coming, differs wholly from that of Millenarians. He says :—

"The church in all ages has believed that the rest that remaineth for God's people, was in *heaven*. . . . According to the views of Millenarians, the saints never enter heaven at all."—P. 22.

But suppose it was so; how does their difference on that subject prove that the Scriptures do not teach that Christ's second advent is to precede the Millennium? Mr. S.'s allegation is irrelevant to the point he affects to establish by it. But next, he is totally mistaken in respect to the faith of the

church in the early and middle ages on that subject. Nothing but sheer ignorance could have betrayed him into so extraordinary a misrepresentation. Had he looked into the fathers of the first four or five centuries, or ascertained at second hand what their opinions were, he would have learned that the general doctrine of those ages was, that the souls of departed believers are detained in Hades or an underworld, until Christ comes to deliver them; and that it was held that Christ, in the interim between his death and resurrection, descended to that world, and proclaimed the expiation he had wrought to the ancient saints, who then peopled those shadowy realms; and that that belief is incorporated in the 'Apostles' and the Athanasian Creed, in the expression, "He descended into Hades;" or in the common English translation, into "hell." And those creeds have not only been held to the present day by the Catholic and Greek churches, but are retained also by the Lutherans, the Episcopal church of Great Britain and this country, and many other Protestants. And thirdly, Millenarians, instead of maintaining "that the saints never enter heaven at all," receive the teachings of the New Testament, that they are, during the period intermediate between death and the resurrection, in Paradise, where they enjoy the presence of Christ; and that he will bring them with him, when he comes to raise their bodies from the dust.

He further alleges "that it has been believed, *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*, that the church would be absolutely complete at Christ's coming"—p. 22. He can derive very little aid, however, from the faith of the church, as far as his statement expresses it; for there was never, until a recent period, any considerable body of Christians who believed that the nations of the earth were to be converted anterior to Christ's second coming. The doctrine of the early and middle ages was, that antichrist was to continue his reign till Christ came and destroyed him; and that doctrine was also held and taught in the most emphatic form at the period of the Reformation, by Luther, Melancthon, and others. It was not till towards the close of the seventeenth century, that the doctrine was first advanced by Dr. Whitby, that the conversion of the nations is to take place, and religion triumph for a thousand years, anterior to the coming of Christ.

Professor Sanborn thus attempts to prove *his* doctrine, that Christ's second advent is not to take place till after the nations have been converted, and the multitude of the redeemed swelled by the countless hosts who are to people the earth during the thousand years of the saints' reign, by the testimony of parties who did not believe that the nations were ever to be converted, but held that antichrist would prevail till the Redeemer comes; and that when he comes, it will be to destroy his open enemies, not to convert them!

To his third and fourth statements, that "the church has believed in all ages that there would be a simultaneous resurrection of the dead, both of the just and of the unjust," and, that "the church has ever associated the end of the world and the final judgment of the quick and the dead, with the coming of Christ," it is not necessary to reply at length. As far as they are true, that faith was the consequence of the belief that there was never to be a conversion of the world; but that antichrist was to reign till the time of the last judgment. But that Antimillenarians, through a long tract of ages, made this egregious mistake, is no proof surely that modern Antimillenarians have the authority of Scripture for their belief that a conversion of the nations is to take place anterior to Christ's second coming. What piercing insight, what exquisite logic, this confident critic displays!

His fifth statement, "that the church universal has believed that the nations of the earth would be converted before the second advent of Christ," we have already shown to be wholly mistaken. No such faith prevailed either in the early or the middle ages, nor at the Reformation. It was the common doctrine of those periods, that the church ~~was~~ to continue in tribulation till Christ should come, and that it would not be till he came that antichrist would be destroyed. "Millenarians," Prof. S. also asserts, "teach that the antichristian nations are to be destroyed, not converted"—p. 24. No statement could be at a greater distance from the truth, if, by antichristian nations, he means the nations that are not converted at the time of Christ's coming. Millenarians hold that the antichristian *rulers* and *hosts* who are then to be arrayed in open war on Christ's kingdom, are to be destroyed, according to the predictions of the Old and

New Testaments; not that the unconverted nations at large are to be destroyed. Mr. S. himself has, in a former page of his *Essay*, stated it as the belief of Millenarians, that the nations are *not* to be destroyed at Christ's coming, but are to survive and be converted; and it is their belief that men are to continue in the natural life, and multiply after Christ comes, that he makes the ground of his charge against them of sensualism, on which he dwells with so much zest! What admirable consistency! What scrupulous truthfulness!

On reaching this point, he seems to have lost sight entirely of his proposition, and to have been seized with a frenzy that peopled his imagination with a crowd of dark and frightful spectres. Millenarians became gigantic monsters to his glaring eye, and filled him with ill-defined and unutterable horror. He says, "There is not a single doctrine of the Bible that is not essentially modified" by them; that "they use the sacred Scriptures precisely as the Greeks and Romans did their Sibylline books—" which means that they use them solely to dupe and sway the ignorant and superstitious multitude; that "they quote by sound, and interpret by feeling;" that "the system of Christian theology seems," in their hands, "to have suffered from internal convulsions, similar to those which mark the geological epochs in the physical earth; its strata are dislocated, upheaved, and tilted over, so that the inferior are often found cropping out at the surface, or overlying the superior; that no truth is *in situ*; but each must be referred to its proper age by an expert in premillennial hermeneutics." Among the dire exploits, however, of which he represents them as guilty, that which struck him probably with the deepest terror, is that which he couches under the appalling declaration, that "They invert new 'laws' of interpretation, and thereby find confirmation of old errors!" No wonder his teeth chattered, and a shiver of horror ran through his whole frame at this portentous fact! How can we sufficiently admire the caution and tact with which, notwithstanding his own agitation, he saved his audience from the climax of alarm to which he might have driven them, had he not allowed the atrocity of the deed to remain veiled in a measure from their sight! He breathes not a syllable of intimation what the new laws of interpretation are which Millenarians thus *invert*; what

the inversion of those laws is to which they are addicted; nor what the old errors are of which they thereby find confirmation! Who can tell what dire effects would have resulted, had he drawn the mask from these enormities, and left them, like so many spectres, to flash their terrors on the frightened gaze of his hearers!

After a page of this incoherent raving, he passes to the last branch of his argument: "That the moral influence of this doctrine is decidedly pernicious;"—a point it was quite needless to treat afresh, if the torrent of reproach and denunciation he had just poured out on its advocates, has in it the slightest tinge of truth; but it furnished him an opportunity to disgorge the rancorous malice and glut the spite with which his breast seems to have been swollen; and he availed himself of it with the joy of one who has long hoarded his vengeance, and feels that it is the last chance he is to have to wreak it on his victim. The first assertion by which he endeavors to sustain the accusation, that "it was attended in the early ages of the church with disorder and fanaticism," we have already shown to be wholly groundless. In his next allegation he has either the singular inconsideration, or else the extraordinary audacity—which is it?—to exhibit postmillennialists as premillennialists, and to impute to the latter the false beliefs, the wild disorders, and the fanatic excesses of the former! He says of the doctrine:—

"It was never known to be productive of any good. It was a prevailing belief in the Middle Ages, that *the thousandth year* from the nativity," which was then held to complete the Millennium—"would usher in the end of the world. As the hour approached, signs and wonders were multiplied. Miracles abounded. On the heavens above were written tokens of coming wrath. The sun shone with a sickly hue. The moon refused to give her light. Strange voices were heard proclaiming woe to the nations. Apparitions and visions disturbed all classes. The monk at his vigils, the prisoner in his dungeon, and the serf at his task, all saw omens of approaching ruin. The devil walked in open day. Wizards and witches, prophets and magicians were multiplied. Terrible calamities fell on men and nations. Wars and rumors of wars disturbed all classes. Misfortunes thickened. The very elements seemed to sympathize with the fevered state of the public mind. The fruits of the earth were blasted. Pestilence and

famine stalked through the lands. Terror drove the multitudes to *fasts*, vigils, and prayers. The roads were thronged with pilgrims. The churches were crowded to suffocation. The victims of disease and hunger died in the attitude of worship. The common feeling was, it is better to fall into the hands of God, than to await his judgments. The rich bequeathed their wealth to the church, introducing their bequests with the solemn declaration, 'The end of the world draweth nigh.' Every class of society were smitten with terror, and trembled in agonizing apprehension of coming woes. But the fatal day came and passed, and the earth still rolled on as before."—Pp. 25, 26.

But these, by his own showing, were *postmillennialists*, not Millenarians. The thousand years from the nativity of Christ, constituted, according to the general belief of that age, the Millennium foretold in the Apocalypse; and thence they held that it was at the *end* of that period, not at its *beginning*, that the second advent of Christ was to take place. The terrors, disorders, and calamities, of which Professor S. draws so frightful a picture, were the consequence of that post-millennial doctrine, and the authors and victims of the excitement, were *post-millennialists*—not Millenarians! Did not Professor S. see this? Had he become so infatuated with prejudice, as to imagine that the delusions and fanaticism of his own party must have been the work of pre-millennialism?

He falls into an equal blunder in affirming that, "at the time of the Reformation this belief," respecting Christ's pre-millennial advent, "was revived and widely spread by the enthusiastic Anabaptists, Thomas Munzer, and his associates." They were not Premillennialists but Antimillenarians. They did not look for the coming of Christ in order to the establishment of his kingdom on the earth, but undertook to establish it themselves, "with fire and sword," and proclaimed themselves its kings.

Edward Irving and his followers were, indeed, sadly infatuated; but their fanaticism was the result of their belief that they enjoyed the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit, not of their belief in the pre-millennial advent.

And finally, "the illiterate farmer of Vermont," Mr. Miller and his followers, to whom he last refers, were not Millenarians, but rejected, as we have already stated, some

of the most important of the doctrines that belong to Millenarianism. Such is the tissue of false allegations by which he attempts to establish the charge, that the doctrine has always been productive of the most disastrous effects!

Having closed his argument in these monstrous mis-statements, he indulges in his peroration in a tirade of reckless misrepresentation and insolent and coarse abuse, which we should expect from none but an unscrupulous partisan, who had become frantic with rage; and is seldom surpassed in the most infuriate ebullitions of the political press. He represents the whole body of Millenarians as on a level, in ignorance, delusion, and fanaticism, with the lowest and wildest of those who have ever treated of Christ's coming. No colors seem sufficiently dark to paint the frenzy with which he exhibits them as infatuated; no epithets sufficiently reproachful to express the scorn and detestation with which he regards them. There is not an individual among them, according to him, that should not be shunned as an enemy to religion and mankind; not one who ought not to be consigned as a hopeless lunatic to the mad-house. They are "birds" that "can see best in the dark;" that "fly only in the storm;" that "make night hideous with their hootings;" that "add to the terrors of the tempest by their unearthly screams;" and, not content with this low abuse, in which none but a fanatic in blackguardism would indulge; and having no other means, it would seem, of blackening them to a degree that answered to the rancor of his spite—he turns round, and in direct contradiction to his own statement of their doctrine, and the charge he so frequently alleges against them of sensualism, because of their belief that the nations are not to be destroyed at Christ's coming, but are to increase and multiply during the Millennium,—and exhibits them as teaching that the whole of the race that are living at Christ's advent are to be dashed by his avenging bolts to eternal destruction; and represents them as contemplating the catastrophe with an eager and infuriate joy!

"In this new Pandora's box which they have opened, *no hope for the doomed millions now living lingers at the bottom.* The elect are already gathered in. . . The gospel has been preached as a wit-

ness, and failed to convince the world of sin; now it must prove a savor of death unto death to all that live."—P. 28.

Such is the climax of wanton misrepresentation of them, and contradiction of himself, in which he closes his harangue.

His Essay is thus a tissue of gross blunders, unblushing self-contradictions, and shameful calumnies; and is charged throughout with the concentrated bitterness of a prejudiced and malevolent spirit. The plan on which he proceeds is, first, to rake together all the accusations that have ever been uttered against Millenarians, no matter how groundless, and how often and effectually confuted, and treat them as true, and true of the Millenarians of the present day. Next, to treat the errors and extravagances into which some of their number have fallen on other subjects—such as Montanus and Irving, in respect to the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit—as springing from their belief in Christ's pre-millennial advent, and exhibit the whole body as guilty of those errors and extravagances. Thirdly, to represent Millenarians as holding all the false views, and sharing in all the delusions and extravagances of parties, who, like the late Mr. Miller, are not Millenarians, though they look for Christ's pre-millennial advent. Fourthly, to exhibit Millenarians as responsible for all the errors and fanaticism into which men have at any time run in respect to Christ's kingdom or the end of the world, like those of the Catholics in the beginning of the eleventh, and the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century, although they were not Millenarians, nor Premillennialists, in any sense. And finally, when no other sufficiently effective method of misrepresenting them presented itself, boldly to charge them with maintaining the very doctrines which they reject, and rejecting the doctrines which they maintain. It is by these expedients, and by these expedients alone, that he has wrought the atrocious caricature which he presents to the world as their portrait. Had he dipt his pencil in nothing but truth, there is not a line in the delineation that he would ever have drawn. There is not a page in his Essay that he would ever have written. On the injustice, the meanness, and the malice of this course, it is not necessary to expatiate. What would be thought of a man who should attempt, by a similar method, to depict the character of the

present Congregational clergy of New England: who should first repeat the imputation to them of all the follies, errors, and crimes that have ever been charged on them, from the arraignment and execution of the witches at Salem, to the present day? Who should next array the false doctrines that individuals among them have from time to time advanced, and treat them as doctrines common to them all—such as Parker's open infidelity; Emerson's idealism; Bushnell's pantheism; Beecher's pre-existence of souls; Taylor's denial of God's power to renew the mind; Channing's denial of Christ's deity and expiation; Emmons's assertion that God creates all the acts of his creatures; and every other mistaken opinion that has been entertained by any of their number? Who, thirdly, should charge them, as a body, with all the private vices and public crimes which he thought might naturally spring from their various false doctrines? And who, finally, in addition to their own errors of doctrine and practice, should also accuse them of the false beliefs and crimes of those most hostile to them, whose peculiar dogmas they reject, and whose evil manners they abhor? Would such a hideous picture have any title to be considered as presenting their true character? Could it proceed from any but the pen of a low, prejudiced, and unscrupulous partisan, whose very object was to blacken them with traduction and obloquy? Yet that would be a very exact parallel to Mr. Sanborn's course in the delineation he affects to give in his *Essay* of the doctrines and character of Millenarians. If it is legitimate, there is not a body of Christians on earth that may not, with equal effect, be shown to be monsters of debasement and impiety.

It is not necessary that we should protest against this atrocious procedure. The exposure of the deceptions he has attempted to impose on his hearers and readers, will make him the object of disapprobation to all honorable minds in his own party, as well as others. Upright Antimillenarians will not deem their cause worth maintaining, if no better means can be found to defend it than the wanton misrepresentation and abuse of their opponents. The blow he has aimed at Premillennialists, instead of yielding any service to his cause, will recoil on himself, and consign him to the reprobation and pity which his blunders, his folly, and his malignity deserve.

ART. II.—NOTES ON SCRIPTURE. CRITICAL SUGGESTIONS.

John xix. 2.

"JESUS answered: Thou couldst have no power against me except it were given thee *from above* (ἀνωθεν); therefore (διὰ τούτου) *he that delivered me* (ὁ παραδίδούς με) to thee, hath the greater sin."

It is remarkable that these are the first words our Lord uttered, so far as we know, after his former interview with Pilate within the Pretorium, when he avowed his kingly character (John xviii. 37, 1 Tim. vi. 13), although, in the meantime, he had been sent to Herod, and sent back by Herod to Pilate, and re-examined by Pilate in the presence of the Jews, and scourged by the soldiers in the court of the palace. During all these scenes, and under all these indignities, he opened not his mouth: thus fulfilling Isaiah liii. 7.

It is to be observed, also, that the words quoted above are not an answer to Pilate's question, "Whence art thou?" (verse 9.) That question he had answered before, when he said he was a king (John xviii. 37). What he said at this time was intended to instruct Pilate upon the point of his own authority, and to inform him of the relative guilt of those concerned in the transaction. But why should he speak upon this subject, while he remained silent upon all others? The reason may be that Pilate's remark (verse 10) was prompted by atheistical opinions—certainly it trenchanted upon the honor of the divine government, inasmuch as he claimed a power independent of the providential government of God.

Pilate derived his power from Tiberius Cæsar. Tiberius was the chosen successor of Augustus. Augustus overturned the government of his country, and made himself master of the Roman people by military power. Thus we trace the power of Pilate to a usurpation. How, then, are we to understand ἀνωθεν?

The answer appears to be this: Pilate's power came to him in the order of God's providence, and so was derived and dependent, or delegated. (See Rom. xiii. 1, 2.) There

is no power but of God. The powers that be, are ordained of God. True: God does not directly choose temporal princes, as he did David, but his providence regulates and controls the events by which their powers are established. We observe that in this qualified sense our Lord admits the power of Pilate even over himself as a man; inasmuch as his words imply that Pilate was established in lawful authority by God's providence, and also that it was not the divine purpose at that time to prevent an abuse of the power intrusted to him, but rather to permit it, in order to the execution of the purpose of redemption. Had Pilate been a good man we have no reason to suppose God's providence would have permitted him to be the governor of Judea at that time.

But how do these premises justify the conclusion, "Therefore (*διὰ τούτο*) he that delivered me (*ὁ παραδίδούς με*) to thee, hath the greater sin?" Here lies the difficulty of the passage. Who of all those concerned in the transaction then in progress, did not act by delegated or derived power in this sense, as truly as Pilate? We observe that the pronoun is in the singular number—he that delivered—as if some one person was intended. Recurring to the historical facts, we find that Judas betrayed him to the band, the captain and the officers of the Jews (John xviii. 1, 2, 3). They led him to Annas (verse 13). Annas sent him to Caiaphas (verse 24). Caiaphas examined him in the presence of the officers (verses 19–22). As soon as it was day, he was taken to the council (Luke xxii. 66), and from that place the whole multitude took him to Pilate (Luke xxiii. 1, 10, 13, 14; John xviii. 28.) To whom, then, does the word *he* (*ὁ παραδίδούς*) refer? Judas did not even approach Pilate, so far as we know; certainly he was not the accuser. (See Matt. xxvii. 3–5.) Yet these words (*ὁ παραδίδούς*) are repeatedly applied to Judas in other places, as being especially applicable to him. (See John xviii. 25; Matt. xvii. 3; Luke xxii. 4, 6, 48.) Some say that the singular is put for the plural, and includes Judas, the high priest, and the whole Sanhedrim. Diodati says it refers to the chief priest and the Jews. Clark thinks to Judas and the Jews. Henry says either the Jews, or Caiaphas in particular was meant. Doddridge says, the Jewish high priest and the council. Others have sug-

gested that Herod, or Caiaphas in his public or official character, is meant.

There is no doubt all these were guilty actors, and even more guilty than Pilate; for it was Pilate's duty to take cognizance of all matters brought before him, as the chief magistrate of Judea. His sin consisted in the abuse or sinful exercise of his legitimate powers; in his cowardice; in his unjust regard to infuriated men; in his vain expedients to shuffle off his duties; in the cruelties he had perpetrated under pretext of clemency; in his unjust judgment in opposition to the known and declared innocence of the Lord Jesus. All these sins are traceable to one source—the fear of man. Had Pilate's courage seconded his judgment and conscience, he would have soon put an end to the whole proceeding, and dispersed the boisterous crowd, if necessary, by the military force he had at his command. The priests and rulers, on the other hand, were active in bringing the object of their hate to the bar of Pilate; and malicious, as well as active, in making false accusations. They pursued their victim hotly, and with the malice of murderers; and Pilate, through weakness and fear, yielded to their importunity and threats, though it is plain he wished to deliver Jesus (Acts iii. 13). But this disparity of guilt does not meet the difficulty; for it may still be inquired whether Judas, Annas, Caiaphas, the council, or the whole people, could have any power over the Lord at all except it had been permitted to them in the providence of God? Our Lord's words to Peter at the time of his arrest in the garden, are pertinent in this place. "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?" (Matt. xxvi. 53.) And this also: "I lay down my life that I may take it again. No one taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." (John x. 17, 18.) These passages prove that none of the enemies of our Lord had any power over him at all, but such as he himself permitted them to exercise. Does not, then, the reason assigned for the difference between the sin of Pilate and that of the others fail, if this view be correct? The great diversity, not to say discordance among those who have attempted to explain this passage, gives ground to sus-

pect some common mistake, and shows the propriety of further inquiry. The following suggestion may be equally remote from the truth, but it appears to be worthy of consideration.

In Gen. iii. 15 we find the first prediction and promise made to man after his fall—a prediction which preceded the curse upon man. “And the Lord God said to the serpent, because thou hast done this. . . . I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed. It shall bruise (or rather *crush* thee as to) thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” In the meantime, Satan, in consequence of the apostasy of man, acquired a dominion over this world of such a nature, and to such an extent, that he is called the God of this world (ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, 2 Cor. iv. 4)—the prince of the power of the air (Eph. ii. 2)—the prince of the world (John xiv. 30; xvi. 11)—the power of darkness (Luke xxii. 53; see also Acts xxvi. 18; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 7, 10; xx. 3). It is important to observe (for upon this consideration the explanation to be submitted chiefly turns), that the power or dominion of Satan thus acquired is altogether *different* from the power of merely human governments. These are changed or overturned, and their places supplied by others, in the order of God’s providential government; whereas the power acquired by Satan at the fall could be broken and destroyed, consistently with the divine justice, only by the incarnation, sufferings, and death of the Son of God. Hence John says (1 Epist. iii. 8), “For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, ~~that is,~~ in the flesh, “that he might destroy the works of the devil;” and Paul teaches (Heb. ii. 14) that the “Son of God became a partaker of flesh and blood, that through, or by means of death, he might destroy him that hath the power of death, that is the devil,” or the old serpent spoken of in Gen. iii. 15; Rev. xx. 2. It is unnecessary to say that such a power as this is altogether different from the Roman power, from which Pilate derived his authority. Every *human* power is ordained of God (Rom. xiii. 1.) It comes in the way of God’s providence, and is removed in the *same* way; whereas the power of Satan could not be defeated or destroyed consistently with the divine wisdom and purposed mercy to man, except by a sacrifice of infinite price. We

cannot indeed say that Satan's power is in any sense independent of God: for, had it seemed best to his infinite wisdom, he could have destroyed it at once, as well as the man he had made. But Satan's power was not *delegated*; it was *usurped*. And the scheme of redemption made it necessary that the usurpation should be permitted for a time.

Bearing in mind this distinction, we proceed further to observe, that the terms in which the curse was pronounced against the serpent (Genesis iii. 15), imply a contest, or an assault by the serpent upon the predicted seed; and when the Lord Jesus stood before Pilate, that assault had been commenced. The issue of it was to fulfil the prediction. Although addressed to Satan, the words of the prediction contained a mystery which he could not fathom (1 Cor. ii. 7, 8). He was caught in his own craftiness (Job v. 13; 1 Cor. iii. 19). He had, indeed, felt the power of that mysterious man, until he entered into Judas, and was absolved from further restraint. (See John xiii. 27, and a note on this passage at page 303 of the seventh volume of the Journal.)

In the person of Judas, he went to the hall of Caiaphas—prompted the words of the traitor, instigated the chief priests, the Pharisees, the officers, the band of armed men—proceeded with them to the garden, guided their operations there; and at the house of Caiaphas, entered with them into their midnight counsel, prompted all the acts of spite, indignity, and outrage, which occurred there, and at the hall of Pilate. He was the chief actor, while Judas, the chief priests, and the Jews, were his guilty instruments. All this is implied in the transaction then in progress, judged of, by the prediction (Genesis iii. 15). Satan's power was then to be crushed, but in the way of a seeming victory by him; and, there can be no doubt, that the death of our Lord on the cross by the means of Judas, the Jews, and Pilate, was the very event foretold by the words addressed to the serpent, "Thou shalt bruise his heel." Yet how could this be, unless Satan was the chief actor? The same idea is involved in the words our Lord addressed to them who went to apprehend him. "This is your hour, and the power (*ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους*) of darkness" (Luke xxii. 53), that is, the hour of Satan's power (in which he shall be permitted to fulfil the prediction (Genesis iii. 15).

Our Lord, therefore, in the words under consideration, regards his enemy as single and one,—in fact, as that *great* enemy whom he had, but a few hours before, set at liberty for the conflict he was then enduring. He did not, indeed, name Satan. It was not necessary to do so to Pilate; for he was incapable of understanding more than these words conveyed. But if, on the other hand, we exclude from this transaction the direct agency of Satan, we may ask how or when did the conflict predicted (Genesis iii. 15) take place? The apostle Paul expressly ascribes to Satan the power of death (Hebrews ii. 14). . Some have supposed (as Baxter) that our ordinary sicknesses, as well as death, are inflicted by Satan, partly on the ground of this passage. That is a question upon which we need not enter. It is sufficient for our purpose, if we restrict the allusion of the apostle (Hebrews ii. 14) to Genesis iii. 15, and the method of atonement thereby mysteriously appointed. For although the work of redemption was voluntarily assumed by the Son of God (Phil. ii. 7), yet having assumed it, there was a divine necessity that he should submit himself to the power of Satan, for the undergoing of those sufferings and that death which were the appointed means of the world's redemption, and of the destruction of Satan's power over it.

Both John (xiii. 27) and Luke (xxii. 3) inform us that Satan took *actual corporal possession* of the traitor, in order to accomplish his part in the last scene or catastrophe of our Lord's ministry in the flesh. (See Volume vii. p. 303-5, and the original Greek.) And we have no evidence or reason to suppose he quitted possession of him until he had delivered Jesus into the hands of Pilate. On this supposition then, the words *ὁ παραδίδους με* (though on other occasions applied especially to Judas) were in this instance intended to designate the great enemy, whose power was soon to be crushed.

Luke xviii. 7.—“And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day and night unto him (*καὶ μακροθυμῶσι ἐπ' αὐτὸν*) *though he bear long with them.*”

The last clause of this verse has created much difficulty. Bengel reads *μακροθυμῶσι*, in which he thought the force of the construction might be easily perceived. The ancient Alexandrian MS. has the same reading. The translator of the

Vulgate evidently read the word in the future (μακροθυμηση). But Kuinoel rightly thought both these readings marginal annotations. The common reading, even if it be the more difficult, is best supported by authority. (See Kuinoel, Lamy's Harmony, and Simon's French Version of N. T., also Trench on the Parables.)

The difficulty lies in translating the words, or rather in apprehending the precise meaning of the original Greek, whichever reading is adopted. This is proved by the great diversity among translators, some of whom are even more obscure than the Greek.* We submit to the reader the following hints for the right translation and interpretation of the passage.

* To justify this remark, the following specimens of translation have been selected :

- patientiam habebit in illis. *Vulgate.*
- et tam erit in eos difficilis. *Castalio.*
- et longanimis erga eos (erit). *Sebast. Schmidt.*
- et longanimis super illos. *Arias Montanus.*
- et cum patiens fuerit super illis. *Erasmus.*
- quamvis auxilium iis differat. *Næbe.*
- in eorum causa lentus erit. *Grotius, Knatchbull.*
- et protrahet spiritum suum in eos. *Fabricius à Syriac.*
- et protrahet spiritum suum contra illos. *Tremellius à Syriac.*
- and schal haue paciens in hem. *Wickliff à Vulgat.*
- and will he have patience in them. *Rhemish Version à Vulg.*
- and shall he delay to do it? *Simon à Vulg.*
- and will he have patience in their regard? *Kenrich à Vulg.*
- e sarà lento in lor danno? *Martini à Vulg.*
- et il souffrira plus long-temps qu'on les opprime? *Mons à Vulg.*
- et il souffrira toujours qu'on les opprime? *De Sacy à Vulg.*
- yea, though he differre them. *Tyndale, Cranmer, Geneva.*
- yea, though he suffer long for them. *Breeches Ed. 1598.*
- though he delayeth their cause so long. *Gilbert Wakefield.*
- and he is compassionate towards them. *R. Dickinson.*
- and he will be slow in their cause. *Evanson.*
- though he long forbear with them. *Scarlet.*
- and shall he long have patience for them? *Knatchbull.*
- though long bearing with them. *Sharpe.*
- though he delay their cause so long. *Dr. Conquest.*
- benche sia lento all' ira per cagion loro. *Diodati.*
- ancora che paziente stato sia in quegli. *Della Lega & Ravizza.*
- useroit-il d'un plus long delai à leur égard. *Beausobre & Lenfant.*
- wenn er es auch lange anstehen laest. *J. D. Michaelis.*
- wenn er sie ihnen auch verzieht. *Leander Van Ess.*
- und solte geduld darueber haben. *Luther.*

The object of the parable is stated in the first verse. It is to give encouragement in the duty of unceasing prayer, by an example of its efficacy under the most unpromising circumstances. The common English version, "that *men* ought always to pray," is not quite exact. The parable has respect especially to the *elect*, considered collectively, and not as individuals (v. 7). Some of the earlier English versions have "They" instead of "*men*," but Wickliffe and the Rhemish version have "it behoveth" το δεῖν "always to pray," which is more exact.

The example our Lord takes, presents two characters. One is that of a man in authority, devoid of all sense of moral or official obligation, regardless of public opinion, and accessible only through his selfishness. Such a man would, of course, feel no sympathy with the suffering, nor anger against oppressors. The other character is a widow, helpless in herself, and without recourse for justice, except to this man. By repeated appeals, this widow obtained the end she desired, not through the compassion of the judge, or his love of justice, or his indignation against oppression, but through his love of ease or desire to avoid molestation. No suitor for justice ever sought it under more unfavorable circumstances, and her success is an encouragement to persevere, even when we have to deal with the worst of men: "And shall not God avenge?" &c.

The force of the parable lies in simile and contrast; the points of which, though not formally stated, are obvious. The widow, in her helplessness, resembles the elect church, in its militant and depressed condition. Her frequent coming to the judge with her petition, represents the prayers, the elect offer to God from age to age, for deliverance (Rev. vi.

The glosses are as various as the versions. Take the following as examples. Euthymius and many after him, explain these words, "Although he be patient for some time." The Breeches edition, "Though he seem slow in revenging the injury done to his." Diodati thus: "Though he tolerate their enemies, and come not suddenly to punish them, as the impatience of the flesh would require." Tremellius thus: "iram suam differet contra opprimentes eos." Trench: "though he bear them long in hand;" or "though he delay with them long." See his note, p. 405, also Bengel and Kuinoel, who cite Sirach xxxii. 18, for similar phraseology, καὶ ὁ Κύριος οὐ μὴ βραδίᾳ ἰσθὲν μὴ μακροθυμῇ ἐκ' αὐτοῖς ὥς ἂν συντριψῇ σάρκα ἀσεβῶντων.

10). The adversary of the widow is set in contrast with the adversary of the elect, and the delay of the judge (*ὅκ ἰθὺλῆται ἐπὶ χρόνῳ*) with God's delaying to avenge his elect expressed by the words *καὶ μακροθυμεῖ ἐκ' αὐτοῖς*, which involve the chief difficulty of the passage.

The principal contrasts presented by the parable lie, (1) between the character of the judge, to whom the widow appealed, and the character of God, to whom the elect appeal; and (2) between the relation of the judge to the widow (who we may suppose was a stranger to him, or at most a common suitor), and the relation of God to his elect or chosen people, who are precious to him as sons, redeemed by the blood of his only begotten, and loved with ineffable love. (John xvii. 23.) The cause of the elect and their experience, are like the widow's. Both suffer wrong, and both are delayed in obtaining redress, but the motives, and the effect of the delay in the two cases, are widely different.

The delay of the judge arose from his indifference to wrong-doing, and worked injury to the widow while it lasted; whereas the delay of God to avenge his elect, does not arise from indifference to the wrongs they suffer; so far from it, he actually restrains the impulses of his justice, for the good of those who ask his interposition. Let us now attempt to embody these ideas in a translation of the passage, and then consider whether the original will support it—

"But God: will he not avenge his own elect, who cry day and night unto him (*καὶ* for *καὶ περ*, *quamvis*, see Kuinoel), seeing he restrains his anger (against their adversaries, or bears long with their adversaries), for their (his elect's) sake."

Dr. Robinson translates *ἐκ' αὐτοῖς* "on their account"—a sense which the words easily admit. The common English translation, by representing the elect as the object of God's forbearance, destroys the contrast the parable presents between the adversary of the widow and the adversary of the elect:—Also that between the unjust and *hurtful* (*i.e.* to the widow) delay of the judge to punish the widow's adversary; and the merciful and *salutary* (*i.e.* to the elect) delay of God to punish the adversary of his elect. Besides, it mars the congruity of the representation: For how does God's for-

bearance towards his elect afford ground for supposing that he will not avenge them? The seeming forbearance of the judge towards the adversary of the widow (which was in fact his sinful indifference to the demands of justice) did afford ground for believing that he would never act at all; and the forbearance of God towards the adversary of his elect might seem to warrant the same conclusion, if we were ignorant of his character and the motive of his delay. But when we are taught that God forbears with the adversary of his elect, simply because he has a work of mercy to accomplish in their behalf, which would be frustrated by his immediate interposition, not only is the delay accounted for, but an assurance given that the avenging act will not be delayed longer than the good of his elect requires.

But how can the good of the elect be promoted by God's delay to avenge them of their adversary? How can it be said, that God restrains his anger against Satan and every other adversary of his elect, out of regard to their best interests?—This is the next inquiry.

We regard this parable as having respect to the whole church, or the accomplished aggregate of the elect for whom the Saviour especially interceded, in John xvii. 20, 21. This body has not yet been fully gathered, and space must be given for this purpose. The time allotted to it is an unrevealed secret; God only knows the number of his elect—how many of them have been chosen and gathered out of past generations, or how many remain to be brought in. (John xvii. 2.) But until this body shall be completely formed, and all those who have been given to Christ by covenant, shall be born and born again, it is plain, that the work of avenging them would be premature,—for it would put an end to that dispensation or order of things, which has been appointed for the building of the church (Matt. xvi. 18). The tares cannot be separated from the wheat before the harvest, lest the wheat, while yet immature, be also rooted up with them. (Matt. xiii. 29.) Had God opened the windows of heaven, and broken up the fountains of the deep, without giving time to finish the ark, and time for Noah and his family to enter it, his designs of mercy towards that patriarch would not have been accomplished, in the appointed way. As God forbore with the old world for

Noah's sake, and thereby gave the wicked of his day a space for repentance which they did not improve; so now he forbears with the wicked for the sake of his elect. Not one of those given to Christ must fail of his predestinated part of the purchased possession. He permits, therefore, the god of this world to retain a portion of his power: he allows the wicked to rage and imagine vanities. His elect people must wait till all their fellows shall be sealed. But when the mystical body of Christ (the body of his elect) shall be completely formed, then the motive for longer forbearance will cease, and the avenging act will be speedily accomplished (See 2 Thess. i. 7, 8. Matt. xxiv. 38. Luke xvii. 27, 29). *Œcumenius* (on 2 Pet. iii. 9) thus expresses the same doctrine. *Consummationis tempus differtur, ut compleatur numerus salvandorum*—"The time of the end is deferred that the number of those who are to be saved may be filled up." By the persons to be saved we understand the elect. (See Macknight on 2 Pet. iii. 9.)

From the foregoing, the sense in which we are to understand *οὐ ταχὺ* may be easily gathered. These words contain the assurance that the period of suffering shall not be unnecessarily prolonged, as though God were indifferent to the interests of his people, but shall be hastened to its consummation. The period may seem long in man's reckoning, but the work of constructing so great and glorious a body as God's elect, is too vast to be brought within the compass of our diminutive measures. Relatively to God, with whom a thousand years is as one day, and relatively to the magnitude and glory of the work to be accomplished, the delay is short—nay, the very shortest possible, consistently with the plans of infinite wisdom. The word *speedily* does not fully express this idea, nor is it literally exact; for the words express (*οὐ ταχὺ, scilicet χροῖον*) some continuance of time, which cannot be less than the work to be accomplished necessarily requires. See Rom. xvi. 20, in which the apostle may be supposed to have had in view the passage under consideration. Satan is the great adversary of the elect (1 Peter v. 8; Heb. ii. 14; Rev. xx. 1, 2; John xii. 31—xvi. 11), as he was of the Lord Jesus, in the proceeding before Pilate; yet now greatly restrained of his power for the sake of the elect.

Luke xi. 1-13. This passage is in some respects similar to Luke xviii. 1-8. The object of both is to encourage prayer: the difference is—this seems more particularly addressed to individual believers, while that primarily respects the church as a body. Or we may regard the prayer, in part, as the common prayer of the whole body of the elect for the coming of the kingdom, and in part, as the prayer of individuals, for the supply of their daily wants. The former part, then, would coincide with the cry of the elect, that God would avenge them of their adversaries (Luke xviii. 7; Rev. vi. 4; 1 Cor. xv. 26; Heb. ii. 14; Rom. vii. 24—viii. 23; Phil. iii. 21)—a cry which, as we have seen, he defers to answer, until their body shall be completed, which is the time appointed for the coming of the kingdom—while the latter has respect to such things as God is pleased to grant now, for the current necessities of his people, in anticipation of their complete and final deliverance. This, however, is not the part of the passage to which we wish to call attention. The method our Lord took to encourage perseverance in the duty of prayer for daily wants is the subject of these observations. Let us introduce the fifth verse, as Luke does the parable of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 1). The interpretation is allowable as a paraphrase—“And he spake these similitudes to them, to the end that they ought always to pray and not faint. Which of you shall have a *friend* and shall go to him at *midnight* and say unto him, Friend, lend me three loaves, &c., and he from within shall answer and say, Trouble me not, the door is now locked and my children are in bed with me; I cannot arise and give thee. I say unto you that although he will not rise and give him, *because he is his friend*, yet on account of his (*ἀναιδέϊαν*) importunity, he will rise and give him as many as he needeth.”

Here we observe that the case put, apparently, is not so hopeless as that of the widow in the parable of the unjust judge; yet there is a point of resemblance between the motive of the friend and that of the judge. In both it was selfish. Neither of them does the thing desired through love, or even willingly, but to avoid annoyance. The difference is in their characters. The friend, under other circumstances, we may suppose, would have willingly done the favor requested; whereas the judge, though in duty bound

to act whenever appealed to, would not have been willing to act under any circumstances whatever.

The force of the exhortation or application in the next (9th) verse, depends upon the contrast implied between God, the common father of all men, and the friend thus importuned. "And I say unto you, ask and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock (alluding, perhaps, to the knocking at the door of the friend at midnight) and it shall be opened unto you."

The friend had an evil nature, or, to say the least, he did not love his neighbor as himself. He was subject to many frailties. He was called upon under circumstances which silenced the voice of friendship. He was in bed, his doors barred, his children in bed with him, the hour unreasonable. It was too much to ask even of a friend: and he would not for awhile. Yet importunity at length prevailed. How much more shall importunate persevering prayer prevail with God, who is perfectly good, and infinitely removed from every frailty; whose eye never slumbers, whose power never wearies; to whom midnight and noon, darkness and light, are alike.

Thus far the instruction conveyed is like that of the parable of the widow. But the similitude founded on the parental relation (in verses 11-13), was proposed with a different view; and of this, too, the force depends upon contrast. "If a son shall ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone; or if a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent; or if he shall ask an egg, will he offer him a scorpion?" The allusion is to the fourth petition, "Give us day by day our daily bread," and our Lord assumes, what we all know, that a father's love is a sufficient guaranty that he will not give an evil thing to his son, who asks for a good thing, much less will he give injurious or baneful things, in mockery of his wants. "If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more your heavenly Father: for he is perfectly good, and has an infinite and overflowing fulness of all good things." Creating to give and to enjoy, and giving to all his creatures, are his constant work. The good things of this life, such as God gives you to bestow on your children, like the rain and sunshine, he showers and sheds on all; on the

evil as well as the just, as of course, even without their asking. Of these things he makes no account: but the Holy Spirit, the most needful of all gifts—the gift which carries with it all other blessings, even this gift, your heavenly Father is more willing to bestow on those that truly ask him for it, than you can be to bestow on your children such good things as He puts in your power.

The last clause of the 13th verse is elliptical. It may be supplied thus: “How much more shall your heavenly Father give (not only the daily bread for which you pray, but also) the Holy Spirit to them that ask him.” Or perhaps the implication may be, that the influence of the Holy Spirit is a necessary part of our daily aliment. Something of this kind seems to be intimated by the connexion: “If a son ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone?” that is, will he give him for the nourishment of his body that which cannot serve the purpose? But our heavenly Father knows that our immortal souls have wants, as constant and much more urgent than the wants of our perishable bodies; and were he to give only those things which would support the body, he would, as it were, give a stone, in respect to the wants of the soul. Indeed such gifts cost him nothing. He confers them indiscriminately. The bestowal of them in this life is no mark of his especial favor. He will, therefore, enlarge the petition, and answer it commensurately with the actual wants of his praying people. He will give the Holy Spirit to sustain the soul in health and vigor, without which, the gift of the perishable good the body requires would fail of its end.

These illustrations, it is suggested, were designed to apply especially to those petitions which respect the daily wants of believers. As to the petition for the coming of the kingdom of God, and the universal prevalence of perfect righteousness on earth, the elect, both individually and collectively, are encouraged to persevere in putting it up, by the parable of the widow considered in the last note.

2 Peter iii. 9. “The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, &c., but is long suffering to us-ward (ἀλλὰ μακροθυμῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς μὴ βουλημένος τινὰς ἀπολεσθαι), not willing that any should perish.”

This epistle was addressed to the elect (1 Peter i. 1, 2,

compared with 2 Peter iii. 1). By us (*ἡμᾶς*) therefore it is plain we are to understand the elect, and not the ungodly world. The passage is parallel with Luke xviii. 7, and should be interpreted accordingly. We suggest the following paraphrase:—"The Lord is not slack to execute the promise of his coming in the customary sense of that word; for delay is not tardiness or slackness when founded in good reason; on the contrary, he puts off the execution of his promise out of regard to us (the elect), even restraining his displeasure against the wicked for our sake; it being his purpose that none of his elect should perish, but that all should attain salvation through repentance."

The unjust judge was slack to execute his duty, through indolence and indifference to justice; and the scoffers are represented as accounting for the Lord's delay in the same way, or in some other not less at variance with the unchangeable attributes of his nature. The apostle, on the other hand, asserts that the Lord's delay is no evidence of his forgetfulness or hesitation to execute his threatenings, as the scoffers vainly suppose, but it is evidence of his unchangeable purposes of mercy to his elect. For he restrains his anger against the wicked, and bears their scoffings, in order to give space for the execution of his purposes of mercy towards his elect. So that his delay is not to be accounted (*ἀπαυτῆτα*) slackness in any sense, as though it arose from indifference to the wickedness of the world, but (*μακροθυμία*) long-suffering, a restraining of his wrath against wickedness, because of his fixed purpose (verse 9) that none of his elect should perish. Hence God's (*μακροθυμία*) long-suffering towards the wicked may be justly accounted (*σώτηρις*), the salvation of the elect (verse 15), because it gives space for them to attain it (in the appointed way) through repentance (verse 9).

In writing this epistle, the apostle appears to have had in mind the discourse of our Lord, recorded in Luke xvii. 22; xviii. 8. The apostle alludes to Noah and the destruction of the old world, chapter ii. 5; iii. 6; to Sodom and Lot, ii. 6, 7; to the last days, iii. 3; to the destruction of the world, or rather the present order of things, iii. 7; to the second advent of our Lord, iii. 4-10; to the lack of faith, the recklessness of the wicked, and their voluntary igno-

rance, iii. 4, 5. He uses the word *καινεσους* in some of its forms repeatedly, iii. 9, 15, which word occurs also in Luke xviii. 7. If the reader will now turn to the discourse, he will find the same topics. This coincidence is strong internal evidence of the authenticity and genuineness of this epistle, which, by some, has been called in question, although without any just grounds. We cannot show the reasons of this suggestion, without making a much more extended analysis of this epistle, than would be proper in this note.

2 Peter iii. 13. "Nevertheless, we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth," &c.

The following remarks upon this passage are in substance abridged from Houbigant's Preface to the Prophets.

Peter, when he says, "We according to his promise look for new heavens and a new earth," refers to the promise contained in this prophecy of Isaiah (lxv. 17), for we do not read of new heavens and a new earth in the Old Testament except in Isaiah, and it is plain that Peter understood the promise literally, and not allegorically. His words prove this; for in the same chapter he had already twice mentioned the heavens and the earth. In verse 5 he had said, "The heavens were of old, and the earth," &c., and in verse 7, "But the heavens and the earth which are now," &c. No one doubts that the apostle in these places used the words in their strictest literal sense; and, therefore, it is not to be doubted, that when he speaks afterwards of new heavens and a new earth, we ought to understand his words literally.

This also may be proved by the argument itself. (See verses 3-13 inclusive.) It is plain from this reasoning, that the *new* earth Peter speaks of, is to succeed the earth that now is, as a *new* thing succeeds an *old* one. But Peter could not say that a new *allegorical* earth was to succeed the old *material* earth. He employs, as the premises of his argument, two examples of (the sort of) earth intended, *viz.* the earth that formerly was, and the earth that now is, in order to prove, that as the earth which formerly existed was changed, so the earth which now is will hereafter be changed, in order that a new earth may exist. Nor would he have made use of these premises, if he had wished to conclude that the new earth expected, will not *really* be a new earth,

but only *allegorically* so called ; since from the facts, that one earth had been changed by the deluge, and another earth was to be changed by fire, it could not by any reason be collected, that the new earth he expected was a mere allegory (that is, not *really* a new earth, but only *allegorically* so called). Such an argument would be utterly unworthy of the apostle ; for if that were his view, he ought to have proved that the scoffers erred in supposing that the new earth (which was spoken of as a mere allegory) was to be in reality a new earth ; and that they erred also in supposing, that the new earth promised could not be given to men, unless the earth which now is be changed. . . . For the same reason, the apostle ought not to have made use of such premises, because they were not pertinent to the subject. Besides, his language tended to mislead ; because, after having spoken of the former earth in the *proper* sense, he speaks of the *new earth* as though he intended something real, and not a mere allegory or similitude. . . .

The same is proved by the arguments, and the words of the scoffers, against whom Peter disputes. Their language intimates that they are Jews. "Since the Fathers fell asleep," is a Hebrew locution. They seem to be persons who had really expected the advent of Messiah ; for they say, "where is the promise (*ubi est promissio aut adventus ejus*) or his coming," which is the same as if they had said, "We, Jews, believed that the Messiah would come. But if, as the Christians say, he came long since, where then is his promise, or what sign have we of his advent ? Isaiah foretold the creation of new heavens and a new earth, yet since the fathers (to whom those promises were made) fell asleep, all things remain as they were before. We see no change of heavenly or earthly things. Belief in the gospel, therefore, is ridiculous, since nothing new is seen in the heavens or in earth. Therefore, there will be no renewal of the earth—no salvation of men." If such be the scope of the argument of the scoffers, it is plain they speak of the *earth* in the proper sense and application of the word, and not *allegorically*. The reply of the apostle does not permit us to doubt that such is the sense of it ; for he replies to the different parts separately. The scoffers say, "All things remain as they were from the beginning of the creation."

Peter replies, that neither the heavens nor the earth remain as they were at first. They were changed by the Deluge, out of which the present heavens and earth arose, as these scoffers well know. From this wilfully false assumption, they go on to infer the perpetuity of the present order of things, and discard all expectation of the fulfilment of the promise, and all hope of the advent of Messiah. The apostle replies, that the heavens and the earth which now exist are reserved for fire; and, therefore, the inference from the supposed perpetuity of the former earth, that nothing new can befall the heavens and the earth now existing, is false. Hence, Peter concludes that God's promise is not delayed, as these Jewish scoffers would believe, but, on the contrary, the advent of Messiah ought to be expected, because God is about to create new heavens and a new earth, in which the promise will be fulfilled. From the whole, it appears:—(1.) That these Jewish scoffers supposed that the future renewal of the earth was to be accomplished through the advent of Messiah, which they pretend they had expected in vain. (2.) It appears, also, that this expectation of the Jews was not regarded by Peter as unfounded in Scripture, for if he had so regarded it, he would not have said (*non tardat Deus promissionem suam*), "the Lord is not slack concerning his promise." (3.) The whole stress of the apostle's argument is to prove that this expectation of the Jews (which is not vain) will *then* be fulfilled when God shall create new heavens and a new earth. It follows, therefore, that Peter understood this prophecy of Isaiah concerning the new earth *literally*, and not as referring to eternity (or to the present order of things).

It may well be doubted whether this learned author is right in supposing the scoffers will be Jews only. There is more reason to suppose that, for the most part, they will be from among the Gentiles. However, it is interesting to know the opinions of so learned an expounder and scholar.

ART. III.—THE PARABLES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

XVII. THE GROWING SEED.

Mark iv. 26-29.

"THE kingdom of God is as if a man should cast seed into the earth, and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knows not how. For the earth spontaneously bears fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full grain in the ear. But when the fruit presents itself, he immediately puts in the sickle, for the harvest has come."

This parable is designed to illustrate the truth which Christ, just before uttering it, had announced, that they who constitute or belong to the kingdom of God, make progress in the knowledge of his will, and yield obedience to it; and that the manifestation of their character as his children, is one of the great offices which they are to fill in this life. The discourse in which it occurs, appears to have followed the parable of the sower, in which Christ had taught that of those to whom the gospel is preached, none will prove obedient, except those who have upright and good hearts; but that they will bring forth fruit richly, though in different degrees—some thirty, some sixty, some an hundred fold. And seemingly to exemplify this, and show that a life of holiness is the object for which the light of a new life is kindled in the heart—he asks his disciples:—"Is a lamp brought that it may be set under a bushel, or under a bed; not that it may be placed upon a lampstand?" The design of this question is, to indicate that it is as inconsistent with the end for which God communicates his word to his children, that they should not bring forth its proper fruits, or show their peculiar principles and affections by obedience to his will; as it is with the purpose for which a lamp is carried into an apartment where guests are assembled, that it should be put under a bushel, or the couch on which the guests, when feasting, reclined. The truth and love which he lights up in the renovated mind, are kindled there, that they may show their presence and their excellence to those around them; as truly as a lighted lamp is carried into an apartment

where a family is assembled, to fill it with its light ; not to be concealed and leave them without its aid, and in ignorance of its presence. The Saviour then confirms this by adding, that even things that are concealed—valuables, treasures,—are concealed only that they may at a future time be brought forth to the light. They are never hidden to remain concealed for ever. That would be to throw them away ; not by secreting them from the knowledge of others, to preserve them for one's own possession and enjoyment. "For there is nothing hid, which is not to be revealed, neither is there any thing concealed, except that it may come to light. If any one has ears to hear let him hear." If that be the end—the implication is,—with which men conceal the objects which they most value, in the recesses of their dwellings—to preserve them from the grasp of others,—till they are ready openly to display and enjoy them ; much more is it the design of God in placing the treasures of his truth and grace in the hearts of his children, that they should be manifested in a life of knowledge and holiness. He then exhorted them to attention and care in respect to the word which they heard, and forewarned them that the knowledge communicated to them would be proportioned to their endeavors to attain it, and that a failure to receive new communications would issue in the loss of what they had already attained. And he said to them : "Consider what ye hear. With the measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you ; and to you who hear, more shall be added. For to him who has,—who grasps, who holds the truth—there shall be given : and from him who has not,—who does not receive and retain it,—even what he has shall be taken away." That is, he who welcomes and cherishes the truths which are addressed to him, shall receive fresh communications of knowledge, and go on in continual progress ; but he who does not, will lose what he has heard, and sink back into his original darkness and unbelief. Then follows the parable in which this natural and necessary progress of the children of God in knowledge and holiness, is illustrated by the natural growth of seed placed in the earth, and progress from the blade, which it first shoots up, to the formation and maturity of the fruit, when it is harvested and gathered into the garner. It is in the kingdom of God,

as it is in a field in which a man should cast seed, and should then sleep and rise alternately, as night and day revolve; and the seed should sprout, and grow up, he notices not how. For the earth spontaneously sends up a growth, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full grain in the ear. And when the fruit becomes ripe, immediately he sends the sickle, for the harvest has come." The doctrine of the parable thus is, that as the earth naturally causes the grain which is sown in it, to spring up and bear fruit, which the husbandman, when it has ripened, gathers, and appropriates to its proper use; so the children of God, in whose hearts he plants the truth and grace of his word, naturally advance in knowledge and obedience, until they at length become mature and fit to be removed from this scene, to the higher life in which they are to be devoted to the ends for which they are created and redeemed. The parallel may be traced in all their chief features.

1. The seed is lodged in a soil congenial to its nature, and placed under the influence of warmth, moisture, light, and other forces, that naturally cause it to germinate and grow.

So the word of the gospel meets in the renewed mind a spirit and affections that are congenial to it. It is welcomed and cherished there, and allowed to put forth and exert its life-unfolding and energizing powers. The soul is fitted by renovation, for the reception of the truths of the gospel, a sight and sense of their reality and beauty, and the birth and growth in it, under their quickening presence, of the fruits of wisdom and righteousness. The blindness, the insensibility, the enmity of the natural mind are removed, and light, life, and love, are kindled in their place; so that like tasteful food to the body, the teachings of the word at once give pleasure and sustenance to the soul, and become vital elements in the current of its life.

2. As the blade which springs from the seed sown by the husbandman, is at first slight and weak, but at length shoots up, acquires strength, and becomes able to sustain the glow of the sun, the rush of the wind, and the dash of the tempest, so the new views and affections of the renovated mind, are at first weak, unstable, and liable to be disturbed by the disorders of the body, passion, and the cares and distractions of life; but at length rise to clearness and energy,

and attain a settled station in the soul. Fresh accessions of knowledge are continually made. A deeper acquaintance with self is attained; a larger understanding of the work of redemption, and higher and more transforming views of God. Brighter beams of light are flashed into the mind by the Spirit; and, like a vegetable that is shooting up its stalk in the light of the sun, and expanding its stem, and limbs, and leaves into full form, its thoughts and feelings rapidly unfold, and acquire definiteness, strength, and stability. As a plant that by a want of light, warmth, moisture, or a fitting soil, should be arrested in its growth ere it had reached half its proper size, would soon be so stunted, as to be incapable of a perfect development; so a renovated mind that should early be arrested in its growth in knowledge, love, and faith, by a want of means of instruction and excitement, and the loss of spiritual influences, would soon become fatally stunted, and lose the possibility of advancing to the high attainments it might otherwise have reached.

3. The end of the grain plant, is to flower and bear fruit. It is that for which it is created. It is that for which it is cultivated. It is in that, that its being is consummated; and to that, that it owes all its value. And so the end for which the children of God are renewed, and the word of his truth is communicated to them, is, that they may become obedient to his will, and yield the fruits of righteousness. The object is not simply to display the power which is exerted in their renovation. It is not to save them from punishment. It is not to thwart and confound the malignant aims of Satan; but they are chosen that they should be holy and without blame before God in love. The great design accordingly of the various discipline to which they are subjected here, is their sanctification; and it is by their being extricated from the dominion of sin, by their holiness, and their yielding the fruits of righteousness, that they become meet to be released from punishment for their rebellion, and raised to an immortality of blessedness in his kingdom.

4. And finally, as the seed, when ripened, is harvested, and put into the garner, to be appropriated to the uses for which the husbandman raises it; so the children of God, when they have become fitted for it by knowledge and piety, are

summoned by him to his presence, and assigned to the stations and services for which he created and redeemed them.

The great truths taught by the parable thus are:—

First. That the children of God who at their renovation enter into a new life, gradually advance in knowledge and piety, as a plant which springs from a seed gradually shoots up its stalk, throws out its branches and leaves, and at length having reached its full form, blossoms and bears its fruit.

Secondly. That as there is a maturity of a grain crop that fits for the sickle and the garner, so there is a degree of knowledge, love, faith, and obedience generally, or a measure of fruitfulness in his service, which prepares a believer for a transference to the future life. God acts as a sovereign, indeed, in summoning his people from life; and some make far greater progress than others, ere they are called; but none are arrested in their course, and transferred to the rest and glory of the intermediate state, until they have reached such a maturity as fits them for the stations and services which are assigned them there.

XVIII.—THE TWO DEBTORS.

Luke vii. 40–43.

“Two persons were debtors to a certain creditor. The one owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty; and they not having the means to pay, he forgave both. Say, which of them will, therefore, love him most? And Simon answered and said, I suppose he to whom he forgave the most. And he replied to him, you judged rightly.”

This parable was uttered by Christ for the purpose of indicating the reason of the extraordinary affection shown towards him by a woman, whose eyes had doubtless been opened to see that he was the Messiah, and whose heart had been renewed by the power of his grace.

“And one of the Pharisees asked Jesus to eat with him. And he entered the house of the Pharisee and reclined at the table. And behold a woman in the city, who was a sinner, knowing that he had taken a place at the table in the house of the Pharisee, brought an alabaster box of myrrh, and standing behind by his feet, weeping, began to wet his feet

with her tears. And she wiped them with the hair of her head; and she kissed his feet, and anointed them with the myrrh. And the Pharisee who invited him, seeing it, spake to himself and said: If he were a prophet he would know who and what sort of a woman she is who touches him, for she is a sinner. And Jesus answered and said to him; Simon, I have something to say to thee: and he replied, Master, speak."—Vs. 36-40.

Christ then uttered the parable and applied it, by contrasting the love which the woman showed, with the studied avoidance by the Pharisee of all tokens of affection.

"And turning towards the woman, he said to Simon, you see this woman. I entered thy house; no water didst thou give for my feet; but she with tears wet my feet, and with the hair of her head wiped them. No kiss didst thou give me; but she, since she entered, has not ceased to kiss my feet. Thou didst not anoint my head with oil; but she, with myrrh, has anointed my feet. Wherefore I say to thee, her sins which are many are forgiven; therefore she loves much; but he to whom little is forgiven, loves little. And he said to her, Forgiven are thy sins."—Vs. 44-48.

It was not that the woman's acts towards Christ were a deviation from the customs of the Hebrews that the Pharisee regarded them with surprise. It was Christ's submission to such expressions of reverence and love from a woman who was a sinner, that excited his doubt that he was a prophet. Kissing and anointing the feet were, like washing them, expressions customary among the Orientals of veneration and homage to persons of distinction. The narrative and the parable imply, that the woman had already experienced the mercy of the Redeemer, perhaps in a miraculous deliverance from some malady, as well as in the renewing power of the Spirit, by which she was brought to a knowledge of Christ as the Messiah, and the reception of him as her Redeemer, and the hope of pardon and life through his grace. For she came to him, not as a despairing sinner, nor as a suppliant for mercy she had not yet attained; but she came to testify her love and homage for what she already knew him to be; and she loved much, because being a sinner, a great and notorious offender, the grace by which she was saved was great and wonderful.

The first lesson taught by the parable thus is—That when those who have been great and open transgressors, are renewed, they are brought by the Spirit of God to deep realizations of their guilt and sin, and the greatness and wonderfulness of the grace by which they are forgiven and saved. As the debtor who owed five hundred pence, must naturally have been fully aware how much his debt exceeded that of the other debtor who owed but fifty; and felt with deep sensibility how much more hopeless his extrication would be, should he be cast into prison till he could discharge his whole debt: so the sinner, under the enlightening and convicting power of the Holy Spirit, is brought to the knowledge and sense of the peculiar sins of which he is guilty, and made to feel how deep his desert of destruction is, and how great and signal the grace must be that purifies, pardons, and saves him. As it is natural and unavoidable that a person who has been guilty of some very flagrant and disgraceful sin, should feel a deeper abasement and compunction for that than for sins of far less enormity; so it is equally natural and inevitable, that persons whose career has been marked by sins of the most audacious and disgraceful character, should feel a profounder sense of their villainess and desert of destruction, than those who have fallen into no such atrocious offences.

Secondly. Those whose transgressions are great and numerous, feel, when redeemed, a profounder sense of the grace by which they are rescued from the thralldom and misery of sin, and contemplate the Saviour with a more fervent gratitude and love. The greatness and wonderfulness of their deliverance, heighten their sense of the grandeur of the condescension and goodness by which they are ransomed, and kindle their hearts with a warmer glow of affection and devotedness to him who washes them in his blood, and is to make them kings and priests unto God, and give them to reign for ever in his kingdom.

The penitent woman displayed these affections in a very beautiful form. How deep her sensibility! Into what annihilation had the pride of her heart, and her fear of man sunk! With what sanctity and majesty was the Saviour invested to her eye! How reverent and awe-struck was her love! How expressive were her tears and sobs, unaccom-

panied by words: gushing from a heart too full to utter itself in language! How eloquent the homage of anointing the feet of the Saviour with a balsam, that was usually appropriated to the consecration of priests and kings, and of sacred things; and that filled the whole scene with a delicate and exhilarating perfume! On the other hand, how beautiful and majestic the grace of Christ appears in receiving the homage of such a being, rescued by him from the degradation and curse of sin, and extending to her a full and everlasting forgiveness of all her great and numerous offences!

Thirdly. The love of Christ which the sanctified feel; the rapturous sense of the beauty and glory of his goodness; the glow of delight, adoration, and devotedness, which kindles their hearts, are the consequences of the renovation of their minds, and their conscious reconciliation to him, and attainment of his favor. They are not forgiven because they weep, supplicate, and offer expressions of homage and love: but they love because they are renewed, behold and feel the grace of Christ, and are forgiven. The tears of the woman were not tears of anguish, terror, and entreaty. They were tears of love and gratitude, because of the mercy of Christ, which she beheld and felt, and the salvation from sin and death, which she had already experienced. The Spirit had already renewed her heart, and doubtless by the disclosure to her of the office and work of Christ, as the Redeemer of the world. She had seen his glory as the Messiah, and had accepted him as her Saviour, and felt the peace and joy of reconciliation: and it was that discovery and experience of his glory and grace that filled her heart with a tide of love, which found its expression only in weeping and acts of reverent and affectionate homage, that bespoke her sense of his dignity and majesty as the Prince of peace, the Saviour of the lost. The love of the renewed is ingenuous, not selfish. Their adoration is prompted by the greatness and beauty of Christ's love; the grandeur of his mercy, wisdom, and power; not by a sinister regard to their personal interests.

XIX.—THE GOOD SAMARITAN.

Luke x. 25-37.

"And Jesus replying said; A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among thieves; and they having despoiled and beat him, went away leaving him half dead. And a certain priest, by chance, went down that road, and on seeing him passed by on the other side. In like manner a Levite, having come to the place, approached and looked, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan travelling, came to him, and on seeing him had compassion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. And he placed him on his own beast, and conducted him to an inn and took care of him. And on the morrow as he was departing, he took two pence and gave them to the host, and said, Take care of him; and whatever more you may spend, when I return I will repay thee. Which now of those three, think you, was neighbor to him who fell among the thieves? And he said, He who exercised mercy toward him. Jesus therefore said to him, Go thou and do likewise."

This parable was spoken by Christ in answer to an insidious inquiry of one of his hearers respecting the service which God requires in order to justification; and who they are whom the law denominates our neighbor.

"And behold a certain lawyer stood up and trying him said: What is it I must do that I may inherit eternal life? And he said to him: What is written in the law? How readest thou? And he answered and said. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself. And he said to him, Thou hast answered right. Do this and thou shalt live. But he wishing to justify himself, said to Jesus: And who is my neighbor? And Jesus replied by the parable."

The object of this, and the parable which precedes it, is not therefore, like most of those which our Lord uttered, to illustrate the general characteristics or course of the kingdom of God, but only to exemplify the love of the renovated mind; that of the woman being designed to show what the love of

those who are renewed and pardoned, is towards Christ ; and this intended to show what that love towards one's neighbor is which the law of God enjoins. Who is it that we are to love as ourselves ? How will that love display itself ? What is it to act as a neighbor towards one whom we are so to love ? The answer which the parable presents to these questions is very clear and emphatic. Christ first shows what is not to act as a neighbor, and exercise the love which the law enjoins.

Jericho is situated in the valley of the Jordan about twenty miles from Jerusalem. Much of the intermediate country is mountainous and desert, and was a favorite resort of robbers. The man who fell into the hands of the thieves and was plundered and beaten, was an Israelite, and ought therefore to have excited the sympathy of the priest and Levite. The severe wounds he had received, and the solitude in which he was left, made it obvious that if he were not relieved, and speedily, by some one who happened to discover him, he must perish ; while from their acquaintance with the divine law, they must have seen and felt that not to pity and relieve him, would be a violation of the command to love their neighbor as themselves. The priest and the Levite, therefore, though urged by these strong inducements, did not act the part of a neighbor ; they did not show or feel any of the love towards the Israelite with which they loved themselves. Whether they were prompted by pride, indolence, a reluctance to incur expense, hardness of heart, or were in the pursuit of some pleasure or gain which they were unwilling to forego for the sake of their perishing countryman ; a narrow-minded, cold, and merciless selfishness reigned in them, that led them to witness his misfortunes and suffering without making an effort for his relief ; and which, if common to all hearts, would make men worse than savages ; more cold-blooded and unsympathetic than the brutes. Were all as unfeeling as they were, no sufferer, however pitiable his condition, would ever be relieved by the hand of man ; no misery would ever be mitigated by human sympathy and love. The priest and Levite, therefore, though standing in so intimate a relation to the wounded man, and under such peculiar motives and obligations to commiserate and relieve him, did not act towards him the part of a loving neighbor.

Very different were the relations towards him and the conduct of the Samaritan. He was of a different nation. He was of a different religion; and the two races regarded each other with such dislike and hatred that they had no intercourse. The Samaritan, therefore, was under strong inducements to pass the helpless Israelite without any effort for his relief; and had he, without an emotion of pity, and with haughty scorn left him to his fate, not only his own nation, but the Israelites themselves would have considered him as justified. Instead, however, of yielding to the antipathies of his countrymen, or any other sinister feeling, he was moved to commiseration. At the sight of the wounded and helpless Israelite all the sympathetic and generous affections of his heart were aroused; and to cheer, relieve, and serve him became as delightful to him, and as essential to his own happiness, as his tenderness and care were to the sufferer. He did not approach him with suspicion. He did not begin by exhorting him to endeavor to go on to the inn where his wounds could be dressed, or content himself with assisting him to rise and see whether he had power to walk. He did not accuse him of cowardice or a want of skill in not defending himself from the robbers, nor satisfy himself with merely binding up his wounds, and then leaving him to make his way or not, as he might, to some friendly habitation where he might obtain the shelter and care which he needed. His words were words of tenderness and love. He raised up the dying man; he bound up his wounds and soothed them with oil and wine. He lifted him to his beast, bore him to an inn, and there took care of him till the next day; and when departing made provision for his being taken care of till he should recover.

The parable thus teaches that every one is our neighbor, and is to be loved as we love ourselves, who is an object of commiseration, who needs relief from suffering, or lacks blessings that are essential to life, safety, and happiness. That he is of a different nation; that he is of a different religion; that he is even an enemy, is not to debar him from our kindness and love; nor is he to be denied it because fashion or public opinion would justify us in withholding from him our commiseration and bounty. He is our neighbor, and is to be pitied and loved by us, because

he is a human being ; because he is the creature of the same Creator and Ruler who made and reigns over us ; and because he is precisely such a being in nature and condition, as we are formed by sympathetic and humane affections to pity and relieve. As those affections were given us to be exercised, and the necessities and sufferings of our fellow-men are the objects that naturally excite them, an obligation springs from our very nature, as well as from the divine law, which expresses and enforces that obligation, to exercise that sympathy and love towards the suffering and wretched who are placed within the sphere of our knowledge and influence.

Next : The love which the law enjoins, is not a calculating selfish affection, that looks for some remuneration for the benefits it confers ; but is disinterested, sympathetic, warm, and truly seeks the good of its object, and at the price, when necessary, of toil and self-denial. It does not exhaust itself in mere professions or vain wishes, nor content itself with endeavoring to excite others to the pity and generosity which the suffering need ; but displays itself towards them in direct acts of commiseration and bounty. And this benignity, this tenderness, this love,—the opposite of the selfish, the resentful, and revengeful spirit that is natural to man,—is preëminently the affection that is breathed by the Spirit of God into the new created heart, and forms its distinguishing characteristic. “The fruit of the Spirit is, love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,” or self-restraint. “The elect of God, holy and beloved, put on bowels of mercies, kindness, humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering, forbearing one another, forgiving one another, if any one have a quarrel against any, even as Christ forgives.” “All bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamor, and evil speaking, are to be put away from among them ; and all malice.” The opposite spirit, is the spirit of the old, not of the new man ; of Satan, not of God. “If ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts, glory not, and lie not against the truth. This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. For where envying and strife are, there are confusion and every evil work. But the wisdom that is from above, is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be

entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy." The love enjoined by the command, therefore, is not a rare affection that is to be exercised only by the prosperous and wealthy, or on occasions of extraordinary calamities; but is to be cherished by all hearts, and be their abiding and reigning disposition.

How obvious it is that the benevolent institutions of the age had their origin in this love! What a paradise will the world be, when it becomes the ruling affection of all minds, and displays itself in its most perfect and beautiful forms!

ART. IV.—PROFESSOR LEWIS'S RESPONSE IN REFERENCE
TO HIS SIX DAYS OF CREATION.

SEVERAL communications from the pen of Professor Lewis have appeared in *The New York Observer*, on the article in the Journal on his *Six Days of Creation*. Instead of the calmness, however, decorum and candor, which become a scholar and a gentleman, they seem to have been written—especially the introductory part of the first—in a paroxysm of mortification and resentment; and under the mistaken apprehension, that little more is requisite for his vindication, than to put on the air of splenetic contempt, and to traduce and abuse us. This method, if legitimate, is doubtless eminently suited to his case; as it may be used with as much freedom and effect by the weakest, the most baffled, and the most hopeless disputant, as by the most victorious. There is not a speculatist so shallow, nor a charlatan so absurd, that when he has no other means of sustaining himself, he cannot swagger, misrepresent, and affect to despise those whom he is unable to answer. It is not the method, however, which persons of integrity and good taste, conscious of the truth and vindicableness of their views, will choose to employ. It is the expedient of the defeated and helpless, not of the successful; of wounded pride and irritated selfishness, not of injured innocence. Innocence does not pout, bluster, and play the fury, to repress her assailants.

It is the serpent, not the dove, that when smitten or threatened, hisses, darts out its fiery tongue, and endeavors to save itself by inflicting a poisoned wound on its foe. To resort to it is, accordingly, a very decisive indication of a conscious defeat which it aims to conceal. If we may judge from observation, for not a short period, of the effects of criticism on different classes of minds, there is no more indubitable signal that an opponent is baffled, and yields under the defeat to the sway of malignant feelings, than that he affects to treat the confutation of his doctrines with contempt, and undertakes to depreciate his antagonist by misrepresentation and abuse. Those who are able to defend their opinions by legitimate means, do not need to resort to such expedients; upright minds recoil from them with abhorrence, and deem them far more discreditable than mistakes in regard to facts, or errors in speculation. In resorting to this method, Professor Lewis, instead of overthrowing us, has only withdrawn the mask from himself, and revealed in the assumptions on which he proceeds, the misrepresentations in which he indulges, and the passions he displays, far darker features and a more sinister spirit, than in the moments of our most unfavorable judgment we had ever ascribed to him.

Thus, after intimating that "those who consider the peculiar nature of that review"—the Journal—"and the spirit in which it is generally conducted, would not regard such a reply"—as he has made—"as either necessary or wise,"—(which might, indeed, mean that a rejoinder that does not meet the main objections to his work, but repeats its blunders and absurdities, and relies for its effect chiefly on assertion and misrepresentation, instead of extricating him from difficulty, would only call forth a fresh criticism, and a more effective exposure of his errors; and will, perhaps, prove to be the issue of his "reply")—he asks—

"The first question would naturally be, what so arouses the *wrath* of Mr. Lord? Without impugning in the least the plenary authority of Scripture, or calling in question the great article of the creed in which we profess our belief in God the Father Almighty, *Maker* of heaven and earth, an opinion is maintained that the days mentioned in Genesis, chapter i., were not sun-measured, and, therefore, need

not be regarded as twenty-four hours long. This is the length and breadth of the offending."

Here is thus a specific, unqualified assertion that the only proposition advanced in his volume, which we question and attempt to confute, is whether "the days mentioned in Genesis i." were "sun-measured" or not," and are, therefore, to be regarded," or not, "as exactly twenty-four hours long." It is equivalent, accordingly, to an assertion that on every other point discussed in his volume, we absolutely concur with him, or at least do not regard his views with dissatisfaction. "This," he says, "is the whole length and breadth of the offending." Was ever a more monstrous or a more silly misrepresentation uttered by a bewildered and exasperated disputant? What has become of his theory, which we confuted, that the work of creation recorded in that chapter was not an absolute gift of existence to the things created, but a mere shaping of them out of pre-existent materials? What has become of his "opinion" that the earth, in the state that is ascribed to it in the second verse, "may have been an immense floating nebulosity," to which we pointed out unanswerable objections? What has become of the "opinion" he maintains, and which we confuted, that the light which God is said to have called into existence, was developed out of the ocean and mineral matter of the earth by a chemical action; which implies that the globe became a flaming comet, and blazed on in that manner through an immeasurable round of ages? What has become of his "opinion," that while the earth continued wrapped in that ocean of flame, vegetables of all kinds sprung up from the land which had emerged from the ocean, and flourished through a long tract of ages; which we showed to be in the most absurd contradiction to the laws of chemistry and physiology, and impossible? What has become of his Platonic doctrine, which we disputed and overturned, of "immaterial," "spiritual" "entities," which he maintains are the vital principles, the animating souls of all living things, and all crystallized and aggregated forms of dead matter, which he holds were the only things to which God gave existence, and asserts were the powers by which the moulding and shaping of the forms in which they severally dwell, were wrought? And what has

become of the long list of other opinions advanced in his volume, which we assailed and proved to be erroneous? It is not supposable that Professor Lewis had lost sight of this point-blank disagreement with him on every doctrine of his work—more than thirty in number—on which we animadverted. That would imply that he had become absolutely stunned;—that he had sunk into a syncope under the impression of the review. Besides, if he had lost sight of them, how is it that he immediately proceeds in his reply to treat of objections which we alleged to other parts of his system, and occupying himself almost wholly with them, says scarce a word on “the opinion,” the maintenance of which he here asserts is “the whole length and breadth” of his volume, with which we indicate any dissatisfaction? How, then, is it that he has indulged in this extraordinary misrepresentation? Can it have been the innocence of the dove that prompted it? Is it not more probable that it sprung from a wish, on the one hand, to *conceal* from the public, as far as might be, the array of unanswerable objections to his theory which we have presented, and escape the discredit of the exposure we have made of his ignorance on some of the most important subjects of which he treats; and on the other, to impress them falsely with the belief that we in fact, after all we have said, dissent from him only on one point? But if that be so, what a revelation is made by it of his principles and spirit? How dark the form that discloses itself as he lifts the mask? We are sorry to say that from the whole of his communications to the Observer, we are constrained to fear that he here displays his real character. *Ex pede Herculem*. At least ordinarily, after a personage, though professing to have come from heaven, has disclosed a cloven foot, it is not thought necessary to inquire into the rest of his anatomy, to ascertain to what category he belongs! But whether it sprung from recklessness or weakness, it shows very clearly that his asseverations, while under the thong of criticism, are not to be relied on; that he must be watched and scanned, or his readers can have no assurance that they are not misled.

In the next place, he assumes in effect, that no one can dissent from his opinions and prove them to be erroneous, unless prompted to it by passion and a direct hostility to

him. For he represents that his book has offended us, and aroused us to "*wrath*;" and implies that that was the reason that we arraigned and condemned it. We, however, did not regard his work as an offence against us. Not a hint of the kind, nor anything that can be tortured into such an intimation, exists in the review. It was against the word of God, and the facts and truths of science, and them alone, that we regarded and represented it as offending. Nor did we express or cherish the slightest touch of "*wrath*" against him. The only feelings that we uttered in regard to his errors, were "surprise" and "regret." The only feelings in respect to him with which his volume impressed us, that we did *not* express, were pity at his weaknesses and delusions, and laughter at his absurdities. As then not a syllable was penned by us that indicated that we were prompted by anger, or any hostile feeling to him; as his imputation to us of such sinister motives is wholly gratuitous and the work of his heated fancy; it seems manifest that he proceeds in the charge on the assumption, that no one can arraign and confute his opinions, unless it be under the impulse of an angry hostility to him. As there is nothing in the manner of our criticism to justify or suggest the accusation, it must be founded on the mere fact of our dissent from and confutation of his views; and would be uttered therefore against any one else who ventured to question and overthrow his favorite doctrines. That a person can be prompted to reject them, point out their error, and vindicate the truths which they deny, from love of the truth, from obedience to God, and from a desire to promote the wellbeing of man, Professor Lewis appears to suppose out of the question. God and the truth, he seems to imagine, must vanish when the opinions of the author of *The Six Days of Creation* are made the subject of consideration! He must then fill the whole sphere of vision; and no other motive than personal pique and anger can prompt to the rejection and refutation of his errors! But who, we take leave to ask, is Mr. Tayler Lewis, that he has thus become invested with a higher consequence than the great Being whose truth he perverts and rejects? Who is this professor of Greek, who thus not only assumes that in his presence the infinite Jehovah himself loses all his rights, and his word all its title to respect; but who in effect

claims that no fellow-creature can refuse the most abject homage to *his* genius, and submission to his dictum, *unless* under the dominion of the most sinister and malignant affections? Was such a revolting arrogance ever before displayed by a baffled speculatist? Was such a base expedient ever before resorted to by a disappointed and mortified author, to excite the prejudice of his readers against the person who, in the discharge of a great duty to God and man, and in entire fairness and good temper, pointed out and confuted his mistaken and mischievous doctrines? Who, we ask again, is Tayler Lewis, that no one can confute his perversions of the word of God, and expose his monstrous blunders in philosophy, unless it be from base and malignant motives? He proceeds—

“The reviewer has something to say of a certain other crime, which he calls Platonism, but as his views of said Platonism do not seem to be remarkably clear, it is hard telling what the charge really amounts to.”

He has already discovered, it seems, that there is at least one question besides that which he affirmed in the preceding sentence was “the length and breadth of the offending,” in which we dissent from his views. His affectation of an inability to tell what the doctrines of Plato are, which we represent him as adopting, is a specimen of the artifice to which he frequently resorts in his book, of professing a profound ignorance of a subject, and affirming that it lies out of the sphere of human comprehension, when he wishes to turn the eye of his readers from his exceptionable opinions, and escape the necessity of meeting the objections to which they are obnoxious. After all his discussion about “invisible, immaterial vital powers, principles, laws, call them what we will,”—from which he maintains all “outward or phenomenal entities were generated or born”—does he wish his readers to believe, that when we state his theory respecting them, and allege that it was a leading element in Plato's philosophy, and was borrowed by Professor L. from him, he is not able to tell what we mean? Whose foot is it that appears here? He goes on:—

“What makes this the more unaccountable, is the fact, that in the

book assailed, full respect is manifested towards all Christians and Christian writers who hold to the twenty-four hours theory. Their piety is unquestioned, their ability is conceded, the force and reasons of their position are duly appreciated. They are cordially commended for their earnest defence of the exact verity of the Sacred Word, and the author is proud to rank himself with them as against the scientific sceptic, or the neological interpreter."

But what has this to do with that which he alleges against us, unless he proceeds in it on the assumption, that his having refrained from misrepresenting and depreciating those who entertain different opinions from himself, entitles him to exemption from all just criticism of his mistaken interpretations of the sacred word, and false notions in philosophy? If he does not set up that preposterous claim, how is it that he alleges what he here offers, as a reason that his book should not have been subjected to the calm, candid, and thorough examination, which it received from us, and its errors pointed out with a force of demonstration, and an earnestness, that are certainly no more than suitable to the importance of the subject? The pretence that our article is but an angry assault upon *him*—is a fetch. What an extraordinary assumption, then, is that on which he here proceeds? The man, it seems, who puts forth a set of postulates or principles of interpretation utterly mistaken and subversive of the truths taught in the divine word, applies them to an important portion of that word, and promulgates, under their sanction, the most erroneous and absurd notions,—is to be regarded as innocent, and exempted from all just criticism, if he only abstains from misrepresenting and abusing those who dissent from him; while he who in the fear of God, from reverence and love of his word, and a desire to prevent his fellow men from being led into a disbelief of its teachings, and rejection of its authority, vindicates it from misinterpretation, and sets forth its meaning in a clear and convincing light, is guilty of an outrage; and is to be denounced and calumniated for his independence, integrity, and fidelity to the truth! What a charming item in a code of controversial morals this is? What "a short cut to infallibility?" Who can now doubt that Professor Lewis's rights have been grievously violated: that our exposure and

refutation of his errors must have had their origin in mere reasonless and malevolent wrath? If this is not the real implication of his complaint, what is its meaning? If he admits that his not having treated others unjustly, is no reason why he should not be subjected to criticism, and what are deemed his errors, pointed out, and fairly—and effectually confuted; why does he thus treat it as an injustice, that could spring only from the most reprehensible feelings, that we have subjected his volume to such a criticism? He next affects to give the reason of the “unaccountable” “wrath” from which he represents the review as having sprung.

“The mystery of all this acrimony is cleared up to one who is acquainted with the peculiar idiosyncrasy of the reviewer. As an author (and we speak of him in no other character), he may be scientifically described as a man of two ideas and one stereotyped phrase. One of these ideas is, that the word ‘day’ in creation, or when used in the beginning of our mundane history, means exactly twenty-four hours, neither more nor less; the other, that the same word in prophecy, or *eschatology*, or when employed of the ‘*latter days*’ of the world, means just one year of three hundred and sixty-five solar periods, making the Millennium, or the epoch of the new heavens and new earth, exactly 365,000 years, neither more nor less. Whether he makes any difference between sidereal or solar time in the one case (the two kinds of days being not quite the same), or makes any allowance for leap-year in the other, does not appear; but any man who ventures to call in question either of these opinions, is an infidel. And so of his favorite form of speech, ‘*the laws of symbolic language*.’ Every one who fails to see how the mere repetition of this cabalistical formula explains all mysteries, is utterly unfitted for the interpretation of the Scriptures.”

“If these statements were true, Mr. Lewis, instead of being thrown into a paroxysm of excitement by our criticism, and resorting to extraordinary and desperate expedients to save himself from any damaging influence the review could exert on him or his book, should have congratulated himself that he had only so ineffective an antagonist to contend with. A man who has but “two ideas and one stereotyped phrase” to meet, and feels that he is easily able to dispatch them, surely can afford to keep cool. His sense of safety; his consciousness that he has scores and hundreds

of favorite ideas to match against the two of his opponent, and scores of "yoms," "olams," "vital powers," "invisible principles," "immaterial entities," "spermatic words," and other stereotyped terms and phrases, to battle with the "one" of his critic, should have hushed every angry passion into silence; should have dilated his breast with generous affections, and led him to feel that it was quite unnecessary to resort to any violent measures to defend himself. Mr. Lewis's self-respect, his dignity, which he assumed is so immense that all other beings lose their rights in his presence, should have withheld him from it. How happened it, then, that the review, instead of being received by him with calmness and a smile at its impotence, threw him into a transport of alarm and rage, and led him to feel that the most desperate expedients were necessary to save him from the adverse influence it is likely to exert? Can any fail to see that his pretence of having but "two ideas" to contend with is a mere fetch; a reckless endeavor to cover up the overthrow of his volume on the one hand, and excite a prejudice against us on the other? Is there but one idea presented in the review?—for nothing is said in it in regard to the time which a day—not the word, but the period—signifies, when used as a prophetic symbol. Is the length of the six days of the creation the only topic that is discussed in it? Is nothing said of Professor Lewis's construction of the first and second verses of the narrative of the creation? Is nothing said of his notion of the nature and origin of the light which was spoken into existence on the first day; of his ideas of a chemical agency that invested the world in fire; of his notions of the analogy on which he holds the words evening and morning are used; of his theory of the development of the atmosphere from the matter of the globe; of his idea of the germination and growth of vegetables in a mere light and heat produced by a chemical combustion; of his immaterial spiritual entities, and a long train of other subjects? Are not all the important points of his theory amply discussed, and the grounds on which they rest swept from beneath them? What then can Mr. L.'s aim be in representing that it presents only a single idea, but to conceal its true character from those whom he addresses, and persuade them that it offers no confutation of

the main doctrines of his volume? He must have felt his condition to be truly deplorable, to deem it needful to resort to such a device for his alleviation?

But what shall we say of his assertion that "any man who ventures to call in question either of these opinions" he ascribes to us, respecting a natural and a symbolic day, we regard and are accustomed to denominate "an infidel"? What but blind rage and recklessness could have prompted him to utter it? He could not have framed a proposition more utterly devoid of truth. We have never expressed nor entertained such a judgment. We challenge him to point to any passage in which we have pronounced any one an infidel, or intimated that we regarded him as such, because he does not deem a day, when used as a prophetic symbol, as denoting a year. We challenge him to point to any instance in which we have pronounced any one an infidel, or intimated that we thought him one, simply because he did not regard the six days of creation in Genesis, as natural days of twenty-four hours; and if he cannot produce any such passage, we call on him to take back his accusation, and as publicly as he has made it, unless he wishes to stand before the community as a reckless calumniator who is ready to resort to any false accusation by which he thinks he can for a moment prejudice the public against us, and shield himself from the unwelcome consequences of our exposure of his errors. Whose foot is it, we ask again, that appears here?

As it regards "the stereotyped phrase" which he imputes to us, he is at an equal distance from the truth. Has he ever met with that phrase on our pages, unless it may have been quoted from some one for the purpose of pointing out its inaccuracy? Let him indicate an instance, if he can, in which we have used the expression, "the laws of symbolic language," as descriptive of any laws of interpretation which we entertain. He will search in vain for it. Professor Lewis, it seems, notwithstanding his boasted culture of sacred hermeneutics, has never carried his investigations far enough to know, that there is no such thing as "symbolic language;" that the symbols of the prophetic Scriptures are not *words*, but *agents*, as angels, men, beasts; *material objects*, as lampstands, incense; or *acts, conditions, changes, effects*,

as slaying, lying dead, and being raised from death. An awkward blunder this, for one who undertakes to escape the discredit of the mistakes into which he has fallen, by depreciating the person who has exposed his errors! He must have felt his condition to be a very desperate one, to have thought it necessary to descend to such expedients.

He appears, in penning his next paragraph, to have wholly forgotten what he had alleged in regard to the number and nature of our ideas, and without any sense of his self-contradiction, imputes to us a variety of others; though unfortunately for his credit, they are but the fictions of his heated brain.

“We once lived in the neighborhood of a very singular lunatic, who was possessed by a most remarkable hallucination. It was neither more nor less than that he was the only true church; its whole succession, hieratical and laical, having at last centred in his own single personality. Mr. Lord has come to regard himself as almost the only true believer in the Scriptures to be found in Christendom, or at least in the American churches. He can hardly think any man to be honest who dares to differ from him in the interpretation of any passage in the Bible. It is not enough to charge error, and show it if he can, but the error must be a wilful one, or come at least from some bad design. It is put forth to serve the cause of infidelity, and therefore this zealous champion on the watch-tower of Biblical orthodoxy is called in conscience to warn his clique of hearers against the wolf in sheep's clothing.”

Of what an unpardonable outrage should we have been held to be guilty, had we introduced the review of Mr. Lewis's book with such a tirade of gratuitous and malignant misrepresentation? What execrations would have been heaped upon us, had we even in far milder terms intimated that Professor Lewis “has come to regard himself as the only individual who is endowed with such genius, and has made such attainments in philology, that he can give a true interpretation of the Scriptures; that he accordingly sets aside the sense that has heretofore been ascribed to their most important parts, by the greatest and best writers, and assigns to them a wholly new meaning; and that in place of allowing others quietly to enjoy their opinions, he makes it a main object of his work to insult and traduce all who dissent from him; and fills his pages with imputations to them of

ignorance, dishonesty, infidelity, and atheism; and acts the part throughout of 'a very *singular* lunatic who is possessed by a most *remarkable* hallucination!'" Yet such a representation would not be a whit more contradictory to fact, more malignant, or more mean, than the tissue of false statements he utters in the passage we have quoted. But the recklessness he displays, the depth of debasement to which he has sunk, disarm his malice of its power, and make him the object of commiseration. He proceeds:—

"Thus has he proved Hugh Miller to be an infidel, and a shallow sciolist besides. We find this monochord of the Theological and Literary Review playing the same tune on all occasions. It has but one string, and that is ever sounding the same weary, twanging, acrimonious note."

How admirably this harmonizes with the allegation in the preceding paragraph, which he uttered with equal positiveness, that we have but "two ideas and one stereotyped phrase;" that those ideas relate to the period of a natural and a symbolic day, and that phrase to "the laws of symbolic language!" The poor gentleman was agitated, it would seem, by such a tempest of passion, that he was not able to recollect, from one paragraph to another, what he had said; or else he cared not what falsehoods, nor what contradictions he uttered, if he could only gratify his vengeance by misrepresenting us. He goes on:—

"Thus has he also shown Moses Stuart to be an infidel, and Pye Smith to be an infidel, and Professor Hitchcock. They are not only infidels, but very dishonest infidels; they ought to know better; they make false interpretations on purpose. *This is not an extravagant statement of his manner, for no other fair interpretation can be given of his language towards them.* Against the author of the work entitled 'The Six Days of Creation,' the charge is put forth in a still more offensive form. It is constantly repeated in the most insulting manner, 'that the writer studiously affects,' and 'ostentatiously displays,' and 'adroitly pretends,' a zeal for the Scriptures and their philological interpretations, which he does not really feel—that his opinions are merely Platonism, or Origenism, or crude science, or something else as a cover to which the Scriptural guise is dishonestly assumed. This is certainly a very harsh charge, and yet no other meaning can be drawn from multitudes of paragraphs in the review

It may be said to form *the staple of the article*. Certainly the sentences in which it expressly or impliedly occurs, would form *many continuous pages*."

It required a very unusual measure of audacity to utter such a volley of misrepresentations—known to great numbers dispersed through the whole country to be wholly groundless, so easily confuted, and so sure to recoil with a fatal force on himself. This charge that we have pronounced him, or either of the persons whom he names, an infidel, is a sheer fabrication. There is not a particle of truth in it. There is not a shadow of ground in anything we have written for its justification. Neither the word infidel, nor any term equivalent to it, is applied to him in the review of his volume: nor is there the slightest intimation that we regard him as an infidel. A more gratuitous and senseless accusation was never got up by an exasperated writer. The passage probably that gives him the most offence, is that with which the review closes, *which expressly recognises his belief in the truth of the Bible*, and exhibits it as the objectionable feature of his work, that it interprets the Sacred Word in a manner that is adapted to disparage it, and strengthen their hands who are disposed to reject its authority, or bend it to the support of their mistaken theories. Thus we say of his work :

"It seems to us to bear the marks throughout of a mind deeply possessed of a set of mistaken and extravagant misconceptions and false theories, and *presuming that if true THE BIBLE MUST ACCORD WITH THEM*," which is an express recognition of his belief in the Bible: for how could he presume the Bible must agree with what is *true*, if it is not true itself?—"is determined at all hazards to make out that they have its sanction. *We are much surprised at this*, as, though aware in a measure of Professor Lewis's cast of mind, we had entertained a far more favorable estimate of his candor and judgment. *We deeply regret that he has given to the public a work which is so adapted to disparage the Word of God* in the estimate of the young, and to strengthen the hands of the numerous class who are already disposed either to reject it as without authority, or to torture and pervert it into the sanction of their unscriptural theories. Of the various forms in which it is assailed, there is none that bespeaks a more sad alienation from its spirit, or is more mischievous, than that of one

who, like Professor Lewis, while making forward and ostentatious protestations of respect for it, in fact *treats it as having no clear and determinable meaning, but as susceptible of any sense, no matter how false, how absurd, or even how blasphemous*, which the passions or the fancy of the interpreter chooses to ascribe to it. The truth has no worse enemy than such a *professed friend*; and *infidelity* has no more effective propagator."

Here is, thus, no representation that he is an infidel. So far from it, there is an express exhibition of him not only as a believer of the truth of the Bible, but as forward and ostentatious in his protestations of respect for it—not as avowing himself a sceptic, or decrying it as a mere human production; and the exceptionable character which we ascribe to his book is, that *the manner* in which the word of God is treated in it, in order to bend it into harmony with his cosmology, is adapted to lead others to doubt and distrust its divine authority. Whether that characterization of his book is just or not, it offers no justification of his assertion that we have denominated him an infidel, or exhibited him as such. To be an infidel, and to write a book that is adapted to weaken the faith of men in the inspiration of the Scriptures, and lead them into scepticism, are surely very different things. Is Professor Lewis prepared to maintain that no believer in the Bible ever wrote anything, that from its mistaken principles of interpretation, its false notions, or its absurd theories, was adapted to lead men to doubt the inspiration of the Scriptures, and reject their teachings? Has he never heard of Origen? Has he never heard of Spinoza? Has he never heard of Swedenborg? Has he never heard of Newman; to say nothing of a long train of others who have indulged in speculations, and often without a suspicion of their tendency, that have undermined the great doctrines of the Bible, and led men to doubt and disown its divine origin?

But that characterization of his book, we believe to be just, and expressed in terms, to say the least, no stronger than were required by fidelity to the truth. We wrote it after deliberation, and in entire exemption from unfriendly feelings towards him; we weighed every expression which we used; we presumed that it would excite him to

deep resentment; we were apprehensive that it would not meet the approbation of several persons friendly to him, whom we were very reluctant to displease (who were among the first, however, to express their emphatic approval of the review, and without any exception to that part of it);—and we gave it the form it bears, from a full conviction that we were discharging a duty, which it would be highly culpable to omit; that to dismiss the work without plainly pointing out its exceptionable features—to wind up the review, in the fashionable way, with a half dozen pages of extravagant protestations of respect for Professor Lewis, notwithstanding our disagreement with him, and fulsome eulogies of his talents and learning, which would perhaps have been immediately quoted as proving that after all we do not consider his errors as of any great moment, would be criminally to desert and betray the truth, in order to escape the unpleasant consequence of a calm and resolute fidelity to it.

And can any one reasonably question the propriety of that judgment? What can clearly entitle a work, and the course pursued by its author, to such a characterization? What can make it not simply right, but an undoubted duty, to pronounce such a judgment on a volume? Every friend of truth will admit, that if a person advances principles of interpretation, and employs them in the exposition of the history of the creation, Genesis i. and ii., which if applied to the other passages in the Bible, in which the word or words which they respect occur, would assign to them an utterly false sense, and convert the Sacred Volume into such a chaos of contradictions and absurdities as to make it impossible to believe in its inspiration or authority,—his work may legitimately, and must in justice, be declared to be adapted to disparage the word of God in the estimate of the young, and strengthen the hands of those who are already disposed to reject it, or torture it into the sanction of their unscriptural theories. And such are the rules or principles of interpretation which Professor L. advances, and makes the basis of his exposition of Genesis i. Thus, take his theory of the principle on which the word day is used, and the meaning he assigns to it, of an indefinitely long period—ages or myriads of ages—and it converts a long train of passages into the grossest solecisms and absurdities. Such

is the metamorphosis which it works, for example, in Jacob's statement of the length of his life:—"The days of the years of my pilgrimage are an hundred and thirty years: few and evil have the days of the years of my life been; and have not attained unto the days of the years of the life of my fathers, in the days of their pilgrimage."—Genesis xlvii. 9. This, translated so as to express the sense Professor Lewis ascribes to the word day, is turned into the following group of contradictions and impossibilities:—"The indefinitely long periods or ages of my pilgrimage are an hundred and thirty years. Few and evil have the indefinitely long periods or ages of the years of my life been, and have not attained unto the indefinitely long periods or ages of the years of the life of my fathers in the indefinitely long periods or ages of their pilgrimage!" What an exquisite answer to Pharaoh's inquiry, "How old art thou?" What beautiful chronology? It must, indeed, be a "time world," where such a species of years prevailed! A hundred and thirty years, each consisting of three hundred and sixty-five indefinitely long periods,—47,450 in all,—and comprising severally, perhaps incalculable millions of ages, would be a close approximation to eternity! But what must the life of Jacob's fathers have been, whose years of indefinitely long periods were six or seven times as many as his! If anything can be adapted to make infidels of men, would not such a distortion of large portions of the Bible, by which it would become absolutely impossible to believe their statements? If any work could be entitled to severe reprobation, is not one that converts its teachings into such inexplicable contradictions and nonsense? But Professor Lewis will, perhaps, claim, that the days in this passage are defined as natural days of twenty-four hours, or the earth's revolution on its axis, by being denominated days of *years*. But that no more defines them as days of the earth's revolution, and limits them to that length, than the terms evening and morning, darkness and light, define the six days of the creation as natural days, and limit them to periods of the earth's revolution on its axis. There are no other days that consist of an evening and morning, a period of darkness and a period of light, but natural twenty-four hour days. The fancy that there are other days of which they are the

peculiar and distinguishing characteristics, is as groundless and absurd, as the notion were that there are years that are made up of indefinitely long periods or ages. Professor Lewis cannot give a reason for regarding the days of the years of Jacob's life, as natural days, that is not an equally good reason for regarding the six days of the creation as natural twenty-four hour days. He cannot give a reason for his interpreting the six days of the creation as indefinitely long periods, that is not an equally good and imperative reason for interpreting the days of the years of Jacob's life as indefinitely long periods.

It will be admitted also by every friend of truth, that if a person advances philosophical theories, and principles of interpretation, that give a meaning to the sacred text, by which it is made to narrate or assert occurrences that are in palpable contradiction to the laws of nature, and cannot therefore consistently be believed to have taken place; his work may justly be denounced as adapted to disparage the sacred word in the estimate, especially of the young, and to strengthen the hands of those who are disposed to reject it. But Professor Lewis advances such theories and principles of interpretation, and they are the great and most distinctive teachings of his book. Thus, it is a well ascertained fact of vegetable physiology, that no plant can germinate and grow, unless it be from a seed, or from a part of an already formed and living plant, as a root, a twig, or a bud. Yet Professor Lewis maintains that the herbs, plants, and trees, which were called into existence on the third day of the creation, were neither directly created by God, in contradistinction from being formed by a natural growth, nor germinated from seed, or any other parts of previously living plants, but "were generated or born from invisible *immaterial* vital powers, principles, laws, spermatic words or ideas," which, in contradistinction from the plants and trees, "are themselves the first and immediate creations of the divine word, going forth before any mere agency of nature, whether the universal, or any particular nature." But no such "immaterial entities" are known to physiology, as belonging to plants; nor any such mode of their generation. It is as contradictory to the laws of their nature, and as impossible, as their self-generation is. It is as true that there is

but one mode in which they can come into existence in a natural way, as it is that there is but one in which human beings can come into existence in a natural way. He makes the text, therefore, assert what is in open contradiction to the laws of nature, and cannot be true; and what, therefore, if it be the real meaning of the text, proves that it cannot be the word of God; and makes it, to those who are aware of its contradictions to the laws of nature, impossible to believe that it is his word.

It is a well known fact also, that no vegetable organism can grow and reach maturity except it enjoy the light and heat of the sun. To grow healthily, and mature without the light of the sun especially, and its heat also, is as impossible, as it were to grow without an atmosphere, and without soil. No other light will serve as a substitute for sunlight, nor any other heat, as a substitute, except in a small measure, for the heat of the sun. But Professor Lewis maintains that the vegetables called into existence on the third day, grew and flourished through a long series of ages, without a solitary ray of sunlight, or particle of sun-heat; and that they found a substitute for them, in the light and heat of a combustion, which he holds was the work of a mere chemical process. He says:—"Vegetable life might have been supported long before" the sun began to shine. "Warmth and light, *if necessary*, might have been produced in all required abundance, from *chemical agencies, solely terrestrial*."—P. 188. No greater and more palpable contradiction to the laws of nature can be conceived. To affirm that vegetables can exist without *sunlight* and *sun-heat*, is as great a solecism, as it were to affirm that they can exist without soil and air, or that animals can live without an atmosphere. He represents the Bible, therefore, as declaring what every one who is aware of the laws of vegetable life, knows cannot be true; and what, therefore, all those who are apprised of those laws, and regard his interpretations of the text as presenting its genuine teachings, must, of necessity, consider as an indisputable proof that the narrative in Genesis of the creation cannot come from God, nor any other part of the Bible that recognises and sanctions it as true.

It is a well known fact of animal physiology, that no creature, whether insect, fish, bird, or beast, can come into life in

a natural way, except by propagation by creatures of the same kind. But Professor Lewis represents that the Scriptural history of the production of these various creatures, teaches that they were neither directly created by God, nor—which was of course impossible—produced by propagation from others of the kind, but that they were generated, and in a natural way, from invisible, immaterial, spiritual entities or souls, that were created antecedently to, and independently of the creatures they finally animated, and deposited in the water and earth, out of which these living organizations—fish, birds, insects, beasts—were called forth. But that is wholly inconsistent with the only known mode of their production in a natural way. It is as contradictory to the laws of nature, and as impossible, as it was that they should causelessly have sprung into existence out of nothing. Professor Lewis could not utter a grosser or more revolting solecism, were he to declare that all the fowls of the mountains and the cattle upon a thousand hills, were wafted down from Jupiter, or jumped to the earth from the moon. In representing the Bible, therefore, as asserting that that was the origin of the various orders of animals that were called into existence on the fifth and sixth days of creation, he exhibits it as teaching what every one who is aware of the contradiction of that fancy to the laws of nature, must see proves, if it is the genuine sense of the scriptural history, that it cannot be the word of God.

These are but exemplifications of his violations of the language of the text, and the contradictions which he represents it as offering to the most indisputable laws of nature. The whole tissue of his philosophy is in the most open war with the best established and most important facts and experience. Were the question submitted to the arbitrament of the great masters of language, and cultivators of astronomy, optics, chemistry, and vegetable and animal physiology, there is not an individual among them who would not pronounce his exegetical and philosophical theory a senseless fiction, that could have originated only in the grossest ignorance of nature; and that, therefore, if justly ascribed to the Scriptures, presents the most unanswerable proofs that they cannot have come from God. If there was ever a book, then, that was justly entitled to emphatic condemnation as unfriendly

to the word of God, and adapted to lead men into infidelity, that book is Professor Lewis's "Six Days of the Creation."

His assertion that we have pronounced Moses Stuart an infidel, or John Pye Smith, or Edward Hitchcock, or Hugh Miller, or represented them as such, is in like manner a sheer misrepresentation. There is not a shadow of ground for it. We have never denominated or represented either of those writers as an infidel. We have simply said and proved in respect to them, what we have said and proved in respect to Tayler Lewis, that they proceed in their interpretations of the sacred word, on principles that are wholly subversive of its truth, and advance theories that contradict its plain teachings, and are, where they relate to the material world, in many respects at open war with the laws of nature; and that their speculations, therefore, are adapted to impair the authority of the Scriptures, and prompt men to distrust and reject them as a revelation from God.

But the reviews of those writers have occupied but a very moderate space in the more than five thousand pages of the Journal; and were his allegations in respect to them true, would form no justification of his statement that "we find this monochord of the Theological and Literary Review"—the exhibition of authors as infidels,—“playing the same tune on all occasions. It has but one string, and that is ever sounding the same weary, twanging, acrimonious note.” In what part of the Journal can he find any ground for this assertion, except in the articles in which we have treated of the atheistic and infidel systems of Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Coleridge, Strauss, and others of that school; and of the works of Morell, Nevin, Bushnell, Park, Schaff, and Hickok, in which they have expressly adopted and sanctioned the whole or essential parts of Kant's metaphysical system, which is now on all hands admitted to be subversive of belief in the being of God? But if his reference is to those articles, what other conclusion can we draw from his sneer than that *his sympathies are with those writers?* An awkward revelation of himself to be made, while treating it as an unpardonable injustice in us, that we represented his book—not as infidel—but as adapted, from its mode of treating the Bible, and its contradictions to the laws of nature, to disparage the word of God, and to strengthen the hands of those who are

disposed to reject it! We are aware that he gave his sanction to Dr. Hickok's *Psychology*, which is a mere reproduction of Kant's idealistic theory, and is wholly inconsistent with a belief in an external world, a revelation, or a creator; but as it was apparent from his articles on the work, that he had no thorough comprehension of its principles, we did not infer that he had become an idealist, nor therefore regard him as having given up the Bible as a real book, and a revelation from God. We, however, will not dwell on this very unfortunate indication of the feelings with which he regards the great authors and propagators of atheism and infidelity. If Professor Lewis wishes to escape the suspicion of being an infidel, he had better, in the first place, take care not any further to impair the confidence of the religious public in his truthfulness, by uttering such false statements and malignant calumnies as those in which he indulges in his communications to the *Observer*: and in the next place, he had better avoid indicating that he takes the side of the great deniers of God and the Bible, but regards those with aversion and scorn who expose their impious errors, and endeavor to guard the unwary against their deadly influence.

So much for the introductory part—with the exception of a paragraph we are hereafter to notice—of Professor L.'s response. Did ever a writer exhibit a more pitiable spectacle of weakness, recklessness, arrogance, and rage? Did ever an author more wholly mistake himself and the public? He obviously regards himself as of so lofty a rank in genius and learning as to render it presumptuous in the utmost degree in us, to question his opinions. He seems to imagine that nothing more than a blast of malignant accusation and insolent abuse is requisite to sweep us out of his way; and flatters himself that the public will receive his representations with unquestioning faith, and regard the wail in which he indulges, as the cry of injured innocence; and his defiance, as the shout of a giant, conscious of his unmatched powers, and sure of a victory over his foe. He not improbably will find he misjudges both himself and his readers. The grimaces and howl of the monkey that in playing his tricks has the misfortune to frisk his tail into a trap, are not likely to be mistaken by the public for the intrepid port and roar of the lion.

Instead of this silly course, Prof. L., if he attempted to reply to our review, should have made it his business calmly and thoroughly, if in his power, to meet the objections we have urged against his book ; and if he found himself unable to set all or any of them aside, to retract or modify his views, so as to bring them into harmony with the divine word, and the laws of nature, which they respect ; and he would have found in that task, ample scope for all his ingenuity and all his knowledge.

Thus, his theory of creation is twofold. He maintains, in the first place, that every living organism, and every aggregate of matter that constitutes or forms a body by itself—such as crystals, rocks, the earth, the waters, the air, the moon, the planets, the sun, and the stars, is animated by an invisible immaterial and spiritual entity, essence, or soul, that is its vital power or principle. Next, that these immaterial spiritual entities, were the things, and the only things, which God called into existence ; that they were created before the forms which they were to animate ; and that they were severally, by their vital aggregating and shaping forces, the causes of the construction or organization of the masses of matter, or bodies, of which they became the indwelling energy. On the other hand, he maintains that the creation which is narrated in Genesis i. and ii., was not the creation of those immaterial spiritual essences, the existence and agency of which were indispensable to the formation of the *material* masses or organisms which they were destined to construct and vitalize ; but that the work of the six days was the mere formation of those vitalized bodies, and that it was accomplished in a natural way, by the force of those several vitalizing spiritual essences ; in contradistinction from being called into existence by the direct act of the divine will. He holds, moreover, that the matter of which those bodies were formed, was not then created out of nothing, but existed prior to the six days of the creation. And finally, he holds that the creative acts ascribed to the Almighty, were not employed in giving existence to that which before had no being, but simply in moulding and shaping material forms out of matter that previously existed. But this theory is embarrassed by the most formidable difficulties.

In the first place, those immaterial spiritual entities, on the

reality of which his whole system depends, are mere fictions drawn by him from his favorite master, Plato, of whose philosophy he now affects to be so ignorant, as not to know what this very theory is, which lies at the foundation of his cosmology! There is not a particle of proof or probability of the existence of such entities. They are wholly unknown to all those branches of natural science,—astronomy, optics, chemistry, crystallography, physiology, through which alone it is, that if they exist, they could be discovered; and their imagined existence and agency are in total contradiction to the forces and laws that govern matter. The whole fabric of his cosmology thus crumbles into dust, at the first touch of criticism, because built upon a gratuitous and a demonstrably false assumption.

In the next place: as he represents those invisible immaterial spiritual entities, as the only things to which God gave existence, he removes his creative agency entirely out of the sphere of material things, and limits it to the spiritual; while, on the other hand, he maintains that the creation which the *narrative* ascribes to God, was not a gift to them of their existence, but only a mere *shaping* of them out of something that already had a being. That implies, accordingly, that God's creating those immaterial spiritual entities, was not a gift to them of their being, or the being of their substance, but only a moulding of them by cutting, carving, shaving, or some similar agency; and therefore that that of which they consist, had a previous existence. But the representation that God gave a shape to those entities by cutting and carving, or some similar process, is a self-contradiction; inasmuch as a spiritual entity has no shape, and cannot be cut and carved by an instrument, or subjected to any treatment of that nature. It is a solecism, also, to suppose that the spiritual substance of which immaterial entities consist, existed, as he implies, in an unconscious chaotic form, as he asserts the matter of the material world did before it was wrought into the masses and shapes in which it now exists. Moreover, to maintain that that out of which those supposed spiritual entities were formed, existed before the creation narrated in Genesis, is equivalent to maintaining that there is no proof in *the Bible*, that God is the real author of those entities; for the Bible utters no intimation

that God is the author of anything that belonged to our world-system at that epoch, except that which he is said in the narrative (Genesis i. ii.) to have then called into existence. Into what a beautiful quagmire of difficulties Professor Lewis thus precipitates himself at the first step of his theory! What a sharp-eyed and scholarly air his finespun speculation wears, on which he plumes himself so much, respecting the primordial meaning of the verb *bahrah*—translated *create*, but whose leading sense in the narrative he asserts is, to cut, shave, and mould into form!

In the third place: if Professor L. recoils from this, and declares that he does not hold that those immaterial spiritual entities were the objects of the creative acts that are ascribed to God in the six days, but that the material worlds of our system, and the unorganized and organized forms which belong to the earth, were the objects of his agency; then his construction of those creative acts becomes irreconcilable with his theory in respect to the office and agency of his spiritual essences. For he asserts in his theory that that which the verb *create* denotes, was wrought by those vital spiritual entities solely, and took place in the way of nature, like the production of effects now by chemical or vital forces—in contradistinction from a production by the immediate act of God, without the intervention of second causes. The leading doctrine of his book—the great distinctive feature of his cosmology, he everywhere affirms, and reasserts in the communications to the *Observer*—is, that the whole process narrated in Genesis, was a process of mere nature, a growth from vital forces—in distinction from a creation from nothing by the fiat of the Almighty. If, on the other hand, he adheres to his theory, that those immaterial spiritual entities were the real causes of the moulding and shaping of matter into form, which he maintains was the sole work involved in the creation which the sacred narrative relates: then he contradicts and abandons his construction of the verb *bahrah* *create*, inasmuch as the forming of organized and unorganized bodies by the forces of nature, bears no resemblance whatever to cutting, carving, and moulding into shape by the removal of particles from a mass of aggregated matter; but is by a directly opposite process;—unorganized bodies, such as mineral masses, and living organisms, such as vegetables and animals, being

formed by the aggregation or union of particles that before had no union or connexion with each other; instead, as in carving, by the separation from a mass, of particles that before belonged to it. Moreover, if he sticks to his theory that all the forces that were exerted in the production of the effects that are narrated in the history of the six days, were the forces of his immaterial spiritual entities, and lay within the sphere of nature, than he denies that God had any agency whatever in the creation of the six days, and makes the whole the work of mere second causes, and a natural process; and absolutely reads God, as a creator, out of the Bible, and leaves us without a particle of evidence from that Book, that he had anything to do with the creation of the heavens and earth, and the things that are in them. For if the narrative in Genesis of the six days, does not exhibit him as having any agency in their creation, it is vain to look for any such exhibition in other parts of the sacred volume.

In what a pretty batch of predicaments are his philological and philosophical theories thus involved! Turn which way he will, he overthrows some part of his system. If he adheres to his philology, he upsets his philosophy. If he adheres to his philosophy, he upsets his philology. If he adheres to his spiritual entities, he excludes God from the work of creation. If he admits that God was the creator, he then abandons his spiritual entities! What a profound self-knowledge he exhibits; what a beautiful spectacle of meekness and truthfulness in crying out, in a tempest of rage, from this bottomless abyss of blunders and self-contradictions, that we have done him a wanton and cruel injustice, in representing his book as adapted to disparage the word of God, and strengthen the hands of those who are disposed to reject it! These formidable difficulties, with which his scheme is embarrassed, we pointed out in our review; and they should have been met by him, if he attempted an answer. If he cannot extricate his cosmology from this horrible thralldom, the gust of rage and abuse in which he has indulged, will yield him no relief, but will only make a fuller revelation of him, and show that his passions and principles are on a level with his philology and philosophy.

His assumptions and theories, in regard to light, involve him in equally perplexing embarrassments. He maintains

that the light which was called into being on the first day, was not sunlight, nor the light of any orb distinct from the earth, but was developed out of the matter of the earth itself, or the ocean with which it was then covered; and was the light, therefore, of a combustion produced by the action of chemical agents, like a common, or rather like a volcanic fire, and took place in a purely natural way, like the flashes of fire that now occur in solfataras, or the jets into the atmosphere of burning matter that are seen in the violent eruptions of volcanoes. His representation, indeed, implies that the whole surface of the ocean was in a blaze; and that the appearance of the orb, to a spectator at a distance, must have been that of a burning world, or flaming comet. It was this light, he holds, that caused the illumination which God called day, and the commencement of which he called morning; and finally, he maintains that it was in this light, that the vegetables created on the third day, grew and flourished through the innumerable ages, which he holds intervened between their creation and the illumination of the earth by the light of the sun. But this notion, which plays a most important part in his exposition of the sacred narrative, and if overturned, carries his whole cosmology with it, is obnoxious to unanswerable objections. In the first place, it is a mere philosophic theory, assumed without any authority in the text. It is not founded on philology. There is nothing in the word light, nor in the fiat, "Let there be light," by which God called it into existence, that indicates that it was the light of a chemical combustion, and not the light of the sun. But he can never verify his cosmology, while this essential part of it is built on such a mere groundless assumption. The whole is but a fiction, as long as the foundation on which it rests, and its main walls and bulwarks, are but spectres of the fancy.

In the next place, it is in direct contravention of the text; for the narrative expressly declares that the light which God called into existence, was that light which he called *day*, and which was separated from the darkness which he called night; and that must have been sun-light; as there is no illumination except that by the sun, that bears the name of day in contradistinction from night. It is expressly declared, moreover, that it is the special office of the sun to rule over

the day, as it is of the moon to rule the night, and "to divide the light from the darkness." Instead of an exposition of the text, therefore, by the laws of philology, his interpretation is a point-blank violation of it, in order to bring it into harmony with his theory that the creation, so far as material things are concerned, was but a development and shaping of things from pre-existent matter; and that the days, instead of days of sunlight, measured by the earth's revolution, were indefinitely long periods.

In the third place, his assumption that there was such a chemical combustion as he represents, that lighted up the whole surface of the globe, is wholly gratuitous and infinitely improbable. He has not a particle of evidence that any chemical action then took place, that converted the whole exterior of the globe into a volcano, or wrapped it in an ocean of flame; nor that a solitary spark of fire was kindled on its surface. Nor do the materials of which the present surface, or the interior of the earth, so far as they are known, consists, render it credible that the whole was ever in a state of combustion. The materials which generate and sustain volcanic fires are confined to narrow limits. There is no volcano in the vast territory of the United States, we believe, except a single one in Oregon; and no trace that any ever existed on the east side of the Rocky Mountains. What can transcend the weakness and extravagance, in this total want of evidence and probability, of assuming that the whole surface of the globe consisted largely of sulphur, carbon, naphtha, or some other inflammable substance, and was set by a chemical agency into a flame; and building on such a mere imaginary and preposterous foundation, the towering fabric of a cosmology? The whole structure is but a dream, while this important part is thus totally baseless and unreal.

In the fourth place: let it be supposed, however, that such a chemical flame or combination of volcanic fires, as his theory contemplates, existed, and it could not produce the morning and day which were the consequence of the light which God created. If the whole globe were wrapped in the flame, as it must have been in order that the light and heat should have been diffused over its whole surface, and it burned on like a meteor through an indefinitely long period, how is Professor Lewis to account for its then sink-

ing into extinction, and remaining shrouded in impenetrable darkness through an equally indefinitely long period; on the close of that season of darkness, again bursting into a fresh combustion, and flaming on through another indefinitely long period; and finally, repeating that process again during the measureless ages which, Mr. Lewis holds, are meant by the evening and morning of the third day? He must show that these alternations of burning and becoming extinct, once in his twofold indefinitely long periods, were produced by natural causes, and were as necessarily the consequence of the state of the earth, as the succession of day and night now is from its revolution on its axis in the light of the sun. If he cannot prove that such a chemical or volcanic combustion, and such an alternation of burning and not burning, were natural consequences of causes that were then in existence and activity on the earth, is it not plain that he cannot prove that such a chemical flame ever existed and shed its light over the world; and the whole conception becomes an idle and impertinent dream? Professor L. must therefore demonstrate the fact that the earth wrapped in the ocean was such a blazing meteor through three such indefinitely long periods,—ages on ages—as he avers are denoted by the first three days, and point out the cause of it; and, on the other hand, must demonstrate with equal certainty, that through an equally indefinitely long period immediately preceding each of those blazing ages, its flames were extinguished, and it was wrapped in impenetrable darkness; and show what the cause was of its existing in that state. If he cannot do this, his whole cosmology collapses. He cannot pass off such a monstrous notion under the sacred title of the Six Days of Creation, and the vaunted auspices of Scriptural philology, when not the shadow of a sanction can be produced for it either from the inspired narrative, or from the realms of nature, but it is repelled by both as a wild and senseless dream, which none but a charlatan in philology and philosophy would for a moment entertain.

But perhaps Professor Lewis will say, that he does not conceive that that chemical fire absolutely enveloped the whole globe; that it is sufficient to suppose that there were separate fires in such numbers and brilliance as everywhere

to light up the surface of the ocean with which the earth was then covered. Let it be conceived, then, that there were volcanoes enough distributed over the globe, and shooting up their fiery lava and burning gases through the ocean into the vacant space above, to shed their glare over the whole surface of the orb. That would require, if stationed even fifteen or twenty miles apart, at least three or four hundred thousand. To verify his cosmology, then, Mr. Lewis must prove the actual existence of that immense army of flaming volcanoes, and demonstrate that the state of the earth was such, that they *must* have existed in that frequency on every part of the globe, and burnt on in uninterrupted fury, through the three indefinitely long periods, which he holds are denoted by the first, second, and third days. He cannot take it for granted, without authority, and against the clear meaning of the text, and the most indubitable teachings of science. What a task for even such a philologist as he is! What a magnificent work even for a philosopher like him, of so vast a genius, and such unexampled attainments, as to make it an unpardonable crime in any one to controvert his opinions or doubt his infallibility! He must prove also, that after having burned on in concert through those several indefinitely long ages, they then as unanimously stopped their fires, like lines of batteries when a signal is given, and left the world shrouded in darkness through equally indefinitely long periods; and that that was the natural consequence of the laws under which the globe then subsisted, or effect of the forces that were at work in the matter that constituted its surface. If he cannot accomplish this, his whole cosmological theory falls. And suppose he can prove all this, could anything be more unnatural and absurd, than to call those periods of burning mornings and days, and the intervening periods of extinction nights? Did a spectator of Etna, or Mauna Loa, ever think of calling a season of their eruption extending perhaps through several months, a day; and the period of inactivity that followed, extending through scores of years perhaps, or even centuries, a night?

In the fifth place: But concede to Professor L. his chemical combustions, and his periods of their intermission, and his scheme is still embarrassed by the most fatal difficulties; inasmuch as it would have been impossible that the grass,

herbs, and trees, created on the third day, should have subsisted in a world that was enveloped in an ocean of flame; or, if the fires were volcanic, and at some distance from each other, equally impossible that they should have grown and matured in their light; as it is only in sunlight that, after germinating, they can maintain their life and flourish. It is as impossible to plants, after germinating and emerging into the air, to subsist without sun-light and sun-heat, as it is that they should live and grow without moisture or air; or as it is that animals should live without air, or without food. Here is a difficulty which no pretexts of philology, no declamation about *yoms* and *olams*, invisible essences and spiritual entities, will enable him to overcome. Prove or assume what he will, as long as he cannot prove that grass, herbs, and trees can live and flourish in a devouring flame, or in the mere gleam and heat of a chemical combustion or volcanic fire, without the light and heat rays of the sun, he proves nothing, and his whole cosmological theory falls. Nay more: to verify his theory of the nature and origin of the light of the first three days of the creation, he must not only prove that vegetables can exist and flourish in the mere glare and heat of a chemical or volcanic fire: but that they can subsist, grow, and flourish in perfection without any light or heat at all. For how otherwise could they have subsisted through the indefinitely long period—ages on ages—which he holds intervened between the third day in which the vegetable tribes were created, and the morning of the fourth day, when, he maintains, the earth was for the first time lighted and warmed by the rays of the sun! Gigantic as his powers are in his own estimate as a philologist and a philosopher, they may well stagger under this formidable task!

These objections, pointed out in our review, should have been met by him, if he attempted an answer.*

* Those who wish to know what views are entertained, by the ablest investigators, of the necessity of sunlight and heat to vegetable life, will find the requisite information in Carpenter's Elements of Physiology, Draper on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants, and other works of the kind. To such as may not have access to treatises on the subject, the following passages, from Dr. Carpenter, will show what the results of modern ex-

His theory that the days of the creation were not natural days, determined by the revolution of the earth in the light

periments and investigations are that are received by all physiologists, and considered as amply established as any of the facts that lie within the sphere of scientific inquiry and demonstration.

"The forces to whose operation we can most clearly trace the phenomena of life, are light and heat. . . . The agency of *light* is indispensable for the first production of organic compounds, by the instrumentality of the vegetable fabric, but it would possess no efficacy whatever, without the simultaneous operation of heat. The importance of this agent—light—not only to the vegetable, but to the animal world, is not in general sufficiently estimated. *Under its influence alone can that first process be accomplished, by which INORGANIC MATTER is transformed into an ORGANIC COMPOUND, adapted, by its nature and properties, to form part of the organized fabric.* The following is an example of the simplest phenomena of this kind; and it demonstrates the influence of light the more clearly on account of that simplicity. 'If we expose some spring-water to the *sunshine* . . . it presently begins to assume a greenish tint; and after a while flocks of green matter collect on the sides of the vessel in which it is contained. On these flocks, whenever the *sun is shining*, bubbles of gas may be seen, . . . which prove to be a mixture of oxygen and nitrogen. . . . Meanwhile the green matter rapidly grows, its new parts, as they are developed, being all day long covered with air-bells, which disappear as soon as the sun has set. If these observations are made upon a stream of water which runs slowly, it will be discovered that the green matter serves as food for thousands of aquatic insects, which make their habitations in it.'* Such is the general succession of nutritive actions on the organized creation. The highest animal is either directly dependent upon the vegetable kingdom for the materials of its fabric, or it is furnished with these by some other animal, this again (it may be) by another, and so on, the last in the series being *always* necessitated to find its support in the *vegetable kingdom*, since the animal does not possess the power of causing the *inorganic elements* to unite into even the simplest organic compound. *This power is possessed in a high degree by PLANTS; but it can only be exercised under the influence of light.*"

"If a few garden seeds of any kind be sown in a flower-pot, and be caused to germinate in a *dark room*, it will soon be perceived that although they can grow for a time without the influence of *light*, that time is *limited*; the weight of their solid contents diminishes, although their *bulk* may increase by the absorption of water; their young leaves, if any should be put forth, are of a *yellow or grey-white color*; and they soon fade and die. But if these plants are brought out sufficiently soon into the *bright sunlight* they speedily begin to turn *green*, they unfold their leaves, and evolve their different parts in a natural way;" . . .

"Various experiments have been recently made, with the view of determining more precisely the conditions under which light acts, in producing the chemical changes that have been discovered. These experiments, for the most part, agree in the very interesting result, that the amount of car-

* Professor Draper on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants, p. 25.

of the sun, but were indefinitely long periods—ages, perhaps myriads of ages in length—embarrasses him, in like

bonic acid, decomposed by plants, subjected to the differently-colored rays of the solar spectrum, but otherwise placed in similar circumstances, varies with the *illuminating power of the rays*, and not with their *heating* or their *chemical* power. The method adopted by Professor Draper, which seems altogether the most satisfactory, consisted in exposing leaves of grass in tubes filled with water which had been saturated with carbonic acid (after the expulsion of the previously dissolved air by boiling) to the influence of the different rays of the solar spectrum dispersed by a prism. These were kept motionless upon the tubes for a sufficient length of time to produce an active decomposition of the gas in the tubes which were most favorably influenced by the solar beams; and the relative quantities of the oxygen set free were then measured. It was then evident that the action had been almost entirely confined to two of the tubes, one of them being placed in the red and orange part of the spectrum, and the other in the yellow and green. The quantity of carbonic acid decomposed by the plant in the latter of these, was to that decomposed in the former, in the ratio of *nine to five*; the quantity found in the tube that had been placed in the green and blue portion of the spectrum, would not amount in the same proportion to *one*; and in the other tubes it was absolutely nothing, or extremely minute. Hence, it is obvious, that the yellow ray verging into orange on one side, and into green on the other, is the situation of the greatest exciting power possessed by light on this most important function of plants; and as this coincides with the seat of the *greatest illuminating power* of the spectrum, it can scarcely be doubted that *light* is the agent here concerned, more especially as the place of the greatest *heat* is in the red ray, and that of the greatest chemical power is in the blue, both of which rays were found to be quite inert in the experiment. . . .

"The effect of the complete and continued withdrawal of *light* from a growing plant, is to produce an *etiolation* or blanching of its green surface, a loss of weight of the solid parts, owing to the continued disengagement of carbon from its tissues, unbalanced by the fixation of that element from the atmosphere; a dropical distension of the tissues in consequence of the continued absorption of water which is not got rid of by exhalation; a want of power to form its peculiar secretions, or even to generate new tissues, after the materials, previously stored up, have been exhausted; in fine, a cessation of all the operations most necessary to the preservation of the vitality of the structures, of which cessation its death is the inevitable result. . . .

"There is one period in the life of the flowering plant, however, in which the influence of light is rather injurious than beneficial; this is during the first part of the process of germination of seeds, which is decidedly retarded by its agency. This forms no exception, however, to the general rule, since the decomposition of the carbonic acid of the atmosphere, and the fixation of carbon in the tissues, do not constitute a part of the operation. On the contrary, the embryo being nourished, like an animal, by organic compounds previously elaborated and stored up in the seed, the chemical changes which take place in them involve the opposite action—the extrin-

manner, with inexplicable difficulties. 1. Instead of adhering to the doctrine on which he professes to proceed in his philology, that the primordial sense of the words of the narrative is to be considered as the true sense, he quits and contravenes it in his interpretation of *yom*, day; the primary meaning of the root from which it is derived being *warmth—heat*, which is a conspicuous characteristic of day, in contradistinction from night.* No allusion, however, to *this* is made by Professor Lewis! He utters not a syllable on the etymology of the word. How happened this? Amidst his immense researches into the "primordial" signification of the terms of the history, did he forget to look at *yom*? If any meaning had lurked in its root, on which he could have founded an argument for his interpretation, is it probable he would have left it unnoticed? But whatever may have been his reason for passing it in silence, if the ground on which he professes to build the whole fabric of his work has any validity, that the primordial is to be taken as the true sense of the terms of Genesis—it confutes his as-

tion of carbon, which is converted into carbonic acid, by uniting with the oxygen of the atmosphere. It is obvious then, why light should not only be useless, but even prejudicial to this process, since it tends to fix the carbon in the tissues, which ought to be thrown off. As soon, however, as the cotyledons, or seed-leaves, are unfolded, the influence of light upon them becomes as important as it is on the ordinary leaves at a subsequent time; their surfaces become green, and the fixation of carbon from the atmosphere commences. Up to that point, the young plant is diminishing day by day (like a plant that is undergoing etiolation) in the weight of its solid contents, although its bulk has increased by the absorption of water. From the time, however, that its cotyledons begin to act upon the air, under the influence of light, the quantity of solid matter begins to increase; and its augmentation subsequently takes place, at a rate proportional to the amount of green surface exposed, and the degree of light to which it is subjected."—*Carpenter's Elements of Physiology*, pp. 59–67.

* It is referred by Gesenius to a root signifying *to be warm, hot*. *Heat* is exhibited as the characteristic it was designed to express in an article in the Methodist Quarterly Review for April, 1850, by Professor Johnson, Ohio Wesleyan University, from which Mr. Lewis appears to have drawn many of his ideas. How was it that this part of the disquisition escaped his notice? Others have very striking resemblances in an essay in that work on *The Mosaic Account of the Creation* for October, 1852, from Professor Thompson, South Hanover College, Indiana. Notwithstanding the display Professor L. makes of his philology, instead of original, it is taken from others, and the arguments also he employs to sustain it.

sumptions and speculations in respect to the length of the days, and indicates that they were ordinary days of sun light; inasmuch as the warmth of the natural day is one of its most conspicuous characteristics; and it is the only complete, or cyclical period, that has that peculiarity.

2. As the Hebrews undoubtedly had some word at the time when the sacred narrative was written, which was the literal and established name of a natural day, in distinction from all other periods, if *yom* was not that word, Mr. Lewis ought to be able to point to some other term that filled that office. If he knew then of any such term, why has he not indicated it? How happens it that not a syllable has fallen from his pen on that subject? But *yom* is the only word in the Hebrew that denotes a natural day, measured by the revolution of the earth in the light of the sun. It was the original and proper name, therefore, of that day. If not, what has become of the word that was its primary name? That that was its original and proper name indeed, the text itself announces, in the declaration that *God called the light—day*—at the time of creating it; and that each several day of the six consisted of evening and morning. If *yom* was not the literal name of the natural day, but some other word held that office, why was *yom*, and not that other word, used as the name of natural days in the history of the fourth day, in the command, "Let the luminaries of the expanse of heaven, be for signs and for seasons, and for *days* and for years." Here the only periods that are determined by the sun—days, seasons, and years—are distinguished from each other, and *yomim* (days) is indisputably used to denote natural days. Mr. Lewis, himself, admits it. But how did that happen, if that was not the literal established sense of the word? If the times denoted by *yom* in all other instances in the history, were wholly different from natural days, and of great and indeterminable length; and if the sacred writer wished here to distinguish natural days from those indefinitely long periods, would he not have employed some other term as the literal name of natural days? Turn what way he will, Professor L. is met by insuperable difficulties. If he maintains that *yom* is not the literal name of a natural day, he is bound to prove it by producing some other word which was the proper and established name of

that period. But that he cannot do. If he admits that there are no indications that the Hebrews had any other word than *yom* as the name of a natural day, and still denies that that was its proper name; he then either implies that they had no literal name of the day, which he cannot prove, and is impossible; or else, that though *yom* was the real established and only name of a natural day, yet it was not its true and proper name, which is a contradiction and absurdity. What a beautiful position for a man who assumes such lofty airs as a philologist;—who regards himself as of such authority in the world of letters, as to make it an unpardonable crime in any one to question his infallibility! Can anything be more manifest, than that he has no knowledge, except of a very superficial kind, on the subject; that he has never caught a glimpse of the abyss of contradictions and absurdities into which his assumptions and interpretations plunge him?

8. In his attempt to prove that *yom* is used in the narrative to denote indefinitely long periods, from the fact that it is used to denote longer periods than a natural day, he totally overlooks the consideration that in all those instances it is employed by a synecdoche for *time*, and is accompanied by a definition, which shows what the period is, which it is employed to signify; as the day of *affliction* is the *time* of affliction; the day of *slaughter*, is the *time* when men are slaughtered, without consideration whether the time is but a few hours, or a series of days or years. No usage of the Hebrew is more indisputable than this; and it proceeds on the fact, that the word literally denotes a natural day. It were absurd, were not that its settled meaning. Mr. Lewis should have seen, therefore, that he could not establish his point, unless he could show that there is such an express definition of the word in the narrative, as used for some other period than a natural day. But he offers no such proof. He appears, indeed, to have been utterly ignorant of the office of these definitions. He coolly alleges such instances as the day of the Lord, the day of vengeance, the day of Israel, the day of salvation, the day of Jerusalem, in which it is accompanied by such defining terms, as a proof that it is used in the narrative to denote long and indefinite periods, although it is *not* accompanied there by any

terms that show that it is employed as the name of some other period than a natural day! What an exquisite exemplification of his philological knowledge! His argument, therefore, if it proved anything, would prove that it never denoted a literal day. For if its being used in the sense of time, irrespective of length, in those passages where its figurative meaning is expressly indicated, proves that it has that meaning in a dozen passages where it is not accompanied by any such modifying terms, why does it not equally prove it in regard to all others? And that would prove again, or imply, that the Hebrews had no word which was the proper and distinctive name of a natural day; for if *yom* is not that name, then clearly there is none in their vocabulary. What a beautiful display of his critical powers! Who can doubt his thorough mastery of the usages and laws of the language!

4. But his construction of the word is in direct contradiction to the most specific definitions of it throughout the narrative, as the name of a natural day. First, it is declared to have been called day because of its light, which is a peculiarity that belongs to no other period. Next, it is said to consist of evening and morning, which are parts of a natural day, and of no other period of time in the physical world. Third, it is represented as determined by the sun, along with seasons and years; and is, therefore, a natural day, as there is no other period besides seasons and years that is determined by the sun. And fourth, it is used as the name of a natural day in the history of the institution of the Sabbath; as it is used as the name of the period which God consecrated for man's rest, which is a natural day. These are so many plain, point-blank, unanswerable proofs of the error of Professor L.'s construction and philology. If he is master of the language, how is it that he did not see them? If he saw them, how is it that in the face of these and other considerations we have mentioned, he maintains that the word is used in the history,—not as the name of a natural day, but of an indefinitely long period? What is a philology worth, that sets the most indisputable usages of the language at such open defiance?

5. As the narrative is a narrative of the creation of the natural world, and of effects that took place in it; not of the

social or moral world, which then had no existence ; the days of the narrative are indisputably days of the natural world ; that is, of the earth in its relations to the sun. And as they were made up of evening and morning, a period of darkness called night, and of light called day, as all natural days are, if they were days of an indefinitely great length, as Mr. Lewis contends, they plainly must still have been natural days, that is days determined by the revolution of the earth on its axis in the light of the sun. He accordingly, to maintain his position, must show that they were natural days of an indeterminably great length ; and must prove, therefore, that the earth then occupied an indefinitely long period in revolving on its axis. And he must prove it, not from the word *yom*, which has no such meaning ; but from considerations drawn from the nature of the earth itself, the laws that determine the motions of bodies whirled on their axes where they meet nothing to accelerate or retard their rotation. Let him prove, then, if he can, that the earth, at first, had but a slow movement on its axis, and occupied perhaps ages or myriads of ages, in completing a revolution ; and that it gradually accelerated its movements, till it reached its present term of a complete rotation. This will undoubtedly require something more than a pretentious and mistaken philology ; as modern astronomers have demonstrated that for thousands of years, not the slightest trace of a variation in the time occupied by the earth in revolving on its axis, is discoverable ; and it is one of the great laws of motion, that a body projected into space, with an advancing or rotary motion, or both, that meets no resistance from the medium in which it moves, will continue its movements for ever without any acceleration or diminution of their rapidity. In spite of these great facts, however, Prof. Lewis must demonstrate that the earth's rotation originally was indefinitely and inconceivably slow, so that ages on ages, perhaps, were occupied in a single revolution on its axis, and that it subsequently accelerated its movement, till it reached its present rate of rotation ; or else he must abandon his fancy that the days of the creation were of an indefinitely great length.

When he has established these points in a satisfactory manner, as it is apparent that in so slow a whirl of the earth, every part of its surface must have been deprived of the

light and heat of the sun for "indefinite unmeasured periods;" he should then explain how vegetables, to whose life the light and heat of the sun are necessary, could have flourished, though totally deprived of his rays, through the long period that intervened, according to him, between their creation, and the illumination of the earth on the fourth day. This is a knot which it will require all his powers as a philosopher to resolve. But he must untie it in the most scientific and perfect manner, or else he must give up his notion that an "indefinite unmeasured period" of pitch darkness intervened between the creation of vegetables on the third day, and the illumination of the earth by the sun on the fourth day. Why is it that he has hoarded in his own bosom the rare knowledge he has attained on this subject? Why has he not permitted the world to see and admire the dazzling light his genius can throw on it? And finally, as he in effect admits that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh days of the narrative, were measured by the sun, and were therefore natural days, or days of the earth's revolution on its axis, and still maintains that they were of indefinite and immense length, perhaps myriads and millions of ages; he implies that every part of the earth's surface, during one-half of those unmeasured and boundless periods, was wrapped in pitch darkness and divested of the heat of the sun. He should therefore explain, not only how grass, herbs, and trees, but how fish, insects, birds, and beasts, could have subsisted through those periods, when not only all vegetables from which most of them derive their sustenance, must have perished, but a degree of cold must have prevailed, far greater than reigns at the poles, where night continues but for six months. Into what a beautiful paradise has he converted the world by a touch of his philological wand at *bahrah*, *yom*, *olam*; and a few other Hebrew words! What a busy time Adam and Eve must have had, to keep warm through the immeasurably long night of frost and darkness that, on Prof. Lewis's theory, must have intervened between the sixth day, when they were created, and the seventh, which God consecrated for their rest! Even the Professor's chemical combustions, or countless army of flaming volcanoes, would scarcely have sufficed to have kept them from freezing!

His theory of immaterial spiritual entities, as the souls or animating powers of plants, is obnoxious to the most formidable objections.

In the first place, he cannot prove the existence of such spiritual natures. It is not revealed. With all his disposition to twist the Scriptures into the support of his philosophy, he has not been able to adduce a passage that bears the faintest air of supporting this part of his theory. Those imagined entities are not discoverable by the senses. They are, according to him, invisible and immaterial, and cannot therefore be detected by the eye, or any material test; nor can their existence be inferred from the organization, life, or any property of the plants which he maintains they inhabit and animate. Their existence is altogether imaginary, and can never be demonstrated by any process. This fact is fatal to his whole speculation, which he founds on their supposed existence.

In the next place, on the supposition of their existence, he is equally unable to prove that they could fill the office which he assigns them, of generating the plants which were called into existence on the third day. He can never demonstrate that a spiritual entity placed in the earth as he maintains those were, which he ascribes to the herbs, grass, and trees, that were then created, could exert such an influence on the particles of matter with which it was in contact, as to give rise to a material organism, having life, the power of unfolding and augmenting itself, putting forth leaves, boughs, flowers, and seeds, and discharging all the functions of a living and propagating plant. If he can, let him show how it would accomplish that extraordinary effect. Let him state what the natures are of the forces which it would exert for that end, and how they would accomplish their purposes. Let him state how a spiritual entity could institute a connexion between itself, and oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon, and set a variety of forces to work—electricity, magnetism, chemical affinities and repellences, so as to unite those gases to itself, set free oxygen, solidify carbon, form and give life to a germ, and then build it up to a perfect plant. If he cannot do this, he cannot do anything towards the verification of his theory. But he cannot do

this ; as, by his admission, his spiritual entities are invisible, and cannot be detected by any test within the sphere of our senses, while the supposition of their existence is not necessary to account for the germination and growth of plants. All the processes that take place in their growth, are the result of physical powers, that belong to the system of nature ; such as light, heat, electricity, chemical affinities—and are sufficiently accounted for by those forces.

In the third place. But dismissing that objection, and supposing, as he affirms, that his spiritual entities were each "*a nature in the earth, acting through a real dynamical process of its own,*" it is still impossible that that process should have been, what he maintains it was, "*a growth out of the earth, by and through the earth ; in other words, a nature with its laws, stages, successions, and developments ;*" that is, by a *natural process*. There is no growth of a plant by a *nature* or *natural process* through the earth, except from a *seed*, or an *organized germ* in some form, as a bud, root, or sprig. If his supposed spiritual entities, therefore, gave birth to plants by a growth in a natural way, that is according to the nature of plants, and the mode and by the agencies through which they are brought into being, it must have been by the production of seeds, buds, roots, or some other organized part of plants which could be made to germinate and grow to maturity by the forces through which plants naturally germinate and grow. But seeds, buds, roots, and sprigs are never produced in a natural way, except as parts of plants that have already germinated and advanced towards, or actually reached maturity. Their existence, therefore, to be the subjects of a "*dynamical process*" of the spiritual entities, implies that a set of plants had already germinated, grown up, and produced roots, buds, and seeds, which might be made to germinate *before* the spiritual entities commenced their "*process* ;" and those seeds, or roots, and buds, imply that another set of plants had existed from which those they are traced to, were derived ; and so on in an endless series. His spiritual entities, therefore, could never have commenced the organization of plants in a natural way. Their germination, to

have been natural, must have been through a seed or vital organism already in existence. If then those entities exerted their power in germinating seeds, those seeds must, according to nature, have been the product of plants that previously existed. If they exerted their quickening force in causing roots to grow, those roots must, according to nature, have sprung from seeds that had previously germinated, and that were the product, therefore, of a previously existing set of plants; and so on in an interminable series. Professor Lewis's spiritual entities, therefore, instead of answering the end for which he assumes their existence, completely confute his theory; inasmuch as in place of superseding the necessity of God's creating grass, herbs, and trees without any process of growth, the existence of living organisms either in the shape of seeds, roots, or some other part that was susceptible of germination and growth in a natural way, would demonstrably have been necessary in order to the possibility of their exerting their powers in such a condition, that germination in a natural way should have followed. This is a consideration that should not have escaped the eagle-eye of such a philosopher as he is, who in so many instances claims the rare gift of seeing what is not to be seen. Let him extricate himself from this embarrassment, if he can. There is no more ignominious predicament for a speculatist, who arrogates the lofty authority which he claims, than that he overthrows his philosophical system by the very means which he employs to sustain it.

In the fourth place, his notion of a creation, by a growth in a natural way, is thus in the grossest contradiction to nature; and as completely out of the sphere of possibility, as the leaping of plants into existence is without any cause whatever. It is a dream which no one but a theorist, wholly ignorant of the laws of nature, or inconsiderate of the import of his language, could possibly adopt. What more ridiculous spectacle can be conceived, than his immaterial spiritual entities would present, could they be made visible, in endeavoring, like so many monkeys, by grimacing, gesticulating, flirting their tails, and *bahrahing*, that is, cutting and scraping, to call living organisms into existence by a natural process, when no seeds, roots, or other

living organisms were in existence, which, by the terms, were indispensable means or conditions of their exerting their powers in the excitement of germination! The gulf that intervened between Dives and Lazarus, was without breadth, compared to the infinite distance that would separate those spectres from their object. Professor Lewis, however, in fact, though unwittingly, instead of placing his spiritual entities within the sphere of *nature*, as one of its forces, has invested them with a power altogether above it. In endeavoring to get rid of one Creator, he has called an infinite host on to the stage, and clothed them with the prerogatives of the Deity; for it is as impossible that such agents as his spiritual entities, unless omnipotent and omniscient, should call living vegetable organisms into existence, as it is that they should speak a whole material universe into being! A pretty system, truly, to be palmed off on the world, under the sacred name of Biblical philology.

His theory, that the bodies of the fish and fowls were produced in a natural way, by the organizing power of their spiritual entities placed in the water, and the bodies of the beasts and reptiles, by their spiritual entities placed in the earth, is, if possible, a still greater monstrosity in philosophy and theology.

1. He assumes that their immaterial spiritual entities were created, and, for aught that appears, had a conscious existence before the creation of their bodies. He offers no proof of it, however, and cannot. There is nothing in the inspired history to sustain it; there is nothing in physiology to support or favor it. Instead, every known fact of the nature and life of animals is against it. There is not the slightest reason to believe that their conscious natures do or can subsist, except in union to their physical organisms. To suppose that they may and do, is, in effect, to suppose that they continue to exist after the death of their bodies. Does Professor Lewis hold that they are immortal? How can he prove that they are not, if he maintains that they may exist, and did, no one knows how long, anterior to the creation of their bodies?

2. Let it be supposed, however, that their spiritual entities were created anterior to their bodies, and were placed in the water and earth, Professor Lewis still would not be

able to prove that they could generate their several bodies by their imagined organizing and vitalizing powers. If he can, let him do it. Let him show what those vitalizing powers are, and how they would exert themselves on the particles of matter by which they were surrounded. What are those powers? Are they magnetic, electrical, chemical, or are they those of a voluntary agent; the powers of a will? Let him show how they could institute a connexion between themselves and oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen, and cause them to unite in the structure of the germ-cells, which are the primary elements of animal organisms. If he cannot do this, the whole structure of his theory of the creation of those organisms, by a growth out of the water and earth, under a generative power of their spiritual entities, falls to the ground.

3. But his theory of their *growth* out of the earth and water, in a natural way, under a generating and organizing agency of their spiritual entities, is embarrassed with the still more formidable difficulty, that it implies that their bodies, or their germs, were begotten, conceived, and born, by those spiritual entities, and grew up from their ova, or germs, in the water and earth. If their production and growth was in the way of *nature*, in contradistinction from a direct creation, it must have been in its commencement, as well as in its subsequent stages. There is no production of animal bodies known to nature, except by generation and birth, in some form, by animals already existing. All that now exist are the offspring of others that preceded them; they were in like manner the offspring of an earlier set; and so of each series and individual in the succession, till we reach the first that drew their being, not from a "dynamical process" of nature, but from the omnipotent fiat of God. Professor Lewis's theory, therefore, in fact, implies that the immaterial spiritual entities to which he assigns the high office of generating the bodies of the several animals which they animated, were themselves already possessed of bodies of the same nature as those which they generated; that they were of different sexes, and gave being to their new bodies by generation, conception, and birth, in the usual way! For otherwise it was not a natural process, but altogether above and contradictory to nature. A fine

"idea" of their creation this, got up by a pert philologist, to get rid of the doctrine of the Bible, that God gave existence to the entire natures of the animals that were formed on the fifth and sixth days, by a direct creative fiat! If he wishes mankind to accept it as a true account of their origin, he will find it necessary, we presume, to clear up some of the difficulties with which it is perplexed. And first: Who created those animals that, according to his scheme, generated the bodies of those that were produced, as he maintains, in a natural way, out of the water and earth, on the fifth and sixth days? Not Jehovah, the creator of the heavens and earth. For Professor L. represents that he was the author only of their immaterial spiritual entities. Whence then did they derive their bodies? Were they self-existent, or were they the offspring of a previous set of similar animals? If from a previous set, and they already existed in the world, what necessity was there that they should be put into the water and ground in order to give birth to a new progeny that were to stock the earth? If those pre-existing animals were not already inhabitants of the earth, whence were they derived? Were they brought from some of the other planets, or from some remoter group of worlds? By what law of nature was it, that on the generation of the offspring, which it was their office to bring into being, their spiritual entities left their original bodies, and became the immaterial, vitalizing, and organizing powers of the new bodies which they had produced? Does Professor Lewis hold to the Pythagorean dogma of metempsychosis, or the transmigration of the immaterial spiritual entities of animals? If these imagined processes took place in a natural way, by what law or instinct of nature was it, that the birds, that can exist only in the air, took to the depths of the waters to perform their generative functions; and how was it that they were able to hold their breath there, and subsist without food, through the days and weeks that must naturally have passed before their eggs reached maturity and were laid? How were they hatched in such an element—without, or with the incubation of the parent? How could the spiritual entity of the parent, at the same time, perform the task of incubation in its own proper body, and yet be the spiritual entity, and

vitalizing and organizing power of the egg, and the embryo chick forming in it? It would require sharp practice, at the same time, to fill that office in two wholly separate bodies. By what law or instinct of nature was it that the beasts of the earth and the creeping things buried themselves in the earth, in order to exercise their generative functions? How was it that they subsisted there through weeks and months without food and without air, till their offspring were born? And how was it that their spiritual entities filled the double office at the same time, of animating their own bodies, and the bodies of their offspring? These questions, and a crowd of others, Mr. Lewis must answer, if he flatters himself men of sense will give credence to his philosophy. Do the annals of ignorance and folly present anything that approaches this portentous figment, in silliness and monstrosity?

4. His whole notion of a creation of animals by a "growth" in a natural way, is in utter contradiction to the laws of nature, and could never have been entertained by any but a dreamy speculatist, who draws his philosophy from Plato, without considering what the laws of nature are; or what the results are to which his theory leads. There is no such thing known, or possible, in the sphere of nature, as the generation of animals, except by animals themselves. This fact, which it were a disgrace to any but a mere child to doubt or deny, Professor Lewis ignores, and maintains that all that was originally necessary to the generation of their bodies in life, and the full discharge of all their functions, was, that their spiritual or conscious essences should be buried in the earth or water, and left to act on the matter around them by a dynamical process of their own! The most essential laws of nature, of which he professes to make so much; the most indisputable facts and truths of science, have not the weight of a straw with him, when they lie in the way of his heathenish theory, by which he excludes God from his office and work as creator, and substitutes a host of finite entities in his place, invests them with his attributes and prerogatives, and makes them the authors of their own organized life, which nothing short of a power and intelligence that are infinite like his, could produce.

Such are the main elements of Professor Lewis's cosmology! Such—with a crowd of others which are urged in our review—are some of the objections to which it is obnoxious! Does the history of wild and reckless speculation present anything that equals it in ignorance! Was ever a grosser outrage offered to the Bible, to nature, or to science, than in the pretence that this wretched complication of blunders, contradictions, and impossibilities, is the cosmology of the word of God, and the true "idea" of the origin of the world? Is there a scholar of any rank and authority, in any branch of knowledge, whether philologist, astronomer, chemist, physiologist, metaphysician, or theologian, who would venture to stand up before the world, and avow his belief in it, and claim for it the suffrage either of revelation or any branch of natural science? Is there one, whom such an avowal and advocacy would not consign to utter distrust and disgrace with all men of learning and sense? Yet it was in the presence of this hideous monstrosity, and because of the exposure we made of its revolting features, that Professor Lewis poured out the tempest of ruffian insolence and blackguardism, with which he assailed us in his communications to the *Observer*, and thought by that silly and desperate expedient to save himself from the blow with which he and his book were smitten. Was there ever an author who had less reason for just complaint against one who pointed out his errors? Was ever a writer who put forth such a portentous system of error and absurdity, treated with greater fairness, forbearance, and courtesy, than were maintained towards him, by us? Instead of presenting his blunders, his perversions of the sacred word, and his physiological errors in their fullest dimensions, and most repulsive aspects, we spared him at every point, and contented ourselves with as mild an exhibition of them as we thought consistent with fidelity to the truth. In place of exhausting our powers of confuting and confounding him, we only made a slight essay in that direction. There is not a chapter, there is scarce a series of pages in his book, that is not marked by either such errors or defects, as to be open to the most cutting criticism. What a sad exhibition, at once, of his passions, his taste, and his science, he made, in selecting, in this condition,

such a method of shielding himself, as that to which he has resorted? Instead of indulging in such a whirlwind of rage, false accusation, and low abuse, he should have employed himself exclusively in meeting the objections we had alleged against his cosmology, and should have seen, that if he could not answer them, and in the most effective manner, it would be useless to attempt to save himself from the damaging impression the review was adapted to make. Here was ample scope for all his powers, and matter sufficient to fill as many pages of the *Observer* probably, as the editors of that paper would be likely to yield to his defence of himself.

What, however, is the character of the exculpatory part of his response? Has he met these objections? Has he vindicated his work on any of the chief points on which we assailed it? Has he done anything to show that the view we gave of his system is not in every essential particular just? Has he fairly met us on any of the thirty to forty points on which we animadverted, and proved that we have fallen into any important error? He has not. There is nothing in his response, indeed, that deserves the name of proof or argument. It is made up from beginning to end of asseverations; and they are either mere utterances of abuse, groundless complaints, reassertions of the false doctrines of his cosmology, or dogmatic declarations that things are so and so, without any proof; and in all important cases, against indisputable facts. The first, which follows that we last quoted, presents a sample of all of those styles.

"Now who is the man that takes such a position? We may well ask the question. We are justified in examining closely his credentials. Is he the philologist he assumes to be, or has he anything to warrant such an air of infallibility, equal, if not superior, to any that has ever been challenged for the Vatican itself? In testing such an assumption an appeal might be made to his general writings; but a sufficient evidence may be drawn from the attack which has occasioned these remarks. We ask the reader's most candid attention to the point we now present, and to the test it affords. In the book so vehemently assailed, a very large portion, perhaps the greater part, is devoted to an extended examination of certain Hebrew words. These are traced to their roots; their primary and secondary meanings are carefully analyzed; then are examined the peculiar circum-

stances and modes of thinking, which, in different ages, would modify the current view of their meaning. An effort is made to obtain that position, which, divesting us of all alien, modern conceptions, would take us back of them to the primitive image—*this primitive image*, in the interpretation of so old a record, being esteemed *a matter of the first importance*. These words, in Gen. i., are compared with their applications in other parts of the Hebrew Scriptures. Their kindred roots are examined in the cognate tongues; their translations are diligently studied in the ancient versions. The idea which lies at their root is traced in other languages not of the same phonetic family, but presenting the same law of thought. Especially is this the case with the words denoting *nature, origin, generation, creation, birth*, etc. And thus is there an effort made to get back to those views of *their primitive force*, without which no one should ever think of interpreting them in any passage that involves difficulty, and especially on a subject having in itself so much importance, and so much out of the common track of thought, as that of origin or creation. Now it is not for us to say whether the philological investigation was conducted well or ill; but this we do say, it was entitled to some attention. The book was not worth reviewing, or this was *not* the chief matter to be reviewed. [What beautiful harmony subsists between these two propositions!] And yet we have the remarkable fact that in a pretended examination, occupying more than seventy octavo pages, there is hardly any notice taken of it at all. The *etymological deductions* are unnoticed; the extended *citations* from other parts of the Hebrew Scriptures are unnoticed. There is especially the long argument from Prov. viii.; from Micah v.; from Psalms xc., cx., civ., clxv., and many parts of Job and Isaiah; there is the argument at great length from the use of the Greek *aion* and Hebrew *olam*, as employed equally for *ages* and *worlds*; but all this is utterly passed over as probably having no bearing upon the question! The aid derived from the ancient versions is ignored as of no manner of importance. Now how shall we account for this total silence in respect to everything which a scholar, or theologian, would regard as forming the real merit or demerit of the work? But one answer can be given. The critic knows nothing about it—not enough even to see its importance or bearing upon the true interpretation; else he would not have so completely avoided *the true issues*, and filled his seventy pages with a senseless rigmarole about *infidelity* and *Platonism*, and the danger to revelation from *philosophy*, interlarded in almost every paragraph with insinuations against the faith and honesty of those who differ from him.

“What right has such a man to pretend to sit in judgment on

such a work, and instead of entering into *the real issues* to do nothing more than to repeat over and over again, *ad nauseam*, a few propositions that are continually assuming the matter in controversy? Day means day—that is twenty-four hours, and that is the end of it. It *can* mean nothing else, and the Hebrew *yom* can mean nothing else. It is 'plain,' 'palpable,' 'self-evident.' To assert otherwise is a 'monstrous perversion' of Scripture, and common sense, etc. It is Platonism, or Origenism, or something else equally bad. Moses could have had no other idea than that of a solar day. The other supposition is a 'palpable absurdity.' The word means nothing else, and the man is an infidel, a bad-meaning infidel, who would even attempt to prove that it *can* mean anything else; and so on for seventy pages."

Had it been the aim of Professor Lewis to frame a passage that should exhibit the most indisputable proof that either he has no comprehension of the true nature of the controversy between us, or else that he is utterly reckless, and capable of any false statement by which he may hope to shield himself from the discredit in which the errors of his book involve him, he could scarcely have penned one more suited to that end than this. He proceeds in it on the most unhesitating assumption, that the question whether the cosmology he ascribes to the first chapter of Genesis is true or not, turns on the truth or error of his etymologies. No greater mistake was ever made by a superficial and bewildered mind. The question whether his notion of the primordial meaning of three or four Hebrew verbs, and three or four Hebrew nouns, on which he builds the whole fabric of his philology, is true or not, is not of the slightest consequence in the controversy. The poor gentleman, it would seem, does not know what his own system is, nor what the considerations are that show its error, and strike it hopelessly to the dust.

His cosmology is, in all its essential features, a mere *philosophy of nature*, drawn from Plato, and the modern theories of geology; that is neither taught in the sacred text, nor intruded there, even, by his *philology*! The most proper and effective method, therefore, of confuting it is—not to discuss his *etymologies*, but—after proving that it is not taught in the sacred narrative—to show that it is in open contradiction to the most indisputable and important facts of astronomy, optics, chemistry, and physiology. If

at war with the best ascertained and most essential truths of science, it cannot be sustained by the primary meaning of a half dozen words, that do not in the remotest manner touch its nature.

Thus, the first element of his cosmology is, the doctrine that the matter of which the heavens and earth are made, existed anterior to the creative work that is narrated in Genesis i.; and that that creation accordingly had nothing to do with the origination, or first existence of that matter. "Thus," he says, "we think the whole creation that is meant to be revealed to us IN THE BIBLE, commences with a pre-existent nature," p. 234. But that notion has no ground in *the text*. There is not a hint, nor anything that can be turned into a hint, that the matter of the heavens and earth was in existence *prior* to the work of the Almighty that is there narrated.

The next element in his cosmology is, his notion that the earth, in the form in which it is described in the second verse of the sacred narrative, was "an immense floating nebulosity," or a "measureless," "unfathomable," "fluid mass, or waste of water," "without a bottom." But this notion has no ground in the text. There is nothing there that answers to "nebulosity," a "fluid mass," or a "waste of water, without a bottom." It is a mere theory drawn from Plato, and modern astronomical and geological hypotheses respecting star-clouds, and the existence of the earth in a state of gas and of fusion.

The third element of his system is, the theory that all organized forms, and all masses of matter, are animated by immaterial spiritual entities, which exist antecedently to the forms or masses in which they dwell, and are the forces by which they are formed, and actuated, and discharge their various functions. The text, however, teaches no such doctrine. No philological chemistry can detect a trace of it in the sacred narrative. It is a mere figment drawn from Plato and Origen.

The fourth element of his cosmology is, his theory that the light which was called into existence on the first day, was not the light of the sun, but was the glare of a fire produced by the action of chemical agents on each other in the ocean and earth beneath it. That also is a mere fig-

ment of his philosophy. There is not the shadow of any such doctrine or intimation in the text. Mr. Lewis does not pretend to allege any expression or word in the passage, that gives such a definition of the light that was created, or represents that it was developed from the matter of the earth, in place of being called into existence by the fiat of the Almighty.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh elements in his system are, his notions, that the sun was not then in existence, or at least that there is no proof that it was; that the earth did not then turn on its axis; and that there is no certainty even that it was a part of the solar system. But these points in his theory, have no basis whatever in the sacred narrative. There are no propositions, or words there, that bear any such senses, or can; nor anything in the remotest form approaching them.

The eighth point in his cosmology is, the assumption that the first day of the creation—as well as each of the six that followed—was not a natural day, caused and measured by the light of the sun, but that it was an indefinitely long period, and measured by a mere chemical or volcanic fire and light developed out of the matter of the earth. But there is not a hint to that effect in the text. Professor Lewis, indeed, does not found his interpretation of the word *yom*, day, on its *etymology*. That is against the sense which he ascribes to it, and he takes care therefore to keep it from his readers. But he builds his construction of it, on its occasional use in other parts of the sacred writings by a *figure*, although, in the narrative of the first chapter, it is *not used by a figure*, but is employed in its usual proper sense, as the name of a natural day, measured by the revolution of the earth in the light of the sun.

The ninth point in his system is, his representation, that the atmosphere created on the second day, was developed out of the matter of the earth by a chemical process, in contradistinction from being called into existence by the divine word. But there is nothing whatever in the text that corresponds to this notion. Professor Lewis, does not even affect, in his chapter on the subject, to offer the shadow of a philological reason to sustain it. It is a mere figment of his philosophy.

The tenth element of his cosmology is, that the plants that were created on the third day, were brought into existence by depositing their spiritual entities in the soil, and that those entities then, "by a real dynamical process of their own," germinated their organisms in the way of a natural growth. But no such representation is given in the text. There is not a syllable in it that conveys the slightest hint to that effect.

The eleventh point of his system is, that those plants, consisting of grass, herbs, and trees of various kinds, grew to maturity, and flourished through a vast tract of time—no one knows how many ages—without a ray of sunlight or sun-heat, in the mere glimmer or glare of chemical combustions, or volcanic fires. But no representation or hint to that effect exists in the text. It is a mere blunder, into which Mr. Lewis has fallen, in his ignorance of chemistry and the physiology of plants.

The twelfth point of his cosmological scheme, is his notion that the sun did not appear in the heavens, and begin to illumine and warm the earth, till the fourth day. But there is no declaration to that effect in the text, nor anything that implies it.

The thirteenth element of his system, is the doctrine that the production of the fish and fowls on the fifth day, was accomplished by putting their spiritual entities into the waters, and the generation there of their several bodies in a natural way, and advancement then to maturity by a regular natural growth. But there is nothing of that kind taught in the text. No refinement of philology, no violence of torture, can extract anything from the language of the passage that can give the faintest color of support to it.

The fourteenth element of his system, is the doctrine that the beasts and creeping things called into life on the sixth day, were formed in like manner, by putting their spiritual entities into the ground, and the generation of their bodies there by them, and their growth then to maturity beneath the soil in a natural way.

His cosmology is thus made up of a series of speculative notions drawn in a large degree from Plato, respecting the pre-existence of the matter out of which the heavens and earth were made, the state in which the earth existed, when

enveloped in the ocean; the nature of the light created on the first day; its development from the matter of the earth, and the kind of day it produced; the non-revolution of the earth at the period; its not then forming a part of the solar system; the non-existence or non-shining of the sun till the fourth day; the development of the atmosphere from the matter of the earth; and the physiology of plants and animals—that are not taught in the text, and have no foundation whatever in its terms, or the facts which it narrates. This cosmology, therefore, most manifestly is not a deduction from his *philology*. Instead, his philology, by which his main aim is to prove that the creation narrated in the sacred history, was but a mere shaping of forms out of matter that previously existed; and that that shaping took place under the vitalizing and organizing powers of spiritual entities which it was made to embody, or the forces that are inherent in matter, by a natural process—is an *inference from*, or at best, an attempt to accommodate the text to his *philosophy*, and in its most effective office, is but a mere auxiliary to his cosmological scheme; not its ground or origin. Yield it all the scope that can be claimed for it, and it has no power whatever to demonstrate or touch the main parts of his philosophic system.

As then his cosmology thus lies wholly *out* of the text, and is altogether distinct and different from anything that is taught there, it is clear that the question, whether it is false or not, does not turn upon his *philology*; and that the proper and most effective way of confuting it is, to show that it is gratuitously assumed, and that it is in contradiction to the most indubitable characteristics and laws of matter—or at war with facts and principles that are scientifically established in the several departments of natural knowledge, such as astronomy, optics, chemistry, and the physiology of plants and animals. We, in our review, accordingly confuted in that manner all these constituents of his cosmological system.

Thus, we confuted his assumption that the matter of the heavens and earth existed prior to the creation narrated in Genesis, by showing that according to his construction of the "beginning," as the beginning of God's agency towards it, that matter must have been self-existent, and that that

would have precluded God from giving it a form, or exerting any fashioning agency on it; inasmuch as if it were self-existent, the cause of its existence lying in itself, must have been the cause of its existing in those identical shapes which it actually bears. Its assuming those shapes, therefore, could not be in any sense the work of an agent, like Jehovah, wholly exterior to itself.

We confuted, in like manner, his notion that the earth was a chaos, by showing that it is gratuitously assumed; that it directly contradicts the text, in denying that the globe had then any solid nucleus of earth on which the ocean rested; and that it is in equal contradiction to the most certain facts in respect to the bulk of the sphere, inasmuch as it implies that the mass of the ocean was then immensely greater than it now is; and represents the solid parts of the globe as existing in a form which we have no reason to believe they were ever capable of assuming under any forces that belong to their nature.

We refuted his theory of immaterial spiritual entities as the formative and actuating powers or principles of all masses, and all organized forms of matter, by showing that it is assumed without evidence; that it is impossible to prove the existence of such entities; and that the powers and agencies which Prof. L. ascribes to them, are in contradiction to the facts and laws of nature; inasmuch as he virtually assumes that they are conscious voluntary agents, and that they exert forces, such as those of chemistry, magnetism, electricity, and others, that belong only to matter; and yet affirms that they produce their effects in a natural way, or according to the laws of living material organisms.

We set aside his theory that the light that was created on the first day, was a mere fire, produced by a chemical combustion, or the jet of volcanoes into the space above the ocean, by showing that it is assumed without evidence; that it is impossible for him to prove that any such combustion took place; that it is in contradiction to the text, which declares that the light which God created, was *light*—and the light that is called day, not fire—and was therefore the light of the sun, which is the only light that produces day, and bears that name: and that it is in contradiction to the laws of nature; inasmuch as chemical or volcanic fires

never produce morning and day, and divide them from night ; and they are wholly incapable of filling the place of sun-light and sun-heat in sustaining the life of the vegetables, that were created on the third day ; which, Prof. Lewis maintains, flourished in their burning glare or flickering glimmer, through an unmeasured round of years.

We met his notion, that the sun was not in existence on the first day, and that the earth did not turn on its axis, and did not belong even to the solar system, by showing that they are assumed without evidence ; that they are wholly irreconcilable with the representation of the text, inasmuch as day and night, morning and evening, could not have resulted from the creation of light, unless it had been the light of an orb like the sun at a distance, in which the earth revolved on its axis ; and that they are also in the most open contradiction to the laws of matter ; inasmuch as to suppose that the earth was not connected with the solar system, which was indubitably then in existence, is to suppose that it was not subject to the gravitating force that is inherent in all matter ; and that is to suppose that its elements had no weight, and were not subject to any power that could have kept them in combination.

We confuted his theory that the first day of the creation, as well as those that followed, was not a natural day, by showing that it is against the plain and indubitable representation of the text, which defines the day by the clearest marks as a natural day ; and against the laws of nature, by which, no evening and morning, no night nor day, is produced, except by the revolution of the earth in the light of the sun.

We set aside his representation that the atmosphere was developed out of the "semi-chaotic" matter of the world, instead of being created, by showing that it is gratuitously assumed by him, and is in contradiction to the laws of matter ; first, because there is no such thing known as an immaterial entity of the atmosphere, that, as he maintains, has the power of exerting forces, like those of chemical agents, on the matter of the globe, evolving oxygen and nitrogen, and uniting them so as to form atmospheric air ; and next, because there are no chemical agents known that could have evolved those gases in such a mode, and on

such a scale, as to form the atmosphere; and finally, that the chemical combustions or volcanic fires, which he represents as enveloping the globe—had they been possible without an atmosphere—would have caused oxygen to enter into combination with the matter that was burned, and formed a solid, in place of being set free and uniting with nitrogen to constitute atmospheric air.

We confuted his theory that the plants that were created were generated in a natural way by spiritual entities deposited in the earth, by showing that he assumes the existence of those entities without proof; that his theory implies that they are conscious existences, which is inconsistent with the nature of plants; and that it contradicts the laws of their germination and production by nature, which takes place exclusively from seeds, germs, or parts of plants already formed; not immaterial, spiritual entities, which are unknown to nature.

We confuted his theory that the plants created on the third day, grew and flourished without sun-light—in the glare or gleam of chemical or volcanic fires, by showing that their existence in such a fire, and without the light of the sun, was against their nature and impossible.

We set aside his representation that the sun was not created, or at least did not shine till the fourth day, by showing that it is in contradiction both to the text and the laws of nature; inasmuch as it implies that light existed; that days and nights, mornings and evenings had revolved; and that vegetables had existed and flourished through long periods without the sun—which is in contradiction to nature; since it is the sun alone that gives the light that makes day; it is by the revolution alone of the earth in the light of the sun, that morning, day, evening, and night can take place; and it is in sun-light alone that plants can exist and reach maturity.

We have disproved his theory that the fish and fowls created on the fifth day, were generated by their spiritual entities in the waters in a natural way, and that their bodies advanced from their embryo state to maturity by a natural growth; by showing that it is in the grossest contradiction to nature; inasmuch as there is no generation of animals known to nature, except by other animals of the same kind. Animals are never begotten and born by their own spiritual

entities. And finally, we have disproved his theory, in like manner, that the beasts and reptiles created on the sixth day, were brought into being by the generative power of their spiritual entities, and grew to maturity in a natural way.

Nothing can be more certain, then, than that we took the right method of overturning his cosmological system, and accomplished it effectually. As it has no ground whatever in the text, but is a wholly foreign scheme, and is not even touched by his philology, to discuss his etymologies was not the proper way to refute it. They belong to a wholly different sphere. The overturning, or the non-overturning of his etymologies, has nothing to do with the overthrow of the main parts of his philosophy; nor the overthrow of his philosophy, anything to do with the maintenance or defeat of his etymologies. It is the Professor, therefore, not we, who has failed to comprehend his system, and see what the proper means are of overthrowing it. "We ask the reader's most candid attention" to this "point, and the test it affords" of Professor Lewis's capacity. For "how shall we account for this total silence" in his response "in respect to everything which a scholar or theologian would regard as forming the real" substance and "merit or demerit of" his "work? But one answer can be given;" unless we question his fairness. He "knows nothing about it—not even enough to perceive" what the great points of his system are, or their "bearing upon the interpretation" he gives of a few of the leading words of the sacred narrative. "Else he would not have so completely avoided the true issues" of his discussion, and "filled" his communications to the *Observer* "with a senseless rigmarole about infidelity and Platonism," "interlarded in almost every paragraph, with insinuations" against the knowledge of the reviewer, whom he finds himself so wholly unable to answer!

He falls into an equal error also, in his assumption that if his philology is set aside, it must be proved that the primary meanings of the principal terms on which he dilates, were not those which he ascribes to them. It was not necessary, however, for us to controvert his etymologies of the verbs translated create and bring forth, or the noun

toledoth—from which he endeavors to sustain his theory that creation was a shaping, a generation, and a growth—in order to show that his interpretation of them is mistaken. He proceeds in his argument respecting them on the assumption, that their primordial meaning must be the meaning with which they are employed in the narrative; which is equivalent to assuming, against the most indisputable certainty, that they have no secondary meanings! A beautiful exploit, truly, for a philologist who would have his readers believe that he has mastered all the intricacies of the language, and takes the most scrupulous care to evolve the true import of its terms! Let him admit that those words have other meanings besides that which they primarily bore, and that their meaning in the narrative of the creation differs from their primordial signification—which no scholar will venture to deny—and the whole fabric of his philology falls to the ground. The fact that *bahrah* primarily means *to cut and shave*, is no more proof that it does not also mean to make and create, than the fact that *manumit* originally meant to *send out of the hand*, proves that it does not now mean simply to *free from bondage or slavery*. The mere fact that *toledoth* originally meant generation, is no more proof that it does not also mean origin simply, than the fact that generation in our language primarily means the begetting or conception of living creatures, is a proof that the term is not also used in the sense simply of origination or production; as in the expression, the generation of noxious exhalations, of gases, and of crystals by a chemical process. Nor, does the fact that *dahshah*, rendered *bring forth*, in the expression, “let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit after his kind,” literally means *to sprout, to spring up*, any more prove that the grass, herbs, and trees sprung up in a *natural* way; inasmuch as that would imply that they sprung from seeds, roots, or some other part of organisms of their own kinds already existing in the earth; which is inconsistent with the fact that they were then in their whole being first called into existence. It was enough for us to set his construction aside, to show that *bahrah* cannot have the meaning, Genesis i. 1, which he ascribes to it, but has the sense expressed by our verb *create*; and that *dahshah* cannot have the meaning he

assigns it; but that the command, "Let the earth *sprout up*, or *shoot up* grass, the herb, and the tree," is only a command that the herbs and trees should spring into existence by the divine power, not by a natural germination from seeds and roots; and that we proved.

Thus we showed that *bahrah* (Genesis i. 1) cannot mean *to cut, carve, and shave*, because it was inconsistent with God's nature to form the heavens and earth with a knife or other cutting instrument. He produces effects by his simple volition, not by the muscular power of a hand, and the use of an implement. It is indisputable, therefore, that the verb is not employed in its primitive sense.

Next: we showed that it cannot be used in the sense of separating, as in cutting and shaving particles are separated from the mass that is cut; because a large share of the divine acts after the earth was brought into existence, were not acts of separating, but of direct creation, as of light, the atmosphere, plants, animals, and man: and that the formation of plants and animals, if it had been by a growth, would not have been a separation of particles, but an aggregation and union of them in a living structure.

Thirdly: we showed that it cannot have been used to denote a mere fashioning or shaping of preëxisting materials; inasmuch as the verse expressly declares that in *the beginning*, that is the beginning of the heavens and earth, God created them. That creation must have been the commencement of their existence; otherwise it would not have been the beginning, but only a modification of them. Moreover, as that was the beginning undoubtedly of God's agency towards them, to suppose that the matter of which they consist, existed previously, is in effect to suppose that they were self-existent; and that is to imply that God could not have exerted a *shaping and fashioning* agency on them; since, if they were self-existent, their nature must necessarily have been the reason of their existing in some particular shape; and that would as necessarily have been the shape in which they actually existed. The fancy, therefore, that God could have changed their shape, is the fancy that he could have *altered the mode of their self-existence*, which is a contradiction. It is as certain, therefore, as any self-evident truth can be, that the act which the verb *bahrah* denotes,

was the absolute gift to the heavens and earth of their existence. It was a production of them out of nothing, by his omnipotent will.

Fourthly: we showed that that is the true meaning of the verb in the narrative, from the fact that it is used to express the production of man, whose spiritual nature indubitably had no previous existence. We might have added, that Gesenius gives to *form*, to *create*, to *produce*, as its secondary meanings, and cites these very passages and others of the kind, Gen. i. 1, 27, v. 1, 2, vi. 7, as examples of its use in that sense.

Fifthly: we alleged also the admission of Professor Lewis himself, that the word is used, in narrating the creation of man in the image of God, to denote a real creation by the direct gift of existence. He goes so far even as to assert that *ahsah* and *bahrah*, "*he made or he created*," "*are only general modes of expressing THE FACT of the divine production*, whether such production be *direct* or through *media*," p. 247. What more ample confutation of his construction of the verb—which is the main pillar in his philological fabric—could be asked, than thus to prove from the nature of the case, that it cannot be used to denote either cutting, separating, or shaping, but must mean directly and absolutely to bring into existence; to show that it is used in that sense in the narrative; to show that it is held to be employed in that sense in Genesis i. 1, 27, v. 1, 2, and vi. 7, by the very lexicographer from whom Professor Lewis drew his knowledge, that to *cut* is its primitive meaning; and finally, to cite the Professor himself, specifically admitting that direct production and absolute creation are its legitimate and true meaning? Yet in the face of this confutation of his notion of the signification of this verb, on which the whole of his philology depends—for if he gives up his notion of creation, and admits that it was a direct production in distinction from a shaping and growth by a natural process, he abandons his whole system—he has the injustice to complain that we took no notice of his philology!

In like manner, we showed that the verb *dahshah*, rendered *bring forth*, in the narrative of the creation of vegetables, cannot mean, as Professor Lewis maintains, to sprout or spring up in a natural way. First, because no sprouting or

springing up of grass, herbs, or trees, is known to nature, except from seeds, roots, or sprigs, which are parts of previously existing herbs or trees. Next, that they cannot have come into existence in the mode which his theory represents, through the agency of immaterial spiritual entities deposited in the soil, both because no such entities are known to nature, and because, had they existed, as he avers, and filled the office of seeds or roots, in generating the herbs and trees, the production of the herbs and trees, through such an agency, would not have been according to nature. Thirdly, we alleged the express declaration of the sacred narrative, that in the day in which the heavens and earth were created, "the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and *every plant of the field*, BEFORE IT WAS IN THE EARTH, and *every herb of the field* BEFORE IT GREW;" which means, plainly, that the plants and herbs which God created, were not made by a *growth*, in the manner in which they are now formed, but by a direct creation, and before they were formed as they now are by a germination, from roots and seeds. Can anything be more certain, than that if God made every one of them "before they grew," he did not make them by a *natural growth*? Can anything be more clear, than that if he made every one of them before they were in the earth as a natural production, he did not make them by causing them to sprout up in a natural way from seeds or roots deposited in the earth? Is it possible to frame a statement that should more unequivocally declare, on the one side, that they were brought into existence by the fiat of the Creator; and on the other, that they were not produced by sprouting and growth in a natural way? Fourthly, we cited the declaration of the apostle, Heb. xi. 3. "By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God, so that not from things that appear, were *the things that are seen made*;" which is a direct negative to Professor L.'s theory, that they were formed out of pre-existing matter, and by a process of shaping and growth. And finally, we alleged, as further proof that his interpretation is wrong, that it exhibits the earth as the active agent in the production of the plants and trees, instead of God; which was impossible, as the soil had no inherent power by which it could shoot up vegetables without seeds or roots.

As there was no mode in which they could have been called into existence in a natural way, inasmuch as that would have required the previous existence of seeds or roots, from which they might have grown, they must have been called into being by a direct and absolute gift to them of their existence. The fiat, therefore, by which they were created, was the same in meaning, as though its language had been: Let grass rise or stand out of the earth, the herb yielding seed, and the tree yielding fruit. And we might have added, that Professor L., in fact, admits this, though he, at the same time, represents that it was *through* nature, not by the direct act of God, that the creation was wrought. Thus he says—

“As in all the other periods, so here there was, doubtless, the instantaneous beginning of a new, and at first, *supernatural force* put into *nature*. Vegetable life had a moment when it began to be—a new thing upon the earth, unborn and undeveloped out of *anything previously existing*. The earth, by any natural power previously imparted, or previously exercised, would never have produced it; but then when the new energy is imparted, the mode or law of production is *through* the earth.”—P. 197.

If he means by this last expression, anything more than that the herbs and trees were created in that connexion with the soil, by being rooted in it, which was requisite in order to their life and health, and that the oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and other elements, of which they were constituted, were taken from the matter of the earth that previously existed; then his two representations are inconsistent with each other. If the force that gave existence to the plants, was a “*supernatural force*,” then it cannot have belonged to nature, but was distinct from and above it, and was the power of the omnipotent Creator who spoke the fiat. There was no “*supernatural force*” then communicated to the earth, by which it became capable of shooting up plants without seeds, roots, or any media whatever; no such power belongs to the earth. The supposition is in contradiction to the very theory which it is Mr. Lewis's aim to maintain, that the plants and trees were produced in the way of *nature*, in contradistinction from a *supernatural* method or creation by the immediate act of God.

We, in like manner, set aside the sense of generation in a natural way, which he endeavors to attach to *shahrats*, translated *bring forth*, in the command, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven;" by citing the verses which next follow, in which it is declared that God *created* all those moving and flying creatures. "And God *created* great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every winged fowl, after his kind." As they were all thus *created* by God, they cannot have been produced, as Mr. Lewis contends, by a process of nature. We might have added, that the etymology of the verb does not favor his theory; as its primary meaning, according to Gesenius, is—not to generate or bear—but to *crawl*, to *creep*. A secondary sense is, to *teem*, to *swarm with*; and that is the sense which lexicographers assign it in these verses. The command, translated according to the literal sense of the verb, is, therefore, "Let the waters *swarm with* the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth. And God *created* every living creature that moveth, which the waters swarmed with, after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind." The verb thus presents no intimation that the living creatures were produced in the waters by a *generation* and growth according to *nature*; but is a simple command, that they should swarm, or exist there in multitudes.

In respect to the sense which he attaches to the verb *yahtsah*, rendered *bring forth*, in the command, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind;" as he scarce utters a word in regard to it, but passes it, apparently, to avoid startling his readers by openly advancing the absurd doctrine that those animals were generated in the earth, and grew there to maturity by a natural process; we thought it unnecessary to give an extended refutation of his construction, but contented ourselves with showing that, if consistent, he should maintain that man also was brought into existence by the same natural generative, developing, and maturing process. We might have added, that the etymology of the verb does not sustain his theory;

as its primary signification is *to go out, to go forth*. But that meaning does not suit the passage, as it was not the earth that was to go out or forth, but the animals were to go out of the earth. It is used in a secondary sense therefore, which, like several others, in which it is employed, is accommodated to the nature of the thing to which it is applied, and is well rendered by our verb "bring forth," which simply indicates that the creatures commanded into being, were to proceed from the earth, not that they were to be generated and reared in it in a natural way; which were a contradiction to their nature.

But it may, perhaps, be asked, if the creation which these verbs are employed to express was a direct and absolute production, such as the verb *create* denotes, why is it that that verb was not used throughout the narrative, in the place of these? The answer is; it was inappropriate in the passages where these are employed; while these are perfectly proper to express a creation of the various objects that were made in the mode in which they were brought into existence by the divine fiat, and would have appeared to the eye of a spectator. The history consists of two parts: one of which narrates in the past tense, what God had done; the other states the imperative acts by which he commanded what he created into existence. In the former, the verbs answering to *create* and *made* are used. Thus it is first announced that "in the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth." Next, that he "*made* the expanse of heaven;" then that he "*made* two great lights;" on the fifth day, that he "*created* great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters swarmed with after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind;" and on the sixth day, that he "*made* the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after his kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind;" and that he "*created* man in his image, in the image of God *created* he him, male and female *created* he them." And finally, after the creation was finished, the language of the narrative is, "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth, when they were created, in the day when the Lord God made the earth and the heavens; and every plant of the field before it was in the earth; and every herb of the field before it grew."

Thus in all these passages which relate what God had done in calling the heavens and earth, and the vegetables, animals, and man, with which the earth was stocked, into being, the verb *create* is used to express the mode in which he gave them existence; and it shows that it was in each instance by his immediate word, and not by the instrumentality of second causes. The other parts of the history, which state the omnipotent words by which he commanded them into being, must accordingly be construed in harmony with this; and they are perfectly appropriate to indicate the production in that manner of the several objects that were called into being by them, for which the use of the verb "create" in the imperative, would have been unsuitable. Thus, had it been said—let light be created; let the expanse of heaven be created; let grass, herbs, and trees be created; it would have implied that the command was addressed to an agent who was to create them; and, therefore, that he was a different being from God. Instead of that, therefore, verbs are used that present God as the acting agent, and exhibit the several things which he called into existence in the positions and spheres that belong to them, and as they would have appeared to a human spectator, had he witnessed their creation by the divine fiat. Thus, "Let there be light;" "Let there be an expanse;" are the most simple forms conceivable in which the command by a word of those elements into existence, could be expressed. God is exhibited as the agent; and light and the atmosphere as the instantaneous effects of his word. And so of the fiat, "Let the luminaries of the expanse of heaven be to divide the day from the night, and let them be for signs and for seasons, and for days and for years." While the command, "Let the earth shoot up grass, the herb and the tree;" "Let the waters swarm with the moving creature that hath life, and fowl;" "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth;" exhibit them as spoken into existence by the divine word, and in that relation to the earth and water—out of which they were formed—in which they would have seemed to a spectator to have sprung into existence. These verbs, some of which express mere existence, as let be; and the others mere origination, as shoot up, swarm, bring forth; are there-

fore the most suitable that could be selected for the purpose, and are perfectly consistent with the fact affirmed in the other parts of the narrative, that all these things, thus originated, were directly and absolutely created by God.

Such—with the proofs we adduced against the sense he assigns to the word *yom*, which we need not now recapitulate—is the confutation we gave in the review of Professor Lewis's philological theory, that the creation of the six days was a mere fashioning of pre-existent matter, took place by a natural process, and occupied an unmeasured and indeterminable period. And that was all that was requisite to our object. It was not necessary, in order to vindicate the history of the creation, Genesis i. and ii., from his misrepresentation, that we should set aside his disquisitions respecting Proverbs viii., Micah v., Psalms xc., civ., cx., cxlv., and other passages of the Old Testament. There, in fact, is nothing in his remarks on them to be set aside. The fancy that they *establish* anything, is a delusion which none but “a very singular lunatic, possessed by a most remarkable hallucination,” would indulge. There is nothing in them that has any title to the name of proofs or arguments in support of his theory. They are made up of assumptions, suppositions, conjectures, and mere expressions of opinion. The most favorable concession to his views that can be made in respect to the passages to which he refers, is, that on the *supposition* that his cosmology is correct, some of their terms and expressions *may be* considered as consistent with it! To pretend that they present any independent and absolute *proof* of its truth, is an extravagance of which even “a very singular lunatic, possessed by a most remarkable hallucination,” would scarcely be guilty. The question whether the history of the six days, on the one hand, represents *God's* creative work as consisting simply in his shaping matter that pre-existed into forms; and on the other, in direct contravention of that, represents that they were brought into existence, not by God, but by *immaterial spiritual entities*, that gave being to them in a natural way, does not turn on the use of *olam*, which does not occur in the history of the creation, in other parts of the Hebrew Scriptures, or *aion* in the Greek, nor any other terms or expressions on which Mr. Lewis dilates.

And was there ever a more adequate confutation of a mistaken scheme, than that which we have thus given? Is there a solitary element, either of his philosophy or his philology, that is left undemolished by us? Yet in the presence of this demonstration of the utter error of his speculations, he complains that we have not even touched the points on which he rests the support of his system! To show that the great elements of his cosmology are a mere philosophy, that has no ground whatever in the sacred history, but is in open contradiction to it, and to the facts and laws of nature, is not to present any proof, it seems, that it is wholly false! To show that his philology has no bearing whatever on the main doctrines of his cosmology, is not to prove that his cosmology does not rest on his philology for its basis! And to prove that his philology does not even yield any sanction to his theory that creation was but a shaping of pre-existent matter, and that that shaping was accomplished by immaterial spiritual entities, by a natural "dynamical process of their own," is not, it appears, to try at all the merits of his etymologies! He is not satisfied with having every fragment of those parts of his work which we assailed, swept from beneath him; he wishes to have the life smitten out of his *olams* and *aions* also, it seems, or else nothing is done! Till we have dispatched them, or something else no one knows what, the whole gist of the subject is passed over by us in a dead silence, because of our ignorance of its real merits, and inability to encounter him on the ground where every "scholar" and "theologian" would wish to meet him! It was one of Don Quixote's idiosyncrasies, that though struck to the ground and beaten into "a paste" by those whom he fought, he always imagined that he was the victor. Professor Lewis has a touch of the same spiritual entity in his constitution; he is a victim of the same "remarkable hallucination."

Whether, however, we satisfy him, or not, we trust we have exhibited sufficient proofs to our readers, on the one hand, of the error of his system; and on the other, of the groundlessness of his accusations, and the folly of his complaints, and shown that instead of having painted the objectionable features of his cosmology in too bold an outline or too strong colors in our review, we presented its haggard

shape in far fainter hues than truth would have sanctioned, and expressed our judgment of its unscriptural, unscientific, and treacherous character, in much milder terms than justice would have authorized.

We shall respond to the other parts of his communications to the *Observer*, in our next number.

ART. V.—A DESIGNATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE FIGURES
OF ISAIAH, CHAPTER XXXIV.

THIS chapter is a prediction of destructive judgments that are to be inflicted on the nations who are to be arrayed against Christ's kingdom at his second coming, and of the ruin with which the earth itself is to be smitten where those judgments fall.

1, 2. Apostrophes to the nations and the earth. "Come near, ye nations, to hear, and ye people hearken. Let the earth hear and its fulness, the world and all that comes forth of it," v. 1. This summons implies that the announcement that was about to be uttered is of the utmost moment, not only to the nations, but to the earth itself. It is not a slight event that will soon expend its influence, and leave no trace on the social or physical world of its occurrence, but is to be of the most direful nature, and fix a mark on the scene where it takes place, which time itself shall never erase.

"For there is anger to Jehovah against all nations, and wrath against all their hosts. He has doomed them, he has given them to the slaughter," v. 2. God is to visit them in anger, and take vengeance on them for their sins. That is to be the express object of his providence; the form his dispensation towards them is to take; and one means by which he is to accomplish their destruction is the sword. They are to be devoted to slaughter. The prediction implies that this is to be an extraordinary visitation; not such a common providence as he often exercises over the nations, under which, though destructive wars occur, they still enjoy many seasons of peace, and are crowned with rich bounties.

It is to be a peculiar crisis, of which vengeance is to be the characteristic; and vengeance inflicted by the nations in slaughtering each other.

8. Metaphor, in the use of melt, for drenched, or soaked. "And their slain shall be cast out; and their corpses, their stench shall go up, and the mountains shall be melted with their blood," v. 8. Their slain are to be cast out of their dwellings, cities, or fortresses, and left unburied; which indicates that their number is to be so great, and the difficulties of those who survive, so urgent, that it will be impracticable, or inexpedient to attempt to inter them. The whole atmosphere is to be pervaded by their exhalations. The high grounds on which they are slain are to be softened with their blood, like a soil that is drenched with water, so as to run. This bespeaks a vast destruction, and by the hand of man.

4. Metaphor, in the use of consume, for becoming dim or obscure. "For all the host of heaven shall consume away, and the heavens shall be rolled up like a scroll; and all their hosts shall fade like the fading of a leaf from a vine, and like a withered fig from a fig-tree," v. 4. This prediction is very similar to that of Christ, Matt. xxiv. 29. "Immediately after the tribulation of those days, shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken." The events foreshown in these passages are undoubtedly the same; and our Lord's prediction, therefore, serves to explain that of the prophet. It shows that the period of the vengeance here predicted, is that of Christ's second coming, and that the consuming away of the host of heaven, is their becoming dim, or obscured by clouds, smoke, or some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, so as not to give their light. That the region where these events are to take place, is to be turned into brimstone and burning pitch, shows that there are to be earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, as is foreshown in many other predictions of the vengeance that is to be inflicted at Christ's coming. The rolling up of the heavens, therefore, like a scroll, is to be a rolling of the clouds, which is usually peculiarly violent and threatening at such eruptions: and the fading of the hosts of heaven, their obscuration by the

smoke, vapors, gases, and dust, with which the atmosphere, to a great height, becomes suffused.

5, 6, 7. Comparisons. The rolling of the vapors and smoke with which the air is to be filled, like the rolling up of a scroll, is a motion that is common to clouds hovering over a volcano, and is seen only in them. The ejection of burning lava and vast volumes of flaming gas into the air, and the descent of cold currents from higher regions, generate violent gusts and whirlwinds that sweep the clouds round in circles, and roll them in masses as though they were scrolls. The sun, moon, and stars, instead of shining with a clear and brilliant light, are to be dimmed by the lurid vapors and smoke, like a leaf that withers, or a blighted fig that wears a sickly hue. That the prediction is thus literal; that the events it fore-shows are what the language properly denotes—a rolling up of the cloudy elements with which the atmosphere is to be pervaded, and the dimming of the sun, moon, and stars, is certain, from these comparisons; as it is a law of the simile, that the things that are compared, are those which the terms by which they are designated, literally express. It is the rolling up of that which fills the upper regions of the air, that is compared to the rolling up of a scroll; and the dimming of the celestial orbs that is compared to the fading of a vine leaf: and they are the events, therefore, that are foretold; not political or ecclesiastical events—as spiritualizing commentators imagine—which the language does not signify.

8. Elliptical metaphor, in denominating the instrument of God's vengeance with which the atmosphere is then to be pervaded, his sword. "For my sword in the heaven reeks: behold upon Edom it shall come down; and upon the people of my curse for judgment," v. 5. As God is not then to have a literal sword in the atmosphere, it is a different instrument of destruction that is to exist there, which is denominated his sword; and is the storm of fire and brimstone, the context and other predictions indicate, with which the air is then to be charged by volcanic eruptions. By the heaven, is meant the high region of the air where that storm is to rage; and it is presented as the scene whence God's sword is to descend, to distinguish it from the sword by which it is foreshown in the preceding verses, the

nations are to destroy one another. That aerial sword is represented as already reeking, or saturated with blood, which implies that men will have been destroyed by it, before it descends upon Idumea. And its office is to be to execute his vengeance upon the people whom he has sentenced to destruction.

9. Metonymy of Edom for the people who are then to occupy it. The meaning of the passage therefore is—I have, in the high regions of the air, an instrument of destruction as effective as a sword. It already drips with the blood of crowds who have been slain by it; it shall descend upon Idumea, and be the final infliction on the people whom I have doomed to destruction.

10. Elliptical metaphor, in denominating that fiery storm a sword: “A sword is to Jehovah; it is full of blood; it is smeared with fat; with the blood of lambs and goats; with the fat of the kidneys of rams,” v. 6.

11. Metaphor, in exhibiting the sword as full of blood, to signify that it is drenched, or dripping with it. This also implies that it has already slaughtered a multitude.

12. Metaphor, in denominating the slaughter it is to inflict on Edom, a sacrifice. “For there is to Jehovah a sacrifice in Bozrah, and a great slaughter in the land of Edom. And unicorns shall fall down with them, and bullocks with bulls. And their land shall be soaked with blood; and their land made fat with fatness,” v. 6, 7. That it is not a literal sacrifice, is clear from its being inflicted in vengeance, not in order to propitiation; and from the consideration that the unicorn was not among the animals appointed for sacrifice. That it is to be a literal destruction of life, is seen from the drenching of the earth with blood, and fertilizing it with carcasses, which could result only from a real slaughter; and that it is to extend to animals as well as men, is apparent from their being distinguished from them, precisely as in the following verse, the land is distinguished from the men and beasts by whose blood and carcasses it is enriched. It is called a sacrifice, simply because there is to be a great destruction of choice animals, like that which took place at the feasts; not because of any resemblance in the reason of the destruction to the slaughter of beasts in sacrifice. It is predicted also, in Zechariah xiv. 15, that at the last great battle, when

Jehovah is to appear visibly for the delivery of his people from the nations who are to be assembled at Jerusalem against them, the animals in their tents are to perish by the same plagues as the men. By the unicorn, it is supposed by some a species of gazelle is meant; by others, a species of buffalo. As the instrument by which this destruction is to be wrought, is called a sword, it is in order that the description may accord with that imputed nature, that it is said to be smeared with fat; with the blood of lambs and goats; with the fat of kidneys of rams; as in offering sacrifices, the knife was smeared with the fat as well as the blood; the fat and the kidneys being separated from the victim, and sometimes placed on it on the altar, and sometimes burned by themselves. It is a law that when an agent or instrument is metaphorized, the acts or conditions that are then ascribed to it, are in harmony with the nature that is imputed to it by the figure: as, when "Judah" is called "a lion's whelp," it is added: "he stooped down, he couched as a lion; who shall rouse him up?"

13, 14. Synecdoches, in the use of day and year, for time or period: "For it is a day of vengeance to Jehovah, a year of recompenses for the cause of Zion," v. 8. This shows that the object of Jehovah's interposition is to be the deliverance of Zion from her armed enemies, who are to be assembled against her; and that the time is therefore to be that of Christ's second coming, when he is to descend and destroy the hosts who will have been besieging Jerusalem; as foretold Isaiah lxvi. 15-18; and Zechariah xiv. 1-15; where it is also foreshown that he will plead with them both by fire and by sword, and that the slain of Jehovah shall be many.

The prophet next predicts the consequences to Edom, of this catastrophe. "And her streams shall be turned to pitch, and her dust to brimstone, and her land shall become burning pitch. Day and night it shall not be quenched; for ever shall its smoke go up; from generation to generation shall it lie waste. There shall be no one passing through it for ever and ever," v. 9, 10. This change is to be wrought, doubtless, by a volcanic eruption; the only agent by which such effects are produced; and by the eruption by which the clouds with which the high regions of the air are

to be filled, are to be rolled up as a scroll, and the sun, moon, and stars dimmed, as though fading into extinction. It confirms, therefore, the construction we have placed upon that part of the prediction. And this shows that the event is yet future, as no such catastrophe has hitherto befallen Idumea.

15. Hypocatastasis, in the use of a line and stones as a plummet. "Then shall possess it (as a heritage) the pelican and porcupine; the crane and crow shall dwell in it. And he shall stretch upon it the line of confusion, and the stones of emptiness," v. 11. Stretching a line and stones—as a plummet—the instrument by which spaces, as for buildings or inclosures, were determined, and walls separating them from the surrounding spaces were erected, are used by substitution for other acts, to denote that the region thus desolated, is to be determined in its dimensions, and separated from the neighboring regions, as by a wall; and the designation of the measuring line as a line of confusion, and the stones used as plummets, or stones of emptiness, signifies that it is to be thus set apart and devoted to disorder and desolation. /

"As to the nobles, there shall be none whom they shall call to the kingdom; and all her princes shall be nothing. And thorns shall come up in her palaces; nettles and brambles in her fortresses; and she shall be a home for wolves; a court for ostriches. The wild creatures of the desert shall meet with howling creatures. And the shaggy monster shall call to his fellow; only the night-monster reposes there, and finds for herself a resting-place. There shall the great owl make her nest, and lay, and hatch, and gather under her shadow; and there shall the vultures also be gathered, every one with her mate," v. 12-15. These, as far as their natures are known, are solitary, wild, and odious creatures, that shun the presence of man, and seem formed to live in secluded and desert regions. What a picture of desolation! What a token of the blight with which that scene is for ever to be smitten!

16. Apostrophe. "Seek ye out of the book of Jehovah, and read. No one of them is wanting; no one lacks another (a mate). For my mouth it has commanded; and his Spirit, it has gathered them," v. 16. The persons here addressed, are those to whom the prophecy was to be made

known; and the book of Jehovah which they were to read, is doubtless the prophecy itself, and other parts of the Old Testament, that were written at the time of the prophecy, and speak of the animals which God had created. The meaning of the command, accordingly, is, *Examine this catalogue of wild and odious creatures. You will find they are real, not mere spectres, or fictions. They are creatures that pair and have offspring. For God spoke them into existence, and formed them, wild and unsocial as they are, to live together.*

17, 18. *Hypocatastases*.—"And he has cast the lot for them, and his hand has divided it to them by line. They shall possess it for ever; to all generations shall they dwell therein," v. 17. Casting the lot for them, and dividing that desolate region to them by line, are used as substitutes for appointing it for their exclusive habitation. God created them with the natures that fit them for such a desert; he placed them there; and he has, by a sovereign act, assigned it to them as their home through all generations. This is a most emphatic warning, that the prophecy is to be literally interpreted, and is to have a literal fulfilment. It is not to be spiritualized by treating these birds and beasts as mere representatives of resembling classes of human beings. Instead, it is to be taken in its natural meaning; readers are to see what the several animals are, that are here enumerated; and they will find that they are real existences, and that they will actually possess the land of Idumea, after it has been converted into a solitude and waste, by the volcanic eruption which is here foretold.

The prophecy thus foreshows that there is a period approaching in which God is to inflict vengeance on all nations, and that multitudes of them are to be destroyed by the sword and by the fires of his vengeance; that hostile hosts are to be assembled in Edom; and that the country is to be made a waste by volcanic eruptions, that are to fill the air with rushing clouds, shut out the light of the sun, and destroy the invading armies, with the flocks and herds collected for their sustenance; and that their extermination is to be in order to the deliverance of Jerusalem from their power; that Idumea is thereafter to remain desolate for ever, and to be inhabited only by the wild beasts and birds,

whose nature fits them to dwell in the most desolate and gloomy regions.

Many commentators, however, reject this construction, and assign the prophecy what they denominate a spiritual meaning; making Edom a mere representative of Italy; Bozrah of Rome; Zion of the true church; and those who are to be destroyed, of Roman Catholics. But this interpretation is, in the first place, wholly arbitrary. There is not the slightest ground for it in the text; and no reason can be given for it that will not be equally good for rejecting the grammatical sense of every other part of the Bible, and making its meaning depend wholly on the fancy of the expositor. Such a treatment of the word of God is not merely unjustifiable, it is one of the most reprehensible methods by which its truths are set aside. Next: that interpretation cannot be carried through. If Edom, Bozrah, Zion, the nations, are all representative, and of spiritual things; must not the flocks and herds also, the slaughter, the blood, the pitch and brimstone, and the beasts and birds that are thereafter to inhabit Edom? But if "all the nations" that are to be assembled and perish in Edom, are representatives of all the human beings on whom the catastrophe is to fall, who or what is it that the lambs, goats, bullocks, and unicorns denote? And what sort of a death is it that their slaughter represents? If it is spiritualized, must it not signify a spiritual death? But can the violent death of a lamb, or goat, or a bullock, properly represent the spiritual death; that is, the apostasy from God of a human being? What human beings are there to be at that period who can apostatize from God? Can those who have been renewed? Will not all others already be in apostasy? Can pitch and brimstone be representatives of the means by which men are led into apostasy? It is plainly impossible to carry the spiritualization of the prophecy through, without running into the most revolting extravagances and self-contradictions. It is only by limiting the spiritualization to the places and persons, and treating the other parts of the prophecy—the slaughter, the blood, the desolation, against their own principles, as literal, that those commentators elude these palpable impossibilities and absurdities. Thirdly: What on their theory can the hideous creatures represent

that are for ever to inhabit the country denoted by Edom, after it has been made a waste of burning pitch and brimstone? Can they denote human beings? Is the spiritualized Edom to be inhabited after Christ's coming by apostates, immeasurably worse than the present superstitious and idol-worshipping Catholics? Those unseemly birds and beasts are to propagate for ever. Are apostate human beings for ever to inhabit the earth after the Millennium commences, or closes, and propagate an endless series of generations? Such is the abyss of revolting errors in which the spiritualization of the prophecy plunges those who attempt it. That method of perverting it must, therefore, be abandoned. It must be taken in its plain grammatical sense, and thus interpreted, its predictions are intelligible; are worthy of the subject; and are corroborated by many others, in which the same great events or a portion of them are foreshown; such as Zechariah xiv.; Isaiah ii. xxiv., lxvi.; Matthew xxiv. 29; 2 Thess. i. 7-10; 2 Peter iii. 10.

ART. VI.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. **THE BELIEF OF THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES** concerning Christ's Mission to the Underworld. By Frederic Huidekoper. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Company. New York: C. S. Francis & Co. 1854.

It was the belief of the Christian fathers of the second and third centuries that Hades, the world to which the spirits of men pass at death, is situated in the depths of the earth; that the saints of all ages who had departed anterior to Christ's incarnation, were detained in that prison; and that he, during the period between his death and resurrection, descended there and proclaimed to them his expiation; and in a contest with Satan, vanquished him; and either then released, or prepared a way for the liberation of the saints, and transference to a higher world. It is the object of this volume to exhibit the opinions of the fathers on this subject. They are presented in extracts, chiefly, that are translated, and accompanied with such explanations as the author deemed needful to assist the reader to a just construction of their meaning. He says of the notion entertained by the fathers of the abode of the departed:

"Paradise in Heaven, is, at the present day, regarded as the intermediate abode of the righteous until the resurrection. If any trace of this view can be found in the second and third centuries, it must be by inference, and that a very uncertain one, from the writings, either of Tertullian or Cyprian. The Gnostics, and such of the Catholic Christians as agreed with them in sending departed souls immediately to heaven, had no idea of ever bringing them down again to be united to their bodies. On the other hand, the party among the Catholics who defended a physical and general resurrection—for the two seem to have gone together—condemned as a grievous heresy, the opinion of the soul's direct ascent to heaven, which they regarded as overthrowing the resurrection. They seem to have thought that if the soul once reached heaven and bliss, there was little likelihood of getting it back to earth. Tertullian would almost appear to have gone a step further, and to have concluded that, if people were hereafter to be raised *out of* the earth, the only method of securing this desirable end was by keeping them *under* it, until the appointed time."

Their opinions on this subject, and indeed on the whole work of Christ, especially those of Clemens Alexandrinus and Origen, were extremely crude and mistaken.

2. THE CHRIST OF HISTORY :—An Argument grounded on the Facts of his Life on Earth. By John Young, M.A. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1855.

THIS is a highly original and important exhibition of the proofs with which Christ's history abounds, of his Divine Mission and Deity. How are the peculiarities of his life, as a man, his character, his intelligence, his doctrines, his aims, to be accounted for, unless he was divine? He was born of an obscure family; he had no advantages of education; he labored as a carpenter for his subsistence; he remained unknown to the nation till he entered on his ministry; his ministry and his life itself were short; and yet he exhibited perfect spotlessness, benignity, and wisdom; a perfect comprehension of himself; a perfect knowledge of man, and a perfect intelligence of God; announced himself as divine; proclaimed that he had come into the world to redeem it from sin and its curse, by his death; foretold his resurrection from the dead; revealed his purpose to commission his disciples to preach salvation through his blood; to send the Spirit to renew the hearts of men and bring them to receive him as their Saviour; and to extend the kingdom he was then to establish, until he should conquer all his enemies, subdue the whole race to his sceptre, abolish the curse in all its forms, and make

the world what it was originally designed to be, a world of perfect righteousness, blessedness, and immortal life :—and though opposed, rejected, and put to death, by the Jewish rulers and people, he actually died and rose in the character he claimed as Messiah, and instituted a kingdom that has subsisted through more than eighteen hundred years, into which vast crowds have been gathered, and that has answered in all its features and fortunes thus far, to his predictions respecting its course down to near the time when he foretold he is again to come, and openly assume its sceptre. How are these great facts of his life, which are wholly peculiar to him, which lie wholly out of the sphere of other human minds, to which the faculties of other men, however eminently endowed they are, or cultivated, have been totally inadequate, to be accounted or, except by his deity ! These are the chief topics which Mr. Young treats ;—they form one of the finest themes that can engage the study of a Christian writer ; and they are handled by him in a highly original and happy manner. Many of the aspects in which he presents the Redeemer are in a measure new, and exhibit the glory of his character with eminent beauty, by the truth, delicacy, and force with which they are drawn. The work is excellently suited to correct the vague notions respecting Christ, that prevail with many of the speculative, especially, who have been drawn into the vortex of the fashionable idealistic and pantheistic metaphysics, which place God and man on much the same level. No candid mind can peruse it without seeing Christ's immeasurable elevation above all human beings, and feeling that the perfection of his intelligence, the majesty of his truth and wisdom, and the sublimity of his love, are such as can belong only to an infinite being, and demonstrate that he is divine ; that he is adequate to the work he has undertaken ; and that he has a just title to the homage which he claims.

3. *THE PARABOLIC TEACHING OF CHRIST, or the Engravings of the New Testament.* By the Rev. D. T. K. Drummond, B.A., Oxon. Incumbent of St. Thomas' English Episcopal Chapel, Edinburgh. New York : R. Carter & Brothers. 1855.

MR. DRUMMOND employs the word parable in a more extensive sense than usual,—including under it a great number of comparisons, hypocatastases, and aphoristic sayings, that have no representative office. His expositions of them, however, are eminently evangelical, and present their meaning with clearness and force. He has no far-fetched solutions ; and makes no attempts to deduce doctrines from

the text, that have their origin in his fancy. He divides the parables into four great classes:—1. Those which exhibit the character and condition of man while in alienation from God. 2. Those which exemplify Christ's character and work. 3. Those which exhibit the effect of his grace on individuals. 4. And those which exemplify its working in classes and communities. In this last division, he treats of the parable of the sower, the growing seed, the wheat and tares, the great supper, the wicked husbandmen, and the marriage of the king's son, and finally of the ten virgins, the ten talents, and the sheep and goats, that relate to Christ's second coming, which Mr. Drummond, though not avowing himself a Millenarian, holds is to precede the conversion of the nations, and the institution of the Millennial Kingdom. The expositions are natural, brief, and pointed, and present and enforce the great lessons which the passages teach in an emphatic manner.

4. **THE SOUTHERN CROSS AND SOUTHERN CROWN: or the Gospel in New Zealand.** By Miss Tucker. New York: R. Carter and Brothers. 1855.

THESE beautiful constellations, which shed their splendors on that distant sphere, are the title of a simple and touching history of the introduction and triumph of Christianity in New Zealand, occupied, until within thirty years, by one of the most cruel and debased of the heathenish races; now transformed, in a great measure, into peace, order, subjection to law, and the faith and love of the gospel. The annals of Christianity present few examples that equal it in wonderfulness. It has been most conspicuously and emphatically the work of the Divine Spirit; and displays in a majestic form, his new-creating power, and the beauty of the change that is wrought by his enlightening and renewing gifts. The same apprehensions of Christ are flashed into the minds of the renovated there, however humble their powers, and slight their general knowledge, as here; and the same affections towards him made to glow in their hearts. A crowd already, after having given bright evidences of their reconciliation to God, have passed from that scene to the realms of light: and there is reason to hope the gospel will continue to triumph there, till Christ comes in the clouds of heaven, and reduces all the tribes of the earth to submission to his sceptre, and raises them from the degradation and curse of sin, to unsullied righteousness, and an undecaying life.

The history—which opens with a description of the island and its population,—is written with simplicity and taste, and abounds with recitals of the most novel and interesting events.

5. **THE DIVINE LOVE.** By John Eadie, D.D., LL.D., Minister in the United Presbyterian Congregation, Glasgow, and Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. Philadelphia : Lindsay & Blakiston. 1856.

THE work of redemption is too often regarded as a measure of expediency or wisdom in the government of God, designed to prevent his character from being misunderstood, and to exert beneficent influences on his other worlds, rather than as emanating especially from his love. The Scriptures exhibit it as the work of love. It was of the Father's love to *the world* that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life. It was because of Christ's love that he came into the world, and gave himself a ransom for us ; and it is because of the Spirit's love that he descends and renews the minds of those who are saved, and prepares them for the inheritance of eternal life. These are the themes, beautiful, refreshing, and elevating, treated by Dr. Eadie, in this volume, with much copiousness of thought and warmth of feeling. The subject is exhaustless, and is to be meditated, revolved, and cherished as a resident in the heart, rather than dismissed on a cursory perusal. The chapter on the Spirit is particularly pleasing. We realize more easily the love of Christ in assuming our nature, and dying for our redemption ; and feel the grandeur of his purpose to come and take possession of the world which he bought with his blood, bring all nations to submit to his sway, raise his dead saints from the grave, and repealing the curse in all its forms, continue the work of redemption, and reign over the ransomed race through all future ages. Yet the condescension and love of the Spirit are almost equally wonderful, in stooping to enter and strive with the debased and stubborn hearts of men, converting them to love, and maintaining them in allegiance through the trials of their warfare here. Not a beam of heavenly light has ever shone into their souls, but was flashed on them by his power. Not an emotion of love has ever glowed in their hearts, but it was kindled by his grace. And an equal beauty and sublimity invest his purpose at length to exert his life-giving power on all the countless myriads and millions who are to spring into being from age to age, and maintain them in unsullied rectitude and unfaltering love, through their immortal existence. What a grandeur of love it bespeaks !

No one can read the volume without having his thoughts quickened and elevated, and his heart kindled and dilated. No one can meditate its theme without being impressed with the majesty that is reflected on us by the love with which we are regarded by God.

6. **THE PRIEST, THE PURITAN, AND THE PREACHER.** By the Rev. J. C. Ryle, author of *Wheat or Chaff, Rich or Poor, &c.* New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1855.

THIS volume contains three highly discriminative and spirited Lectures addressed to young men, on the Lives and Times of Latimer, Baxter, and Whitfield. They are written with earnestness, point, and candor; present a graphic picture of the most important periods of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries in England; and hold up to the respect and admiration of those to whom they were delivered, three of the Protestant preachers of that kingdom most distinguished for their gifts, the fidelity with which they proclaimed the gospel, the greatness of their labors, and the success with which God crowned their ministry. There are two other addresses also, one presenting hints to young men for the regulation of their conduct; the other enforcing the duty of zeal in religion. The superiority to denominational prejudices by which the volume is marked, the important lessons it teaches, and the spirit of genuine evangelical Protestantism which it breathes, adapt it excellently to interest the young, and lead them to elevated views of the courage, the self-denial, the laboriousness, and the faith, that characterize the ministers of the gospel whom God crowns with eminent success.

7. **THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.** Its Course, its Hindrances, and its Helps. By Thomas Arnold, D.D., Head Master of Rugby School. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakiston. 1856.

THIS volume opens with a caustic essay on the writings of Mr. Newman and his Tractarian associates, and exposure of their egregious error in substituting tradition for the Bible, superstition for Christianity, and the hierarchy for the church. Then follows a series of lectures addressed to his pupils, in which many of the great truths of religion are treated with much originality and force, especially in their practical relations. His aim was to make his hearers acquainted with themselves; to impress them with the necessity of controlling their passions; to unfold to them the principles by which they should be governed; to exemplify the nature and the difficulties of piety; and prompt them to a virtuous, a religious, and a useful life. He is never common-place nor prolix. His thoughts are clear and fresh, often unfold his subjects in new aspects, and lead the mind into fields never before explored, and glowing with objects of unexpected interest and beauty.

8. **MANUAL OF SACRED HISTORY.** A Guide to the Understanding of the Divine Plan of Salvation, according to its Historical Development. By John H. Kurtz, D.D., Professor of Church History in the University of Dorpat. Translated from the Sixth German edition, by Charles F. Schaeffer, D.D. Third edition. Philadelphia : Lindsay and Blakiston. 1856.

THIS is a highly learned and interesting manual of the acts of God towards our world, and the personages who acted a part, and the events that have occurred under his administration, as they are recorded in the Sacred Scriptures. The author begins with the creation in Genesis, and following the narrative, treats of every transaction, every important person, every revelation, every legal enactment and institution, and every event of interest, in the order in which they occur, to the close of the evangelic history ; and gives the necessary explanations of their nature and design. It is brief, lucid, Scriptural on the great doctrines of redemption, and though in its view of the future it places the advent of Christ after the Millennium, and falls into some other errors, it is on the whole a rich repository of Biblical knowledge, and is excellently suited for use in families, schools, and higher seminaries, where such summaries of sacred history are employed.

9. **THE WORLD'S JUBILEE.** By Anna Silliman. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1856.

THE object of this volume is to set forth the Scriptural doctrine that the earth, instead of being annihilated at Christ's coming, as is generally supposed to be the purpose of God, is then to be freed from the curse ; be made the scene of Christ's kingdom and reign ; and be occupied for ever by mankind in the natural life. The author first shows that there are no indications in the Scriptures that the earth is to be struck from existence at Christ's advent ; next, that they directly teach that it is then to be renewed ; that Christ is to descend and reign in it ; that it is to be the habitation of men for ever ; and that this appropriation of it entered as an important element into the covenant with Abraham and with the Israelites ; the promise to David of the perpetuity of his line and throne ; and of the prophecies of the everlasting kingdom and reign of the Messiah. These great points, which occupy the chief part of the volume, are clearly and abundantly established. If on here and there a topic views are advanced from which we dissent—such as that the Abrahamic covenant, and the institution at Sinai, made provision for the exemption of

the Hebrews from death, had they rendered them a perfect obedience; and that the New Jerusalem which the prophet beheld coming down from heaven, betokens the descent to the earth of a real material city,—they do not affect the main argument. The writer, though not discussing them at large, regards it as the doctrine of the Scriptures, that the second advent is to take place anterior to the Millennium; that the holy dead are then to be raised and enter on their reign with Christ; and that the antichristian powers being destroyed, the surviving nations are to be converted, and the world become a paradise of beauty, righteousness, and bliss. The theme, in a measure novel and highly attractive, is treated with a directness, earnestness, and force, that engage the interest of the reader, and will secure the work, we trust, a large circulation, and useful influence.

10. *WORK; OR, PLENTY TO DO, AND HOW TO DO IT.* By Margaret Maria Brewster. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1855.

THIS is the title to a series of tasteful and spirited chapters on the way to be agreeably and usefully employed; to be and to make friends; to be gentle, holy, wise, and happy, and aid others to be such in the various spheres of domestic and social life. They are written with ease and sprightliness; abound with simple and pointed thoughts that sparkle with the light of truth and beauty; present bright pictures of the possibilities of usefulness and happiness in every rank and relation; and teach how to realize them; how to culture the dispositions, and form the habits that are requisite to them; how to seize occasions; how to overcome difficulties; and how to convert obstacles into aids, and ills into blessings, and invest the dark and rugged pathway of life with the soft radiances of heaven-born love, joyousness, and hope.

11. *THE STATE OF THE SOUL BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.* By the Rev. Phineas Blakeman. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1855.

THE ~~author~~ treats in this little volume of the intimations that are given in the Scriptures, of the condition of souls, especially of the redeemed, in the period between death and the resurrection, and maintains that they are conscious and active; that they have powers of perception; that they live in society; that they recognise and communicate with each other; and that they make progress in knowledge and are happy. He falls into the common error of representing that

their resurrection is not to take place till after the close of the Millennium. It is written in a plain style, and will be read with interest and profit by those especially whose thoughts, from the loss of friends, or the approach of death, are turned to the great scenes that are to follow their departure from the present life.

12. *THE BRITISH PERIODICALS.* Republished by Leonard Scott & Co.

THE Quarterlies for October and November present their usual variety of talented and interesting articles. The Westminster has a severe diatribe on Dr. Cumming, of London, in which, if the writer points out some serious faults in that popular preacher, he discloses in equal strength a deep aversion to the great truths of the gospel which Dr. C. proclaims. The London Quarterly has a highly interesting essay on the biographical notices of men of science, by Arago and Brougham. An article on the Charities and the Poor of London presents an appalling picture of the debasement and misery of vast crowds in that metropolis; but a hopeful view of the agencies that are of late employed by the benevolent, to ameliorate and elevate their condition. The Edinburgh, in a review of the late works on the Plurality of Worlds, takes the side of Sir David Brewster, and argues for a plurality against the author of the Essay, who denies it. An eulogistic article on Tennyson's *Maud*—if an index of the popular judgment—indicates a singular decay of poetic taste, and the growth in its place of a morbid passion for the vague, the unmeaning, and the unnatural. An article on Paragraph Bibles urges very strenuously, a revision of the common English version. The most important article in the North British, is on Home Reformation and Christian Union: which gives a startling estimate of the ignorance, vice, and wretchedness that hold vast multitudes in their vassalage, not only in the great cities, but in the rural districts of England, Wales, and Scotland; while it indicates also, that great and in a measure successful efforts are making by the various religious denominations, to rescue them from their debasement, and raise them to intelligence and virtue.

ERRATA.

On page 416, seventh line from the bottom, instead of *Matt. xvii. 3* read *xxvii. 3*.

The article, Notes on Scripture, should have had the signature PHLO.

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ART. I.—PROFESSOR LEWIS'S RESPONSE IN REFERENCE
TO HIS SIX DAYS OF CREATION.

OUR review in the last number of the Journal, of Mr. Lewis's communications to the *New York Observer*, is regarded, we doubt not, by our readers, as presenting ample proof not only of the groundlessness of his accusations, on the points which we treated in it, and of the truth of the objections which we urged against his work; but that we might with justice have condemned in much more emphatic terms, both his cosmological theory, and the philological assumptions and allegations, by which he attempts in a measure to sustain it. On every topic on which we touched, the most decisive evidences appear of an extraordinary inacquaintance with the several branches of knowledge which his system affects; of the contradiction of his doctrines and constructions to the sacred text; of the absurdity of many of his favorite notions; and of the general unreliableness of his statements.

The same characteristics, unfortunately, mark with equal distinctness that part of his communications to the *Observer* which we are now to consider. They are seen in the following passage, which is the next in order to that we last quoted.

"When Mr. Lord would appear to meet a philological argument, it is only on the most outside ground. He never thinks of that radical investigation of the original word in its primitive and secondary uses, which is the only test of soundness.

"Here is one proof, clear and unanswerable, of his incompetency to discover the true logical point in a matter of philology. In commenting on the expressions, Gen. i. 11, 12, 'Let the earth *bring forth*,' and 'the earth brought forth,' there is in the work an attempt to show that this must have meant a *natural* process. After an investigation, at some length, as to what we mean by the words *nature* and *natural*, proof is offered that the same primary idea lies at the root of the Hebrew word in this place, that we find in the Greek *phusis*, the Latin *natura*, and our word *birth*. The argument is, that the word in the verse is a verb of *generation*, so used in other parts of the Old Testament, and that, therefore, it was employed here to express what must have been anciently a *generative conception*, such as we find in the very word *Genesis* which is the Septuagint name of the book. Now how does our learned critic meet this? Thus he reasons: If the expressions, 'Let the earth *bring forth grass*,' and 'the earth brought forth,' in Genesis i. 11, mean a *natural* process, then the expression in the Apocalypse, 'the sea and hades gave up their dead,' must mean that the bodies that rise from them are *natural* productions. This is his argument. But how could he thus stultify himself, unless a determination to find fault had had its usual effect in blinding the mind to the most obvious differences? Even judged from the English expressions alone, which is all he seems to have had in mind, his comparison has no manner of force. Even in the English of Genesis i. 11, there is *the generative idea*; in the Hebrew and Greek it is inseparable from the term. We ask again what right has such a critic as this to sit in judgment on an argument he does not begin to understand? The whole reasoning turns on the nature of the Hebrew word. . . . There is no such word of *generation* in the passage from Revelation, and therefore he might as well have reasoned from any verse taken at random among the proper names of Ezra and Nehemiah."

A more extraordinary group of blunders and misrepresentations is not often crowded, even by Mr. Lewis, into so narrow a space. Quot verba, tot mysteria. There are, at least, as many errors as there are sentences.

In the first place, the argument to which he refers, is not directed against his *philology*, but his *philosophy* in respect to the creation of plants and animals. We stated, as the point

we urged, that "his construction of the passage, instead of having any ground in *philosophy*"—that is, in nature, or the laws of the origin and life of plants, "is overstrained and unnatural;" or in other words, that it assigns an office to *the earth* in their production which it does not and cannot fill. He maintains that *the earth* was the *active cause* of the plants that were called into existence; or that it was in that, that the generative power was put, through which it was, he holds, that they sprang into being. And that, accordingly, we controverted, by showing "that the earth had no power of itself to shoot up herbs and trees, when they as yet had no existence. It had no more power to originate plants in its bosom, than it had to originate immaterial and spiritual entities." Mr. Lewis thus wholly misconceives and misrepresents the nature and aim of our argument. A very awkward blunder, truly, in one who makes such lofty claims to intelligence and learning, and accuses his opponent of ignorance and incompetence! We may justly retort his question on himself. "What right has such a critic as this to sit in judgment on an argument he does not begin to understand?"

In the next place, he accordingly misrepresents the purpose for which we quoted the passage from the Apocalypse. Our object was, not to controvert his representation in respect to the primary meaning of the verbs translated "bring forth," and "brought forth," Genesis i. 11, 12, 24; but to show that his *philosophy* of the effects which they express, is contradictory to *nature*, and that the principle on which he proceeds in his interpretation of them, "would force a meaning on a great number of passages that is wholly false and contradictory;" and we alleged the passage from the Apocalypse as one which it would thus pervert. He maintains that *the earth* was the active cause of the production of the plants and animals that were created on the third and sixth days; or that it was to a power in the earth that they owed their existence. Thus he says in regard to the verb *אָרָץ*, translated "bring forth:"

"The earth, then, was not a mere passive recipient, nor was production by it a mere outward unessential mode, having no other than an arbitrary connexion with the Divine working, or employed merely as

an accompanying sign; but the earth exerts a *real causative power*, and this becomes an essential and important part in the chain of causation which God saw fit to originate and establish. The Divine power was exerted, but it was *upon* the *nature*, and *through* the nature that had become established in the previous creative acts, while at the same time there is the beginning of a new energy imparted to this nature which it did not possess before. *The command is to the EARTH*, but the earth is not passive. She exerts an *active obedience* in the exercise of *the old nature* modified by the new force which comes from the supernatural Omnicfic Word going forth, as it previously did for the separation of the light from the chaos, and the waters from the waters. . . . The earth by any natural power previously imparted, or previously exercised, would never have produced it; but then, when the new energy is imparted, the mode or law of production is *through* the earth."—Pp. 196, 197.

He presents the same representation in the passage which we quoted, and made the ground of the objection in the argument to which he refers. Thus he says—

"It is enough for us to learn, without doing any violence to the language of the account, that the production of the vegetable and animal races are set forth as having been originally a *φύσις*, or *growth*, a growth out of the earth, and *by* and *through* the earth; in other words, a nature with its laws, stages, successions, and developments."—P. 216. "Along with the law and constitution of it, there is *the plastic and formative power*, the ruling or directing energy. *This*, there is no absurdity in saying, *was put in the earth to grow*; for it means by a new power there given, *the earth was made to bring it forth or out*, that is, give it *birth* in *outward material form*. This was the *genesis* of the first vegetation: The earth brings it *forth*."—Pp. 231, 232.

From the fact that, in the command, "Let the earth bring forth grass," and "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth," the earth was addressed as the source whence they were to spring,—he thus maintains that the earth exerted the "real causative power" by which they were called into existence: and then on that assumption affirms, that their production was by a law, "by stages, successions, and developments," and therefore by a growth according to nature,

or the usual modes of their production. It was that false and preposterous doctrine, accordingly, that we controverted in the passage which he cites; and by the consideration, among others, that "such a method of interpretation as that which he there employs, would force a meaning on a great number of passages that is wholly false and contradictory:" and alleging—to exemplify its effects,—Revelation xx. 13: "And the sea gave up the dead which were in it, and death and hades gave up the dead which were in them," we showed that if the fact that *the earth* is said to have "brought forth" the grass and the living creatures, proves that the earth was "the real causative power" by which they were brought into existence; then the fact that the sea, and death, and hades, are said to have "*given up*" the dead that were in them, will prove with equal force, that the sea, death, and hades, exerted "the real causative power" by which the dead that were in them were raised to life; and that if the one proves that the creation of the herbs and beasts was by a natural process, the other will equally prove that the resurrection of the dead is to be by a natural process. This is the relation in which we cited the passage from the Apocalypse. "Does Prof. Lewis," we asked, "maintain that the sea, death, and hades *exerted the power* by which the dead were raised to life? Does he hold that their resurrection was a natural process, *because it was out of the sea, death, and hades*, that they were raised? *Why not*, if his pretext in respect to the meaning of the command, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb and the tree, is legitimate? The cases are parallel." And can any one fail to see that they are coincident; and that our reasoning in regard to them is perfectly legitimate and unanswerable? The sea, death, and hades, are as much exhibited by the verb *give up*, as the efficient cause of the resurrection of the dead, as the earth is by the verb *bring forth*, as the efficient cause of the existence of the plants and animals. The fact that the English verb, give up has not "the generative idea" in it, has nothing to do with the parallelism of the cases, nor with the pertinence of our reasoning respecting them. Yet this argument, clear as noonday, Mr. Lewis, it seems, is unable to comprehend! He is so unacquainted with everything that lies out of the sphere of his superficial philology, and so bewildered by an

appeal to the laws of nature against his false notions, that he alleges *his* ignorance and incapacity as a proof that *we* have no knowledge of the subject! "Here," he says, "is one proof, clear and unanswerable, of his incompetency to discern the true logical point in a matter of *philology*." This is indeed "a remarkable hallucination," and we may again put his own question to him: "How could he thus stultify himself, unless a determination to find fault had had its usual effect in blinding his mind to the most obvious differences?" "We ask again, what right has such a critic as this to sit in judgment on an argument he does not begin to understand?"

Of the deceptiveness of his boasted argument from philology, of the transparent fallacy by which he imposes on himself and his readers, we have a specimen in the passages we have quoted from him. By his own repeated concession and assertion, the truth of his theory respecting the mode in which the plants and animals were called into existence, and of his construction of the verbs by which their production is expressed, turns on the question whether such a new and supernatural power as that which he avers, was communicated to *the earth* by the divine fiat, and the earth thereby became the real efficient cause of the existence of the plants and animals. He admits that the earth possessed no such power before the fiat. He assumes and asserts, that it must have been and was then communicated to it: and his construction of the verbs demands for its justification that such a communication of supernatural power should have taken place; for otherwise, on his theory, the earth would have been commanded to give birth to effects to which it was totally incompetent. To have verified his philology, therefore, he should have *proved* that the earth was then imbued with such a power. Where, then, is his proof of it? He does not offer a particle. He does not affect to. He could not offer any. There is not a hint in the text of any such communication of power to the earth. He only gratuitously assumes and asserts it. He first assumes that such a power must have been imparted to the earth, because otherwise it would have been incompetent to give existence by virtue of its own energies to plants and animals; and then on the ground that the earth possessed that power, assumes that it must have

exerted it by a law, and given being, therefore, to the plants and animals in a natural way by a growth! Or, in other words, he infers the communication of the power from the assumed nature of the effects; and then infers the nature of the effects from the assumed communication of the power? His vaunted philology, thus, instead of standing on its own legs, and filling the office which he assigns it, is wholly dependent for its validity on his gratuitous assumption of the very point which he affects to prove by it; and is an empty shadow, which none but a superficial mind would be likely to mistake for a reality.

We have a glimpse, also, in these passages, of the virtual pantheism, or deification of nature, which pervades his cosmology, and reveals itself at every stage of his argument. Can any one doubt that omnipotence was requisite to the production of vegetables and animals, and was the cause of their coming into existence? Can any one doubt that that omnipotence was associated with omniscience; or, in other words, was exerted by an infinite intelligence? If not, then, if the earth, as Mr. Lewis holds, actually possessed and exerted the power by which vegetables and animals were brought into existence, it must have been omnipotent and omniscient; or, in other words, must have been God, or a part of God. The ascription to the earth, therefore, of that power, and that agency, is a virtual exhibition of the earth as divine; as omnipotence and omniscience are attributes that belong only to God. It implies, also, that the earth is self-existent, and thence, that the power and intelligence by which it created vegetables and animals, are underived; as much as the infinite power and intelligence of God prove that he is self-existent, and that his attributes are underived? This deification of nature runs through the whole web of Mr. Lewis's cosmology, and is as real and essential an element of it as it is of the system of Plato, Spinoza, and Swedenborg.

In the third place: The glowing picture he gives of his argument from the primary meaning of the verbs translated *bring forth* and *brought forth*, has no counterpart in what he alleges in his volume in regard to them. He does not offer the semblance of anything like proof, that they have the "generative" meaning which he assigns to them. He

merely states in regard to the first, *צמח*, that it means properly to germinate, to bud, or to sprout, as in Joel ii. 22, "For the pastures of the wilderness do *spring*." But it no more means to sprout or bud, than it means simply to spring, or shoot up. It is defined by Buxtorf by *herbasco*, to grow green, to bring forth herbs: and by Gesenius, as translated by Dr. Gibbs, to wax green, to flourish: to bring forth: and as rendered by Dr. Robinson, to sprout, to spring up; hence to be green, Joel ii. 22: and Hiphil, to cause to sprout, to bring forth herbage. Its proper sense is therefore fully expressed by our verbs to shoot up, to bring forth, and it is used with perfect appropriateness to signify simply that the herbs and trees were to spring into existence, or shoot up from the earth, by the omnipotent fiat of God, in contradistinction from coming into being in a natural way, by the germination of seeds, or budding and sprouting of roots or twigs. And that is plainly the only sense that can be ascribed to it in the fiat; since the germination and budding of herbs and trees could not have taken place literally in the usual way, inasmuch as there were no seeds, germs, roots, or vegetable organisms of any kind in existence that could bud and germinate in the way of nature. Sprouting, putting forth germs, and budding, are processes of *existing* vegetable organisms, not of immaterial principles or spiritual entities. That verb therefore yields no support to his theory.

Nor does *צא*. Instead, its primitive meaning is to go out, or go forth. It is defined by Buxtorf by *exivit*, *prodiit*, *processit*, *decessit*; and its first sense as given by Gesenius is, to go out, to go forth. It is in its primary signification, therefore, a mere verb of *motion* from or forth of a place or thing; and involves no indication whatever of the mode of the motion or the thing moved. It is applied accordingly to all sorts of objects that go, or are caused to go out or forth; and among others to plants that are caused to spring out of the earth; and to living beings that are born. But it has no more the "generative idea" in it, or naturally carries a sense of generation, than our verbs, to go, to carry, to bear, to bring, or any other mere verbs of motion, out or forth of a place or thing. Professor Lewis's statement, therefore, that it is "a verb of generation," "and that therefore it was employed here to express what must have been anciently a generative concep-

tion," is not only without authority, but is a gross misrepresentation.

His philological argument from these words, to which he attaches so much importance, is thus a mere sham; and instead of indicating an accurate and profound knowledge of the language, shows that he is superficial, blundering, and unreliable in the extreme.

That this is no harsh or mistaken judgment, is seen from the false and absurd results to which the principle on which he here proceeds would lead in the construction of other passages. Thus, if, as he claims, the fact that a verb in its primary sense is a verb of *germination*, or originally signifies to sprout, to bud, or to put forth germs, as a vegetable organism, is a proof that wherever it is employed in the Old Testament, it expresses "what must have been anciently a *germinative* conception;"—that is, that the process which it denotes, is a real process of germination, sprouting, or budding as a vegetable;—then the verb צִמַּח, which literally means to sprout, to spring up, as plants, according to Gesenius; according to Buxtorf, *pullulare, germinare, efflorescere, reflorescere*, must, wherever it is used in the Old Testament, carry with it the sense of germinating, and indicate that the process which it denotes is a real budding, putting forth germs, or sprouting; and consequently, in the expression in which it is used (Psalm lxxxv. 11), "*Truth shall spring out of the earth; and righteousness shall look down from heaven,*" it denotes that truth is literally "to sprout out of the earth," put forth germs, and bud, as a vegetable organism! And moreover, if, as he maintains, the earth is not passive, but "exerts a real causative power" in the production of whatever sprouts, germinates, and grows from it as a vegetable, and is absolutely its efficient cause; then the earth is to be the real efficient power by which truth is to be made to sprout and germinate from it! It must have the same meaning also (Isaiah xlv. 8), "*Drop, ye heavens, from above, and let the skies pour down righteousness; let the earth open, and let them bring forth salvation, and let righteousness spring up together. I the Lord have created it;*" and signifies that righteousness is literally to sprout out of the earth, and bud, as a vegetable! It must carry the same sense also in other passages, as Isaiah xlv. 3, 4, where it is applied to off-

spring: "I will pour my Spirit on thy seed, and my blessing on thine offspring; and they shall *germinate in the midst of the grass*, like willows by the water-courses;" and Isaiah xlii. 9, and xliii. 19, where it is applied to things: "Behold the former things are come to pass; and new things do I declare; Before they sprout (or germinate) I tell you of them." "Behold I will do a new thing; now it shall sprout (or germinate); shall ye not know it?" These things and events, no matter what their natures are, must, according to Mr. Lewis, come into existence by a literal process of sprouting, or germination! Otherwise the verb does not carry the sprouting and germinating "idea," which it was its original office to express! What an admirable exemplification of Professor Lewis's philological perspicacity! What fine work with the Scriptures would the principle make, which he here puts forth with such a pretentious air, and persuades himself no one of the least acquaintance with language would venture to question!

Perhaps, however, he will say, that the verb in these instances is applied to persons, moral qualities, acts, or things, that from their nature cannot literally sprout and bud; and that that fact shows that it cannot be used in its primary meaning, but is employed in a secondary or figurative sense. Undoubtedly it is so; and that disproves the assumption on which he founds his philological argument; for it is no more contrary to nature and a physical impossibility, that truth and righteousness should literally sprout out of the ground, and germinate, bud, and blossom, than it is that Professor Lewis's immaterial and spiritual entities should, as he maintains, sprout out of the earth, germinate, bud, and grow to maturity. To expect him, however, to see and feel this truth, would be quite to forget the peculiar cast of his mind, and the narrow circle of ideas within which he moves.

In like manner, if, as he maintains, the verb *נָטַע* is a verb of *generation*, and always, no matter what the subject is to which it is applied, denotes a generative process or birth, then it must have that signification, Genesis viii. 16-19: "Go forth of the ark, thou and thy wife, and thy sons, and thy sons' wives with thee. Bring forth with thee every living thing that is with thee, of all flesh, of fowl, and of cattle, and of every creeping thing that creepeth upon the

earth; that they may breed abundantly in the earth, and be fruitful and multiply upon the earth. And Noah *went forth*, and his sons, and his wife, and his sons' wives with him; and every beast, and every creeping thing, and every fowl, whatsoever creepeth upon the earth, after their kinds, *went forth* out of the ark." The verb here translated *go forth*, *bring forth*, and *went forth*, is the same that in Genesis i. 12 is rendered *brought forth*, and denotes, therefore, according to Mr. Lewis's philology, a real generation and birth of that to which it is applied. In the first instance, therefore, it was a command to Noah and his wife, and their sons, and their sons' wives, to go out of the ark by a literal generation and birth, according to the special law of their nature; for he holds that the processes which the verbs of the sacred narrative, Genesis i. 11, 12, denote, were natural processes, and took place by virtue of the powers that were imparted to nature! In the second, it was a command to Noah to *cause* every living thing that was with him, of all flesh, of fowl, and of cattle, and of every creeping thing, to go out of the ark by a literal generation and birth, according to the peculiar law of their respective natures! And in the third and fourth instances, it declares that Noah and his sons, his wife and their wives, and every beast, fowl, and creeping thing that was with him, actually *went out* of the ark by such a natural generation and birth process! What a debarkation! How singular that the painters who have endeavored to depict the scene, have missed this "generative conception!" But the great light of philology to which it was reserved to bring it forth, unfortunately did not rise on the world in season to yield them the aid of this brilliant discovery!

The same meaning must, according to Professor L., attach to the verb Exodus iii. 10, 11, in which it was indicated to Moses that he was to bring forth the Israelites out of Egypt: "Come now, therefore, and I will send thee unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest *bring forth* my people, the children of Israel, out of Egypt. And Moses said unto God: Who am I, that I should go unto Pharaoh, and that I should *bring forth* the children of Israel out of Egypt? And he said: Certainly I will be with thee; and this shall be a token unto thee, that I have sent thee; When thou hast *brought*

forth the people out of Egypt, ye shall serve God upon this mountain." This, therefore, according to Mr. Lewis's philology, indicates that Moses was to bring the Israelites out of Egypt by a literal generative and birth process, conformably to the law of their nature. In like manner, the passage, Isaiah xxxiii. 11: "Ye shall *conceive* chaff, ye shall *bring forth* stubble," whatever chaff and stubble may mean, denotes that the Hebrews to whom the prediction was addressed, were literally to conceive and bring them forth in the identical way in which human beings conceive and bring forth offspring. And so the statement, James i. 15: "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death," indicates that lust is really conceived by a natural generative process, and that sin is literally born of it; and that death is literally born of sin in precisely the same way that human beings are generated, conceived, and born of their parents! And so with scores and hundreds of other passages. Can a more decisive proof be asked of the utter error and absurdity of the principle on which he founds his philological argument, for his cosmological theory? Can more humiliating evidence be imagined of his extreme misapprehension of the laws of language, and incompetence to the task he has undertaken? Had his theory been put forth by some Mormon prophet, or some modern clairvoyant or spiritualist, like Andrew Jackson Davis, with what scorn would it have been received by every scholar in the land; with what jeers and shouts of derision would it have been denounced by the religious Newspapers and Quarterlies that have in a measure given it their sanction!

In the fourth place: He exhibits equal ignorance of the physiology of plants, in his notion that the earth, instead of being passive in respect to their growth, or simply yielding the elements they imbibe, without any active co-operation, is the efficient cause of their germination and growth: or in his own language, "exerts a real causative power, and a power that is an essential and important part in the chain of causation which God saw fit to originate and establish," p. 196. This theory is the direct converse of fact. The earth is absolutely passive in respect to the plants that grow from it. It simply yields the water which they absorb from it,

and the mineral elements which that water holds in solution.*
Not a particle of soil, or solid organized matter, is drawn

* "The sap rises in a tree because the sun shines: it is the light of that central orb which produces even these movements in plants. Indirectly, it is true, chemical affinities or electrical agencies are brought into operation; but the prime mover of the machine is the light, which produces a mucilaginous body, which is different in composition in different plants, and which constitutes their proper juices.

"The cause of the movement of sap in flowering plants—both of the rise of the crude sap, and of the descent of the elaborated sap downwards—is the light of the sun, which effects the decomposition of carbonic acid gas.

"From the roots to the top of the plant, large quantities of fluid are constantly passing, and large quantities are thrown off from the leaves by evaporation. All this water is obtained entirely from the soil, and all the carbonaceous matter which constitutes the solid part is derived from the atmosphere. . . .

"There are two points of this circulation which require consideration:—the spongiole and the leaf. The spongioles are the young succulent extremities of the roots," which imbibe moisture from the ground like a sponge.

"The liquid of which the ascending sap is constituted is derived from the ground by the action of the spongioles, and consists of water holding in solution the different saline bodies which are necessary to the plant, along with carbonic acid. This compound fluid passes upward by the woody fibre and ducts of the alburnum, making its way to the leaf, on the upper surface of which, in common cases, *a change in its chemical constitution occurs through the influence of the sunlight*. It obtains a certain quantity of carbon, and, from being a thin watery solution, becomes much concentrated, and gains the under face of the leaf. This elaborated sap, or *latex*, returns now to the bark, and descends through its cellular tissue and inter-cellular spaces, finding its way to all parts of the plant. . . .

"What is the reason that the light of the sun controls the rapidity of imbibition—the speed with which the ascending current comes? Because it controls the amount of carbonic acid gas which is reduced, and, therefore, the amount of elaborated sap that is formed. Why is it that the flow from the roots diminishes when changes are befalling the leaves, and why does it stop in winter? Because the mucilaginous solution which is made by the light, diminishes in quantity, or ceases to be formed altogether. How is it that, when parts are rapidly developing, the latex moves fastest, and the ascending sap comes with most force? Because the consumption and consequent formation of the mucilaginous matter are then at a maximum.

"We see, therefore, that the two sources of force in a flowering plant, the spongiole and the leaf, derive their power from ordinary physical principles. . . . The same law which determines the action of the spongiole, determines also the action of the leaf. The same law is concerned in throwing the sap upward into the stem, and forcing it down again from the leaf. And *the rays of the sun*, which, by forming that mucilaginous body, give rise to these concurrent and harmonious actions, equally set in operation the tissue of the leaf which is freely exposed to their influences; and the absorbing mechanism of the spongiole, which is buried, perhaps, many feet deep in the

by them from it. A large share, indeed, of the carbon of which their solid matter chiefly consists, is not derived from the earth, but from the atmosphere; and the forces by which they imbibe that which they derive from the earth, do not lie in the earth, but in themselves. The water, with the mineral elements it holds in solution, and the carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen, they imbibe from the air, are not forced into them by a power that is without, but are absorbed by them by forces that are within. The earth is no more the causative power by which the water they absorb is made to enter them, than it is the causative power that water enters a pump, when the valve-box is drawn up, instead of its being forced by the pressure of the atmosphere into the space that would otherwise be vacant. The water that enters them is no more injected into them by a force that is without, than the oxygen that is absorbed by the blood from the air that enters the lungs, is injected into it by an external force.

Such is the issue of this attempt to vindicate himself, and overwhelm us! Was ever a sadder spectacle exhibited by an airy dogmatist? The loftiest pretensions to learning; the most towering self-confidence; the most insolent imputations of ignorance and incompetence to us;—with the most ignominious proofs on every hand, that he really knows nothing accurately on any of the subjects of which he treats.

He next refers to our remarks on his notion that the language of the sacred history is merely "phenomenal," and on the use he makes of it in his chapter on the work of the second day. We objected first to the doctrine he there advances, that the verbs and nouns of the text are mere names of appearances, in contradistinction from the things themselves, of which those appearances are effects, while the things meant are of a wholly different and unknown nature; that it contradicts the postulate on which he professes chiefly to found his view of the teachings of the narrative; that the things denoted by the language, are those which the terms taken in their primitive sense signify. If, as he

ground."—*Draper on the Forces which produce the Organization of Plants*, pp. 23, 29, 31, 32.

holds and urges at every stage of his argument, the terms are to be taken in their primitive signification,—and if, as he alleges, those terms, after all, denote nothing but phenomena,—that is, as he defines them—appearances, in distinction from the things that are causes of those appearances, or the grounds of the manifestations that are made by them to our senses; is it not clear that they cannot be the names of a wholly different set of things lying back of those appearances, and of a nature that is altogether unknown? If the office of the nouns and verbs is limited to appearances, and those appearances are altogether distinct and different from another set of things, which, he avers, lie back of them, what can be more certain than that the nouns and verbs are excluded from the office of denoting those unperceived and unperceivable things that stand behind the appearances? We next objected to the doctrine he there advances, that the names of the narrative, and the appearances of which he holds they are names, are representatives of invisible and ineffable things, that lie back of them, and that that is their peculiar and sole office—that it strips both the words and the appearances of all intelligible signification, and leaves the narrative an unmeaning blank. For if the words and the appearances of which he holds they are the names, have only a representative function, and that which they represent is wholly unknown and undiscoverable, what can be more certain than that no information is conveyed to us by the history respecting the realities to which it refers? Professor Lewis, however, avers that we wholly misunderstood and misrepresented him. Let us see whether it is so.

He refers in his chapter on the command: "Let there be a firmament between the waters; and let it divide the waters," to the objection sometimes made to it, that the word translated firmament, literally denotes a solid arch or floor betwixt the waters of the clouds above, and those of the ocean below. He says:—

"We anticipate the anxious inquiry that has pressed, and is yet pressing on many minds, bewildered by false biblical views, and the false claims of modern science. How is this to stand with the present state of knowledge? Here, they would say, they have most palpably presented the old erroneous conception of a material sky or

solid firmament, with a reservoir of water above, separated from the waters below."—Pp. 102–103.

And this objection he admits to be valid. He says:—

"We do not hesitate to admit to the fullest extent, the strictly phenomenal nature of the language employed in this account of the work of the second period, or *the scientific error, be it more or less, contained in it.* . . . The Hebrew word primarily denotes something *expanded* or *beaten out* like a metallic plate. Such is the literal sense of the root from which it comes, and such, too, is the suggested sense of the Greek *σπεῖσμα*, and the Latin *firmamentum*. They denote solidity."—P. 117.

Now how does he attempt to evade this objection? By asserting that the name stands for a mere appearance, not for the thing created, which caused that appearance. He says:—

"The amount of it is, that *the language presents appearances, and not the interior truths or facts*, whatever they may be. Certain facts in the process and order of creation are to be narrated, and these facts are named in the only way they could be named from the phenomena outwardly present: and *these phenomena* again are named in the use of the articulate language, whether direct or metaphorical, which custom, or accident, or knowledge, or imagination, or any other cause, had attached to them."—P. 103. . . . "They denote solidity, but this belongs only to the phenomenal conception."—P. 117.

But how does this exempt the language from the objection? If *rakia*, rendered firmament, literally denotes a solid arch or expanse above, and it is used in that literal sense, is it not clear that unless *the appearance* of which Mr. Lewis avers it is the name is in fact such a solid expanse, the objection remains unimpaired? If that which is named *rakia*, is not itself a solid expanse, and yet that term literally denotes such an expanse, and is applied to it in that sense, what can be plainer than that it ascribes to it a nature that does not belong to it; which is precisely what the objectors urge against the text? If, then, Mr. Lewis evades the objection by claiming that *rakia* is the mere name of an appearance, not of the fact or object which was the ground of that

appearance, it plainly is by assuming or implying, that it was *not* used in its *literal*, but either in a secondary sense which is free from the notion of solidity, or by a metaphor indicating simply that that which was named *rakia*, *resembled* in some relation—that is, in appearance—a solid expanse. But on either of those assumptions he abandons the primary signification which he professes to adhere to, and makes the ground of his interpretation of the history.

He now, however, declares, that the doctrine he advanced is not that which we ascribe to him, but simply, that though the name *rakia* was drawn from the appearance, it was not used by Moses as the name of the mere appearance, but as the name of that which God created—that is, the atmosphere,—which was the cause of the appearance whence the name was derived. He says:—

“But the Hebrew word does not mean atmosphere—but expanse. It conveys, in appearance at least, the old image of a *solid firmament*. The word, we said, represented the appearance, or phenomenon—represented whatever was the unseen physical reality that produced this appearance, and thus might be said to *appear* in it. This physical reality was the thing made. Atmosphere may be one inch nearer to it than firmament; and so our science, which has groped its way thus far into the interior, may call it by this name. But call it what we will, it represented the work done, and the physical state *generated* or *created*, or which *came out*, or was *born* in the second period. It was that which Moses called *rakia*, because it *looked* so to him, and we call it *atmosphere*, giving the name, not as he did, from the outside or ultimate appearance, but from *supposed scientific notions*, correct or incorrect, with which we associate it. Moses *named* it differently; and *thought* it differently; but *that which he named and thought*, is the same *unseen reality* which we name and think, and which all men, scientific and unscientific, will continue to name and think, *however differently*, to the end of the world.”

But how, if this is so, does it exempt the passage from the objection he was attempting to evade? If *rakia* in its primary meaning denotes a solid expanse, and it is used in the passage in that primitive sense, does it not ascribe a nature to that of which it is used as the name, that does not belong to it, as much if it is employed as the name of the atmosphere, which is not a solid expanse, as it does if it is used

as the name of the mere *appearance* of the atmosphere! Is not that appearance as devoid of solidity as the air is which causes it? Nothing, surely, can be more certain than that he does not escape the objection by averring that *rakia* and the other names of the narrative are drawn from the appearance of the things created, unless it be on the ground that though used because of those appearances, they are not employed as descriptive or expressive of the real nature of the things which they are used to denote; and that is on the ground that they are not employed in their primary, but in a secondary, or else in a metaphorical sense.

And so also in regard to the whole series of nouns and verbs employed in the sacred narrative as the names of the divine acts, and the effects produced by them. If, as he maintains, they are taken from appearances; and are, in their primitive signification, merely descriptive or expressive of appearances; while the realities themselves of which they are used as the names, are of a wholly dissimilar nature; then it is clear that instead of indicating by their primitive meaning, the nature of those realities, they totally misrepresent them; and to take their primitive sense, as the sense in which they are used in the text, is completely to miss their real meaning, and misinterpret the history.

Nothing can be clearer then, than that we were right in objecting that his two theories, that the language of the sacred history is altogether phenomenal, or descriptive and expressive of appearances in contradistinction from facts and realities; and that nevertheless its primitive and literal sense, as descriptive of those facts or realities, is the sense in which it is used in the text, and which is to be adhered to in the interpretation, are in direct contravention of each other; and that whenever he recurs to the one or the other to sustain his construction, he is battling with himself, and employed in overturning his own system. If all that he means by what he represents as the "key-note, or suggestive thought that pervades the whole argument," that the language of the narrative is "phenomenal," is simply that it is *taken* from phenomena or appearances, and is descriptive merely of them, not of the creative acts or created things which it is used to denote; then he plainly abandons and contradicts his doctrine that it is actually used as literally

descriptive of the nature of those creative acts, and the things called into existence by them; and is to be interpreted as employed in its primitive sense, in order to reach its true meaning; and the whole of his theory, accordingly, founded on that notion of the meaning of the terms,—that the work of creation was a mere shaping of the things made out of pre-existent materials, and that that shaping took place by a natural generation, or germination and growth, is relinquished and smitten to the ground.

Is the view, however, which he now gives of the relation in which the terms of the narrative are used, in accordance with the representations of his book? Were we mistaken, in regarding him as teaching in his "key-note," that the language of the narrative is "phenomenal," as clearly and consistently as he teaches anything; first, that its terms are the names of *appearances* merely, in contradistinction from and exclusive of the realities that caused those appearances. And next, that these appearances are representatives of those realities which, he maintains, are themselves wholly imperceptible, and lie out of the sphere of our knowledge? We think not: let us try the question. He says:—

"The key-note, or the suggestive thought that pervades the whole argument, comes from the distinction which is believed to exist between the language of Paul, Hebrews xi. 3, and that of the Mosaic account in Genesis—the one referring to the *essential*, the other to the *phenomenal*,—the one addressed to the faith, apprehending directly, without sense and without induction, the *invisible divine powers*, or *the unseen forces* from which are made *the things that are seen*; the other addressed to the sense, or rather to the faith *through* the sense, and making use of the *things that are seen* as the names or *representatives* of the *primal invisible entities* that are not only far removed from the senses, but away back of science itself and its most interior discoveries."—Pp. 7, 8.

Here he represents that the key-note on which he proceeds, is, the distinction which he holds exists—not between appearances and the material things which cause those appearances, and are the real objects of perception—but between those appearances merely and "*the invisible divine powers, or the unseen forces, from which the things that are seen are*

made." The material things that cause perception, and are its real objects, are left wholly out of the account. And he maintains that the language of Genesis refers only to *appearances*; while he holds that those appearances are used as *representatives* of the primal in visible entities, "that are not seen, but lie back of the senses and of science itself in its most interior discoveries." No broader distinction between the two could be stated, nor a more absolute limitation of the names to the office of designating appearances, in contradistinction from realities. Again he says:—

"Let us suppose that the Deity designed to reveal to a human mind, and through that human mind to other human minds, that on a certain occasion there was a preternatural lengthening of the day. *The phenomenon*, or *appearance*, connected with the physical agency or supernatural act (whichever it was), and *representative* of such act or agency, is that of the sun's standing immovable in the firmament. This is that *appearance* to the senses, in which the act or agency terminates, and aside from which the one to whom it is revealed cannot conceive it. It *stands for the fact*, and is in *this sense* to him, the *language* of the fact, just as the articulate descriptive words represent, or are to other minds, the *language of the phenomenon* itself. . . . Any new language would still be phenomenal, and any new phenomenal conception or conceptions, would still have more or less of that disagreement between them and the remote *physical or divine agency represented*, which it could be shown exists, and must ever exist, even in our most scientific dialect." —Pp. 22, 23.

Here the appearance or phenomenon is distinguished in the clearest manner from that which causes it, and is exhibited as *representative* of that cause; while the office of language is limited to the mere denomination of the *phenomenon*, or *appearance*, in contradistinction from the remote physical divine agency which he holds the appearance represents. Again he says:—

"What is mainly had in view is, the phenomenal language of Scripture, and here our formulas have their strictest application. Letters, or elements of speech, *represent* words or articulate sounds; —articulate sounds *represent* a sensible *conception*, or mind's *image*; —this *sensible conception* represents a fact or facts, either near, or

remote, or ultimate, standing behind it. The *ultimate fact* is in itself *ineffable*, because inconceivable under any forms of sense. The various *conceptional representatives* of it may be more or less simple, or more or less scientific, but falling short of that *unutterable* reality which no language can by any other means express."—Pp. 24, 25.

He thus teaches not only that the special and sole office of articulate sounds—that is, language, is to represent sensible conceptions, or the mind's images, that is, appearances; and that these conceptions have the office of representing the facts that stand behind them; but he asserts that those facts are in themselves "ineffable" and "unutterable;" that is, cannot possibly be designated by names, because they "cannot be *conceived* under any of the forms of sense." And this is "the key-note, or suggestive thought, that pervades his whole argument." It is what he himself presents in his Introduction as one of the "*Leading Ideas*" of his work; and we might quote scores and scores of other passages in which it is repeated.

We were right, therefore, in representing on the one hand, that he teaches in his "key-note" that the names of the sacred narrative are names of mere appearances, in distinction from the things that were created, which *caused* those appearances; and on the other, in objecting that in that theory he abandons and controverts his other theory that the language of the narrative is used in its primordial meaning, and is in that sense descriptive of the acts exerted by God, and of the material things called into existence by those acts—not of the appearances that were consequent on the existence and agency of the material things which he created. As the things that were created, such as the earth, the waters, light, the air, the sun, the moon, vegetables, animals, and man, differed wholly in their nature from the appearances, that is, the images they produced in the eye of a spectator; it is certain that if the language was literally descriptive of those appearances, it cannot also have been literally descriptive, as he maintains in his theory respecting its meaning, of the wholly dissimilar material organisms and masses of matter which were the causes of those appearances, and the real objects that men perceive. We were as clearly right, also, in objecting that this doctrine, that the language of the his-

tory denotes nothing but mere appearances which lie wholly in our senses, and that these appearances are mere representatives of invisible divine powers, and ineffable and unknown realities, implies that we have no knowledge whatever of the things which God created. For the mere appearances, which Prof. Lewis avers the language of the history alone denotes, were not the things that were created, but were the effects produced by those things in the eyes of human spectators—and did not exist, therefore, till after Adam was created. Nor were “the invisible divine powers,” or “primal invisible entities,” or any “ineffable fact,” or “unutterable reality,” of which he holds these appearances are representatives, the things that were created; or, if they were, by his concession the history gives us no information respecting them. If they are invisible and ineffable, they not only are not revealed to us in the sacred narrative, but are not within the scope of our knowledge. It is noticeable, accordingly, that in the passage we have quoted, in which he states his distinction between the phenomenal and the real, not a hint is uttered respecting any material things as created by the Almighty, and exhibited by the history as the special effects of his creative fiat; but the only things to which he exhibits the text as referring, are the appearances on the one side, and on the other “the invisible divine powers, or unseen forces,” and “primal invisible entities,” by which he holds those appearances were produced. All, therefore, that the narrative gives us, according to this theory, is phenomenal. We have not a shred of a material universe. This, however, he repels as an unpardonable misrepresentation of his book. He says:—

“In just such blunders as this”—that is, ascribing to him the doctrine which he denominates the key-note that pervades his whole argument—“Mr. Lord grounds the charge, repeated in other parts of the review, that the author of the book represents God as only making phenomena. In another place he makes just the contrary charge. He represents the writer as holding only to a creation of primal powers, and here finds Platonism again, and pantheism, and Swedenborgianism even, and over and above all this, something still more horrid, which he characterizes by the name of Bushnelli. One of the views he thus charges would make the world a mere side show; the other a pantheistic emanation. Both char-

false, and could never have come from a man who understood the argument he was assailing. The representation he would give of the doctrine of the book is most absurd both ways. How could God make, or how could any man conceive of God's making causes without effects, or appearances without that which appears?"

It is, doubtless, very absurd to maintain or imply that no material heaven and earth, nor any material organisms, were called into being by the Almighty; that nothing but mere phenomena resulted from his creative acts: but its absurdity does not prove that it is not implied by Mr. Lewis in a portion of his speculations. It is the distinctive metaphysical doctrine of Kant, Coleridge, Schelling, Hegel, and many other writers. They openly deny or disown the existence of an external material universe, and maintain that all the phenomena are caused by the senses themselves, or mind, instead of being the effects or consequences of things without, that in some respect correspond to them. And that is the theory also advanced by Dr. Hickok, in his *Rational Psychology, which Mr. Lewis has publicly sanctioned and commended, as presenting a just view of the origin and nature of our perceptions*. It is rather too late, therefore, for him to disclaim the doctrine, on the ground that it is too absurd for him or any one else to maintain. But he confutes himself in this very attempt at his vindication; for he admits the distinction between "appearances" and "that which appears;" that is, the material things which cause the appearances in the senses; and between the "effects," or phenomena, which the things that were created occasion, and those material things which are the "causes" of those "effects." As, therefore, he maintains that "appearances" are the only things that are denoted by the language of the sacred narrative, he in effect represents that phenomena were the only things that resulted from the creative acts of the Almighty. In the sentences that follow, he not only repeats this distinction, but reasserts his theory respecting the nature of the language of the sacred text, and attempts to verify it by a bold misrepresentation of a passage from the New Testament. He says:—

"The real statement, however, is one that pervades the whole

book. It is the one derived from the Apostle, that 'the things which are seen' *represent* 'the things that do not appear,' and thus the former are not only made from the latter, but *furnish* the outward *appearances* by which alone they can be conceived, and the outward language by which alone they can be named."

Here he recognises the distinction between "appearances," and the things which cause or "furnish" them; and shows thereby, that according to his "key-note," that the names of the sacred history denote nothing but appearances, nothing but appearances or phenomena are represented by the narrative as resulting from the creative acts of the Almighty. But he falls into a very extraordinary error, in exhibiting the apostle as teaching that "the things that are seen" *represent* "the things that do not appear." The apostle utters no such proposition, nor anything that approaches it; neither the word "represent," nor any that is in any measure equivalent to it occurs in the passage; nor is there any statement or implication in it, that "the things that are seen," were "made" out of "the things that do not appear." What he says is that, "By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God; so that *not* out of things that appear, were the things that are seen made." Here is nothing said of a *representation* of invisible things, by the things that are seen. There is nothing said of a making of the things that are seen, out of things that are invisible. But the apostle's averment is, first, that "the worlds were made by the word of God;" and next that it was "*not out of* things that appear"—that is from preëxisting matter, that "the things that are seen were made;" which is in direct contravention, on the one hand, of Professor Lewis's theory that the creation of the six days was a mere shaping of things out of preëxisting matter, and was the work of immaterial spiritual entities, instead of the word of God; and on the other hand, of his theory, that the effects that are denoted by the language of the text, and resulted from the creative acts of God, were mere appearances; for the things that are seen, are not mere appearances, that exist only in the senses, but are the material things created during the six days, which are the causes of those appearances, and are the real objects that are perceived. Instead of vindicating him-

self, therefore, by these assertions and denials, he has verified the objections we urged against him, and given fresh proofs of the irremediable errors and contradictions of his system.

He is equally wide of the truth also in denying that he implies in some of the representations of his volume, that he "holds only to a creation of primal powers." For he holds in the most specific manner, that "the whole creation that is meant to be *revealed* to us in the Bible, commences with a preëxistent nature;" that that creation consisted merely of a shaping and fashioning of things out of that preëxistent matter; that that fashioning and organization was the work exclusively of "primal powers," and, finally, that God created those "primal powers." Thus he says:—

"The outward or phenomenal entities"—that is, the masses and organisms fashioned out of the preëxistent matter—"were generated or born from the *invisible immaterial vital powers*, principles, laws, spermatic words or ideas, call them what we will, which are *themselves the first and immediate creations* of the Divine Word, going forth before any new agency of nature, whether the universal or any particular nature."—P. 224.

What he means by creations by the Divine Word we will not now attempt to decide. Very probably it is only what Swedenborg means by it, who holds that those "immaterial vital powers," or "psychical entities," are mere emanations from the Deity; for Mr. Lewis calls those "primal powers," "invisible *divine* powers;" or what Dr. Bushnell means when he says that—

"There is in God a capacity of self-expression—a *generative power of form*, a creative imagination, in which or by the aid of which he can produce himself outwardly, or represent himself in the finite:" that in order to reveal himself, he must assume finite forms; "the One must appear in the *manifold*; the Absolute in the *conditioned*; Spirit in *form*; the motionless in *motion*; the Infinite in the *finite*. He must *distribute Himself*; He must let forth his nature in *sounds*, colors, forms, works, definite objects, and signs." "He must be to us as if Jehovah . . . were dividing off himself into innumerable *activities* that shall dramatize his immensity," and that "thus the God revealed, in distinction from the God Absolute, will have *parts, forms, colors, utterances, motions, activities, assigned Him*."—*God in Christ*, pp. 139, 140, 145.

Many things which Mr. Lewis says, seem indeed inconsistent with this notion; but they are no more inconsistent with it, than many of Swedenborg's and Bushnell's expressions and representations are. But whatever it be that he means by denominating his "invisible divine powers," "immediate creations of the Divine Word," these passages and many others of the same import, show that he is justly obnoxious to the charge of holding "only to a creation of primal powers;" for that is the distinctive doctrine of his cosmology, its animating soul, without which all its parts would instantly collapse. If this doctrine, as he now avers, "makes the world" "a pantheistic emanation," it is he that is responsible for it, not we.

Such is the issue of this attempt to vindicate himself. What a tissue of errors! He blunders first in his notion that the terms of the sacred narrative must be used in their primitive senses, and thence that *rakia* must carry with it the conception of a solid expanse, and that his philological chemistry is requisite to expel that fancy from the text. No notion could be more gratuitous and mistaken. It is apparent from the description that is given of that which is called *rakia*, that it was not a solid, but a fluid, and was the atmosphere; as it was in the *rakia*, expanse, that the clouds floated and the birds flew: for it divided the waters that were above, from those that were on the bosom of the earth: but there are no waters above but the vapors that exist in the form of clouds, or else are so diffused and absorbed by the atmosphere, as to be invisible: and it was "in the open *rakia*, expanse of heaven," that is, in that part of the expanse that was not occupied by clouds, that the fowls were to fly. How could the Hebrews, with these definitions of the *rakia*, imagine that it was a solid arch or floor? The supposition that they attached any such notion to it, is absurd and contradictory in the utmost degree.

The expedient by which he attempts to escape the difficulty in which his false notion, that the language of the narrative is used in its primordial sense, involves him; that the language is merely phenomenal, or denotes appearances solely, in contradistinction from the material things which cause those appearances, is equally mistaken and absurd. The words, earth, waters, seas, light, expanse, herbs, trees,

sun, moon, living thing, fowl, creeping-things, beast, man, are the names not of mere appearances, that is mere images or effects produced in the senses, but of the material visible realities without, which produce those appearances, or images in the eye. All our consciousness, all language, all the agencies of life proceed on this as an indisputable and self-evident fact. When a person buys a house, it is not an appearance merely that he purchases, or the terms of the bargain indicate, and that is conveyed to him in his deed; but it is the house itself—a literal material structure, which wears, or produces in him that appearance. When a person makes a sale and delivery of lands, merchandise, utensils, or other kinds of property, they are not mere reflections, outlines, colors, appearances, or images in the eye, which the language of the transaction denotes, and which he delivers; but real substantive existences that wear those appearances, or produce those images. Were the young men whom Mr. Lewis instructs to affirm that his *name* does not stand for a real substantive existence, a human being, a body and soul having consciousness, the power of thought, of motion, and of speech, but is the name of a mere appearance, or superficies of dark colors, bounded by a winding line; he would regard it not only as the greatest contradiction to fact, but as equivalent to an affirmation that *he* himself is not a man, but a mere appearance, a shadow in the eye. But it would not be a greater misrepresentation and caricature of the truth than his doctrine is, that the language of Genesis, and of mankind generally, is merely phenomenal, or its names the names of mere appearances. On this theory no title to property, no compact, no charter, no law human or divine, no political constitution, no written instrument of any species that defines the relations and rights of men, and guarantees their possessions, their persons, or their liberties, would have the slightest significance. Society itself, indeed, could not subsist for an hour were language used, as he alleges, to designate mere appearances, instead of realities: the mere shadows of the world, instead of the substantive existences that cast those shadows.

He is equally in error in his theory that the appearances produced by objects are representative of invisible entities, or ineffable facts that stand behind them. Written and

printed letters are representative of articulate sounds and words, and articulate words are representative of thoughts; but it is artificially, or by contrivance and convention, not naturally. But the appearances, that is, the images produced in the eye by material objects, mountains, hills, plains, trees, buildings, implements, animals, human beings, are not representative of invisible, ineffable things. No greater contradiction to consciousness and the convictions on which we proceed in all our thoughts and agency can be conceived. Those appearances are the media by which we perceive the various objects which bear those names. The mountains, the vales, the trees, the works of art, the human beings, are directly perceived by us through the colors and figures by which they are painted on the retina, not those colors and outlines merely. The structures in which we live, the scene that spreads around us, the fellow-beings with whom we associate, are objects of positive and familiar knowledge, not unseen and ineffable powers that lie back of mere appearances, or groups of lines and colors.

He passes from this theme to our objecting to his treatment of Hebrews xi. 3, that it is "an alteration of the text," not an "interpretation" of it. He says:—

• "The author is charged with *altering* the text of Hebrews xi. 3. How disingenuous this is, any reader may see who turns to that part of the book in which this important passage is examined at some length.

"Mr. Lord makes no difference between the charge of altering a text, which, besides being profane, would be a very foolish proceeding, and that of adopting a various reading. This may have been done on insufficient grounds; but was it *blindness or design* which kept back the reason given, with the clear concurrence of the oldest versions, the Vulgate and the Syriac, as also the agreement in the same view of the best modern scholars, who support their opinion by independent evidence, without any reference to the bearing of the passage on the subject to which we have applied it. . . Mr. Lord should not be so shut up to the narrow field of the *Theological and Literary Journal*, as to forget that he lives in a scholarly age, and that the eyes of scholars are upon him, if they choose to take notice of him at all."

"How disingenuous," how utterly treacherous this is, if

Mr. Lewis has any knowledge of the subject, the reader will soon see. The passage to which the question relates is the following:—*οὕτως τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλεπόμενα γιγνέσθαι*, which is literally: “so that *not* out of things that appear, were the things that are seen made;” and is an express affirmation, therefore, that the things that are seen were not made out of matter that previously existed; and is a direct negative, accordingly, to Mr. Lewis’s theory, that they were made out of pre-existent matter, and by a natural generation and growth. The change which he made, was the removal of the negative particle *μὴ*, not, from before *ἐκ*, out of, and placing it after that preposition, so that it should govern *φαινομένων*, instead of *γιγνέσθαι*, and make the passage read: “So that out of things that do *not* appear, the things that are seen were made;” and thereby give a color to his theory, that the material things that are seen, were made out of *things pre-existing*, that are not seen: that is, “out of the invisible, immaterial entities,” or “divine powers,” from which he holds they were made. The rendering, accordingly, he gives is: “So that the things that are seen were made from *things that are unseen*,” meaning by things unseen, real, though invisible, because immaterial existences.

Now in the first place, the change which he thus made in the arrangement of the words, is literally what we denominated it, an *alteration* of the text, and for the most unjustifiable purpose,—to make it express a meaning the direct converse of that which the language, in its original order, conveys. The pretext, that instead of an alteration it was only the adoption of “*a various reading*,” is truly an extraordinary one. There is no such various reading. Not a single Greek manuscript of the epistle presents the collocation of the words which Mr. Lewis substitutes for that of the received text. Wetstein, Griesbach, Knapp, Scholz, Lachman, Hahn, Theile, Tischendorf, knew of no such manuscript; nor any other editor or interpreter. Instead, *Ita codices omnes*—all the manuscripts, Wolfius declares, give the reading of the received text, *οὕτως τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων*. To allege the Syriac and Vulgate translations as “various readings” of Greek manuscripts, is a very unfortunate blunder for one who talks so airily of this “scholarly age.” The change, then, is an *alteration*, and an arbitrary one; and—as

it has been advocated by certain interpreters—is so pronounced by many of the ablest critics. Thus Kuinoel says, "Beza, Schmidt, Storr, Schulze, Bohm, Winer, most justly maintain that this transposition is *arbitrary*, and that the particle *not* should be joined to the verb *made*."

Mr. Lewis's intimation, that the best modern scholars agree with his view of the text, is unauthorized and deceptive. The reader would naturally regard it as indicating that they founded their advocacy of a transposition of *μη* on a various reading of Greek manuscripts. But that is not the fact. There is not a hint in either the ancient Greek commentators, or those modern scholars, that they were aware of any such reading as that which they adopted or recommended. Instead, they all founded it, it is not improbable, —it is known that some of them did,—on the belief, first, that the fact meant to be declared by the apostle, by *μη ἐκ φαινομένων*, was the same as is expressed by *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, out of things that were not; that is, out of nothing; and next, that it is more in accordance with the Hebrew usage, that the negative particle should be joined to *φαινομένων*, than referred, as in the received text, to *γεγονέναι*. They accordingly, without exception, maintained that when transposed, the affirmation of the passage is identically the same as in the original collocation, that the things that are seen were not made out of pre-existing matter, but out of nothing; and that was the construction put on it also by Chrysostom and Theodoret. Thus Kuinoel says—

"Not a few interpreters think that 'not out of things seen,' is put for 'out of things not seen'—following as authority the Syriac and Vulgate versions, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Œcumenius. Chrysostom's words are,—'It is plain that God made the things that are, out of things that were not; the apparent out of non-apparent, the real out of non-real.' They—those interpreters—therefore render the words,—'So that out of things that were not, the things existed which are.' They intimate that transpositions of this kind are frequent in the best writers, and that by the Hebrews, a thing not seen, is used to signify a thing not existing. On the contrary, however, Beza, Storr, Schulze, and others, regard that transposition as *arbitrary*, and hold that 'not' should be connected with the verb made. And taken in that manner, the sense is, 'The

world existed by the will of God; so that it was not made out of pre-existing matter, but was made when nothing had before been.' ¹⁷⁰

Those interpreters, therefore, who advocate the transposition, regard the expression *ἐκ μὴ φαινόμενων* as not altering the sense of the passage, but as precisely equivalent to *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*; as more in accordance with the usage of the Scriptures; and as more emphatically declaring the fact, that God made the things that are seen out of nothing, than *ἐκ μὴ φαινόμενων*. Chrysostom, also, as we have seen, held it to be precisely equivalent to *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων* out of nothing; and that is the sense attached to it also by Theodoret; for he gives *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων* as the equivalent of the text. *ἐξ ὧν γὰρ δημιουργοὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὁ δὲ τῶν ὄλων Θεὸς ἐκ μὴ ὄντων τὰ ὄντα παραγάγει.* "For men fabricate works out of things that exist; but God produced the things that exist, out of nothing." Their making, therefore, or approving the transposition of the negative term, does not yield the slightest sanction to the sense which Mr. Lewis deduces from it, but so far as their authority goes, as Fathers or the best modern scholars, confutes it; while it divests him also of all apparent sanction from the Syriac and Vulgate versions: for if the Greek Fathers, Chrysostom and Theodoret, as well as the modern scholars who followed them, regarded the expression when transposed, as equivalent to *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων*, and as teaching that God made the world out of nothing; who can fail to see that

* *Μὴ ἐκ φαινόμενων* haud pauci interpretes positum esse putarunt pro *ἐκ μὴ φαινόμενων*, secuti auctoritatem ver. Syr. Vulg. *ex invisibilibus*; Chrysostomi (eujus verba sunt: *ὁ γὰρ ὁτι ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ ὄντα ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεός, ἐκ τῶν μὴ φαινόμενων τὰ φαινόμενα, ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὁρατούων τὰ ὁρατά*), Theodreti, Theophylacti, et Ecumenii. Verba igitur reddiderunt: ita ut ex iis quae non essent, ea quae sunt, existerent. Monuerunt, ejusmodi transpositiones optimis scriptoribus frequentes esse . . . et *τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον* Hebraeis dici *rem non existentem* . . . provocant praeterea etiam ad 2 Macc. vii. 28, ubi pro *ἐκ τῶν μὴ φαινόμενων* legitur: *ὅτι ἐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ (τὸν σῶμα καὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς πάντα)* et eadem trajectio locum habeat. Contra vero, Beza, Er. Schmidius (ea quae cernimus, non esse facta ex apparentibus) Storrius, Schulzius, Böhmius, Winerus, hanc transpositionem *arbitrariam* esse, et negandi particulam *μὴ* ad *γενέσθαι* referri debere, rectissime judicarunt. Hac ratione admissa, sensus est:—mundus Dei voluntate extitit, ita, ut non ex materia quadam aeterna factus sit, sed conditus sit, cum nihil antea esset.—Comm. in *Epist. ad Hebraeos*.

that may have been the judgment also of the authors of the Syriac and Vulgate versions, and that they may have used the expressions they employ, as teaching that the things that are seen were made, not out of pre-existent matter, but out of nothing?

That is the judgment also of Wolfius. *Τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα* eadem sunt, quæ *τὰ μὴ ὄντα*, quæ non sunt. Id patet ex Rom. iv. 7, ubi Deus dicitur *τὰ μὴ ὄντα καλέσας*. Ita., 2 Maccab. vii. 28; omnino *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* in negotio creationis dicuntur, quæ hic audiunt *τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα*. Idem apparet ex opposito, *βλεπόμενα*. Sicut enim per hæc res *vere existentes* indicantur, ita necesse est ut per *μὴ φαινόμενα* intelligantur res *non existentes*.

"*Τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα* are the same in sense as *τα μὴ ὄντα*, and mean 'things that are not.' This is seen from Rom. iv. 17, and from Maccab. vii. 28, where the latter is used in reference to the creation in the place of the former. It is seen, also, from the contrasted *βλεπόμενα*, the things that are seen: for as these denote things that really exist, so by *μὴ φαινόμενα* must be understood things, *not existing*." He adds, that "the faith in respect to the creation, of which Paul here speaks, was the common faith of the Jewish people, that all things were made out of nothing."

Professor Stuart speaks of the passage as "controverted and somewhat difficult," but interprets it as denoting a creation out of nothing.

"If we construe it as the text now stands, the *μὴ* must naturally be joined with *γεγονέναι*, and it must be rendered, *so that things visible were not made of things that do appear*. . .

"Those who adopt a different construction of the passage, maintain that *εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινόμενων* may be translated as if it were written *εἰς τὸ ἐκ μὴ φαινόμενων*.

"Take them which way we will, . . the sense, all must admit, is plain, and is substantially one and the same."

"On the whole, then, we must regard the phrase in question as equivalent to the expression in our language, 'The visible creation was formed from nothing, i. e. it came into existence by the command of God, and was not formed out of any pre-existing materials.'"

Such is the issue of Mr. Lewis's attempt to make out that

he has the authority of "a various reading" for his alteration of the passage, and the sanction of the Syriac and Vulgate versions, of the Greek Commentators, and "the best modern scholars" for his construction of it, as teaching that the things that are seen, instead of being made out of nothing, were made out of pre-existing immaterial entities, "invisible divine powers, or unseen forces." Whether his misrepresentations had their origin in ignorance or disingenuousness, we leave our readers to judge. A very moderate share of sense should have withheld him from such an expedient to shield himself from the discredit which his tampering with the word of God reflects on him. He "should not be so shut up to the narrow field" of his pantheistic "primal invisible entities" "as to forget that he lives in a scholarly age, and that the eyes of scholars are upon him—if they choose to take notice of him at all!"

On quitting this topic, he devotes a column to his theory of invisible immaterial spiritual entities as indwelling and vitalizing all material forms; re-asserting and attempting to verify it, and intimating how easily, if he chose, he could "run" us "fathoms down into an ocean of absurdity." That he well knows the way to that bottomless deep, and is familiar with the topography of the region, we are aware. It does not accord, however, with our habits or taste to accompany him there; and we shall leave him to make the journey alone.

By way of showing with what difficulties he thinks we are embarrassed, he ascribes to us several views which we do not entertain; such as "that God made the first trees and herbs," by "fashioning" them as "outward dead" masses, "as the artist forms the waxen tree or fruit, by an outward mechanical plastic process, and then put" them "into the ground," as a gardener sets out plants and trees. That statement is wholly without authority, and as wide of the truth as any proposition he could have framed. We have never expressed nor held any such notion.

Another fancy equally mistaken, on which he descants, is, that if we reject his theory of spiritual entities, we "must choose the lowest system of *nominakism*." A fine flourish to be put forth by one who himself maintains, that all the names of language are mere names of *appearances*, in con-

tradistinction from realities; and that all realities lie back of them, and are absolutely unknown and unknowable! What nominalism is, however, in contradistinction from realism, he seems wholly to misapprehend; as he immediately proceeds to represent it as the doctrine "that in the *natural* universe there are only individual *materialities*, or what is the same, that lowest system of *materialism*, which makes all life to be the result of material organization;" and that finally denies that there is any conscious spiritual existence, creature or God, in the universe; which he says is "worse than the dreaded pantheism." If Mr. Lewis is himself a pantheist, and holds with Spinoza, Swedenborg, Bushnell, and others of that faith, that God is the only conscious being in the universe, and the only existence; that all psychical entities and material masses and organisms are only the Infinite distributing himself into parts—"letting forth his nature in sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects—" and embodying himself in the finite; then we can see how he may imagine that to deny that one class of these finite forms, such as plants and trees, are formed and animated by immaterial spiritual entities, is to deny that the others are, and imply that there is no spiritual existence, created or uncreated, in the universe. But not otherwise. For that is the only postulate from which such a conclusion follows. If God and creatures are not identical, but wholly distinct, then the fact that plants and trees are not formed and animated by immaterial spiritual conscious entities, is no more proof that animals have not a conscious nature—that mankind are not intelligences, and that there is not a self-existent and Infinite Intelligence who is the creator, upholder, and ruler of all finite existences—than the fact that dead unorganized matter has no spiritual and conscious nature is such a proof. But it is not necessary that we should again treat of the nature and laws of vegetable life. We have already shown that his vegetable spiritual entities are gratuitously assumed; that the office he assigns them is wholly inconsistent with the facts of physiology; and that the effects to which he represents them as giving birth, could only be produced by a conscious, intelligent, and omnipotent cause. This last consideration alone sufficiently confutes his theory. If a pure, immaterial spiritual entity, unconnected with any

living material organism by which it could act on matter, were to produce a plant or tree, it is plain that it must be by a creative *will*. By the supposition, it could not act on the elements of which the plant was *formed* by any of the forces which are peculiar to matter, such as electricity, magnetism, or chemical affinity, by which one material substance acts on another, and attracts or repels it, and augments, counteracts, or modifies its qualities and tendencies. It must be by a *will* alone, and by a will that has absolute dominion over all the elements and forces that are united in the constitution and structure of the plant. As a plant, then, consists primarily of germ-cells, that are formed by a combination of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon, and those germ-cells are united in a structure, in the constitution and functions of which heat, light, and all the chemical forces have an office that are concerned in the combination of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon, in such a living organism, and the various modifications which they undergo, it is clear that the will which unites them in such a structure, must have dominion over all those species of matter, and the forces which influence them; and therefore must have an absolute control of the whole realm of nature: for a will that could by a mere volition command such a share of those elements and forces as enters into the constitution of a plant, could, undoubtedly, with equal ease, command any other share of them. It must be as absolute in order to the one effect as to the other; and must be the power of the being by whom those elements and forces subsist. For none but their upholder can be supposed to possess such a power. A will that could thus control them, must have a perfect *knowledge* of them also. It must know that they exist, and where; and what their several natures are. It must know by what forces they can be united, and in what proportions; what the primary germ-cells or organisms are which they must be made to form, in order to the structure of a living plant; how those primary combinations must be joined, and in what countless numbers, to constitute roots, a stem, branches, and leaves; what a nature the structure must receive, and what the elements are by which it must be fed, and the forces which must act on it in order to the various processes and functions of a living plant: and that know-

ledge plainly must be omniscient, and be the knowledge, therefore, of the being who created and upholds the whole realm of nature. The production of a plant by a mere volition must indisputably, therefore, be the work of an omniscient and omnipotent intelligence, and that Intelligence must be the Infinite, Self-existent, and Almighty Creator and Ruler of all. That a finite, unintelligent, and unconscious entity could produce such an effect, involving an immeasurably greater knowledge of the nature and processes of the physical world, and an immeasurably higher control of the elements and forces of nature, than men possess or can acquire, is a solecism too palpable and monstrous for any one to entertain. The offices and functions, therefore, which Mr. Lewis assigns to his immaterial spiritual entities, imply that they are infinite in power and intelligence, and therefore that they are divine; and cannot be consistently believed to belong to them, except by a pantheist.

On leaving this subject, he turns to the first day of the creation, and avers that we are "greatly puzzled to make a natural solar day in the beginning of the creative hebdomad." We are not aware of any perplexity, however, on the subject. We hold, with the apostle, that "by faith we understand that the worlds were *made* by the word of God," and were spoken, accordingly, into existence,—the earth, sun, and all that belong to our system, in a moment; and as God himself declared at Sinai, that "in six days he made heaven and earth, the sea and all that in them is," it is clear that the earth, the sun, and the other orbs of the system were made on the first day: and if the days were reckoned at the meridian of Paradise, as is seen from the history of the sixth and seventh, which closed when evening began there, all that was necessary to make the first day *at that meridian* just such a solar day as those that followed were, was, that the sun should rise there twelve hours after the earth was spoken into existence, and set at the moment when the first twenty-four hours of its existence terminated. Is there any puzzle here? Did it transcend the power of the Almighty that the first day should terminate at the place at which it was reckoned, at the exact completion of the earth's revolution on its axis? Did it transcend his power that that revolution should take place in the same time in which all its subse-

quent revolutions have been accomplished? Besides, if there is any puzzle here, is it not one with which Mr. Lewis's theory is equally embarrassed? He surely believes that there was, at the close of the days of creation, or at some subsequent time, a first natural solar day; and if so, must he not suppose that the sun rose at the meridian at which the day was reckoned, just twelve hours—if the period of its shining were twelve hours—before it set at that meridian; and set there at the end of the twenty-four hours from the close of the preceding day? And is there not just as much of a puzzle in the supposition of such a first sunrising and sunsetting on the fourth, the seventh, or any other subsequent day in the earth's history, as there is on the first? But it is quite in character that such a speculatist as Mr. Lewis should puzzle, or affect to puzzle, himself over a subject like this, which involves no difficulty, and is, moreover, settled by the direct testimony of the Almighty. He sees nothing to startle and embarrass him in the *assumption* which he makes, that the matter of which the heavens and earth are formed, was in existence anterior to the creation recorded in Genesis: and that no intimation is given in the Bible that God is its author; that the work of the only creation ascribed to God was a mere shaping of pre-existent matter; and that that shaping was accomplished by finite entities. He sees nothing to embarrass him in the assumption he makes, that the light of the first three days was not sunlight, but the mere gleam or flame of a chemical combustion; that the atmosphere was developed out of the matter of the earth; that plants and trees were formed by immaterial spiritual entities put into the soil, in the exertion of their own inherent powers; and that those plants and trees grew and flourished through long periods, without a ray of sunlight or sun-heat; that animals of all kinds were brought into existence also in a natural way by the powers of their immaterial spiritual entities deposited in the water and earth; and a crowd of other notions that contradict the laws of nature, and the teachings of the Scriptures. He can swallow this long caravan of camels without the slightest distortion of countenance; but how the Almighty could cause the first day to close at sunset at the meridian at which the day was reckoned, and just at the moment when the

earth had completed its first rotation on its axis, transcends his comprehension, puzzles, bewilders, confounds him !

He thinks, too, that our view of the work of the fourth day is far less satisfactory than his. It is not necessary to renew the discussion respecting it. We have shown abundantly that the light of the first, second, and third days was the light of the sun. It is demonstrated by the fact alone that vegetables, to the existence of which sunlight and heat are essential, were created on the third day. It is indicated also by the creative word of the fourth day, which exhibits the luminaries of heaven as already existing: "Let the luminaries in the expanse of heaven be to divide the day from the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years." As, then, they were already in existence, this command implies that a change was then wrought in their relations to the earth, or the earth to them, by which the days, seasons, and years became under their light what they now are. What, then, is it in the relation of the earth to the sun, by which the days, seasons, and years are what they now are? The answer is, it is the inclination of the earth's axis to the ecliptic; as it is from that that the variation of the days and nights in length results, the succession of the seasons, and thence the peculiarities which that variation and succession give to the year. As, then, that adjustment of the earth's axis to the luminaries of heaven was what was requisite to their filling the office assigned them, and it was a work—especially if the other planets of our system received their inclination to the ecliptic at the same time—fraught with as important effects as that of several of the other days,—for the whole economy of the world has resulted from it—it is a natural, a just, and a sufficient view of the work of the fourth day. This, however, does not satisfy Mr. Lewis's fastidious intellect. He feels no difficulty in assuming that the earth had not before the fourth day revolved on its axis, nor even belonged to the solar system; that it had had three days and nights without a gleam from any exterior orb; that its days were formed by the flash or glimmer of a chemical combustion; that vegetables had subsisted on its bosom through vast periods without a ray of sunlight; and that after this command, the days were of immeasurable length—thousands, and perhaps

millions of years—which implies that the earth occupied such a vast period in turning once on its axis; that the nights, therefore, were of half the length of such a period, and must thence have been far colder than the long nights now are at the poles; and consequently, that plants and trees lived through three such nights at least; the animals, created the fifth day, through two; and those created on the sixth, and Adam and Eve also, through one! These, and a crowd of other fancies, that are not only without a shadow of support from the text, but in infinite contradiction to it and to the laws and possibilities of nature, he can maintain without the slightest misgiving: but that God should change the axis of the earth, and probably the other planets, from a perpendicular, so as to cause that variation in the days and nights, that succession of seasons, and those peculiarities of the year, which determine in a great measure the economy of our lives, surpasses his comprehension! He starts back from it with a philosophic horror!

He finally closes his response with the charge that he is misrepresented by us; and he specifies three subjects. The first is the self-existence of matter. He says:—

“Mr. Lord's review abounds in misrepresentations. Some are too absurd for refutation. We refer to those in which he charges the writer with making light and matter eternal.”

What we alleged is, that some of his constructions and representations *imply* that matter is self-existent; and we gave reasons for it, which we think cannot easily be set aside. And as this is one of the most important questions in regard to the real nature of his system,—inasmuch as if it actually or virtually teaches that matter is self-existent and eternal, it is pantheistic—he should, if in his power, have disproved it. How happens it, then, that he evades it by the pretext that the charge is “too absurd for refutation?” That his book presents very strong indications that he regards matter as self-existent and eternal, we think cannot be denied. Such is, 1. The fact that Plato and Swedenborg, from whom he drew the main elements of his cosmology, held that doctrine; that it is as essential to the consistency of his system as it is to theirs; and that he nowhere, so far as we

have observed, directly and specifically disavows it. 2. His construction of "the beginning" (Gen. i. 1), as the beginning of God's agency towards the heavens and earth, while he denies that God then gave being to the matter of which they consist, implies it. If the agency there narrated was God's first agency towards it, and yet it did not derive its existence from that agency, then clearly it did not owe its existence to him, and therefore it must be self-existent and eternal. 3. He specifically maintains that the matter of the heavens and earth existed prior to the creation narrated in Genesis. 4. He maintains, in the most open manner, that we have no revelation in the Scriptures that God ever gave existence to the matter of the universe. "Thus," he says, "we think the whole creation that is meant to be revealed to us in the Bible, commences with a preëxistent nature" (p. 284). 5. He formally asks the question whether "light is eternal," and avers that he sees no philosophical or theological objections to the supposition that it is; that if the Scriptures had asserted its "absolute eternity," he should have had no hesitation in believing it; but affirms that *they* teach nothing from which we can decide that it is *not* self-existent, or that it is! He asks:—

"What is light?" The Bible represents it "as the raiment of God. . . . Was it eternal then? Did it thus ever form the Divine abode, the 'secret place of the Most High,' the innermost Shekinah, in which God dwells? *On such a question we would not turn over a leaf to get the answer of science or philosophy. If the Scriptures had declared in any way the absolute eternity of that substance whose motions are the cause of vision in sentient beings, we should have had no hesitation in believing it, and no fears on the ground of any supposed pantheistic tendency. But they tell us NOTHING ON THE SUBJECT.*"—Fp. 69, 70.

If light is eternal, it must be self-existent; and if self-existent, it must be God; as otherwise, God could not alter its form. For if self-existent, the reason of its existing—at any time in a particular form or variety of forms—must lie in itself, not in a different and independent being. To suppose its "absolute eternity," therefore, is plainly to suppose it to be God, which, instead of being chargeable simply with a "pantheistic tendency," is pantheism itself. Is it not nat-

ral and unavoidable to conclude from this, that the reason that Mr. Lewis sees no objection to the theory of the "absolute eternity" of matter on the score of science or philosophy; that he has no curiosity even to know what "answer" they give to the question, whether it is self-existent or not; that he sees nothing in the teachings of the Scriptures in regard to created things, or to God, that is inconsistent with the supposition that they might have declared the "absolute eternity" of matter; and that he has no fears of any pantheism that is involved in that doctrine, is, and must be, that he is in fact a pantheist; and that the assumption, therefore, of the eternity and self-existence of matter, instead of an obstacle to his cosmology, is *the very basis* on which its whole fabric is erected?

The objection, then, which we made to his speculations on this subject, that they *imply* that matter is self-existent, is well founded. We might indeed have used much stronger language, for he not only *seems* to proceed in some of his constructions on the tacit assumption, that matter is self-existent; but some of the avowals which we have quoted, are inexplicable on any other supposition than that he regards it as absolutely self-existent.

The question, therefore, whether this is the actual implication and teaching of his volume, is legitimate, and the most important that could have engaged his attention. How happens it then, that, instead of candidly considering this objection, setting it aside, if in his power, and openly and emphatically disavowing pantheism and everything that implies it, he contents himself with passing it under the pretext that it is "too absurd for refutation?" Would such a course be the dictate of sense, if he really rejects pantheism, and regards it with the abhorrence which he ought? If fair-minded, could he possibly treat the objection, when sustained by such ample reasons, as though it was absolutely groundless, or the work of mere ignorance or disingenuousness? Is it not far more natural and just to conclude that the reason of his dodging the objection with an affectation of contempt is, that he is unable to answer it; that he is in fact a pantheist, and is conscious that the self-existence and divinity of matter are the fundamental element of his cosmo-

logy, and cannot be abandoned without abandoning his whole speculative system?

He next proceeds to the specification of two subjects, on which he alleges we have most seriously and inexcusably misrepresented him. The first relates to his view of the evenings and mornings of the second and third days.

"There are, however, two that demand a more special attention as specimens of unfairness, which it is difficult to cover with the mantle of perfect charity. He represents it to be the doctrine of the book, that there was a covering of light upon the earth of some phosphorescent kind, during all the days before the fourth, and that, in some way, by this were made the mornings and evenings. There is no truth at all in the statement, *as far as the latter idea is concerned*, and the first, although *alluded* to in the book, is a mere *conjecture*, to which no kind of importance is attached in the general argument. The *first* light that shone upon the dark chaos is treated as the *first morning*, because the context forces us to it. How any reader can resist that impression we cannot well conceive. The first morning *thus made by a light*, may have given rise, in the conception of the writer, to the name morning, as applied to the corresponding times in the succeeding periods; but it is not *affirmed* (any more than it is denied) that the second and third mornings were made by a light *succeeding a darkness*. It is rather supposed, with St. Augustine, that though the peculiarity of the first great morning *originated the name*, the other mornings following might have been any great *supernatural awakening* in nature, to which the term, in its essential idea, might be just as well applied."

The charge here is, 1: That we represent him as teaching that there was a covering of phosphorescent light on the earth—that is, that the earth was lighted up by a chemical combustion on each of the first three days; and, 2nd, that we exhibit him as holding that the mornings and evenings of the second and third days were caused, like the first, by the shining and discontinuance of light. And this he parades as one of the "specimens of unfairness which it is difficult to cover with the mantle of perfect charity!" And yet he admits in this very paragraph, that he "alluded" to the first—the illumination of the first three days by a chemical light; that is, *he spoke of it as a fact*, though he now

pretends it was by a conjecture to which he attached no importance! Alluded to a conjecture! A novel mode, truly, of settling such an important point in his cosmology! He admits, also, that he "treated" "the first light that shone upon the dark chaos" "*as the first morning, because the context forces us to it.*" A good reason, certainly. He admits that the fact that the first morning was thus made by a light, may have been the reason that the name morning was given to the corresponding periods of *the second and third day*. And finally, he concedes, that though he did not affirm it, yet neither did he deny, that the second and third mornings were also made, like the first, "by a light succeeding a darkness!" That is, he admits that he left the subject in such a position, that we naturally understood him to hold that the reasons he gave for regarding the first day as beginning with a morning of light, and closing with an evening of darkness, were the reasons also for which he held that the second and third day began with a morning and closed with an evening! But these considerations were surely a full justification of our representing him as holding the views we ascribed to him. How, after he had expressly indicated that he regarded the first three days as illuminated periods, could we, without a hint that that was not his belief, assume or suppose that he did not regard them as such? How, after expressly asserting that the morning of the first day was produced by light, and its evening by darkness, could we, without an intimation that that was not his faith, suppose that he did not regard the mornings and evenings of the second and third days as produced by the same causes?

We are not left, however, to these grounds for our justification. We have the most ample authority in his volume for the construction we placed on his theory. Thus, he gives express definitions of a *day*, as consisting of an illuminated and a dark period; and definitions of that illuminated period, as commencing with a morning of light, and closing with an evening of darkness.

He in the first place alleges, that the command "Let there be light," was equivalent to the command, "Be it light on that dark chaos; and light was there." As then God called that first period of light on the chaos, day, and because it

was light, it follows that the second and third periods that were called day, must also have been periods of light on the earth, and were for that reason called day. Next: he admits and asserts, that the division of the light from darkness which God made, was, or may have been, a division of *time*. "*And God divided the light from the darkness*. Here is the sense of the Hebrew words sufficiently satisfied by referring them directly to the particular *shining of the light* upon the chaos. . . Or the *division* may be one of *time*, and may refer to the point or *period*, on one side of which was *the light*, and on the other *the darkness*," p. 71. It was, unquestionably, a division of time, since otherwise the light would not have been called *day*, and the darkness night, which are not contemporaneous, but different parts of the twenty-four hours. As the word day, then, denoted such a division on the first day, it must denote a division also on the second and third. And, in the third place, he immediately proceeds to state that the word day, was used to denote a period of time marked by a succession of light and darkness.

"And God called the light day, and the darkness he called night. . . In Scripture to *name* is to *distinguish*. It denotes here a continuation of what is expressed in the first clause, or *the original division*" as to time "therein indicated. . . . He called aloud to the light or *the day*, and it awoke from its latent state among the slumbering elements of chaos. . . . There is no difficulty in regarding these expressions, day, light, etc., as borrowed from their applications at a much later period. . . . It is, however, a better view, as we shall attempt to show, that we have here the primary idea of the word [day] in respect to its *nature* or *quality*, [as a period of illumination] in distinction from its quantity [or length.] A day is not so much that *fixed duration* which is afterwards determined by settled modes of measurement, as a *periodical time marked by the opposite successions* of *light* and *darkness*, or what may be supposed to be analogous to them," [by which he means cases in which it is used by a *figure*, as in the expressions, a day of visitation, calamity, redemption.]—Pp. 72, 73.

He thus expressly defines a *day*, not the first day of the *six*, in distinction from the others, but a *day universally*, when the word is used in its literal sense, as a periodical time marked by opposite successions of light and darkness;"

that is, a periodical time, divided into a season of illumination, and a season of darkness. The second and the third day must, therefore, by his definition, as much as the first, have been a periodical time, consisting of a season of illumination, and a season of darkness. He asserts, accordingly, that the word day was used by Moses to designate such a period.

"And there was an evening, and there was a morning—one day, or first day. . . . We must interpret the writer in consistency with himself, whether we suppose him inspired or not. The revelation is made to us through the conceptions of Moses, and although such conceptions are not binding on us as the absolute truth, yet they are the medium, or one stage of the medium through which it is conveyed, and by whose aid, therefore, it must be exegetically studied. On either view then we must look for a harmony of representation in the writer's own mind. He certainly could not have had in his thought a common day, in the sense of one measured by an earthly revolution, or by the apparent circuit of the sun. . . . He had just what he has given to us, the idea of a period, commencing in darkness and ending in light, a bounded period, measured by chaos on the one hand, and the birth of a higher organization on the other; a period to which, for these reasons, there is given that name yom [day], which is afterwards used of the cyclical solar succession of light and darkness."—Pp. 73–75.

Here is an express representation, that the very ground on which Moses gave the word *day* as the name to the period which he employs it to denote, was his conception of that period as commencing in *darkness* and ending in *light*. *Moses*, however, declares that God himself gave the name *Day* to the light which he separated from the darkness, and gave the name *Night* to the darkness, to distinguish it from the period of illumination from which it was divided. We have thus, in these express definitions by Mr. Lewis of the meaning of the term "*day*," and the reason of its being given as the name of the period which it is employed to denote, the most ample reasons for representing him as holding that the second and the third day was, as much as the first, a period consisting of two divisions; one a time of darkness and night, the other a time of light and illumination. Yet in the face of these definitions and many other passages of the same pur-

port, he now has the coolness to assert that he only "*alluded*" in his book to the illumination of the first three days in "a conjecture, to which no kind of importance is attached," and to charge us, in representing him as holding that they were periods of illumination, as exhibiting a "specimen of unfairness which it is difficult to cover with the mantle of perfect charity." It is not necessary that we should characterize this proceeding. The cloven-foot is too apparent to need to be pointed out.

His definitions of morning as a period of commencing light, and of evening as a commencement of darkness, are equally specific.

"*And there was an evening, and there was a morning—one day.* What was this evening but the *darkness* of the chaos over which the Spirit hovered, and what was this first morning but *the first beams* of that separating *light* which broke in upon it, when God said, *Let it be light, and light was there?* This was the evening, and this was the morning—one day."—P. 81.

"Why is it said *there was an evening, and there was a morning?* To keep us, we may answer, [which is the chief point he aims to establish in his exposition of the words day, evening, and morning,] from regarding *duration*, or a *certain duration* as the *main*, or even any *essential element* of the idea. It was not *this* that made it a *day*, or justified the name; but *the fact* of its having *two marked and contrasted seasons* to which the names *evening* and *morning* could be given (especially is this said etymologically of the Hebrew words) with as *much propriety*, as to those that were made by *the setting and rising of the sun*. This was the evening, and *this* was the morning—one day. As though the writer had said, it was this [season of commencing light, and season of darkness] that made that day, and had brought in the expression to guard against any misconception [in respect to its *duration*] that might come from connecting it with any subsequent measures of time, after measured time began."—Pp. 85, 86.

He then proceeds to give the etymology of evening and morning, and to show that the one denotes a season or beginning of darkness, and the other a commencement of light, or a season of illumination.

"These views are strengthened by an etymological examination of the terms employed. Day and night or the Hebrew יום and לילה are general terms, and may be taken of *the times occupied by cer-*

tain phenomena, as well as of *the phenomena themselves*. The words *evening* and *morning* are confined mainly to *the latter use*. They denote, not *duration* of any extent, so much as *THE OPTICAL OR PHYSICAL APPEARANCES* by which they are *marked*, or in which they *commence* and *terminate*. It is rational, therefore, to lay a *stress* on *their phenomenal or etymological significations*, which might not be justified in other cases; especially when we bear in mind, that they are *explanatory of this word 'yom.'* They are used to show *why* it is called *day*, because divided into two contrasted states [darkness and light] that could be characterized by no words so well as by those which are afterwards used, to denote *the corresponding parts* of that lesser and more distinctly marked cycle, *the common solar day*. What makes them the more appropriate for this purpose, is the fact that when etymologically examined, they present that same primary conception to be found in the general words *create* and *to separate*, and which underlies our view of almost every great development in the physical world. It is called *a day*, because there was an *ereb* and a *boker*—that is, a *mingling*, a *blending*, or confusion of elements such as is previously called *choshek* or the darkness that was upon the face of the deep; and this followed by a *SEPARATING*, a *CLEAVING*, a parting of elements issuing in *THE FIRST LIGHT*, whether regarded *optically*, or in reference to its *pictorial effect* in marking the outlines and divisions of things."—Pp. 86, 87.

After endeavoring to confirm these representations by references to other passages of the Hebrew Scriptures and other languages, he adds—

"Thus, *ereb* and *boker* are *etymologically opposed*, not *merely* as two different *times*, not *merely* as *LIGHT* and *DARKNESS* even, but as presenting those antithetical ideas of *blending* and *separation*, into which expressions for *the phenomena* of *light* and *darkness* are ultimately, and perhaps in all languages, capable of being resolved."—Pp. 88, 89.

Here is thus an express definition of morning, as denoting, etymologically, first, *the phenomena* of dawning, or the commencement of illumination after a period of darkness; and next, as denoting the *time* of such a dawning, or commencement of illumination after darkness; and on the other hand, an express definition of evening, as denoting, first, *the phenomena* of the discontinuance or absence of light, or the obscurity and darkness that prevail when there

is no light; and next, the *time* of such disappearance or absence of light, either preceding or following a season of illumination; and finally, he repeatedly declares that these words, in these senses, "are explanatory of the word *day*," and are used for the purpose of showing *why* the two contrasted seasons which they denote, one of light and one of darkness, are called *day*. We have the most ample ground, therefore, for the view we gave of his theory. The statement we made is in entire coincidence with that which he himself makes, professedly founded on etymology, and endeavors to confirm by his "leading idea" that the language is *phenomenal*. Were he to try, he could not more clearly exhibit himself as holding that morning denotes a period of commencing light after a period of darkness; that evening denotes a period of darkness either before or after a period of light; and that *day* is the name of a period consisting of an evening and morning, or a season of such light and a season of such darkness. He could not, therefore, were he to make the trial, give more clear and emphatic proof that he regards the second and third day, as much as the first, as having consisted of such a period of darkness and of illumination; and that he holds that the mornings of the second and third day were caused by light that began then to illuminate the earth, and the evenings of those days as caused by the discontinuance of light.

What now are we to think of his point-blank and passionate assertion that these are not the views he presents in his book; that there is NO TRUTH AT ALL in the statement that he represents the mornings of the second and third day as caused by light, and their evenings by the discontinuance or absence of light; and that instead of representing that the word *day* is used in the sacred narrative to denote a time made up of a season of darkness and a season of illumination, and, therefore, that it denotes that the second and third days were such periods, he only "alluded" to the existence of light on those days in "a *conjecture* to which no kind of importance is attached?" Is it to be supposed that he does not know what the teachings of his book on the subject are? Is it not far more probable that his object in the denial is to escape the ridicule and disgrace which the chemical combustions or volcanic fires have brought on him

with which he represented the world as lighted up during the first three days? He must have felt himself sadly scorched by that combustion, to have been driven to escape it by such a step, in which he not only abandons his etymology, and his theory that the language of the sacred narrative is phenomenal, but makes it impossible to his readers to place any reliance on his statements respecting his belief. If he can thus deny the specific representations he has made on this subject, and treat the imputation of them to him as a "specimen of unfairness which it is difficult to cover with the mantle of perfect charity," who can be surprised if, under the pressure of objections, he should deny every other doctrine of his book? Besides, he gains nothing in a physical relation by this denial, but involves himself in worse embarrassments, if possible, than before. For it is more contradictory and absurd to maintain that there was no light nor heat on the second and third days, than that the earth was illumined in a measure and warmed by chemical combustions and volcanic fires. If there was no light of any kind in those days, it is clear there can have been no heat; and if, as Mr. Lewis maintains, they were periods of vast length—thousands, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of years—and they passed without any heat from the combustion of the earth or the light of the sun, what can be more certain than that the ocean and earth must have become one frozen mass long before the second day passed; that no vapors, therefore, could on that day have floated in the air (Gen. i. 6, 7); and that no removal of the waters from a portion of the earth's surface could have been accomplished on the third day unless by a miracle? They must have been thawed unless removed in solid masses, but how could they have been thawed without some combustion that would have given light? And how could vegetables have been created on the third day if the whole earth and sea were frozen, and the temperature that reigned hundreds of degrees colder than is now ever felt, even in winter, at the poles? Is such a killing frost any better than the comfortable chemical fires with which he before warmed and lighted up the world?

It is apparent that, if Mr. Lewis did not use the words day and morning in the sense we ascribed to him, to denote

periods of illumination, and evening to denote a period of darkness, he must have used them to signify periods or phenomena of a different, but analogous nature, and, therefore, must have employed them by a metaphor. Yet his other and final accusation, which he represents as of an "unfairness which it is difficult to cover with the perfect mantle of charity," is, that we stated that, notwithstanding its inconsistency with his admissions and representations, that morning and day were caused by light, "he intimates his belief that both the words day and light are used in the narrative in a metaphorical sense." He says:—

"But the most serious and indefensible misrepresentation of Mr. Lord, is one to which he gives a prominent place in his table of contents, and repeats throughout his review. The whole argument of the work, he says, is to show that the word day is to be taken as a metaphor. Nothing could be more false than this."

This accusation is as groundless and unjust as the other. Our object, in the pages to which he refers, was to show that his admissions and definitions required him to regard the period denoted by the words morning and day, as periods of illumination. We said: that "to maintain that while the light which caused the morning and day was real literal light, the morning and day which it caused were not *periods of light*, and a literal morning and day, is to plunge into the grossest self-contradiction. . . . He proceeds, *nevertheless*, to intimate his belief, that both the words day and light are used in the narrative in a metaphorical sense." And we alleged in proof of it, the passage we have quoted above, in which he says: "There is no difficulty in regarding these expressions, *day, light, etc.*, as *borrowed* from their applications at a much *later period*, and carried back to denote *the ineffable things they most resemble*;" and that "a *day* is a periodical time—marked by the opposite successions of light and darkness, or *what may be supposed to be analogous to them*." But if day and light are used, not to denote day, a period of illumination, and light, which causes that illumination—but "*ineffable things which they most resemble*"—then, certainly, they are not used literally, but by a *metaphor*, the peculiarity of which is, that words are applied by it as names to things, which they do not literally signify, but which only

resemble what they denote. And so of the similar expression in respect to the meaning of the word day. If, instead of "a periodical time," "marked by the opposite successions of light and darkness," it sometimes in the sacred narrative denotes "what may be supposed to be *analogous to them*," then it plainly is not in those cases used literally, but by a metaphor, as the name, instead of a day, of a period that has characteristics that are *analogous* to successions of light and darkness." And that, contradictory as it is, Mr. Lewis uses these terms in these metaphorical senses, is indisputable. He represents in many passages that day, and even morning and evening, are used in this metaphorical sense. That is, indeed, the main aim of his thirteenth chapter. After stating it as one of the "elementary constituent thoughts," embraced in "the idea of a day," that its "periodicity" is "made by two antithetical *states* characterized by opposite qualities, of which the one kind is the negative of the other," he says:—

"The mode of antithetical division may be by risings and settings of a revolving, or apparently revolving body, called the sun ; or it may be by *any cyclical law in nature* producing *two opposite times of rest and action, of progress and repose ; of cold and warmth ; of growth and decay ;* or it may be by *any other mode* in which there are produced *two periods of direct contrast, making up by their alternation the completed cycle.*"—P. 153.

According to this definition, then, all that is requisite to constitute a day, is two contrasted periods that follow each other in succession. The period of the rise and fall of the tide is a day, therefore ; the period of the moon's increasing light from new to full moon, and of decreasing light from full moon till it ceases to shine, is a day ; the period of the increase of light and heat from the winter to the summer solstice, and the decrease of light and heat from that to the winter solstice, is a day ; the period of the monsoons or rains, and the period without rains, into which the year is divided in parts of Africa and Asia, are a day ; the period of the revolution of the moon on its axis ; the period of the earth's circuit round the sun ; the time occupied in the swing of a pendulum from the extreme point to which it passes on one side of the centre, till it returns there, is a day ; and so

of innumerable other periods which are made up of two opposite kinds of action, or condition. Yet it is only by a *metaphor* that such periods can be called a day; since the antithetical divisions of which they are made up, are not marked, like a literal day, by light and darkness, morning and evening, but only by characteristics that in some relation resemble them. And Mr. Lewis not only uses the word day in that metaphorical sense in his book, but as if to give his readers a finishing proof of the inextricable confusion in which he is involved, and leave them with an ineradicable conviction that no reliance is to be placed on his statements, he avers, under his previous accusation, that "*there is no truth at all in the statement*" that he holds that the mornings and evenings of the first three days were caused by the presence and absence of light—that is, that those days consisted of two contrasted divisions, one of which was a period of light and the other a period of darkness; and that "it is not affirmed" in his volume "that the second and third mornings were made by a light succeeding a darkness;" but "it is rather supposed, with St. Augustine, that though the peculiarity of the first great morning originated the name, the other mornings following might have been any great supernatural awakening in nature, to which the term, in its essential idea, might be just as well applied." But if it was a supernatural awakening in nature to which the name was given, then it cannot have been a natural morning, caused by the dawn or commencement of light after a period of darkness; but must have been merely called a morning by a *metaphor*, because of its resembling in some respect a real morning; and if the mornings and evenings of the second and third day were not natural mornings and evenings, but some supernatural awakenings and sleepings, then the period occupied by those supernatural events cannot have been a natural day; and can have been called such, therefore, only by a metaphor! Such is the issue of this imputation to us of a "specimen of unfairness which it is difficult to cover with the perfect mantle of charity!" Instead of falling into an error in ascribing to him the contradiction which he now so passionately disclaims, and yet repeats and reaffirms in the very act of disclaiming it, it is a conspicuous element in his speculations; it is graven in glaring characters in his volume; and

no one, without seeing it, can form a just estimate of the confusion that everywhere reigns in it, and the utter deceptiveness of the pretext, that his expositions and cosmology are founded on the primordial meaning of the language of the sacred narrative.

Mr. Lewis, in several passages in his response, sneers at the representation in the review that some of the leading elements of his philosophy are drawn from Plato, and are essentially the same as those of Origen, Swedenborg, and Bushnell, as "too absurd for refutation." It is noticeable, however, that he confines himself, as he does in regard to the eternity of matter, to sneers. He nowhere proves, he nowhere attempts to prove, he nowhere asserts, even, that his notions of God and the universe are not substantially the same as those of Plato and Swedenborg, and were not drawn from those writers. Nor could he, without adding to his self-contradictions and confutations, and making himself, in a still higher degree, the object of distrust. He differs from those writers, doubtless, in some particulars, as they differ from each other. But his philosophy of God and nature was undoubtedly, in its main points, taken from Plato and Swedenborg. How nearly he corresponds with Swedenborg, may be seen by a statement of the leading points of the two systems.

SWEDENBORG.

1. Swedenborg held that the matter of which the heavens and earth are made, existed prior to the creation recorded in Genesis.

2. Swedenborg held, that the creation recorded in Genesis was a mere shaping and fashioning of that pre-existent matter.

3. Swedenborg held, that that shaping and fashioning was the work of spiritual entities, not of the divine fiat. Mr. Bush says:—"We can no longer recognise creation as the immediate product of the divine fiat, but as always proceeding through the spiritual world, which itself proceeds by emanation from the Lord himself. All living organisms, whether animal or vegetable, are the elaboration of spiritual essences, which become fixed and sensibly mirrored in material embodiments."

LEWIS.

1. Professor Lewis holds the same doctrine, and it lies at the foundation of his theory of the creation.

2. That is the doctrine also of Mr. Lewis.

3. This also is Mr. Lewis's doctrine, and a leading feature of his system.

SWEDENBORG.

4. He held that those spiritual entities are the divine ideas, or archetypes, after which the material organisms and forms are made.

5. Swedenborg held that the creation by the agency of spiritual entities, was in the way of nature by laws, and a gradual development and growth.

6. Swedenborg held that those psychical entities were emanations from God, and were truly divine, or God in a finite form.

7. Swedenborg accordingly held, that matter is self-existent and eternal. He says: "There is but one only substance, which is really substance, and all things besides are formations from it."

8. Swedenborg held that the language of the Scriptures has a double meaning.

9. Swedenborg held that the things which the names of the divine word denote, are representative of other things of a higher nature.

LEWIS.

4. That is the theory also of Mr. Lewis, and is expressly recognised by him as the theory of Plato, p. 231.

5. That also is Mr. Lewis's theory, and one of its most conspicuous elements.

6. Mr. Lewis does not openly advance that doctrine. He, however, implies it: for he expressly asserts, that those entities were pre-existent; he calls them "invisible *divine* powers," and he ascribes to them functions that imply that they are omniscient and omnipotent. His theory, therefore, that creation was a *growth*, in the way of nature, is nothing else than Swedenborg's doctrine, that it was a development of the finite out of the infinite; or, the embodiment of God—distributed into psychical emanations—in material shapes.

7. Mr. Lewis does not openly teach that doctrine, but he implies it: for he holds that the matter of the heavens and earth was pre-existent to the creation recorded in Genesis: he avers that he sees no objection, philosophical or theological, to the supposition that it was eternal: and that he should have no hesitation in believing its absolute eternity, if the Scriptures in any way declared it.

8. That theory appears to be held by Mr. Lewis. He intimates repeatedly, that the words of the sacred narrative are *representative*, as well as the things of which they are the names.

9. That doctrine, also, is held by Mr. Lewis. He maintains, that the *appearances*, which he holds the names of the history of the creation signify, are themselves representatives of "primal entities that are far removed from the senses, and back of science itself in its most interior discoveries."

His philosophy, therefore, of God and the universe, is indisputably the same in all its essential features with that of Swedenborg. Were he openly to avow a belief in the self-existence of matter, and the identity of God and the finite entities and forms that make up the universe, and declare himself a pantheist, it would not alter *his system* a particle, nor make it necessary to change his phraseology to render it as consistent with that theory as the language of other pantheists generally is.

We have thus gone through with the several topics of his response, and shown it to be a tissue of gross misrepresentations. The task of such an exposure and confutation has been very unwelcome and distasteful; but it will subserve, we trust, the cause of truth and science. If any duty is imperative, it is the vindication of the word of God from such perversions, and philology and science from responsibility for such errors. Several points, we think, may be considered as settled by the discussion.

1. Mr. Lewis has, in his book, undertaken a task for which he has not the requisite qualifications.

2. He has mistaken the proper method of shielding his theory from objection.

3. His philology is the product of his philosophy; not his philosophy the product of his philology. Had he not first embraced his pantheistic theory, he would never have dreamed that the sacred narrative exhibits creation as a natural process of generation, development, and growth.

4. His principles of interpretation are false and dangerous in the utmost degree. If applied to the Bible, generally, there is not a fact or doctrine which they would not either strike from existence, or convert into the grossest contradiction and nonsense.

5. His views of the main events that are narrated in the history of the creation, are in contradiction to the facts and laws of nature in the departments of astronomy, optics, chemistry, crystallography, and the physiology of plants and animals, and cannot be maintained unless those sciences are overturned.

6. His philosophy has no foundation whatever in the sacred history, but is a foreign theory drawn from Plato and Swedenborg, and can never be consistently maintained,

except on the ground that matter is self-existent, and that all finite existences are but emanations and modifications of God.*

In adopting and putting forth that theory, he has accordingly placed himself, as a cosmologist, with the disciples of Swedenborg, Bushnell, and others of that faith. How far he has followed his system to its legitimate theological results, we leave others to judge. No one probably has yet been known to adopt it, who did not, after the example of Swedenborg, as a natural consequence, reject the doctrine of the Trinity, expiation by the blood of Christ, and justification by faith. If the system is true, what can be more certain and self-evident than that those doctrines are false? If God is distributed into millions of millions of personalities—as numerous as there are finite intelligences in the

* What Professor Bush's judgment of his system is, is seen from the following notice of his work in the *New Church Repository* for November, 1855.

"We are happy to meet our old friend Professor Lewis in a new arena, where he has been gathering laurels plucked from fields bordering somewhat closely upon the domain of the New Church. Despite his professed loyal adhesion, in other days, to the exclusive sense of the letter, and his marked dissent from the N. C. positions on this subject, he here comes before the world as the able advocate of the non-literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation. His theory leaves him indeed far short of the genuine *spiritual* exposition of the sacred record; but it advances him incomparably beyond the *Ultima Thule* of the mass of commentators.

"Still we find our interest more attracted to those portions of the volume which display the writer's *philosophy*, than to those that develop his philosophy. Here he bravely assumes, as fundamental to all just ideas of the subject, that the original term for *create* does not imply the *origination* of the heavens and the earth from nothing, but simply the *shaping, fashioning, arranging of pre-existing materials*—that each of the various forms thus created had an interior essence or principle, which was its vital or formative power, existing *prior* to the material substances with which they are clothed—that these invisible essences, or plastic principles, are the divine ideas or archetypes, according to which the material forms exist; and that the work recorded in Genesis was merely a formative process, a growth, an evolution like that of a plant from a seed, and occupying immensely extended tracts of time. Such is the cosmology of Professor Lewis—a gentleman who looks upon Swedenborg as a grand heresiarch, a subverter of Calvinistic orthodoxy, and an impugner of the Westminster Assembly's Catechism. Yet strange as it may appear to Professor Lewis, in this same audacious teacher, this pseudo-philosophist, he will find the grand features of his own system, so far as they are true, developed and demonstrated, with a vigor and clearness which will be sought for in vain in Plato, or any of his disciples."

universe—what can be more palpable than that there are more than *three* persons in his nature ; that his personalities, instead of threefold, are multitudinous beyond the power of language to express ? If all human beings are mere emanations of the divine substance, or God in a finite form, what can be imagined more impossible, than that millions on millions of finite parts of his being, should need an expiation by the blood and death of another finite part of him ? What can be more contradictory and impossible, than that an infinite multitude of finite parts of his substance, should need a gratuitous justification by faith in the blood and righteousness of another individual finite part of him ? Mr. Lewis has therefore placed all those who understand his system under the necessity of regarding him as holding premises, from which the rejection of the great doctrines of redemption follows as a natural consequence ; and as likely himself, therefore, to be conducted by them to that result. What is to prevent him from it ? Or what is to prevent his book, as far as it has an influence, from leading others to reject them ?

His only method of escape from this position is the renunciation of his cosmology. As long as he continues to stand on the same platform with Plato, Spinoza, Swedenborg, and Bushnell, no mere protestations that he does not belong to their school—no pretext that the imputation to him of a pantheistic philosophy is “too absurd for refutation ;” will serve in any measure to restore him to the confidence he has lost.

May God in infinite mercy reveal to him his errors, and lead him to renounce and retract them.

ART. II.—THE SECOND EPISTLE OF PETER.

THIS is a precious portion of the New Testament. Mac-knight observes that the discoveries made in it “are more grand and interesting even than those contained in the first epistle, and that to the foreknowledge and declaration of them, a degree of inspiration was necessary superior” (rather say equal) “to that required in the writing of the first epis-

tle." The following summary of its contents has been prepared partly with a view to this remark.

The epistle begins with a benediction upon the persons to whom it was addressed (ch. i. 1, 2). They were the strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, Bythinia, *elect* according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, as appears by comparing 2 Pet. iii. 1 with 1 Pet. i. 1, 2. After referring to the exceeding great and precious promises of the Gospel (2 Pet. i. 4), he adds an exhortation to diligence in acquiring the graces of the Christian character (v. 5, 7, 9), so that they may make their calling and election (*βεβαιωσιν*) sure, and thereby gain an entrance into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ (v. 10, 11). He then adds his own promise to remind them continually of these things, viz. of the duties and hopes of their calling, although he is well aware that they knew them (v. 12). Yet he considers it nothing more than his duty to stir them up, as long as he lives, which would not be long, as his Lord and Master had showed him (v. 13, 14), and that was a reason why he should reduce his admonitions to writing, that he might still be serviceable to them after his decease (v. 16). And the subject was well worthy of such pains; for the Gospel of the glorious kingdom of our Lord, which he had preached (the hopes of which he cherished), was not an artful fable, but a truth founded upon the most convincing evidence. For, in the first place, three of us, apostles, viz. James, John, and myself—when we were with him on a certain mountain, set apart for the purpose, had ocular evidence of this truth—we beheld his Majesty, and not only,—we heard a voice proceeding from the magnificent glory which invested his person, attesting his divine character and Sonship. This evidence was of a nature which excluded the possibility of deception. The glory was too transcendently great and overpowering to proceed from anything earthly, or not truly divine. This evidence, it is true, was exhibited to us three only, and we were expressly charged not to speak of it before he should have risen from the dead (Matt. xvii. 9)—a mysterious command, which we were at that time quite unable to comprehend (Mark ix. 10; Luke xviii. 34; John xx. 9). But our veracity is pledged for the

truth of what I now say ; nay, more, the truth of God is also pledged to the same effect ; for, while we preached this Gospel, God has borne witness to us by signs and miracles which the Divine power only could perform.

It is not necessary, however, that we should confine ourselves to this single proof of the doctrine concerning the power and future coming of our Lord in his kingdom. For you, as well as we, have a more permanent proof than this ocular one in the prophetic Scriptures, to which it is your duty as well as privilege to attend ; they are like a lamp in the hand of one walking in a dark place, and they will continue to serve us by the light they shed till the day—the great day of the Lord’s appearing in his glorious kingdom—shall dawn upon us, and the morning star of that day shall arise, shedding additional light, and awakening hopes in our hearts of the near approach of the day of our redemption (v. 19). The apostle then adds a caution in the interpretation of the prophecies, which we omit. (See vol. vii. p. 573.)

Having mentioned the prophets as furnishing sufficient proof of this doctrine, he digresses (in the second chapter) to record an important prophecy respecting the Christian dispensation. As if he had said—

Having referred to the prophets of the old dispensation, I am reminded to say, that as there were false prophets then, as well as true prophets, so during this dispensation of the Gospel, there will be false teachers, as well as true ones (ch. ii. 1). The apostle then proceeds to foretell some of their doctrines and practices ; the success they will meet with, as well as the sad effect of their erroneous teaching upon the way of truth. These teachers, moved by mercenary motives, he adds, will meet with an awful punishment. God’s dealings with the angels who sinned ; with the old world in Noah’s day ; with Sodom in Lot’s day ; afford ample evidence of what he will do with these teachers and their followers. Those punishments were awful, and of such a nature, especially in the case of the men of Noah’s day, that one would have supposed at the time they were threatened, the righteous must inevitably have perished with the wicked. But it was not so, as we know by the event. The Lord knows how to discriminate between the righteous and the

wicked, and he is able to deliver the one while punishment (in whatever form) is inflicted upon the other (v. 9). And although you should be like Noah and Lot—few and feeble, and quite overwhelmed by multitudes of the ungodly, fear not—God can and will save his elect (though we may not know how) as certainly as he saved Noah and Lot.

These examples of punishment (v. 4–7) and the reflection the apostle makes upon them (v. 8, 9) may be read parenthetically; so that verse 10 will be a resuming of the subject of the 3d verse. The sense of the apostle may be thus expressed:—That you may know the characteristics of these false teachers and their followers, I here particularly note them: they will be so numerous as to constitute an apostasy, a general falling away from the faith. The apostle then proceeds to describe them (v. 10 to 22, the end of this chapter), and a fearful description it is: yet it is evident from the last clause in the 13th verse, that the persons intended by the apostle, are within the pale of the visible church, and in actual communion with at least some true Christians (*συνωχούμενοι ὑμῶν*).

The whole of this second chapter then is a digression from the chief subject of the epistle announced in chap. i. 16, viz. the future coming of our Lord in power. In chapter iii. 1, he resumes this subject, and, in doing so, he repeats an expression he had employed before (*διευγίζετε ὑμᾶς ἐν ὑπομνήσει*, i. 13, *διευγίζω ὑμῶν ἐν ὑπομνήσει*, iii. 1. “Stir you up by putting in remembrance”—“stir up your pure minds by way of remembrance”). But he resumes it only for the purpose of showing the connexion, or rather of keeping the chief topic prominently in the view of the reader; for in the next verse, he recurs again to the prophecies which he had mentioned in chap. i. 19, 20, in order to connect with them another prophecy respecting the Christian dispensation. When he first mentioned the prophecies he digressed, as we have seen, in order to predict the rising up of the false and mercenary teachers whose character he so minutely described. These would form a counterpart to the false prophets of the Old Testament dispensation. He now returns to the subject of prophecy to say, that at the ending of the days (of the Christian dispensation) persons will arise in the church who will even call in question the great doctrine he was then enforcing

(see chap. i. 16). This will be a new characteristic, distinguishing the Christian dispensation from the former.

These men (walking after their own lusts, and giving utterance to their own wishes and hopes) will say, "Where is the promise of his coming, for since the fathers fell asleep all things continue as from the beginning of the creation?" (chap. iii. 4). This is just what our Lord intimated in Luke xvii. 26-30; xviii. 8. The apostle then proceeds to charge these (*insensiti*, *ludificatores*) deriders with dishonesty; for he says, that if ignorant at all, they are willingly ignorant of the fact of the world's destruction by the deluge—an event he had already alluded to in chap. ii. 3. He then adds, the present heavens and earth (as the former were) are kept in store for the destruction of the ungodly who shall live at the end of these times; and this will occur at the coming of our Lord, which (coming) these deriders say will never occur. This future destruction of the world has been predicted by the prophets, and the destruction of the Old World by a deluge of waters, is, at least, a proof of the possibility of such an event, which these reasoners seek to get rid of, by denying the fact. Again, says the apostle, these persons commit another mistake, when they infer from mere lapse of time, that the Lord will not come at all. They do not consider, that what seems to them long, is very brief in the view of the infinite and eternal God. Does one day seem to us a short time? A thousand years (which would include many generations of such ephemeral beings as we are) are in the view of God as one day is to us—yea, as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night (Ps. xc. 4.) God executes his plans upon a scale immensely more vast than men are accustomed, or even able, to consider. As his dominions extend throughout immensity, and his being through eternity, it is folly in these men to infer, that the Lord will never execute his promise to come, and his threatening to punish, because, in their judgment, he has delayed the execution of it long. And they make a still greater mistake by supposing, that God hesitates to punish them and destroy the world on account of any good he sees in the reprobate, or in the present condition of things, irrespectively of his purposes of mercy. In truth, he does not delay; rather he restrains his wrath, and so they ought to consider it (v. 5-9).

Such, then, are the delusions of this class of false teachers predicted, and such the answer of the apostle to their false reasonings. He then reiterates the great doctrine of the epistle. The day of the Lord will come, and the Lord himself will come at that day unexpectedly, as a thief cometh in the night (v. 10; 1 Thess. v. 2; Luke xvii. 24). It will come with the suddenness and splendor of lightning, as the Lord himself taught (compare v. 2 with Luke xvii. 24, xxi. 35; Mark xiii. 32, 37, and similar passages), and these heavens will then be destroyed, and the earth with the works therein will be burned (v. 10). Yet not annihilated; for out of them, and in their place, God will create new heavens and a new earth of such surpassing beauty, and glory, and excellence that the heavens and the earth, which now are, beautiful as they may seem to us, will not be remembered or come into the mind (Is. lxv. 17).

With this verse (13th) the apostle concludes the chief topic of the epistle. What follows is an exhortation to holy conversation and godliness, in view of the promises and hopes which depend on the Lord's coming (v. 11-14). He recurs once more, however, to the error of the *ἰμῆριται* (scoffers), and exhorts his readers not to account for the Lord's delay as they do, but rather to regard it as a means of their salvation. Paul, he says, taught the same doctrine, though it was perverted by many, as well as the other doctrines of the Scriptures, to their own destruction. His concluding exhortation implies, that even the elect will be in danger of being led away by this error, and thereby fall from their steadfastness. This caution was suggested, perhaps, by the question put by our Lord at the conclusion of the parable of the widow (Luke xviii. 8): "When the Son of Man cometh will he find faith on the earth?" But however this may be, the apostle intimates that the error will be wide-spread and seductive, requiring watchfulness, and growth in grace and in knowledge, of those who would not be led away by it (v. 17, 18). To sum up these observations:—

The leading doctrine of this epistle is the second coming of our Lord. The first proof of it alleged is the transfiguration, and the personal testimony of the apostle, who was an eye-witness of that scene. The second proof is derived

from the prophecies of the Old Testament, and the inspired precepts or commandments of the apostles, founded as they were, upon the precepts and predictions of the Lord himself.

Incidentally he connects with this doctrine a collateral prophecy concerning an apostasy which must precede that great event. With this he connects a minute description of the false teachers, who were to take the lead in causing and continuing it. This prophecy and description (which occupy the second chapter) are parallel with the prophecy of Paul in 2 Thess. ii. This second chapter of 2 Pet., therefore, casts light, to some extent at least, on the prediction of Paul concerning the Man of Sin, and the two chapters should be read in connexion. Peter, in fact, refers expressly to the epistles of Paul (iii. 15, 16).

Resuming the principal subject, the apostle soon drops it again to connect with it another prophetic announcement, which differs from that before just mentioned in this, viz. that it refers to the last times of the apostasy, which he calls "the ending of the days." The expression in the original is peculiar: *ἐν ἰσχυαυ τῶν ἡμερῶν*, which is more precise than *ὅσπερ οἱ χρόνιοι*, in 1 Tim. i. 4; or *ἰσχυαῖς ἡμερῶν*, 2 Tim. iii. 1; or *ἐν ἰσχυαυ τῶν χρόνων*, 1 Pet. i. 20; or even than the expression in Jude 18, *ἐν ἰσχυαυ χρόνων*, a parallel passage. It must, therefore, be a period of greater or less duration at the end of this dispensation, and immediately preceding the day of the Lord.

This second collateral or connected prophecy respects the general unbelief of the world in the chief doctrine of the epistle (chap. iii. 4; Luke xviii. 8, xvii. 26, 27; Matt. xxiv. 39). The scoffers are not represented as calling in question any other. Yet, so fundamental is this, and so many others depend upon it, that they might as well deny the whole. The omission of other errors is significant. It seems strange that the apostle should denominate them (*ἰμπαικται*, ludificatores deriders) *scoffers*, and yet not represent them as calling in question the whole of revelation. But men may commit the inconsistency of receiving the Gospel as a code of morals, or even as a religion, which upon the whole is more beneficial to society than any other, and yet laugh at and deride those parts of it which foretell the destruction of that order of things which they think quite good enough, and desire to

uphold and meliorate by the moral influence of the other parts of the Bible. This mutilation of the religion of Christ is not unfrequent. There are many who profess with their lips to receive the gospel with reverence, while they scoff at and deride its fundamental doctrines. The apostle seems to refer to the Gentile churches in this prophecy; for the error of the Jews is not that the Messiah will not come, but in denying that Jesus is the Christ already come. However this may be, the extreme recklessness which he describes, and the general unbelief of the doctrine of the Lord's coming, as he taught it, is the natural fruit of the apostasy predicted in the second chapter. What is Christendom even now, but the world under the guise of a Christian profession? And what has made it such, but the false teaching and the false teachers foretold by the apostle?—ch. ii. 1. This second collateral prophecy, then, is the proper sequel or continuation of the first. Its use is to describe the peculiar characteristics of the last portion of one and the same apostasy.

But *apostasy* is a harsh word, and may convey to the reader the idea of something which would be gross or revolting to the pious mind. This does not seem to be the conception of the apostle. Were the apostasy foretold to be such, there would be less danger to be apprehended from it, and less need for the emphatic caution, chap. iii. 17 (*φύλασσε-θε*—a military term denoting the action of soldiers who keep guard in fortified towns or castles.—Macknight). Rather should we conceive of it as a vast system of worldly Christianity, adorned with worldly magnificence, enriched with the world's wealth, and supported in some form by the world's power—a system which audaciously mutilates God's truth, as though it were a myth; retaining only so much of it as may be made subservient to ambitious or worldly ends. Against such a system, the apostle exhorts his readers to stand on their guard, lest they be led away and fall from their steadfastness.

One observation more:—The word *scoffer* does not appear to express adequately the meaning of *ἠπαρταί*, v. 8. Scoffing denotes a malignant expression of contempt. It implies opprobrious language, and conduct offensive to decency. Scoffers, properly so called, would undoubtedly come within

the meaning of the apostle. But does not the word *ἰμπαικται* embrace others of less offensive note? It comes from *ἰμπαιζω* (*ἂ παις*), and in its primary signification denotes the sportiveness of children. *Μυκτηρίζω* (Gal. vi. 7) is a harsher word, from which we have *μυκτηριστής*, a *scorner*, *mock*er, *derider*. But this word the apostle did not use. Houbegant, perhaps, had this word (*ἰμπαικται*) of Peter in mind, when he wrote of Grotius: *Ludificat (ἰμπαιζει) suo more*—referring, by the remark, to his exposition of Is. lxv. 17.—(See Isaiah iii. 4. 2 Chron. xxxvi. 16. Esdras i. 51, in the LXX., for the use of *ἰμπαιζω* and *ἰμπαικτης*. Also, Trommius). Schaeffer (Lex.) defines *ἰμπαιζω*, Ich spiele auf. Ich betrüge. It is important to ascertain accurately the full compass of this word (*ἰμπαικται*), lest we err in giving it a too restricted application. Scoffers do not reason when they scoff—they mock. The *ἰμπαικται* (*empæctæ*) intended by the apostle, do reason, but falsely. Scoffers set at naught all thoughts of decorum. The persons intended by Peter openly avow, indeed, their disbelief in the doctrine of the apostle, yet it may be sportively, or at least in a less offensive way.

The Vulgate, Erasmus, and Castalio, translate the word *illusores*. Sebastian Schmidt transfers, without translating it (*empæctæ*), probably because he did not find its exact synonym in Latin. Næbe renders it *irrisores*.

PHILO.

ART. III.—ESSAYS ON THE SPIRIT OF THE INDUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY; THE UNITY OF WORLDS, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CREATION. By the Rev. BADEN POWELL, Savilian Professor of Geometry, in the University of Oxford. London: 1855.

THE subjects of these Essays, though so widely different, are not too disconnected to be united in the same volume; it being the object of the first to determine the principles of inductive philosophy, and of the second and third to indicate the results to which they lead, in respect to a Plurality of Worlds, and the creation of our own orb and its or-

ganized forms. The author states the principal theories that have been entertained of these topics, criticises the opinions which he deems exceptionable, and presents and endeavors to establish his own views. He writes with great clearness and ease, exhibits an intimate knowledge of his subjects, and treats many points with admirable discrimination and force; while in others, especially the inspiration of the Scriptures, and the principles on which they are to be interpreted, his notions are lax in the extreme, and would, we think, in most minds render it impossible to receive the sacred word as an authoritative and reliable revelation. It is not our design to enter into any minute examination of the work, but simply to state its views on a few leading topics, and present the judgment which he expresses of some of the theories and reasonings of modern geologists respecting the proof of a Creator, and the bearing of their speculations on the narrative of the creation, Gen. i. and ii.

In the Essay on the Spirit of Inductive Philosophy, he treats in the first section of the Inductive Principle, or ground on which the mind reasons from particulars to classes; in the second, on the Unity of the Sciences, or their common dependence on that principle; in the third, on the Uniformity of Nature; in the fourth, on the Theory of Causation; and in the fifth, on Final Causes and Natural Theology.

The main question in regard to the Inductive Principle respects the reason that the mind generalizes, or assumes that what it ascertains as true of individual effects or phenomena, is true of all others of the same kind. Does the ground of it lie wholly in the mind? Is it the result of instinct, or is it the consequence of experience; and is its ground in the law of the physical world, as well as in that of the mind? The latter is his answer. He says—

“When we analyse the process logically, it is manifest that in induction, what is superadded to a mere collection of facts consists precisely in the assumption *that all phenomena of the kind in question are similar to the few actually examined.* . . .

“The question then is reduced to this: how does the mind come to make this universal assumption, and to be so firmly convinced of its truth?

"I think it will be allowed, on reflection, that general conceptions of this kind, however apparently abstract in their nature, may be created in our minds by very simple causes, of whose operation we may yet be quite unconscious. There is nothing of which we are less conscious than the acquisition of the commonest ideas by daily experience, and the successive and gradual *generalization* of that experience by the process of *abstraction*; and in this we constantly obtain (without being aware of it) numberless prepossessions and convictions far stronger than any systematic demonstrations can supply.

"The primary assumption involved in all induction, is the *presumed* uniformity of phenomena, or the conformity of other facts of the same class with that under examination to the same law or type.

"It is then perfectly true that no inductive process can advance without the *assumption of this generalizing principle, which is, nevertheless, antecedent to the particular class of experimental testimonies in that instance appealed to*. But what I would particularly dwell upon is, that *it is not antecedent to ALL experience*; it is some principle *already* established in the mind by previous abstractions, *remotely* derived from previous experience, and *specially extended by ANALOGY* beyond the precise limits of actual observation in this instance.

"Our *FIRST inductions* indeed *are always imperfect and inconclusive*: we advance towards real evidence by successive approximations; and accordingly we find false generalization the besetting error of most first attempts at scientific research. The faculty to generalize accurately and philosophically requires large caution and long training; and is not fully attained, especially in reference to more general views, even by some who may properly claim the title of very accurate scientific observers in a more limited field. It is an intellectual habit which acquires immense and accumulating force by the contemplation of wider analogies; and in any one case our conviction of inductive truth is largely built up on past trial of its soundness in other cases; and from the perpetual multiplication of such cases it obtains a perpetually progressive character of greater certainty, increasing in a rapidly accelerated ratio as experience enlarges. . . .

"If there be any force in what has been advanced, then, instead of any primary or inherent principle, any original element of the mind enabling it to see the outward world blindfold; any intuitive internal power to create external facts; any authority derived solely from the interior resources of pure reason to show us physical and material things without reference to the senses, or the like—the simple analogies of the case would lead us to the more sober belief that the source of inductive certainty, that certainty beyond the mere limits

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of sense, that superstructure larger than any foundation of facts, is accounted for by natural and acknowledged processes.

¹“It arises in the first instance out of the power of *abstraction*, acting with unconscious force of powerful rapidity, by whose aid the mind creates, what are indeed new conceptions, yet formed only out of materials already furnished, and this *not by addition, but by abstraction* of properties and particulars.

“Above all, the process derives its whole force from the discovery and acceptance of sound and well framed *analogies*, or as I have elsewhere said, *THE SOUL OF INDUCTION IS ANALOGY*; and higher, more efficacious, and more enduring, as the analogies adopted are more strictly accordant with the real harmonies of nature.”—Pp. 13–19.

It is undoubtedly the law of our minds thus to generalize; or we are borne to it naturally and resistlessly by our intellectual nature; otherwise its universality would be inexplicable. That it should be common to all the individuals of the race who live more than a few months, should assume the same form in all, and should be the effect, not of imitation or instruction, but the spontaneous work of the mind itself, could never take place, were not the ground of it laid in our intellectual nature.

On the other side; as the assumption that other objects of the same class have the same nature as those under examination, and that other phenomena of the same kind are produced by the same causes, is in accordance with fact, and is exemplified and confirmed by the whole of each individual's experience, it is equally manifest that the mind is naturally led to that assumption by experience, and is justified in it. While, therefore, it is owing to the nature of our minds that we generalize at all; it is owing to the analogies that subsist in the physical and intellectual world, and the uniformity of the laws that govern their phenomena, that we generalize respecting them as we do.

Professor Powell rejects the dogma of Kant, Coleridge, and other idealists of that school, who, denying the existence of the external universe, denied the possibility of proofs from it of the existence of God; and maintains that the great system of the universe presents the most unanswerable demonstration of the being of an infinite Intelligence as its author.

"Natural theology, as based in *physical science*, confessedly leads us only to a very limited conception of the Divine perfections; it traces beneficent arrangements, yet mixed with a large proportion of evil; it recognises omnipotence in the constitution of the immense connected machinery of the universe, and the perpetual maintenance of its determinate laws, rather than in their interruption. At the very utmost, it points to providential government in the preservation of an unbroken system of pre-ordained causes for the general good, rather than its suspension for the benefit of individual parts; and influence on mind, rather than disarrangement of matter.

"If the human mind, or human desires, require fuller manifestations, or aspire to a higher sense of the Divinity, it must be from *other* and more *spiritual sources* that such wants can be satisfied:—a philosophic natural theology, while it cannot furnish such satisfaction, yet at least puts no hindrance in the way of its attainment from other and more appropriate teaching.

"But the great argument which we have been considering, it is said, is not one *merely of design*, but must rise *from design to a designer*. And here it is that some objections have arisen.

"On the one hand, it is alleged that the argument is insufficient; and on the other, that it proves too much, and tends to identify nature with the Deity. But both objections seem to me equally traceable to the primary confusion of ideas as to *the real nature of the inductive influences*, and of the obvious distinction between *moral* and *physical causation*. This confusion of ideas pervades the remarks of many otherwise able writers. Thus, Coleridge observes:—

"All the so-called demonstrations of a God either prove too little, as that from the order and apparent purpose in nature; or too much, namely, that the world is itself God; or they clandestinely involve the conclusion in the premises . . . as in the postulate of a First Cause."

"Natural theology confessedly proves too little, because it cannot rise to the metaphysical idea or scriptural representation of God. These stand on quite distinct authority. But the postulate of a 'First Cause' is a notion wholly arising from the confusion of ideas just referred to.

"The common objection to the argument from design to a *designer* appears to be of this kind. It is alleged that to take Paley's well known instance of the watch, we make our inference directly of a *watchmaker*, from obvious comparison of known human works. Even where a person should, for the first time, witness some work far transcending his own power or knowledge, or anything previously heard of, still he would perceive the analogy with the more ordinary

productions of human skill, differing only in *degree*, and would infer a contriver, and an artist of faculties far higher, but still similar to his own. But the works of nature, it is said, differ from them in *kind*; they are unlike any of our works, and suggest no such analogy of an artificer resembling a human artificer, or differing merely in the extent and degree of his skill.

"In those cases most nearly approaching the nature of human works, such as the varied and endless changes going on in the *laboratory of nature*, the results, even when most analogous to those obtained in human laboratories, yet present no marks of the process, or of the means employed, by which to recognise the analogous workmen; and in all the grander productions, the incessant evolutions of vegetable and animal life, which no human laboratory can produce—in the structure of the earth and ocean, or the infinite expanse of the heavens and their transcendent mechanism, still further must we be from finding any analogy to the works of man, or, by consequence, any analogy to a personal, individual artificer.

"But the more just view of the case is that which arises from the consideration that the real evidence is that of *mind and intelligence*; for here we have a proper and strict analogy. *Mind*, directing the operations of the laboratory or the workshop, is no part of the *visible apparatus*, nor are its operations seen in *themselves*—they are visible only in their *effects*; and from effects, however dissimilar in magnitude or in kind, yet agreeing in the one grand condition of *order, adjustment*, profound and recondite connexion and dependence, there is the same evidence and continued manifestation of INVISIBLE INTELLIGENCE, as vast and illimitable as the world wherein those manifestations are seen.

"It is by *analogy* with the exercise of intellect and volition, or power of moral causation, of which we are conscious within ourselves, that we speak of the *Supreme Mind and moral cause* of the universe, of whose operation, order, arrangement, and adaptation, are the external manifestations. *Order* implies what, by *analogy*, we call *intelligence*; subservience to an observed end, implies intelligent *foreseeing*, which, by analogy, we call *design*.

"Again, nothing but the common confused and mistaken notions as to laws and causes, could give any color to the assertion that 'the argument proves too much'—that physical speculations tend to substitute general physical laws in the place of the Deity; and that scientific statements of the conclusions of Natural Theology are nothing but ill-disguised Pantheism. The utter futility of such inferences is at once seen, when the smallest attention is given to the plain distinctions above laid down between 'moral' and 'physical

causation ; and to the proper force of the conclusions from natural science establishing the former by means of the latter.

"The distinction obviously points to the *very reverse* of the assertion that physical action is identical with its moral cause ; the essential difference and contrast between them is the very point which the whole argument upholds and enforces.

"So utterly preposterous, indeed, is the whole idea of Pantheism, that the profession of it, if sincere, can but be a mystical fancy of the most perplexed and unintelligible nature, and involving moral contradictions of the grossest kind.

"The whole tenor of the preceding argument is directed to show that the inference and assertion of a *Supreme Moral Cause*, distinct from and above nature, results immediately from the recognition of the eternal and universal maintenance of the order of *physical causes*, which are its essential *external manifestations*.

"Of the *mode of action or operation* by which the Supreme Moral Cause influences the universal order of physical causes, we *confess our utter ignorance*. But the *evidence* of such operation, where nature exists, can never be lost or interrupted."—Pp. 162–168.

It would have added to the interest of this discussion, had Professor Powell stated more at large the fiction on which Kant, Coleridge, and others of that school, deny the possibility of a demonstration of God from his works, and pointed out its groundlessness and absurdity. Of all the fallacies by which men have duped themselves into atheism, it is the most transparent, and reflects the greatest discredit on the boasted reason of its authors and disciples. It rests on the assumption that our seeming perceptions of external objects, instead of being real, are illusory—instead of being caused by the action on our senses of the external objects which they present to us, are the spontaneous product of a faculty of the mind, which they denominate the understanding ; and thence, that as they are mere phenomena of the mind itself, and the work of its powers, they do not indicate the existence of any other intelligence, and no proofs are involved in them of the being of God. They reject, therefore, and sneer at the argument from the external universe to the existence of God, as fatuitous, and the greatest of all possible solecisms, inasmuch as, according to them, it deduces the existence of an infinite intelligence from a mere nothing. But supposing it to be so on their scheme, that is only an

exact parallel to their own argument against the demonstration of God from the universe; for their theory of the origin of our sense-perceptions is founded on nothing. It is a mere gratuitous assumption. It has no support from fact. No evidences have ever been alleged to sustain it, and none can be. It is contradicted, moreover, by our consciousness. Its author and his disciples were forced by their nature to act every moment of their lives on the assumption of its falsehood; for they, like others, proceeded in all their agency on the felt and undoubted reality of the external world. If it is absurd, then, on their theory, to found an inference of the divine existence on nothing, it is equally absurd in them to found their assumption of their theory of perception, on which they build their inference against the divine existence, on nothing. To look so far as this, however, was quite beyond the scope of their vaunted reason.

But even on the ground of their hypothesis, that the mind is the sole cause of its sense-perceptions, and thence, that the objects of those perceptions exist only in itself, and are purely ideal, how does it follow that the mind, in conceiving of them as having a veritable existence out of itself, and reasoning respecting their convictions, must, as those speculatists maintain, regard the cause of each effect as only commensurate with the effect itself? For that is the assumption on which they deny the possibility of inferring an infinite cause from a finite effect. Thus Dr. Hickok says:—

“ This endless search is also just as empty labor in the conditioned series of *design*, as in that of *causation*. Design indicates a designer; but when we seize upon this conceived designer as condition for the produced design, we find it adapted to the making of *just such products*, and *this adaptation at once becomes a conditioned, demanding for itself* A HIGHER DESIGNER, of which it *must be a product*.”

According to this, then, the cause of a finite effect must itself be not only an effect, and finite, but as finite as the effect which it has produced. The effect must therefore be the exact measure of the powers of its cause; all the powers of the cause must have been exerted, and in their fullest energy, in the production of the effect; and, consequently, that cause can never give existence to either any other than

that class of effects; nor to that class of effects, except on precisely the same scale of dimensions and energy. But it would result from this extraordinary doctrine, that when Dr. Hickok formed a letter on his paper, the production of that effect would, in the first place, exhaust all his powers as a cause; and next, it would be the only effect in kind and measure, which he would be capable of producing! Is this true, however, of him? Was it of Coleridge? Did he never produce but one effect in kind, and one in degree? Are there as many distinct causes as there are different kinds of effects, and effects of the same kind, that differ in their measure? What exquisite philosophers! How consentaneous these issues of their speculations are with our consciousness! How admirably they accord with the infinite diversity of the acts we exert, the objects towards which they are directed, and the effects that spring from them! Such is the fathomless abyss of falsehood and folly into which these infatuated speculatists have plunged, and dragged down myriads of credulous disciples!

In his Essay on the Unity or Plurality of Worlds, Professor P. treats, first, of the argument in a "physical and philosophical," and next, in "a theological point of view." He confines his discussion, however, throughout, to the sphere of philosophy, irrespective of the teachings of the Scriptures. He holds that the argument in favor of a plurality of inhabited worlds, must proceed on analogies between our orb and others.

"Viewed simply as a question of philosophical conjecture or rational probability, without reference to any ulterior consideration, the argument must be based on an extension of *inductive analogies*, a generalization (so far as we can legitimately pursue it) upon the acknowledged relations of animated existence with physical conditions and cosmical arrangements adapted to it."—P. 183.

And those analogies, in respect to the planets of our system especially, are very numerous—such as that they have light and heat, day and night, seasons and years, moons, atmospheres—at least some of them—and vapors, which are conditions of vegetable and animal life, and appear to be designed solely for them. That the stars, too, are suns, and are the centres of planetary systems, seems indicated by

their light, and the revolution of such of them as are binary around a common centre. On these and similar grounds Prof. P. regards it as probable that the various realms of the universe are, or are to be, peopled like our world with intelligent beings.

"Looking at the subject solely as a question of plausible philosophic conjecture, and guided, as we should be, by the pure light of inductive analogy, all astronomical presumption, taking the proofs of geology into account, seems to be in favor of progressive order, advancing from the inorganic to the organic, and from the insensible up to the intellectual and moral in all parts of the material world alike, though not necessarily in all at the same time, or with the same rapidity; in some worlds one stage being reached, while in others only a comparatively small advance may have been made."—P. 231.

We may reason, however, not only from the analogy of other worlds to ours, but also from the end to which God has appropriated our world, to that to which he has appropriated others. As the great purpose for which our world was made what it is, obviously, was that it might be the theatre of vegetable, animal, and intellectual life, and as vegetable and animal life are mainly subservient to the life of intelligent beings, it is rational to infer that as God is unchangeably the same, the end to which other orbs are appropriated, is the support of vegetable, animal, and intellectual life.

But the existence of other orders of intelligences, and of different ranks, is directly revealed in the Scriptures. We are not only taught that there are countless hosts of angels who are far superior to man, and have the power of passing from one world to another; but that among the things visible and invisible in heaven and earth created by Christ, are thrones and dominions, principalities and powers, which imply that there are subjects also over whom those dominions and principalities are exercised; and that Christ is "set far above them," and "every name that is named, not only in this world, but that which is to come;" "that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, and those on the earth, and those under the earth; and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to

the glory of God the Father." This indicates that the intelligent empire which is subjected to Christ's sceptre, and made to glorify the Father by acknowledging him as their Jehovah, is vast, and extends in every direction from our world throughout the universe.

The object of his third Essay, which he denominates the Philosophy of Creation, is not, as the title seems to imply, to explain the mode in which our world, and its vegetable and animal existences, were created, but simply to trace the history of what now exists, or has existed here, as far as possible to its origin. He treats, accordingly, in it, of "the law of succession of forms," of "the principle of continuity," of "immutable laws," of "the vertebral theory," of "the permanence of species," of the "causes of the origination of species," of "the nebular theory," and the "theory of development," and their "bearing on natural theology" and "revelation." We shall not dwell on these subjects, but shall content ourselves with indicating some points on which he differs from many geologists; while he entertains without reserve their general theory in regard to the age of the world, and the conditions of nebulosity, fusion, condensation, and deposition of strata, extended through incalculable ages, through which they hold it has passed. He openly admits the impossibility of reconciling that geological theory with the history of the creation in Genesis. He says, in regard to "the various schemes of the Bible geologists:"—

"It is worth while to dwell on this last instance as very instructive in its consequences, especially to those who have not antecedently taken more general views. Even at the present day there are not wanting occasional attempts to keep up the hopeless chimera of erecting theories of geology on the Mosaic narrative. It is needless to observe that, as all notion of an accommodation of *facts* to the text has long since been given up by all *sane* inquirers, these attempts are now merely directed to *explaining away* the sense of the text; in which they no doubt succeed by *such* principles of verbal interpretation as, if fairly applied to other parts, would readily enable us to put on any given passage any required construction.

"All inquirers, possessing at once a sound knowledge of geology, and capable of perceiving the undeniable sense of a plain circumstantial narrative, now acknowledge that *the whole tenor of geology is in entire contradiction to the cosmogony delivered from Sinai; a*

contradiction which no philological refinements can remove or diminish ; a case which no detailed interpretation can meet, and which can only be dealt with as a whole.

"I have elsewhere fully discussed this subject, and have there explained the only view which I think the case admits ; in one word, that the narrative, as a whole, as it cannot be received as *historical*, may be regarded as a *poetical* representation ; adapted, as it was addressed to the Israelites, as the basis of the institution of the Sabbath. But, be this as it may, real Christianity, I contend, can be in no way affected by this, or any contradiction to the Old Testament law, with which it has been erroneously mixed up ; on the contrary, the palpable discrepancy is valuable, as reminding us the more forcibly of its independence."—Pp. 303–305.

"In Essay ii. I have adverted to the question of discrepancies between science and the language of Scripture generally, and have referred more especially to that notable instance of it—the irreconcilable contradiction between the whole view opened to us by geology, and the narrative of the Creation in the Hebrew Scriptures, whether as briefly delivered from Sinai, or as expanded in Genesis. In the minds of all *competently informed persons* at the present day, after a long struggle for existence, the literal belief in the Judaical cosmogony, it may now be said, has died a natural death. Yet many are still haunted by its *phantom*, which perpetually disturbs their minds with apprehensions equally groundless on collateral points.

"Most rational persons now acknowledge the failure of the various attempts to reconcile the difficulty by verbal interpretation ; they have learnt to see that the six days of thousands of years, have, after all, no more correspondence with anything in geology than with any sane interpretation of the text. And that the immense period at the beginning, followed by a recent literal great catastrophe and final reconstruction in a week, is, if possible, more strangely at variance with science, Scripture, and common sense. Yet, while they thus view the labors of the Bible geologists as fruitless attempts, they often do not see that they are fruitless ; not because they fail in detail, but because they proceed altogether on wrong grounds, and in a wrong direction, and thus remain under the dominion of the same radically mistaken prepossessions, which lead to not less unhappy misconceptions on other allied points.

"Well might Humboldt speak of geology as 'now finally abstracted, on the Continent at least, from Semitic influences.' But in this country, it may be hoped a better epoch is beginning to dawn, as it must do, in proportion as men reflect on the real basis of their reason-

ings, and learn to apprehend clearly the distinct grounds on which science and Christian belief respectively repose."—Pp. 457-459.

He thus unhesitatingly admits that it is wholly impossible to reconcile the theories of geology respecting the formation and age of the earth with the narrative of the creation in Genesis, and exhibits that conviction as common to all sane and thorough cultivators of the science ; and he characterizes the attempts of such writers as Dr. Chalmers, Dr. John Pye Smith, Dr. Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, and others, to torture the sacred history into harmony with the doctrines of geology, as mere endeavors "*to explain away the sense of the text,*" and on "*principles that, if fairly applied to other parts, would readily enable us to put on any given passage any required constructions.*" And that that is the conviction of "*competently informed persons*" generally, we cannot doubt. It seems impossible that impartial and thorough inquirers should mistake such point-blank opposites as the theory and the history, for coincidents and equivalents; or be able by any process to conceal from themselves their total contrariety. It is the superficial, the fanciful, and the near-sighted, who keep up a vague and flickering belief or hope of their compatibility ; not the calm, far-seeing, and philosophic ; and they keep up their faith, not by impartially considering the reasons against it, and discovering that they are weightless, but rather by keeping them out of view, and fixing their eyes exclusively on their contradictory hypothesis, and endeavoring, by showy arguments and conjectures, to invest them with an air of probability and truth.

Instead of subserving the cause of religion by attempting to torture the sacred word into harmony with the doctrines of geology, they have done it a great injury.

Mr. Powell thinks the cultivators of science are unwisely withheld from frankly avowing their adoption of views that conflict with the teachings of the Scriptures ; but that they pursue a far more reprehensible course who attempt to lead the public to believe that their theories, which are in the most irreconcilable contradiction to the sacred text, are in harmony with it.

"There exists, unhappily, too great an unwillingness on either side to meet such questions with perfect honesty and fairness. The

astronomer, the physiologist, or the geologist, for example, *may be fully enlightened as to the extent to which some of the conclusions of his own science may clash with certain received articles of popular belief.* But devoted to that science, and caring more to relieve it, and himself personally, from hostile insinuations, than to promote any higher views of truth, he more naturally than philosophically seeks to conciliate the matter in an ambiguous phraseology; as if accepting literally the irony of Lucian, who, after relating a story of a philosopher having been maltreated by a mob for attacking some of their superstitions, adds—'And very justly; for what right had he to be rational among so many madmen?'

"But still more injurious to the cause of religious truth, is the course too often resorted to by the professed defenders of its cause, even in the present time. Not always duly alive to the actual spread of intelligence, they cringe to the loud but ignorant zeal of the few, and become followers in the train of prejudice rather than its correctors and enlighteners. They have too often yet to learn that, by continuing to insist on dogmas which the advance of knowledge has discredited, and literal interpretations which the discoveries of science have set aside, by adopting fallacious compromises, or by discouraging and denouncing those open avowals which alone consist with the reality of truth, and that free inquiry which Christianity challenges, they are following a course as unworthy in principle as it is short-sighted in policy: they are inflicting the worst injury on their own cause, and are but strengthening the arms of that sceptical hostility which they so strenuously profess to oppose."—Pp. 441-443.

Such is undoubtedly the effect of their attempts to wrench the Mosaic narrative into harmony with their theories. Instead of saving the Bible from the discredit of a contradiction by what they hold to be the facts of geology, they make the impression on their readers, that if their pretexts are true, its language is capable of so many constructions, and the principles on which its meaning depends are so arbitrary and absurd, that it is of little consequence whether it is contradicted by the facts of science or not, and that to believe it to be a revelation from God, and take it as a guide of faith, is impossible.

On the other hand, to admit that the supposed facts of geology that contradict the sacred narrative are real facts, and that they prove the narrative to be mistaken, and in the utmost degree—that all its principal statements are in the

most open war with the clearly ascertained truth, is in effect, if not in form, to give up its inspiration; and with it the inspiration of the whole of the Pentateuch, and thence of the whole Bible, which everywhere recognises and proceeds on the truth of the histories and the institutions that are presented in the writings of the Israelitish lawgiver. If the history of the creation in Genesis—if the repetition and ratification of that history by Jehovah himself at Sinai—are not entitled to any credence, it is apparent that no reliance can be placed on the authority or truth of any other part of the Old Testament: and if that is not divine, neither can the New Testament, which everywhere recognises it as the word of God, be; and that is the conclusion, we take it, to which it has led Professor Powell in regard at least to the Old Testament; as he maintains that the contradiction of "the Old Testament law," by the facts of geology, cannot "in any way" injuriously "affect" "Christianity," but is rather serviceable, "as reminding us the more forcibly of its independence:" and the ground of this opinion—he states, in an article in the Journal of Sacred Literature, is, that the Old Testament was not addressed to us of the Gentile world, but to the Israelites. But the question is not, Who were the people to whom it was originally addressed;—but from whom did it proceed? If it was from God, the fact that it was communicated by him to Israelites originally, does not affect the truth of its statements. They must be in as perfect accordance with fact, as they would be if they had been at first addressed to Gentiles; and they can no more be put aside or questioned, without impeaching his veracity, than the statements and revelations can, that are communicated to us in the New Testament. There is no consistent course, therefore, except to receive them as true, or else to deny that they proceeded from God.

This necessity is not eluded by the assumption to which Professor Powell resorts, that the passages which are discredited are figurative or poetical. He says:—

"Whenever the sacred writers introduce *physical* statements, they may fairly be understood as speaking *conformably to the existing state of knowledge*, or adapting themselves to the ideas, belief, and capacities of those they addressed. In any such cases it would be

irrational for us, at the present day, to insist too literally on such representations, and especially to reason on them in cases where we are precluded from examining into all the circumstances, or canvassing the evidence. But if, after all, in any instance, the letter of the narrative or form of expression may be found *irreconcilably at variance with physical truth*—without trenching on the integrity of the text or of the testimony—we may allow the alternative of understanding them in a *figurative or poetical sense*."—Pp. 307, 308.

But this is plainly nothing less than a license to the interpreter to deny its grammatical sense to any passage whose teachings do not accord with his views, and ascribe to it any meaning that his speculative notions may suggest. Passages are figurative only as there are real figures in them, and those figures are to be interpreted by their several laws, in order to unfold the grammatical sense of the expressions in which they occur. After that is ascertained, the whole cannot then be constituted tropical, at the mere will of the interpreter, by the supposition that the terms throughout, or the agents, and objects, and acts which they express, are used by another figure that is wholly unknown to language. That is as arbitrary and gross a perversion of the sacred word, as it were to deny that it has any meaning whatever; and it leads as legitimately to the rejection of the moral statements of the Bible, as of its representations on physical subjects. For why should not the moralist, the metaphysician, and the theologian, consider himself as much at liberty to pronounce those passages *figurative or poetical* whose teachings contravene what he regards as truths of morals, metaphysics, or theology, as the geologist is, to reject its testimony in regard to the natural world?

It is an equal license also to assume that God conformed the revelations he made to the existing state of knowledge, by directly teaching or sanctioning errors in regard to physical or any other subjects. The only mode in which he accommodated his communications to the knowledge which those whom he addressed had already attained, was in recognising truths and facts, as such, with which they were already acquainted; and in using the terms to designate the several things of which he spoke, by which they were accustomed to name them. Thus, in the narrative of the creation, he employed the terms heavens, sun, moon, earth,

sea, expanse, land, water, light, darkness, day, night, seasons, years, grass, trees, fish, fowls, beasts, and man to denote the same things, of which they were the established names in the usage of the Hebrews. And this makes it certain that they were used in their literal sense, and are to be interpreted by the usual laws of grammar. The supposition that they were used in a wholly different meaning, in accommodation to false notions entertained by the Hebrew people, is to suppose that they had some myth or poetical conception, which they employed those terms in a literal sense to express, which is wholly without ground, and a consummate absurdity. If the terms translated heavens, earth, sea, light, darkness, day, evening, morning, sun, moon, land, water, grass, herb, tree, fruit, seed, fish, fowl, beast, man, are not used to denote those several objects, are there any other words in the Hebrew language that can be shown to be their proper names? There certainly are not. This fancy, then, must be given up. To suppose that God accommodated himself to man by uttering and sanctioning error, is to ascribe to him an act to which no conceivable motives could prompt a Being of infinite knowledge and power, and is to charge him with unrighteousness. There is no medium, therefore, between receiving the Scriptures in their plain, natural sense, or else discarding them as the Word of God.

He rejects the belief entertained by many geologists that there have been successive creations of new species of plants and animals, and maintains rather that there has been but one creation, and that the various changes of species that have taken place, have been the result of mere natural causes, or laws of evolution or development—though of a nature quite different from those maintained by the author of the *Vestiges of Creation*.

“And if to the general truth of the immense continuous series of slow and gradual formations constituting the earth's crust, disclosed by geology, we add the grander theoretical inference, that all the varied modifications of animal life were equally produced *according to some regular scheme of physical causes*; or if the more imaginative speculator should think that he can identify that scheme with certain physiological indications of rudimentary evolution—it is impossible to see in what respect the latter class of views can affect

religious considerations *more* than the former, or be *more opposed* to the letter of the Mosaic description than they are. Yet there are those who seem to view these last ideas with more peculiar apprehension. The discrepancy cannot really be greater, whether we adopt any physical theory of the mode of origination of successive forms, or whether we reject all such speculation. In a word, those who accept geological truths at all, and admit the palpable contradiction to the Old Testament without prejudice to their faith, cannot with *consistency* make it a ground of objection to any hypotheses of the *nature* of the changes indicated, that they are contrary to *Scripture*. They are in no way *more* so than *all geology* is."—Pp. 459, 460.

This, we presume, must be so. Those whose estimate of the Scriptures is such, that they adopt the doctrines of geology notwithstanding they see that they contradict the history of the creation in Genesis and Exodus, naturally will not find any difficulty in admitting any other doctrine that contradicts those or any other parts of the Sacred Volume.

He rejects the doctrine, also, that the creation recorded in Genesis was a calling into existence of that which previously had no being.

"The idea which is often attached to the word 'Creation,' as meaning a calling into existence *out of nothing* (as already observed), rests wholly upon certain *metaphysical* arguments which it is no part of my design to discuss. But with reference to the opinions of those who lay so much stress on the *letter* of the Bible in such points, I would merely observe, that whatever may be the value of other arguments in support of it, it is wholly destitute of any foundation in *Scriptural* authority. The word, which in Genesis and elsewhere is rendered '*create*,' has been pronounced by eminent Hebrew scholars, by no means to bear the sense above mentioned, being only a stronger or more intensive form of expression of the idea of *making* or *fashioning*. While other passages leave the idea, at least, equally indefinite, if indeed they do not, in some sense, refer to pre-existent matter."—Pp. 460, 461.

And he refers as authority for this last remark to Hebrews xi. 3, which Professor Lewis alleges as proof of his theory, that the things that are seen were made out of pre-existing immaterial spiritual entities. But, in the first place, making and fashioning are no more the primary meaning of the Hebrew word rendered Create, than calling into existence out of

nothing is. To cut, to carve, is held by Gesenius to be its primary signification. To make and to create are both secondary senses; but the latter is as literal and as real as the other is; and the verb is indisputably used in that sense in the narrative of the creation of man in God's image, by which original existence was given to his spiritual nature. Next, this is the sense that has been generally ascribed to the verb in the first of Genesis by Hebrew scholars. Thirdly, A metaphysical argument, if valid, is not only as good as any other to prove that the creation of the heavens and earth recorded in Genesis was a creation from nothing, but it is better than any other, when those who hold that the creation was a mere fashioning maintain that the materials that were fashioned not only pre-existed, but were uncreated. For if they were not called into being by the Almighty, they must have been self-existent. But, if they were self-existent, then it is self-evident that he could never have fashioned them, or exerted on them any influence whatever, that should have affected the mode of their existence; for if they were self-existent, the cause of their being must have lain wholly in themselves, and been the cause of their existing in some particular manner, and that manner must have been the identical mode—including shape, conditions, and everything else that was predicable of it—in which it did and does exist. The metaphysical argument proves, therefore, with the certainty of self-evidence, that if God fashioned the matter of the heaven and earth, it was not self-existent: but, if it was not self-existent, then he must have created it out of nothing. But there is no proof, nor probability, that if he created the matter of the heavens and earth, it was not in the six days in which he himself declares that he made them; and if he called them into being out of nothing, there is no word in the Hebrew language so well suited to express that fact, as the verb rendered in our language "create." There is no rational alternative, therefore, but either to admit and hold that the creation of the heavens and earth, which God declares that he accomplished in the six days, was an absolute gift to them of their existence; or to deny that God formed and fashioned them, or exerted on them any influence whatever.

He dissents, also, from the views that are generally enter-

tained by geologists respecting the recency of man's creation. He says:

"One of the points most dwelt on" by those who endeavor to prove that this is the only inhabited world "is the assertion of the recent date of man on the globe, which has been commonly assumed to be settled on what is confessedly mere negative evidence. It is indeed, at present, an opinion current among geologists, that man cannot claim a higher date than a period *later* than the latest of the tertiary deposits; but *how many millions of years ago* was the latest of these deposits, is not so easily settled. This opinion is grounded solely on the *mere absence* of any remains hitherto detected, and with no powerful analogies in support of the negation, *but with every probability to the contrary, afforded in the apparent fitness of the state of the earth for man's being its tenant at a much earlier date than that commonly assigned to his origin.* There seems, however, to be a peculiar fondness in some minds for triumphing in the assumed recent origin of the race, not very intelligible on *philosophic* grounds."—P. 228.

And in corroboration of this view, he refers, in an appendix, to a human skeleton recently disinterred in "the Railway cuttings at Mickleton Tunnel," beneath several deposits, which indicate, according to the geological theory, that "a long series of ages" must have passed since its burial there. The discovery of human remains in such deposits, which are generally held to have been formed myriads, and perhaps millions of years ago, will necessarily force geologists, either wholly to reject the Scriptural account of the origin of man, or else to abandon the hypothesis on which they found their inference of the great age of the earth.

Professor Powell, however, not only deems it probable that man has existed for a far longer period than is generally held, but intimates that he may, in the earlier stages of his being, have been a mere animal, and that his creation, referred to in Genesis, was nothing more than the gift to him of a spiritual nature, by which he was raised into the image of God.

"The prevalent belief in the very recent origin of man, geologically speaking, depends wholly on negative evidence. And there seems no reason, from any good analogy, why human remains might not be found in deposits corresponding to periods immensely more

remote than commonly supposed, when the earth was in all respects equally well suited for human habitation. And if such remains were to occur, it is equally accordant with all analogy to expect that they might be those of an *extinct* and *lower species*. The only real distinction in the history of creation which marks a supposed 'human epoch,' is not the first introduction of the *animal man*, in however high a state of organization, but *the endowment of that animal with the gift of a moral and spiritual nature*. It is a perfectly conceivable idea that a lower species of the human race might have existed, destitute of this endowment."—Pp. 464, 465.

"But the idea of a physical process of origination of organic life, has excited a more peculiar opposition, on the ground that it would include *MAN and his descent* in the general category, and represent the human race as, at some remote period, gradually developed out of an inferior species, which, it is alleged, savors of materialism, and lowers the moral dignity of man. Now, agreeably to what was advanced in a former Essay, it must, I conceive, appear, that in proportion as man's *moral* superiority is held to consist in attributes *not* of a *material* or corporeal kind or origin, it can signify little how his *physical* nature may have originated. The same moral superiority may equally belong to him, whether originally evolved out of any form of earlier organic life, or out of a clod of earth. All truths relative to man's moral or spiritual nature, in proportion as that nature is held to be of an *immaterial* kind, must be allowed to be entirely independent of any theories of the origin of his animal existence.

"The difficulties felt on this subject by some, seem mainly to arise out of the belief with respect to man's primæval state of innocence. But the Scripture account, it will surely be admitted, altogether refers, *not* to man's *physical constitution*, but to the peculiar *spiritual* nature given to him; expressly described as 'breathed into him' by a special act, and which is generally conceived by divines to have constituted 'the image of God,' in which he was made, in which he stood, and from which he fell; all which can surely in no way be affected by what may have been his animal nature or origin prior to that *spiritual creation*; as it refers to that part of his nature which is spoken of expressly as distinct from, and independent of, his physical constitution and material organization."—Pp. 466, 467.

Such is the revolting result to which Professor Powell is conducted by rejecting the word of God, and following what he regards as the lights of science. Though he refers to the narrative in Genesis, as authority for this notion that man was endowed with a spiritual nature *after* he became a living

animal, he plainly has no respect for the sacred word, as, otherwise, he could not maintain that man may have existed anterior to the sixth day, which that asserts was the date of his creation; nor that he was a living animal before God breathed life into him, as it was by that that he became a living soul. It is apparent, moreover, if the text is of authority, that, if man had existed as an animal before he became a spiritual being, he could not have multiplied, inasmuch as it was not until after his creation in the image of God, that Eve, either as a corporeal or spiritual being, was called into existence. Such contradictions, however, to the sacred text, are no greater than those that are offered by geology, and should be no obstacle, Professor Powell holds, to well informed persons, to the reception of those speculations, which are as inconsistent with the great law of induction which he maintains, as they are with the teachings of the Bible. How is he to reconcile the notion he here advances, that man, after having been a living animal of a lower, and now extinct, species, was endowed with a spiritual nature by a direct and sovereign act of God, with the doctrine he elsewhere maintains, "that all the various modifications of animal life," of which this must have been by far the most important, "were equally produced according to some regular scheme of physical causes?" But no absurdities are too great, no follies are too revolting, to be expected from those who reject the information the Creator himself has given us of the origin of man and of the world, and prefer to follow the flickering light of fancy, which but leads to bewilder, and dazzles to blind.

On the whole, then, this volume indicates very clearly, we think, that a considerable proportion of geologists, at least abroad—probably the largest share of them—regard their theory respecting the formation and age of the world, as irreconcilable with the teachings of the Scriptures respecting its creation; that the few writers who still attempt to reconcile them, instead of commanding the respect of those who cultivate the sciences, are generally regarded as discrediting geology, as well as perverting and dishonoring the Bible; that the general train of the discoveries that are making, confutes many of the theories which geologists have entertained respecting the extinction of old, and the creation

of new species of vegetables and animals, and shows what might be expected from the testimony of the sacred word, that there were numerous plants and animals at the earliest date to which the history of the strata can be traced; and, finally, that the extravagances and absurdities in which those geologists who reject the teachings of the Scriptures run, are likely to divest them of much of their authority as speculatists, and lead sincere believers in revelation to the rejection of their system.

ART. IV.—CHRIST AS MAN, AND HIS RELATIONS TO THE REDEEMED CHURCH.

THE doctrine of the Trinity is a profound mystery, past the comprehension of angels, doubtless, much more of man. We can know nothing of it save what is revealed in the Bible. Here, certain propositions are made which we must receive; and though they may appear irreconcilable with our philosophy, or in themselves, we must still receive them with docility; not presumptuously calling them absurd, but simply mysterious, and wait with patience till God enlarge our powers to grasp more of the subject than in this world we can. With the doctrine of the Trinity the two-fold nature of Christ is intimately interwoven, and so becomes a part of that doctrine, having its own mysteries. On this doctrine is built the Christian system, on it hang all the hopes of a lost world, and from it proceed relations to the church, both militant and triumphant, of the most endearing nature. Christ, in his humiliation, and his relations to the church in her militant state, occupy their appropriate share of the sacred page, and should of the Christian press and pulpit. The same is true of Christ in his glory and his relations to the church triumphant. In the conviction that the latter are too much withheld from the contemplation of the people of God in public instructions, and the due proportion neglected, to the injury of Christians, the following remarks are submitted. In pursuance of this object we propose to state, in the first place, what we believe to be

the true doctrine of Christ's Manhood; and in the next place, some of the relations he is in the millennial age to sustain to the church, both the risen saints and those yet in the natural life.

We assert, then, that there is an eternal distinction in the Godhead; not that of office, attribute, or work merely, but a distinction in essence, which is best expressed by the word person, though that is inadequate. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three persons, or hypostases, and they are also one. The second in this Trinity is called by John, in the opening of his gospel, *ὁ λόγος*, the WORD. This Word he treats as a person, to him he ascribes divine attributes—creative power, for he says: "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made;" and eternal existence which, of course, involves self-existence; for when it is said there is no created thing which he did not make, it follows either that he was not made, or that he made himself, which latter is absurd. Therefore, he is both eternal and self-existent.

This personal being, the Word, distinct from the Father and the Holy Ghost, became flesh in process of time, and dwelt among us, i. e. became Man and dwelt among men. By this we understand he was united to a real human soul and body, and hence the man Christ Jesus.

The first point we would notice is, the generator of this human element in the Divine Word. The Bible represents him as the first person in the Godhead, and hence the appellations, God the Father, and Son in the Trinity. It is doubtful if there were grounds for these appellations before the fall of the human race. For us, members of the human family, of course the ground of the appellations is coeval with the commencement of the race.

We pass on to the incarnation. Now the human soul that was united to the Divine Word, is joined to a body, is conceived and born of a woman, not by ordinary generation, but miraculous. "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; wherefore that holy one that shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." At this point he becomes Jesus of Nazareth—a man with all the attributes of a man,—“a true body and a reasonable soul” he has assumed. The Gnostics

denied he had a true body, but only the appearance of a body. Hence the expression in the creeds, *a true body*.

We come next to the subject of dependence and inferiority. So far forth as Jesus Christ is human, he is dependent and inferior. This human soul and body, which was united to the Divine Word, had a beginning. That which has a beginning, an origin, must be dependent and subordinate. So far forth then as Jesus Christ is man, he is inferior to God. *Son of God* thus far marks dependence; Messiah and Christ thus far mark dependence. But then, profound mysteries surround this subject—we meet them at every turn in the Bible, where Son of God, the Christ, the Word, are spoken of—and there is no possible way of reading the Bible safely, without admitting the two natures, and considering in every instance the question, To which nature does the passage chiefly refer? For example, in that remarkable passage, John x. 30, "I and my Father are one," and the context. Heb. i. is another of the same sort. Whoever refuses to take this principle for a thread, must needs walk in a labyrinth hopelessly.

But, furthermore, in this consisted the humiliation of this complex being—the assumption of the human nature. To accomplish the work of redemption, it was needful that he should become man, that by means of death he might destroy the arbiter of death, and deliver his people: that he might declare the Father's name among his *brethren*, and sing praises to him in the *church*, i. e. with them—as one of them: that he might be for them a faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation.

Jesus Christ then is truly man and truly God—in the language of the creeds, "very God and very man;" Son of David according to the flesh, Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead; and, a higher character still, even the eternal WORD by whom all things were made. He is therefore the proper object of adoration and divine worship—we may pray directly to him as did Stephen in his dying moments. And as to the practical difficulty of which some complain, that they do not know which of the persons in the Godhead to think of when they pray, and that it produces a divided feeling and confusion; also, that we ought to pray to God through a mediator, and that if we

pray directly to Christ, it is not praying to God through a Mediator; these are not practical, but they are theoretical, being removed at once by the admission of a twofold nature.

When Christ was in the flesh, he was Son of God in humiliation, weak, sick, in privation; tempted of Satan, persecuted of man, and at length slain, and his body, dead, laid in a sepulchre. Did then the divine nature suffer? That does not follow; on the contrary, the union of the divine with the human nature gives such dignity and efficiency to the latter, that all the ends of the divine government are fully sustained by the sufferings of Christ as man.

But he was made Son of God with power, by the resurrection from the dead. All before was humiliation; now began his exaltation. Here it is asked, "Can the eternal God be exalted?" We answer, No. But Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God, so far as his human nature is concerned, was exalted by the resurrection from the dead. The resurrection was the great triumph over death, and him that hath the power of death. It was the first act in the exaltation. In that same body in which he died, he rose again, and being seen of his disciples forty days, he ascended from the mount of Olives. In that same body with which he rose he ascended. It is not of great importance to determine when precisely that body was changed in its constitution, and passed from a mortal to an immortal state, whether at the resurrection or at the ascension. Our opinion is, at the ascension, in the interval between the moment of leaving the solid ground and that of his disappearance in the cloud. But it is important to maintain, that that body in which he ascended, was a real body—a material body—and was the type of the resurrection-body of his saints. That this body experienced a great change when he ascended, over and above that which took place at the resurrection, and continued during the forty days of his sojourn, there can be no doubt. It was not glorified—it was not that *glorious body* of which Paul speaks, till the ascension.

This glorified body Jesus Christ now has. It was that which was visible to Stephen when he said, "I see the heavens opened and the Son of Man standing on the right

hand of God." In this same body he was seen of Paul on the way to Damascus. In this same body he was seen of John in Patmos, at the opening vision of the great Unfolding. In this same body he will come again, as the angels on Mount Olivet assured the disciples—"This same Jesus which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come again in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." In this body he will be known and seen through the millennial era by the millennial church. It is a part of his human nature, and we have no reason to believe he will ever lay it aside any more than we have to believe he will ever be divested of the human soul he now possesses. "Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek;" and the passages Paul quotes in Heb. i., from the Psalms, applying them to Christ as to his human nature, confirm this view: "Thy throne, O God (Messiah), is for ever and ever. . . . Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore God (the eternal God) even thy God, hath anointed thee (my Son) with the oil of gladness above thy fellows," meaning his brethren of the human race. This inaugurates and consecrates him in his human nature, a king over the redeemed church for ever more.

The passage in 1 Cor. xv., "Then cometh the end," &c., does not, so far as we can see, conflict with this conclusion. It is perhaps, nay doubtless, the most difficult of interpretation of any in the New Testament. All interpreters so regard it, confessing their inability to fathom it. Whatever is meant by Christ's delivering up the kingdom to the Father in the far distant future there contemplated, it cannot involve the annihilation of the human nature of the Son of God. As to the spiritual part of that nature, it is a real existence as much as the soul of any man, and though incomprehensibly united to the divine, it is also a distinct entity, and the annihilation of it is an idea infinitely abhorrent. In a lower degree, also, would be the annihilation of the corporeal element—that glorious body like unto which the bodies of the saints are to be fashioned. Who can think of the head of the church, endeared to every saint by the ties of his own nature, losing that relation, without a sadness like a horror of great darkness, and the feeling of a dreadful contradiction in the character and works of the infinitely glorious God?

Indeed, we know of no writer who maintains such a theory; Barnes takes pains to repudiate it. Then if his human nature is to remain, united still with the second hypostasis of the Godhead, can we understand his delivering up the kingdom to the Father as meaning a withdrawment from the headship and kingship of the redeemed church in glory; and this too as respects his human nature? His being raised to that station constitutes his exaltation. "God hath highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name." This was the joy set before him for which he endured the cross, despising the shame. To renounce this would be a descent from that high exaltation, which again is abhorrent. It cannot be said that such renunciation, by his being resolved wholly into the divine essence, would be a higher exaltation, for that destroys the idea of distinction of the two natures, and necessitates the annihilation of one.

These difficulties are so great that we are compelled to adopt the theory which makes the kingdom there spoken of, not the kingdom of the redeemed church, but the kingdom or dominion over his enemies; and that the passage refers to the final subjugation of his enemies, "For he must reign till he hath put all *enemies* under his feet"—all opposing force. This he will accomplish; and so exhibit to the Father, and present to him a church absolutely and for ever delivered from every enemy and evil. May not this be the *παράδοσις*, the giving up the kingdom—as when a governor of a distant province in revolt receives a special commission and extraordinary powers to put down the insurrection, he does it, and reports the work accomplished: that part of his governmental work performed, and the empire so far safe and intact, it would not follow that his office and authority over the obedient would cease.

And then the following verse will be of easy interpretation. "When he hath put all things under his feet (all foes) even then shall the Son be subject (subordinate) to the Father (as he always was), that God (the infinite God) may be (as in the nature of the case he is and must be) all in all, i. e. supreme." Thus we have a recognition of the subordination of the Son of God as to his human nature in the last revealed climax of God's great government, and yet presenting him as the highest being in the universe

except God—in his human nature greater than Gabriel, greater than all principality and power. The other interpretation would seem to imply a necessity that the Son of God should retire from his position, lest as Son of God he should be, not simply equal, but superior to God the Father.

On our interpretation, no such inference is deducible. There is also, as before remarked, something revolting in the idea that our glorious Redeemer, once exalted to such eminence, should take a lower station; for such it would be. That the facts in his history would remain, and be a subject of sweet remembrance in the redeemed church and the angelic hosts, while he should dwell, as it were, a private citizen in the New Jerusalem, is not the same as his retaining supreme authority under God, and exercising the functions thereof.

Our conclusions, then, on this subject, are these. There are three persons in one God, equal in power and glory. To the second of these persons was united a human nature, soul and body, and that human nature became the man Christ Jesus. His humiliation consisted in entering this world in weakness and sorrow, and meeting death. His exaltation consisted in his resurrection and assumption to the right hand of the Majesty on high. He retains the same human nature, both soul and body, that he had in this world, and will ever retain it. He retains it now; he will retain it through the millennial age; and he will retain it during the eternal round of ages that will succeed. He will ever continue to be the same glorious, active, official head, and King of his redeemed church. Through his human nature and the works he performs in it, our human nature—that is, the redeemed church—is exalted above the nature of angels.

Without such conclusions, we cannot read intelligibly Paul's writings, especially the Epistle to the Hebrews; nor John, especially the Apocalypse. This view explains why, in the New Testament, the passages which *directly* assert the supreme divinity of the Son of God are so few, in comparison with those which treat of his humanity. With his humanity we are much more variously and intimately concerned. John, having asserted in his gospel once, with the utmost plainness, "The Word was God," hardly finds occasion to make the assertion with similar plainness after-

wards. So, in the Apocalypse, i. 8, after stating that Jesus said to him, "I am the Eternal Almighty God," he does not make another statement which, by itself, does not need the qualification of the human nature associated.

By this view only can we read understandingly the Old Testament, especially the parts which relate to the golden age of this world, when he shall reign from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth, with none to oppose his peaceful sway.

The relations of this subject to our views of the character, and work, and manifested glory of our Lord Jesus Christ, in the coming age, are various, important, and extremely interesting.

First, the definiteness they give. It is remarkable that the Bible gives us so little information concerning the interval between death and the resurrection. Men die, the body is dissolved, and mingles with the matter of the earth out of which it was originally constructed. This we know from observation and necessary inference. The soul goes somewhere. But the expressions descriptive are too general to give us any definite conceptions. "To God who gave it," is one; but this, however important and sufficient for its purpose, gives us no conceptions of circumstances and condition other than continued existence, responsibility, and God's omnipresence and special providence. The ancient notions of Hades, the world of the dead, which God saw fit the inspired writers should adopt, whatever their origin, give us but very indefinite ideas. The very term Hades signifies unseen, equivalent to unknowable. The parable of Christ, Luke xvi., has for its object the certainty of future rewards and punishments immediately after death, and the impossibility of communication with the living. As to circumstances of condition, all we learn as to the righteous is, that it is a state conscious, blessed, and social—society with other good men in the same condition. And Paul, when he says, "To die is gain," for the reason that he shall be with Christ, implies nothing beyond the fact of society with him in a state exempt from the evils of this world, and the possession of positive blessedness, great beyond our conception, but not the greatest. Of place and circumstance, he gives us nothing more. The condition of the Lord Jesus Christ as

to his human soul during his sojourn with the dead, is shrouded in darkness. And hence, in this negation of place and circumstance, we are compelled to speak of departed saints as having gone to heaven. But this language, however accurate, when limited to the general idea of blessedness, is deceptive when made to embrace circumstances of which we can know very little. The effort to conceive of the circumstances is prejudicial and injurious to the cause of truth, because it leads to an obstinate attempt to identify the happiness of the intermediate state with that which is to succeed in the resurrection state. This difference is all-important, and to confound the distinction leads to melancholy results. Death is the penalty of sin; and it is a very narrow conception to limit that penalty to the moment of dissolution, and its short antecedents in the present life. All the interval of the disembodied state comes in to make up the penalty. Therefore, the souls beneath the altar, Rev. vi. 10, cry, "with a loud voice, saying, how long?" For this "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together, waiting for the adoption—to wit, the redemption of the body."

The Bible leaps over this intermediate state almost entirely, and discourses chiefly of the state beyond. We may ask, why? but shall hardly obtain an answer to the question. Perhaps the very silence is a part of the penalty—perhaps it is a trial for our faith, and perhaps the disembodied state is such, that with our present powers it would be impossible for us to understand any description of it that might be given. Be it as it may, the fact stares us in the face—very little information is given us of that state in the Bible; but of the succeeding state—the resurrection state—much is given. The kingdom of heaven, the kingdom of God, Christ's glorious kingdom, when he shall come to raise the righteous dead, and deliver them finally from the penalty, and *crown* them with his work, is the great theme of the Bible when speaking of the future blessedness of the righteous, in connexion, particularly, with Christ as their head. The commencement and progress of this glorious kingdom, when all enemies shall be subdued, and the saints reign with Christ, is the burden of prophets and apostles. And how do they represent it? By making

the Lord Jesus Christ, in his human nature, pre-eminently conspicuous, and in clear distinction from the incomprehensible God as second person of the Trinity. Take, for example, Daniel. "I saw in the night visions, and behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all nations and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." And John, in the opening of the Apocalypse—"Behold he cometh with clouds, and every eye shall see him, and they also which pierced him, and all nations (his enemies) shall wail because of him." These and other like passages invest the Lord Jesus Christ with absolute personality as glorified Redeemer—the man Christ Jesus,—who to Daniel was to be cut off for his people—the predicted and expected Messiah—to John the Messiah who had been cut off and risen again. The scene, also, to both the prophets, was far in the future, at some grand consummation—that unquestionably contemplated by Daniel in the conclusion of his prophetic visions—"Many, from out of the dust, sleepers shall awake; these (the awakened) shall be to everlasting life, those (the unawakened) shall be to shame and everlasting contempt."

Remove now the personal and visible appearance of the glorified Redeemer at the consummation indicated, resolve it all into undefinable figure, and scatter and distribute the scene through all the course of time by making his coming to consist in the summons of physical death to each individual; and what becomes of its precision—to what does it amount? Absolutely nothing. Or take from the last chapters of the Apocalypse, where is described the marriage of the Lamb with his church—his vesture dipped in blood, his name the Word of God, and his train the armies of heaven following him; where is described the resurrection of his saints, and the New Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven, that is, to the earth; and where is reiterated the assurance, "Behold, I come quickly." Resolve all this into vague figure, or call it metaphorical without distinction of figure, or symbol without regard to the laws which govern

prophetic symbols, and what becomes of its precision? How is the Lamb, this Word of God, this King of Kings and Lord of Lords, to be distinguished, as man, from the one Triune God—at least from his character as second person in the Godhead? What becomes of the manifestations—the peculiar manifestations of the glorified God-Man, in visible and demonstrated union and intimacy with his redeemed church? And the scene of all this, and of course the reality, is annihilated—certainly, with those who make the coming to be nothing but the providential occurrence of death to the individual. But continue to him the attributes of man—the human nature, and that nature exalted above all principality and power, visible, accessible, associating with men like himself glorified, even as in this world he was like them in their low estate; then we have some definite and satisfying views. The mind is no longer perplexed and baffled by a vain attempt to fathom the circumstances of the intermediate state, or to identify and confound it with the resurrection state.

Second. These views serve to repel the charge of materialism in the odious sense. It is degrading, infinitely degrading, it is said, to invest the Lord Jesus Christ in his glory, and by consequence his glorified saints, with a material body and its accidents—unworthy of God, and impious in us so to think. Do such consider that it may be, nay is, degrading, infinitely degrading and impious, to contradict the plain teachings of God in his word? “This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven.” How can he come *in like manner* except in a body? “Who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself.” God here declares that the Lord Jesus Christ, at the time Paul wrote, had a body, and distinguishes between the precious and the vile in respect to the present bodies of the saints and those they shall certainly have. “And *I saw* the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast nor his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands, **AND THEY LIVED.**” Prof. Stuart well argued on this

passage, that, inasmuch as they had continued in existence thus far, *ἐξῆναι* cannot mean, simply, *they existed*, but must mean they existed in a new form; and as it is said immediately, this is the first resurrection, it can mean nothing else than that they were then united to their bodies—they lived in the body. "It (the body) is sown corruptible, it is raised incorruptible; it is sown weak, it is raised powerful; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body—*ψυχικὸν σῶμα*, *πνευματικὸν σῶμα*—the adjectives vary, but the substantive, *σῶμα*, is common to both. And it means that which is material—*σῶμα* can mean nothing else here, for how absurd the idea that *spiritual body* is itself spirit, as if there were a spiritual soul and spiritual body conjoined, both endowed with the attributes of thought, making two thinking substances! *Σῶμα*, therefore, means material body in both cases, as really in one as in the other. And if any say that by spiritual body is meant a body adapted to a more exalted state, they concede the whole ground.

If, then, Christ has a material body and the saints will have material bodies—and so the Bible declares—it follows by just inference that, in the future scene where they are to live and reign, there will be corresponding material objects. And will any deny that he who is able to subdue all things to himself, can make a new heavens and a new earth worthy of him and his saints? Who are we, to disparage and condemn the works of the divine hand in preparing a material place for the illustration of his grace and glory? Then might we find fault with him in the creation of this world, at first, and of Eden, as a residence for the holy pair, which residence he pronounced very good. They who charge materialism as a crime, or a delusion, must themselves have low views of the power and wisdom of God, and have their vision confined within very narrow limits. And they would do well to consider whether, carrying out their principles, they are not likely to fall into the airy nothing of Swedenborgianism. Rejecting that delusion, and also any midway ground as untenable, we accept the song of the four living ones and the four-and-twenty elders, those august representatives of the redeemed church: "For thou hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation, and hast made us

kings and priests unto our God, and we shall reign—*on the earth.*" And with this we read in harmony, and parallel in sentiment, Rev. xx. 4: "And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." Materialism, such as the Scriptures plainly declare we shall not reject for the din which is raised on account of the abuses which the ignorant or the designing, of this or any former age, have heaped upon it. Let those who degrade the subject by gross conceptions, and by associating with it the weakness, and corruption, and attendant sin of this present evil world, bear their own burden.

Men are prone to wide extremes, is a trite remark. It finds a notable illustration here,—intense spiritualism on the one hand, and gross materialism on the other. Into one or other of these gulfs men, in this fallen state, are constantly plunging. In the early ages gross materialism constituted the chief danger, and idolatry was the consequence. With all the teachings of God through Moses, the Hebrews could not be restrained from making a calf at Horeb, as a medium through which to worship Jehovah; and at the division of the kingdom under Rehoboam, from worshipping calves again at the dictation of the rival king. They did not then pretend they were worshipping Moloch or Baal, but only Jehovah through a visible medium. Yet the contamination of heathen example around them, their own degrading propensities, and the direct violation of the command, *Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image*, immediately sank them into brutal sensualism; demonstrating the wisdom of the prohibition, and the danger to which fallen man is exposed in the direction of materialism. After the return from the captivity, having seen the effects of idolatry at Babylon, and remembering the chastisements of their own sins in that respect; having also begun to learn the wisdom of human philosophy taught by the wise men of the East, they verged towards the other extreme. In the century or two preceding Christ, not only did they suffer no image in their worship, but sects arose, as the Sadducees, who were so intellectual as to deny all spiritual existence, God alone excepted. Between these ultra-spiritualists, and the gross materialists of the earlier ages, there was every shade of opinion.

The tendency of our age, is to the extreme of spiritualism. The followers of Emmanuel Swedenborg furnish a notable example. A new demonstration is showing itself under the denomination of the spiritual rappers, and most of the popular philosophies are strongly tinctured with it. The church is coming to be infected with it, Biblical interpretation bends to it, and lively horror at any approximation to materialism is affected on all sides. A notable illustration of these extremes is found in the respective ages of Irenæus and Origen, not far separated. The latter found nothing in the literal dress of the Scriptures—all must be sublimated into a multitude of subtle, derived meanings, but all spiritual—that is, fanciful. Irenæus went as far to the other extreme when, discoursing of the future reign of Christ, he quoted the saying of Papias, "The days will come in which vines will grow, each having ten thousand branches; and on each branch there will be ten thousand twigs, and on each twig ten thousand clusters of grapes, and in each cluster ten thousand grapes; and each grape, when pressed, will yield twenty-five *μετραι* of wine [i. e. about 209 gallons],"* which being reduced would far exceed the whole Mediterranean sea. This Professor Stuart quotes with satisfaction, as if the bare statement were sufficient to refute the doctrine of millenarians concerning a restored earth; whereas it is only an instance of unbridled fancy, no more censurable than the fancies of Origen, on the other extreme. It is doubtless easy to collect from opposing writers specimens of extravagant statement, which prove not the falsity of the respective systems, but only the weakness, or the partisan heat of the disputants, or the imprudence of the writers in looking into details of a future state, which the Bible does not warrant. If Irenæus had no warrant for his extravagant statement quoted above, neither had Origen for putting Isaiah and John into his alembic, to annihilate everything material from the future reign of Christ.

But in itself, what is there absurd in the doctrine of a regenerated earth, on which the saints shall stand at that day raised from their long sleep of death, in bodies freed from cor-

* Stuart's Apoc., vol. ii. p. 488.

ruption, with all things around fitted for their use, and with their glorious head reigning over the nations that shall be born and live in the cycles of the millennial period? Paul said to Agrippa, "Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?" And the same question may be asked respecting the subject in hand, Why should it be thought incredible that the Lord Jesus Christ, as man—the glorified head of the church which he purchased with his own blood—should reign with them on earth? With them, as one of them? Is it beneath his dignity to associate with brethren when made like him, having neither spot nor wrinkle, nor any such thing, but become as the angels of God? Then much more might we say, it was beneath the divine dignity to associate personally and visibly with Adam in Eden before the fall, and with the patriarchs after the fall. All the sense of incongruity which the candid mind feels on this subject, arises from the associations of a sinful state, and the imbecility consequent on the fall. It is difficult to conceive and contemplate steadily the glory of the spiritual body with its adjuncts, which is to be revealed; as Peter on the Mount was overwhelmed with the glory of Christ and the two heavenly visitors, and could only say, Lord, it is good for us to be here; let us build three tabernacles, &c.: and this, not knowing or considering what he said. Had he considered the incongruity of building three tabernacles on Mount Tabor from such scanty materials as that eminence afforded, and for persons so lustrous and glorious as Elijah, and Moses, and Christ, then there, he would have spoken differently, or not at all. And if we attempt to paint or describe the circumstances or the scene of the future glorious kingdom of Christ and the risen saints on earth, otherwise than the sacred writers do, we shall perhaps make out no better than Irenæus and others who, by their unbridled imaginations, have injured the cause they intended to advance. The main facts are, what we should aim to grasp, and let the circumstances and modes of the new existence rest in the dimness in which God has placed them by limiting the faculties of the present state. Cannot God reveal the fact of an existence of the risen saints, with this earth for their principal theatre and abode, without revealing, also, the circumstances and mode of that existence?

This would be to question his power and deny the facts of his providence, for he has revealed the fact of an existence between death and the resurrection without revealing the mode. "God is not the God of the dead—the annihilated—but of the living." Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were not annihilated but existent, and yet we have no clue to the mode of their existence while absent from the body. Or, on the principles and views now commonly held, that the future scene of departed saints is in heaven, that is, not on this earth, what is there but the fact of blessedness and blessed society and exalted powers that is not open to cavil if one is so disposed. Of the circumstances and modes of existence, what do we know? But in this ignorance, they themselves do not question the fact. In vain, then, will any reasonably question the doctrine of Christ and the risen saints reigning on this earth on the ground of absurdity.

More open to the charge of absurdity are those who, admitting the resurrection of the body, deny the doctrine of a future reign of Christ with his saints on earth. Thus, they say, it is incongruous and inconceivable that Christ and his risen saints, with their spiritual bodies, should mingle with, or be related any way to, material objects. Where then, we would ask, would they have them to be? In heaven, it will be replied, where there are no material objects. Why then, we ask, should they have material bodies at the resurrection? If this body is to be raised, as the Scriptures affirm, and there be no material objects in the place of their residence, is not such a condition as incongruous and inconceivable to us, nay, much more, than an existence on a regenerated and restored earth? Think of men invested with bodies in the etherial regions void of all material substance—no objects holding any analogy or relation to them—nothing solid for them to rest upon, nothing around them for an eye to perceive or a hand to touch—but stationary or oscillating in vast vacuity. In some unknown way they may be conversing with a spirit, or be in an assembly of spirits, but the organs of their bodies being of no use and having no functions!—no light, no air, no sensible creations and objects around!—Why should they have bodies at all? Why should not the advocates of this theory go one step further and resolve all beyond this world into sheer spirit, and deny the resurrec-

tion of the body ? There are incongruities here at least, as great as the reign of the saints on earth. We do not deny the possibility, that God might constitute such an order of things as to sustain men in the body hereafter in absolute vacuity, as we have instanced ; but in addition to the incongruity of the thing, we allege the entire want of Scriptural evidence in its support ; and these difficulties, the one and the other, we apprehend, have driven many to a denial of a resurrection of the body, or which amounts to the same, resolving the spiritual body, *πνευματικὸν σῶμα*, into spirit itself, thereby making a double man—a thinking soul and a thinking body united, to constitute one man ! But, leaving these speculations, let us pass on to the express declarations of the Bible as to the facts.

The Scriptures then declare that the Lord Jesus Christ—Jesus of Nazareth—the man Christ Jesus, is by the right hand of God exalted to be a king over a peculiar kingdom. Obscurely this was declared to Adam at the fall, more plainly to Abraham when God said to him at the making of the solemn covenant, “In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed,” repeated to him personally often, and quoted by prophets and apostles. The Messianic Psalms dwell on this theme. Psalm ii., “Yet have I set my king on my holy hill of Zion . . . Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.” The 72d Psalm, too long to quote, enlarges on the greatness and glory of this kingdom and its king—no other than he whose inauguration is celebrated in the 2d Psalm. It concludes with exuberant praise, predicting his future reign—“His name shall endure for ever : his name shall be continued as long as the sun : and men shall be blessed in him : all nations shall call him blessed.” Isaiah ix. is more specific in declaring who this king is, and in attributing to him both the divine and human nature : “For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given ; and the government shall be upon his shoulder : and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace, there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to

establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth, even for ever." Can anything be more decisive than Dan. vii. 14?—"And there was given him"—the one like the Son of Man, who came with the clouds of heaven to the Ancient of Days—"dominion and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." And did not Christ claim this kingdom, and recognise the prophecies as having their fulfilment in him? Matt. xix. 28—"In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on his glorious throne, ye also who have followed me shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." See, also, his reply to the mother of James and John, asking that they might sit, one on his right hand and the other on the left, *in his kingdom*. "But it shall be given to them for whom it is appointed of my Father." In Christ's reproof to the disciples at the supper, Luke xxii. 29, 30, he recognises and claims this kingship—"And I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father hath appointed unto me, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." And again, at the conclusion of his answer to their question—"When shall these things be? and what shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the age? he says, "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all nations. . . . Then shall the King—that same Son of Man, Jesus of Nazareth—say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." The apostles also recognise and assume the doctrine which the prophets and Christ himself asserted. Peter, in his sermon, Acts iii., assumed it; and, Second Epistle i. 11—"For so an entrance shall be ministered to you into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." To cite Paul to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse on the kingdom, would be to quote a large portion of those books.

We are aware all this is summarily disposed of by referring it to a period when this earth shall be annihilated or

otherwise appropriated, and the scene of the kingdom to a spiritual state, where nothing material exists. Let us look, then, at the scene as the Bible describes it. Peter, in his discourse on the day of Pentecost, asserts a restitution of all things, and makes it a ground of appeal to his hearers in exhorting them to repentance. "Repent ye, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come," or, according to another rendering, "That times of refreshing may come from the presence of the Lord ; and he shall send Jesus Christ, which was before preached unto you : whom the heaven must receive until" (but only until) "the *restitution* of all things which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." A most remarkable evasion is here practised by many in translating ἀποκατάστασις by *accomplishment* instead of *restitution*. But to what purpose, for their argument, we are utterly at a loss to see. For suppose it be translated accomplishment, so as to read, "until the accomplishment of all things which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." Does not the question return—what is it that God hath spoken ? And the answer to this question, we say, is, God hath promised, all along the course of prophecy, to restore this world from the ruins of the fall. Moses, Samuel, David, Isaiah, Daniel, Christ himself, Peter, Paul, and John, have spoken of these things—the restoration of the earth physically, and its people morally, from the dilapidation consequent on Adam's sin. Until the contrary of this is shown, the substitution of accomplishment for restitution is a mere begging of the question. More generous is the interpretation of Prof. Hackett (Com. on Acts, p. 65), "*The times of the restoration of all things, i. e. to a state of primeval order, purity, and happiness, such as will exist for those who have part in the kingdom of Christ, at his second coming.*" And again, "*ἀπ' αἰώνος, i. e. from the earliest times of prophetic revelation. Such a period of restoration to holiness and happiness is the explicit or implied theme of prophecy from the beginning to the end of the Old Testament.*"

Now this restitution to holiness and happiness is to be on this earth, not in Jupiter or Sirius, or in some orb spiritual or intangible. This also is what Christ means when he

says, "In the *regeneration* ye shall sit on twelve thrones." How can we conceive of such a regeneration in a state purely spiritual, without that censurable interpretation which confounds all the laws of language and symbol, and lands in Swedenborgianism? This is what is meant by Isaiah, "For behold I create new heavens and a new earth: and the former shall not be remembered, nor come into mind." That the scene of this regeneration is this earth, and not some other place or region, is manifest from the adjuncts; "They shall build houses and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards and eat the fruit of them." This is not a figure nor a symbol, but a straightforward description in plain language, as plain and unadorned as, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." The one may be spiritualized as well as the other; and if so, what midway ground is there to hold short of the principles of Origen and Swedenborg? This is what John means, Rev. xxi, "And I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away"—gave place to the new. "And I, John, saw the holy city"—the people who should constitute the holy city—"coming down from God out of heaven"—the highest heaven, God's peculiar residence. Where did this holy city come to? Manifestly to the new heavens and new earth, which had taken the place of the old by a regeneration. Therefore it is not the highest heaven of which John speaks, for the essential declaration is, they left that and went to another. And when we ask, what other, and where, the answer is found in the following verse—with men, "Behold the tabernacle of God is *with men*, and he shall dwell with them." And then the details which follow coincide with Isaiah's description of a regenerated world, a state in expectation of which "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the resurrection of the body;"—this being the sign and the commencement of the new state and order of things. The scene of Christ's future glorious kingdom, therefore, is this earth, and not another place.

We pass next to the constituents of this kingdom, over which the Son, afterwards Jesus of Nazareth, is to rule in glory. We read his inauguration in the second Psalm, quoted and applied by Peter and Paul. We read the rap-

turous description in Psalm lxxii., and its progress and triumphant establishment and endless duration in the Apocalypse. What are the constituents?

First, the risen saints. Daniel xii. 2, declares a resurrection exclusively of the saints. Many from among the dust sleepers shall awake to everlasting life, and the rest of the dust sleepers shall remain as they were, unawakened. Our Saviour speaks of a resurrection of the Just: "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the Just;" which on account of that explanatory clause excludes those of the opposite character—certainly when collated with other passages. Paul discourses at length, 1 Cor. xv. 39–57, on the resurrection of the just. By no consistency can we extend that discourse in its application to all men; for John, Rev. xx., distinguishes the classes and the resurrections, if not beyond cavil, at least beyond reasonable objection. "And I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived"—not continued to exist, but existed in a new form. What this new form is, is declared in the following verse—"This is the first resurrection"—of course a life in the body; for it is idle to predicate a resurrection of the soul alone; etymology, philosophy, and the significance of language, as a medium of conception and expression, equally forbid it. The passage also expressly excludes those of an opposite character, "But the rest of the dead did not live again, *rise up*, until the thousand years were finished." Finally, the specifications of the symbolical representation, "beheaded for the witness of Jesus," "had not worshipped the beast," "nor received his mark," &c., are sufficiently full to include all the righteous dead. And as to the righteous living at the time, Paul declares, with all plainness, they shall be changed, transfigured.

Now these are they over whom the Lord Jesus Christ is to reign, and with whom associated they are to reign in various degrees of exaltation. These are they of whom it is said in the passage last quoted: "And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them. . . And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years."

These are they whose representatives, Rev. v. 10, say: "And hast made us unto God, kings and priests; and we shall reign on the earth." These are they to whom Christ, in his humiliation, said: "Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom;" and "I appoint unto you a kingdom as my Father hath appointed unto me." To these are directed the predictions in Daniel, *e. g.* vii. 18: "But the saints of the Most High shall take the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever." And again, vii. 27: "And the kingdom, and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High." Over this church, redeemed, raised, glorified, in their own proper bodies, Jesus Christ is to be supreme, subject only as to his human nature to God, All in All. "And there was given him," by the Ancient of Days, "dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed."

Secondly, this dominion comprehends the nations and people in the natural life. Over these the Lord Jesus Christ will reign supreme, and subordinately the saints in glory will reign over them. The earth renewed, and the hearts of men renewed, the predictions of Isaiah, of David (Ps. lxxii.), and other prophets will find their fulfilment in respect to all the richness and exuberant productiveness of the earth, its freedom from noxious agents, its teeming population of happy men; in short, then will be realized more than imagination has conceived of the blessedness of the millennial age. These are the men with whom when the New Jerusalem comes down out of heaven, God shall dwell. "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away."

But it will be said, doubtless, such a state of things is impossible—the world could not contain the multitudes that will be born. Answer: God can enlarge the earth, if necessary, by extending its diameter and its surface. The

answer is as good as the objection. Besides, it is said, "Behold, I create all things new." Cannot he who created the earth in the beginning, adapted to his plan for the current age, regenerate it, and make it fit for his purposes in the coming age? Or he can translate, if he please, by instant transformation, the generations which grow old into the immortal beauty and vigor of the glorified saints, and so make room for coming generations. Why should we be called on to help God out of difficulties which our weakness alone suggests; especially since equal difficulties press upon us in any theory we may adopt when we demand the circumstances and modes of an economy all different from the present? "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" were questions which the inquirers thought unanswerable; and certainly they were as formidable as any that have been raised since. But Paul pronounced those questions foolishness. And a greater than Paul said, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. As little to the purpose is it to inquire, by way of supercilious objection, how the two classes, the glorified and unglorified, the reigning and the reigned over, can mingle together in mutual discharge of respective functions. What have we to do with difficulties here which lie in our weakness, or in God's sovereign withholding of the data of solution? And why should we stand aghast at circumstances, and refuse credence when the main question is one of facts? Show us the intrinsic absurdity, the absolute contradiction, in the statement, the saints shall reign on the earth in glorified bodies over men in the flesh, as in the proposition, body may occupy two places in space widely separated at the same time, then we will consider and retract.

The subject we have here presented—the Manhood of Christ and its future relations to his church—cannot but be of great practical importance. In this age of daring speculation and bold denial of the authority of the Word of God on the part of many, of disguised infidelity on the part of others walking beneath the veil of professed reverence to the Scriptures, yet confusing and annulling their force by perverse interpretation, it becomes the professed followers of Christ to sit humbly at his feet watching at the gates of his

wisdom. There is, perhaps, no lack of instruction from the pulpit on Christ's humanity while he tabernacled in the flesh. Multitudes of discourses on the divinity of Christ are delivered, in which the preacher is at pains to show by the way that Christ *was* a man—that he eat, and drank, and slept as other men; but very few, we apprehend, preach the doctrine that he *is* a man and will retain his manhood. The consequence is, that the minds of the masses are seldom led to contemplate him as sustaining still the endearing relation of brother, and to expect him at his second coming in the form of a man, and having the other attributes of a man. In their apprehension he is removed from the sphere of humanity, and swallowed up in his other nature, so that he is not, and never will again be, God *manifested in the flesh*. They are in danger of feeling as to Christ, as the Israelites of old in respect to their mediator, the type of him who was to come—"As for this Moses, which brought us out of the land of Egypt, we wot not what has become of him." The excessive anxiety to repel the shafts of those who deny the proper divinity of our Lord increases this tendency, and cherishes the fondness for an intensely spiritual interpretation. By it they are left to doubt and then deny a literal and actual coming of Christ, and resolve it into mere scenic representation. Nothing can be more unpropitious to the practical purposes of the humble inquirer at the word of God.

So also in respect to the doctrine of the resurrection, both Christ's and that of his saints. The apostles made the resurrection of the dead the head of the corner in their preaching of Christ: witness Peter in the temple, and Paul at Athens, and his declaration to the Corinthians, "If Christ be not risen," and by necessary inference, if the saints are not to rise, "then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." But if we are not greatly mistaken, this cornerstone of Christian doctrine is becoming very loose in the minds of the professed people of God. Multitudes think it a matter of very minor consequence, whether the body be raised or not, if so be the immortality of the soul is insured. In that case the resurrection may well be left as a shuttlecock for ingenious theological disputants. We view this matter in a far different light. It is eminently practical, and power-

fully influential of our views of the future reign of Christ and his saints on the earth—of course as having a quickening influence here, while waiting “for that blessed hope, the glorious appearing of the great God, even our Saviour Jesus Christ.”

Again, to keep in view the proper manhood of Christ, as a permanent, an everlasting attribute, invests the life of his humiliation, as given in the gospels, with interest marvelous, and such as those who ignore or lose sight of that enduring manhood cannot feel. Especially the miracles of Christ become instructive and radiant. What reflecting mind can suppose, that the sole object of these was to give authority to his words, and confirm the truth of the Scriptures, as a divine revelation? Were they not also the foreshadowings of a power, which all his true disciples should possess, when endowed with the body that shall be?—sown in weakness, but raised in power? Were his promises to the disciples, of a power over the laws of the natural world, analogous to his, exhausted in the history of those individuals and their immediate successors? Christ showed his disciples on the Mount of Transfiguration, one glimpse of the powers of the world to come, and immediately after his descent he wrought a wonderful miracle, and said to them, asking why they could not do the same, Ye could with faith; ye might say to this mountain from which we have just descended,—remove hence to yonder place, and it should remove, and nothing of that sort should be impossible unto you. But in fact there were few occasions for the exertion of this power in the history of the apostles, and Christ's own miracles were fewer than might have been expected: enough, however, both to confirm his authority, and show to his followers what they might hope to do, in an age when the humiliation should be past.

But most of all, should we not lose sight of Christ's proper and everlasting manhood, in reading those Scriptures, which professedly treat of his future and glorious kingdom. Admit the idea that he has both a human soul and a real body—a material body, since the tautology is necessary—and that he will ever retain such attributes, however exalted they may be, and a thousand difficulties will vanish in respect to his associating with his brethren, and singing praise to God in

the midst of them, his church, in the new heavens and earth, which God will create; or in respect to his ruling with them over the nations of the millennial age, who shall be born and live in the natural life before being translated to the supernatural. A thousand difficulties will vanish in respect to his subordination, as Son of God become man, to God the All in All. Why should they, who admit in general the two natures, refrain from carrying it out to its legitimate extent in the coming age? The greatest difficulties surely are, that the second person in the Godhead should become man at all, and especially in the weakness of infancy, in this sinful world. That he should be exalted above all principality and power, God only excepted, and still associated with those of our own nature in various degrees of exaltation, presents no difficulties greater, nor incongruities more repulsive. This sense of incongruity, wherever it exists, pertains to, and originates in, our sinful and perverted nature, and not in the nature of the things themselves. Without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness, to wit, God manifest in the flesh: we shall never sound its depths, but some things concerning it are written for our learning, to which we do well to give heed; for if we go not to the fountain of God's written word, where for light on such a subject shall we go? In the words of Peter, Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.

S.

ART. V.—ARCHBISHOP WHATELY ON A FUTURE STATE.

A VIEW OF THE SCRIPTURE REVELATIONS CONCERNING A FUTURE STATE, by Richard Whately, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Lindsay and Blakiston. Philadelphia: 1856.

THIS volume consists of a series of lectures on an Intermediate State, the Resurrection, the Judgment, the Millennium, Rewards and Punishments, the Conditions and Abode of the Blest, and a Preparation for Death. They were originally delivered to a congregation consisting principally of the unlearned, and are not only written in a style of great simplicity, but the arguments themselves, and the mode in

which they are conducted, seem to have been chosen rather with a reference to the capacity of his hearers, than to the demands of the subjects. They do not indicate, we think it will be generally felt, the fine powers that are displayed in several of Dr. Whately's works; they are superficial and specious rather than thorough; they are employed in a measure in favoring views that are generally held to be erroneous; and they lack the warmth of feeling, and directness and urgency of appeal, which the themes require. They present, however, many fine thoughts, and here and there passages that rise into the region of strength and elegance, and make us regret that he has not studied the subjects with the attention they deserve; and that in so many instances he takes the side of opinions which we believe are at variance with the word of God. Our object in this article is to examine the grounds on which he rests those opinions, and try their accuracy.

The first, to which his introductory lecture is devoted, is, that no revelation was made to the Israelites in the Old Testament of "a future life."

One of the principal grounds which he alleges in support of that opinion, is, that there is no specific announcement of a future life in the revelations made to Moses at Sinai. But admit that it was so; and it does not show that such a revelation had not been made to the patriarchs, nor that it was not an article of the general faith of the Hebrews. So far from it, it is expressly indicated in the New Testament that the children of God before the flood had a knowledge and belief of a future life. For it was "by faith" that "Enoch was translated that he should not see death: and was not found, because God had translated him." And that faith, it is apparent from the description the apostle gives of its object, was a faith that the reward which God was to give to his children, was in a future life. For he adds, "for before his translation he had this testimony that he pleased God. But without faith it is impossible to please him." What then was the nature of that faith? What truths and promises were its objects? The reality of God's being, and the certainty of his rewarding those that seek him. "For he that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him." Heb. xi. 5, 6.

A revelation, therefore, must have been made to Enoch that God was to reward his children; and that revelation must have disclosed to him the life in which the redemption promised was to be given; so that his faith contemplated the identical reward which he received. Otherwise, as he would have looked for salvation in this life, his faith would in a large degree have been a mistaken belief. If, however, this passage left any doubt of his knowledge of a future life, it is removed by Jude, who expressly declares that Enoch was a prophet, and that he announced to his generation the future coming of Jehovah with all his saints, and execution of judgment on all the ungodly. "And Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied of *these things*, saying, Behold the Lord cometh with his holy myriads, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them, of all their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all their hard things which ungodly sinners have spoken against him." Verses 14, 15. As this coming of the Lord to judge all, is that which is still future, and the holy myriads whom he is to bring with him are to include, as we learn from 1 Thess. iv. 14, those who have died in faith, the prophecy manifestly involved a revelation of the existence of the sanctified after their death; and shows accordingly that the antediluvians were made aware of the future life and the judgment of all, whether good or evil, that is to take place at the coming of the Lord. And as several of the patriarchs who were contemporary with Enoch, were also contemporary for a long period with Noah, the revelation and belief of a future life were doubtless communicated by Noah and his sons to their posterity, transmitted in the family of Abraham to the time of Moses, and were after that time a settled element of the faith of the Hebrews. That such was the faith, indeed, of Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, and Sarah, and, therefore, of all the other patriarchs, is explicitly taught by Paul, who declares that they died in the belief that the inheritance which was promised them, was to be obtained by them not in this, but in a future life. He says of those whom he had mentioned—Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Jacob—"These all died in faith—not having received the blessings promised, but having seen them afar off, and embraced them, and pro-

fessed that they were strangers and sojourners on the earth. For they that utter such things, show that they seek a country. And if they had been mindful of that, from which they had come out, they had opportunity to return. But now they desired a better: that is a heavenly *country*. Wherefore God is not ashamed of them to be called their God; for he has prepared a city for them." Heb. xi. 13-16. Here is thus a clear representation that they did not regard this life as comprising their whole existence, but professed, as a part of their faith, that they were only transient residents here; that the blessings promised them they neither received nor expected in this life, but contemplated them as at a distance, and looked to the kingdom of heaven as the scene where they were to be enjoyed. It is beyond doubt, therefore, that they were aware that they were to exist after death, and the existence and bliss they were for ever to enjoy in the kingdom of God, were the express objects of their faith.

This revelation of the future life thus communicated to them, was transmitted to their posterity, and became the common faith of the nation. The prevailing belief in the existence of the soul after death is accordingly clearly indicated in several passages of the Old Testament: as in the prediction of Christ's resurrection, Psalm xvi. 10, 11, "My flesh shall rest in hope: for thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption. Thou hast made known to me the ways of life, thou shalt fill me with joy with thy countenance." This prophecy of the restoration of the soul from the invisible world, and of the body from death, in which it rested in hope, and of a life of blessedness in God's immediate presence, imply in the clearest manner not only the continued existence after death of the person whom the prediction respects, but an immortal existence in honor and beatitude after a resurrection: for in the Psalm which the apostle quotes, the happiness promised in God's presence is declared to be eternal. Those accordingly who understood the Psalm, must have seen in it a clear indication of a future and immortal life.

The general belief in the continued existence and consciousness of souls after death, is implied also in the exhibition by Isaiah of the spirits of the dead in Hades, as rising from their thrones on the entrance of the soul of the king of

Babylon : "Hades from beneath is excited because of thee, to meet thee at thy coming. It rouses for thee the mighty dead, all the chief ones of the earth ; it raises from their thrones all the kings of the earth. All of them shall speak to thee and say : Art thou also become weak as we ? Art thou made like unto us ? Thy pomp is brought down to the grave ; the noise of thy viols. The worm is spread under thee, and the worm is thy covering. How art thou fallen from heaven, Lucifer, Son of the Morning ; cut down to the earth, thou who didst subjugate the nations !" (Isa. xiv. 9-12.) This exhibition of the souls of the dead as existing and conscious, clearly indicates that it was the religious belief of the nation at the period. Otherwise, it would not only have been wholly unsuitable for such a prophecy, but would have appeared absurd and monstrous. If the Israelites of that period had no knowledge of a future life, and no belief that *they* were to enjoy one, what could be more unnatural and offensive than to exhibit their enemies, and the conquerors and oppressors of the nation, as distinguished by so desirable a gift that was denied them ?

But the common belief of the Israelites at the period of their deliverance from Egypt, and through the ages that followed to the close of the Old Testament, in the existence, consciousness, and activity of the souls of the dead, is placed beyond dispute by the prohibitions in the Mosaic law of necromancy, and the frequent rebukes and reproaches of the nation by the prophets, for their addiction to that practice. Such a prohibition would have been unnecessary, such an offence would have been impossible, had there been no belief in the continued existence and activity of the spirits of the dead. To suppose them to consult for instruction on the most mysterious and important matters, what they regarded as having no existence, is to suppose the consultation not, in fact, to be necromancy, but a mere utterance of unmeaning and objectless words.

That the nation must have been familiar with the doctrine of a future existence, is seen also from the predictions in their Scriptures of the resurrection and immortal life of the dead, as in Psalm xlix. 15 : "But God will redeem my soul from the power of the grave ; for he will receive me." Isaiah xxvi. : "Thy dead men shall live ; together with my dead

body shall they arise." Daniel xii. 23: "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake—some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars, for ever and ever." They had thus a clear revelation, not only that the dead are to be raised, but that the righteous are to be raised to a life of glory that is never to end. And this is confirmed by the Mosaic dispensation itself, and all the revelations that followed. They would in a great measure have been objectless, or unsuited to any attainable end proportioned to themselves, had the Hebrew nation been ignorant of their existence and retribution in a future state; had they regarded this life as comprising their whole being.

Although, then, no express announcement was made to the Israelites at *Sinai* of a future life, it is manifest that the continued existence of the dead, their resurrection, and their retribution, were revealed to the antediluvian patriarchs, and known to the Hebrews, and were objects of their general belief.

Another ground on which Dr. Whately maintains that no revelation of a future state was made to the Israelites, is the apostle's declaration, 2 Tim. i. 10, that "Jesus Christ hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." This he regards as meaning that life and immortality were *first* revealed by Christ through the gospel; and as showing, therefore, that no knowledge of a future state based on Divine authority was before possessed by the Hebrews. Had Dr. Whately, however, looked at the passage in the Greek, he would have seen that that is not what it declares: The language is, *φανέρωσας δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀθάνατον διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*: "Jesus Christ who has abolished death, and *shed light* on life and immortality through the gospel." Though, therefore, the term denotes that a far clearer revelation of the future was made by Christ than had been made before, it does not indicate that no knowledge of a future existence had before been communicated to men and to the Israelites.

He adds, as a further corroboration of his opinion, occasional expressions, which he thinks indicate that those who

uttered them had no expectation of a future state. Such are those of the Psalmist, who asks, "What profit is there in my blood when I go down to the pit? Shall the dust praise thee? Shall it declare thy truth?" Ps. xxx. And again—"Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee? Shall thy loving kindness be declared in the grave, and thy faithfulness in destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?" Ps. lxxxviii. Of the same cast is the prayer of Hezekiah. "Behold, for peace I had great bitterness; but thou hast, in love to my soul, delivered it from the pit of corruption; for thou hast cast all my sins behind thy back. For the grave cannot praise thee: death cannot celebrate thee: they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day," Isaiah xxxviii. But, in these expressions, death is contemplated simply in its relation to the fulfilment of God's promises to his children, and their activity in his service *in this world*. Death was dreaded, because it would preclude them from receiving those tokens of God's favor which they desired in this life, and from performing the duties—perhaps before neglected—that were incumbent on them, or pursuing the plans of usefulness and piety on which their hearts were strongly set; and no more imply, therefore, an ignorance of a future state, than similar desires, which are very often now felt by the pious, imply that they have no expectation of a future existence. Paul was in a strait betwixt a desire to depart and be with Christ, which was far better for himself, and a conviction that to abide in life was more needful for the church; and he chose, on the whole, to remain, from the persuasion that it would be for the furtherance of those who were under his charge in faith, and their more abundant rejoicing in Christ. And there are many in whom, though they have an undoubting hope of a happy existence beyond the grave, the desire to remain, nevertheless, predominates, in order that they may perform duties which they have neglected, that they may watch over and seek the salvation of their families, that they may do something for the advancement of Christ's kingdom, and that they may glorify God by a holy life.

From these considerations, it is apparent that Dr. Whately's

views on this subject are mistaken ; and that there are ample proofs in the Scriptures that the continued existence of the soul after death was made known to Adam and his posterity, that the knowledge and belief of it were transmitted by Noah and his family to Abraham and his descendants, and that it continued to be the faith of the Hebrews, generally, through all the following ages, till Christ came and shed on it the fresh and far more resplendent light of his gospel.

The theme of which he next treats, is, the revelation that is made in the New Testament respecting the state of the dead during the period between death and the resurrection ; and he maintains that little is made known in regard to it, beyond the fact that the dead still exist, and are to be raised at some future time to a new life, and judged, and rewarded according to their character in this world. The principal question, however, that he debates is, whether the souls of the dead are conscious during their intermediate existence, or lost in a dreamless slumber ; and he holds that no means are furnished by the Scriptures of satisfactorily determining the point.

“And this (the intermediate state) is a point on which, I think, nothing is so clearly revealed in any part of Scripture, as to allow us to pronounce positively, that such and such a belief respecting it, is to be held as an essential part of the Christian Faith ; since if such had been the design of the Almighty, I cannot but think there would have been some explicit and decisive revelation given on that point.

“One thing, however, is perfectly clear and certain, respecting what that intermediate state *is not* ;—namely, that it is not a state of trial and probation.

“Since, then, the intermediate state is not one of trial, it must be either one of enjoyment and suffering, according to each man’s character (that is, a state of reward and punishment), or else a state of utter insensibility and unconsciousness ; either of which opinions may, I think, be safely entertained (though only one of them can be true), without failing in any part of the faith which it is essential for a Christian to hold.”—Pp. 54–55.

He proceeds, accordingly, to state “some of the reasons which are urged in behalf of each of these opinions,” and exerts himself to disprove those which are alleged in sup-

port of the former; while he urges the arguments in favor of the unconsciousness of the soul in its intermediate state, in a style that indicates that they are regarded by him as valid, and express his belief.

The first passage generally regarded as teaching that the soul is conscious in its intermediate state, which he attempts to divest of that meaning, is the parable of Dives and Lazarus. He says:—

“Those then who believe that the soul, when separated from the body by death, retains its activity, and consciousness, and sensibility to pleasure and pain, and that it enters immediately on a state of enjoyment or of suffering, appeal to several passages of Scripture, which appear to favor this doctrine, though without expressly declaring it, among which is the parable of the rich man and Lazarus: the former of whom is represented as being in a state of torment, although the end of the world is plainly supposed not to have arrived; since he is described as entreating Lazarus to warn his surviving brethren, lest they also come into this place of torment.

“And if all that is here told were to be considered as a narrative of a matter of fact which actually took place, it would be perfectly decisive. But all allow that the narrative is a parable; that is, a fictitious tale framed in order to teach or illustrate some doctrine; and although such a tale may chance to agree in every point with matter of fact,—with events that actually take place,—there is no necessity that it should. The only truth that is essential in a parable, is the truth of the moral or doctrine conveyed by it. . . . In the parable of the good Samaritan . . . and many others,—there is no reason to believe that any such events did ever actually take place: it is enough for the object of the parable, that it is *conceivable* they *might* take place; and that we should be able to derive instruction from considering how men *would be likely* to act, or how they *ought* to act, *supposing* such circumstances *should* actually occur.

“The parable, therefore, of the rich man and Lazarus, is not, I think, decisive of the point in question. It seems to imply indeed, very plainly, that there is a future state of reward and punishment (a doctrine, however, which most of Christ’s hearers had no doubt of); and also that those who have been devoted to the good things and enjoyments of this world, will have no share in those of the world to come. . . . This appears to have been the general moral design of the parable; in the detail of which many things are spoken figuratively, to give force and liveliness to the description

which are plain enough *when figuratively* understood, but could not have been meant of course to be taken literally."—Pp. 55–57.

This construction, however, of the parable, and notion of the principle on which it is employed, are wholly mistaken. In the first place, the supposition that Hades does not represent the real abode of departed human beings; the persons who are exhibited there, real human souls; and their state of suffering and enjoyment, real misery and happiness of the dead, is in contradiction to the very genius of a parabolic exhibition, an essential feature of which is, that its representative or illustrative agents, objects, and events, are taken from the sphere of nature, and represent persons, objects, and events also that belong to the sphere of nature. But, according to Dr. Whately, it was not necessary, in order to the propriety of the parable in question, that there should be any such place as Hades, the abode of departed souls; nor, of course, therefore, any such beings there as Dives, Lazarus, and Abraham; nor, consequently, any misery or happiness of such beings. If there is no such abode, there, of course, can be no such agents and events. But that is contrary to the fundamental principle of a parable, which requires that all the representatives should be taken from the real world. It is not necessary, indeed, that the actors and events of a parable should be taken from actual life—that is, be individuals that actually exist, and occurrences that really have taken place; but they must belong to the *sphere* of reality. Though, for example, it was not necessary, in order to the truth and propriety of the parable of the good Samaritan, that a certain individual Samaritan really existing should have acted the part that is there ascribed to him; yet it was necessary that there should be Samaritans, Israelites, priests, Levites, a Jerusalem, and a Jericho, inns, beasts of burden, robbers, wounds, oil, wine, and money; otherwise they would not be realities of a known nature, and therefore could not be representatives of realities that are known to be the same in nature, or of a nature that bears a resemblance to them. This law holds universally. All the representatives of the parables of the Scriptures are taken from the real world, and are representatives of realities. This parable, accordingly, proceeds on the fact that there is such a world as Hades, that is, an abode of departed human spirits; that the two classes of

the dead dwell there—the one in misery, and the other in rest and enjoyment; and that they are conscious, not insensible; and these, accordingly, must at the outset be taken as facts, that are the basis of the representation, and the reality of which cannot be denied without denying the whole pertinence and meaning of the parable. For as to deny, in respect to the parable of the Samaritan, that there was any such place as Jerusalem or Jericho, or any such beings as Samaritans, Israelites, robbers, priests, Levites, or inn-keepers, or any such things as wounds, oil, wine, or money, would be equivalent to denying that there are any human beings who possess the natures, exist in the relations, and act the parts depicted in the narrative, and would therefore divest the parable of all its significance, and make its representatives a mere group of nonentities; so, to deny that there is a Hades, or abode of departed spirits, and that there are spirits residing there in consciousness, and in suffering, or at rest, is to deny the very basis on which the parable is built, and strip it of all its true meaning.

In the next place, the supposition of the non-reality of Hades, and of conscious human spirits there, is contradictory to the exact likeness or the resemblance on which the representatives of parables are used. It is not only a law of parables that the representatives are taken from the sphere of nature, and are specimens of what really exist, but also that they are either the same in kind, or else bear a resemblance to those which they are employed to represent. Thus, it was the object of the parable of the Samaritan, to show what it is to love one's neighbor; and it proceeds on the fact, that there are persons in every one's sphere, who are suffering, and need aid from their fellow-men; that there are some men who, like the priest and Levite, feel no compassion for such individuals when thrown in their way, even in circumstances that are adapted, in a high degree, to move them to pity; but that there are others who, like the Samaritan, contemplate them with sympathetic and generous feelings, and readily yield them the assistance they need; and that it is he who acts the part of the good Samaritan towards his suffering fellow-creatures, who loves his neighbor as the divine law enjoins. The whole significance of the parable thus rests on the fact that there are

human beings who are in conditions of calamity and danger either identically the same, or as real, and of as much urgency as those of the wounded Israelite; and that there are others who come in contact with them, or become aware of their sufferings and necessities, who are able and are bound to yield them the aids which they need. There must be suffering to be alleviated, and persons who are able and under obligation to alleviate it, or the parable is wholly objectless. It is not necessary that the suffering and danger should be identically the same as those of the wounded Israelite. They may be of any other kinds that are equally real, and equally need relief from a sympathetic and generous hand. And so in respect to the parable under consideration; there must be a real world in which the spirits of the dead abide, and they must exist there in consciousness, and in suffering or enjoyment, or else the parable is wholly objectless; inasmuch as, if there are no souls of the dead in a condition either the same, or that bears any resemblance to that of the representative souls of the parable; then it cannot exemplify nor illustrate anything in respect to the state of departed souls.

In the third place, the supposition that Hades, Dives, Lazarus, and Abraham, and their condition there, do not represent the abode of departed spirits, departed spirits themselves dwelling there, and their state of misery or happiness, implies that they have no representative office whatever. Hades most certainly does not represent this world; the spirits there do not represent men in this life; nor their condition there, the condition of men in this world. They are not designed in any degree to illustrate the character or state of men here. If, then, they do not represent the abode of departed spirits, and their condition in it, they do not represent anything whatever, and their introduction into the parable is without any end. But that is incredible. Why were they made the main part of the parable if they had no office to fill? Why was Dives exhibited as passing at death into Hades, as suffering there, as seeing Abraham and Lazarus at a distance, as addressing Abraham, and as receiving responses from him, if it was not designed to convey any instruction to us, and has no meaning whatever? Such an assumption can no more be made in regard to this part

of the parable than it can to the other; or than it can in respect to any part, or the whole of any of the other parables. But that is inconsistent with the wisdom of Christ, altogether unlike his method of instruction, and contradictory to the nature of a parable, and is therefore wholly inadmissible.

In the fourth place, that supposition exhibits the parable as deceptive. It certainly represents the souls of the dead as in Hades, and as suffering or enjoying there, and it makes the impression on readers generally that it is intended to teach that the souls of the departed exist in the invisible world in a state of misery or enjoyment, and that impression is natural and unavoidable. There probably was not one among those who heard the parable from the lips of Christ; there probably has not been one in a hundred thousand who have read it in the gospel—who did not regard Christ as teaching in it that the souls of those who die, immediately pass to a scene in the invisible world that is assigned as their abode, and there dwell in misery or in happiness. To suppose, therefore, that the souls of the dead do not, in fact, pass to such a scene, and such an existence, is to suppose that the parable is framed in such a manner, as naturally and necessarily to mislead men on the subject, and betray them into the most mistaken notions. But it is most derogatory to Christ to suppose him to impress men with such false beliefs. His wisdom does not need, nor his righteousness permit, the use of such means to accomplish the ends he pursues.

That supposition makes the parable absurd also as well as deceptive. Why should Dives be exhibited as in torment and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue, if his spirit, instead of suffering, was in a state of total unconsciousness? Why should Abraham have reminded him that his sufferings were the consequence of his having chosen as his portion the good things of this life, if he was undergoing no suffering, but in a state of sheer insensibility? Why should Dives have recognised it as a fact that he had brought his miseries on himself by his conduct in this life, if he was not in any misery; and why should he have asked that Lazarus might be sent to his brethren, that he might testify to them of the necessity of repentance, lest they also should

come to that place of torment, if there was no such place? What can be more absurd, more contradictory, or more unworthy of a divine teacher than such exhibitions, if they have no ground whatever in reality?

In the fifth place, it exhibits the parable as adapted to defeat the very object for which it was uttered. It was designed, undoubtedly, to enforce the direction which had immediately before been given in the parable of the unjust steward, to use the things of this world in such a manner as to secure admission into the everlasting habitations of the redeemed, and the assurance that they could not serve God and riches; and it exemplifies those lessons, on the one hand, by showing the everlasting misery to which a supreme love of the world and devotion to its pleasures lead; and on the other, by showing the blessedness in which a life of poverty and suffering here may terminate. But this lesson is wholly lost, if no such retributive consequences, as the parable represents, follow the conduct of men here. If the rich man suffers nothing in the future world for his impenitence and devotion to wealth and luxury here, and the poor man derives no advantage from his penitence, his renunciation of the world, contentment with the most humble subsistence, and patient endurance of the suffering lot assigned him—then the teaching of the parable is, that the belief of future punishments and rewards is wholly baseless and superstitious; that impenitence, avarice, and luxury draw no evil consequences after them in a future state; and that penitence, contentment with poverty, and patient submission to suffering are followed by no gracious rewards; and therefore, as a life of wealth and luxury here involves a far greater amount of enjoyment than a life of poverty and self-denial, it is the wisest policy to choose wealth and pleasure as one's portion here. But that would render its teaching the direct converse of the lesson which it is meant to convey, and make it sanction and encourage impenitence, avarice, and luxury, instead of dissuading from them, and inculcating a renunciation of the world as one's chief good, contentment with poverty, and submission to suffering, in the hope and expectation of an immortal life of rest and bliss in the kingdom of heaven.

In whatever relation, then, the parable is contemplated, it

is manifest that it must be taken as representing that the souls of the dead are in a state of suffering or happiness in the scene to which they have passed. And this, after all, is in effect admitted by Dr. Whately; for he concedes that "it seems to imply very plainly that there is a *future state of reward and punishment*—a doctrine which most of Christ's hearers had no doubt of; and also that those who have been devoted to the good things and enjoyments of this world, will have no share in those of the world to come." But if it implies such "a future state of reward and punishment," that state undoubtedly must intervene between death and the resurrection; as Lazarus is represented as borne immediately on his death to Abraham's bosom, and Dives as immediately after death lifting up his eyes in Hades; for it was while his brethren were still living that he desired that Lazarus should be sent to exhort them to repentance that they might not come to his place of torment. By this concession, therefore, Dr. Whately, in effect, gives up the construction he is endeavoring to maintain, and implies that Dives and Lazarus are representatives of souls in the intermediate state, and that the sufferings of the one, and the enjoyments of the other, represent the misery of the lost and the happiness of the redeemed in that state; for it is not pretended, and cannot be, that they represent the condition of men after the resurrection.

This, then, is demonstrably its true import, and so clearly and emphatically, that it seems singular that any one should have found himself able to doubt it. The parable consists of two parts; the first of which exhibits two men of opposite characters and conditions in this life; the other exhibits them in opposite states of retribution in the scene to which they passed immediately after death. It is as clear, therefore, that Dives and Lazarus, in Hades, represent the retributive condition of the lost and the saved immediately after death; as it is that in their states while in this world, they represent the conditions and lives of men here of the classes to which they belonged. To deny their representative function in Hades, is as reasonless and contradictory to the parable, as it were to deny their representative office while in this life. It is to be taken, therefore, in its plain and obvious sense; and the impression it naturally leaves on the mind,

is that which it was designed to produce. It proceeds on the fact, that the souls of the departed exist in a state of consciousness and of enjoyment, or misery, according to their character while here ; and its object is to exemplify and illustrate that fact, in order to dissuade men from the supreme love of wealth and pleasure, which consigned Dives to the suffering and despair of the lost. It is a clear and most impressive revelation, therefore, that the condition of the souls of men in the intermediate state, is not one of unconsciousness, but of sensibility, activity, and misery or happiness, according to their character.

It is thought, indeed, by some, an obstacle to this, that the suffering of Dives and the enjoyment of Lazarus were corporeal, and such, therefore, as cannot be felt by disembodied spirits. It is not required, however, by the law of the parable, that the suffering and happiness that are employed as representatives, should be of the same kind as those which they represent ; it is enough that an analogy subsists between them ; or that such as they are to the body, as it exists in this world, such those which they represent, are to the soul in its disembodied state. And such they undoubtedly are ; as the affections of the body are used in great frequency in the Scriptures to represent or illustrate resembling changes and affections of the mind ; as the birth of the body is employed to denote the commencement of the new life, or renovation of the mind ; the food, nourishment and growth of the body, to represent the food, nourishment, and growth of the mind ; the disorders and sufferings of the body, to signify the disorders and sufferings of the mind ; natural death to denote spiritual death ; the resurrection of the body from natural death, to represent the recovery of the mind from sin ; and the most excruciating tortures that can be inflicted on the body here, to represent the insupportable sufferings of impenitent souls in the state on which they enter after death. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, with the law of parabolic representation, and in accordance with the general usage of the Scriptures, that sufferings and enjoyments taken from this life, should be employed in the parable to represent the analogous sufferings and enjoyments of the spirits of the dead in their intermediate state.

He next refers to the souls of the martyrs seen by the

apostle under the fifth seal, Rev. vi. 9-11, and endeavors to show that no conclusion can be drawn from their appearance in the vision, that either they or "any other Christians enter into a state of reward or punishment, immediately after death." No one will attempt, we presume, to infer from it, that the souls of departed saints "enter into punishment immediately after death." He says, in reference to the vision:

"We may collect from this, that a notice was intended to be given to John of the severe and bloody persecution of the Christians which took place not very long after,—and an assurance that God would give deliverance to his church, and that those who had suffered in the cause of Christ, should be highly exalted and everlastingly rewarded by him. But many of the circumstances of the vision are evidently such as can only be understood *figuratively*; such as the *white robes* of the martyrs, which denote their being justified and accounted pure before God through the blood of Christ. So that I think we cannot, from this passage, conclude with any certainty that these martyrs or any other Christians enter into a state of reward or punishment immediately after death. Indeed, if it were but recollected that nothing but *material bodily* substance can be an object of *sight*, it would be plain that all the passages in which a departed soul is spoken of as *appearing to the eyes*, so far from proving the existence of a soul in a *separate* state from the body, and unconnected with any material substance, would, if they were to be understood literally, prove the direct contrary,—that the persons so spoken of as visibly, appearing, actually had bodies at the time."—Pp. 58, 59.

If the reader carefully scans this passage, we think he will see that the point Dr. Whately endeavors to establish, is not at all proved. He does not even argue it. His reference to the white robes of the souls, instead of sustaining, subverts it, inasmuch as they indicated, as he admits, that the martyrs were justified in the divine presence; but that shows that they had passed from their state of trial in this world, and were in the enjoyment of rest, in the scene which is the abode of the redeemed during their intermediate state. For believers are not publicly justified and admitted to rest till after death. And as they were justified then, and were in a state of rest, they were conscious: as it is not to be supposed that they were accepted of God, and in the enjoyment of peace and bliss, while in a state of insensibility. The souls

were the souls of persons who, at the time to which the vision refers, had already been put to death "for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held," and they were symbols of souls, either after they had been put to death, or else while living in this world before martyrdom. But they cannot be representatives of souls while in the body: first, because disembodied souls are not suitable symbols of persons in the body. If the object of the vision had been to represent martyrs while in the body, persons in the body, like the two witnesses, Rev. xi., would doubtless have been employed for the purpose. And next, they are described as having already been put to death, not as to be put to death at a future time. They are symbols, therefore, unquestionably, of the souls of persons who had already undergone martyrdom. And this is shown by the whole scene. They asked, "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge *our blood* on them that dwell on the earth?" This indicates that their blood had already been shed, and that God had already long delayed to avenge it. And their justification, and the command that they should rest still for a time, shows that a period was yet to pass, and other witnesses were to be put to death, before the time of avenging them should arrive. "And white robes were given unto every one of them; and it was said unto them that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also, and their brethren that were to be killed as they [had been], should be completed." Instead of being symbols of martyrs who were thereafter to be put to death, they are thus expressly distinguished from them, and were directed still to rest in their intermediate abode, till the number of their fellow-servants and brethren who were to be put to death, as they had been, should be completed—that is, till the last persecution which is shortly to precede Christ's coming, shall have passed. The pretext that they were symbols of martyrs who were to be put to death after the period to which the vision refers—which was probably some time after the Reformation—is thus cut off. They were representatives of the souls of martyrs that had, at the time when the vision had its accomplishment, already been slain. Those souls were, therefore, to be conscious, active, and happy in their intermediate state. They are exhibited as under the

altar on which expiation was made, immediately in front of the temple where the Almighty was enthroned, as though under the shelter of Christ who had given himself a sacrifice for them ; they indicate a knowledge of God's purpose to avenge the blood of his martyred servants on their persecutors on the earth, and that a long delay had already taken place ; and manifest an earnest desire that the moment of retribution—which is to be the period of their resurrection, and the redemption of the nations from the dominion of the apostate powers, of Satan, and of sin—should soon arrive. Those whom they represent, therefore, are to have the consciousness, the knowledge, and the desires which they had, and are to express them to God in as specific a form. Otherwise their symbolic agency is wholly unmeaning and deceptive. But it can no more be claimed that their consciousness, their knowledge, their desires, and their expressions of them are not symbolical and prophetic of the consciousness and affections and acts of the souls whom they represent, than it can that they are not representatives of those souls. The vision, therefore, is a specific revelation that the souls of the martyrs are conscious, active, and happy in their intermediate life ; that they are familiar with God's purposes in respect to them and the world ; and that they are aware of the progress of time, have earnest desires for the arrival of the hour of Christ's coming when he is to raise them from the dead, destroy the persecuting powers, and make the world the scene of righteousness and peace.

Dr. Whately's impression that the white robes of the souls are to be understood "*figuratively*," and thence, that the vision gives us no information respecting the state of departed saints, is mistaken. The robes, like the souls themselves, are symbols—not figures—and denote, as Dr. W. admits, that the souls were justified by God by the blood of Christ. They prove, therefore, that the souls whom those of the vision symbolized, were to be real human souls who were to be justified by the blood of Christ ; and that they were to be conscious and active at the time of their justification : for none but real human souls are justified by the blood of Christ. Mere shadows are not, and as they are real disembodied souls, whose justification that of the vision represents ; so they were to be conscious, at the time of their

pardon, acceptance, and rest in God's presence : as souls are not justified at the divine tribunal in a state of unconsciousness.

Dr. Whately's intimation, that the souls of the vision cannot have been real souls, or represented real souls, because only material substances are perceptible by the eye, is extremely inapt. The apostle was not in his natural state when he beheld the vision, but in an ecstasy ; that is, under those miraculous influences of the Spirit by which the prophets were able to discern God, angels, and separate human spirits, with as much clearness undoubtedly and certainty of consciousness, as we are able with our eyes to see our fellow men, and other objects around us. John himself saw in these visions Him who sat upon the throne, the Lamb, the living creatures and elders, the latter of whom were undoubtedly disembodied, and a multitude of angels, as well as the souls of the fifth seal. It was no more in contradiction to his nature, therefore, nor to theirs, that he should see them while in that ecstatic state, than it is to ours that we discern the bodied beings and material objects that are in our presence.

On the whole, Dr. Whately's treatment of this passage is very unsatisfactory. We see in it no traces of a careful investigation of the subject, nor any indications of a clear perception of what it is to prove the point he aims to establish, which we might justly expect from a master of logic. He seems content with superficial and vague notions, and to imagine that his mistaken opinions on one subject are sufficient proofs of the truth of his views on another.

He next passes to the transfiguration, at which Moses and Elias appeared. He says :—

"The transfiguration on the Mount on which Moses and Elias appear talking with Jesus, may be brought forward as an argument for the supposition of a state of sense and consciousness after death, before the final resurrection ; Moses and Elias having departed long before. But nothing generally decisive can be concluded from any case which is manifestly an exception to general rules ; and this was in every respect. The prophet Elijah, we know, did not die at all, but was visibly in his bodily state taken from the earth : and in the case of Moses, also, a prophet still more highly favored of God, there appears to have been something peculiar as to his departure, for we

are told, indeed, that he died, and was buried in the land of Moab, but that 'no man knew of his sepulchre.' Whether he also, like Elijah, and like Enoch, was permitted to forestall the general resurrection, we cannot tell; but it seems clear, that the soul, separate from the body, is not an object of *sight*; so that nothing can be inferred respecting a *separate* state of the soul from the *visible* appearance of Moses and Elias, which the apostles witnessed."—P. 60.

But though Elijah was an exception to the general law, that those who depart from this world, depart by death, yet Moses was not. Dr. Whately, therefore, cannot assume that his appearing in consciousness and activity is an exception to the general law in respect to the state of departed spirits. To infer from the fact, that Elijah was an exception to the known general law of a departure from this world by death, that Moses was an exception to an unknown general law of unconsciousness in the intermediate state, is a fallacy in logic, of which we should not have expected the Archbishop to be guilty. Nor can he, without evidence, and against the clear testimony of the sacred word, assume that Moses had been raised from the dead. As he had died, and been buried, and not a hint is given of his resurrection, to suppose it, is to suppose it not only without, but against, evidence. That no one *knew* his sepulchre, is no proof that he had none. That the Israelites were not made acquainted with the place of his interment, was not improbably to intercept them from some unbecoming veneration of his relics. As long as no intimation is given of his having been raised from death, he must be considered as still in the intermediate state; and that that was the fact, is shown indubitably by the express affirmation of the apostle, that Christ was the first-born from the dead, the first fruits of the resurrection.

If Moses has *now* been raised, he cannot have been at the time of the transfiguration: nor can he thereafter, unless he was raised with those who came out of their graves immediately after Christ rose. That he was a disembodied spirit, was no obstacle, as Dr. W. imagines, to his being seen by the apostles; for the transfiguration took place, we are expressly told, in a vision; the apostles were in a super-

natural state, therefore, and could see disembodied spirits, doubtless, as easily as they could see material objects in their ordinary condition.

Moses, then, was unquestionably in a disembodied state. And yet he was conscious and active. His consciousness and activity, therefore, must be considered as indicating that other disembodied spirits are conscious and active also. Why should they not? Are not the consciousness and activity of Elijah in his state after translation, sufficient proof that consciousness and activity are natural to persons who are translated; and that were whole churches or generations translated, they would be common to them all? Why, then, is not the fact that Moses, while in a disembodied state, was conscious and active, equal proof that consciousness and activity are natural to that state, and common to all who enter it?

Instead of this, however, Dr. Whately expresses the belief that the vision was designed to represent the relation of the law and the prophets to the gospel. He says:—

“It is to be observed also, that there can be little doubt the appearance of Moses and Elias on this occasion was designed to represent the Law (delivered by Moses) and the Prophets, of whom Elias was especially venerated; and that their appearing in friendly communing with Jesus, denoted the agreement of his Gospel with the Law and the Prophets, which he came not to destroy but to fulfil. *This was the lesson which the appearance conveyed to the disciples; and the appearance alone is all that concerned them, or that concerns us.* The actual condition of the persons themselves is a point which did not concern them.”—P. 61.

This notion that Moses and Elias represented the law and the prophets, first advanced by Jerome, is rejected by modern interpreters, and is wholly groundless and absurd. If Moses and Elias represented the law and the prophets—that is, the written prophecies—must it not be held that Christ represented the gospels, which, however, were not then written, nor were the teachings and events they record completed? But what can be more groundless and incongruous than to suppose that he was in that or any other scene the representative of the written gospels? The fancy, however, is not only gratuitous and arbitrary, it is shown to be

wholly mistaken by the fact that it is at variance with the law of symbols, and allegoric and parabolic representatives of all kinds, that living beings can only represent living beings to whom they bear either an exact or a partial likeness. They never stand for inanimate existences, or for acts, thoughts, or effects. It is as much against the law of representatives and the usage of the Scriptures, therefore, to suppose that Moses and Elias represent the Pentateuch and the prophetic parts of the Old Testament, as it is to suppose that any one of the rabbies of the middle ages was a representative of the Targums or Jewish comments on the Old Testament; or any one of the modern Jewish writers a representative of the history by Josephus. No imagination can be more utterly baseless and out of the sphere of analogy. There is no intimation in the narrative that they were representatives; and if they were, they must have been representatives of their own class—that is, of the saints who had passed from this life; not of manuscripts, or the contents of manuscripts, to which they bore no resemblance. Nor was the object of their appearance to show that the writings of Moses and the Prophets were in harmony with Christ's teachings. Whence does Dr. Whately learn that *that* "is the lesson which the appearance conveyed to the disciples?" There is no hint to that purport in the narrative. Why, if that was the object of the vision, was Christ transfigured, and before the appearance of Moses and Elias? And why did the voice from the Father enthroned in the dazzling cloud above, proclaim, not that the gospel agrees with the law and the prophets; but that "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him"? But the design of the vision, it is clear from its nature and the testimony of Peter respecting it, was to show the disciples the divine majesty of Christ, assure them by the testimony of the Father that he was the Son of God, and inspire them with faith in his doctrines and submission to his authority. The effect of the vision must have been a full conviction that he was divine, and that his teachings were of authority; and Peter indicates that that was the lesson it was designed to teach. "For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his majesty. For he received from

God the Father *honor and glory*, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. And this voice which came from heaven we heard when we were with him on the holy mount."—2 Pet. i. 16–18. The object of the vision thus was that Christ, arrayed in the majesty of the deity, might be acknowledged in the presence of the disciples by the Father as his beloved Son, and that they, under the impression of that acknowledgment, might receive a command from the Father to hear and obey him. The appearance of Moses and Elias—two of the most illustrious of the prophets who had passed from the world—and their conversation with Christ respecting his approaching death, were doubtless designed to show the disciples that they also regarded Christ as the Messiah who was to accomplish the redemption of the world, and to make a still deeper impression on them of his divinity and authority.

Dr. W. next refers to the promise of our Lord to the thief on the cross, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise;" and endeavors, on the plea that it is an extraordinary case, to set aside the inference drawn from it, that "man passes from death at once into a state of enjoyment or of suffering." He enters into no argument, however, and points out nothing peculiar in the case that touches the question he is debating. The faith of the malefactor may have been extraordinary, the assurance he received from Christ of admission to his kingdom may have been peculiar, but they do not prove nor imply that his immediate admission to paradise was a deviation from what is common to the spirits of believers. Dr. Whately, in assuming that this was peculiar to him, assumes, without any ground, the very point he aims to establish—a singular error in one who, from his familiarity with logic, should be aware of the deceptiveness of such a method of sustaining propositions. As there is no intimation that his immediate admission to paradise was peculiar to him, it must be taken as indicating that all other believers are admitted there immediately after death; and therefore, that the period that intervenes between their death and their resurrection, is not a period of insensibility, but of consciousness and enjoyment.

He at length closes this branch of his discussion, by refer-

ring to the passage, 1 Peter iii. 18-20, in which it is declared that "Christ, when put to death in respect to the body, continued living in respect to the spirit, and in that went and preached unto the spirits in prison that were disobedient, when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was preparing, wherein few—that is eight souls—were saved through water." Instead, however, of discussing it, he contents himself with saying that the passage is extremely obscure, that he has seen no construction of it that satisfies him, and that he regards that interpretation which accepts its grammatical as its true sense, as "very unlikely"—a singular method of escaping a text which no critical ingenuity can force into even seeming harmony with his theory. That the translation we have given of the passage expresses its grammatical sense, no competent judge of the import of the original, we presume, will deny. The terms are all of frequent occurrence in the New Testament, and of a clear and well-settled meaning. And it declares, first, that when Christ was put to death as it respects the body, he continued in life as respects the spirit or soul, and went in the soul and preached to the spirits in prison who were disobedient in the days of Noah, while he was preparing the ark, in which, of the vast crowds who then peopled the world, only eight persons were saved. It teaches, therefore, in the clearest manner, on the one hand, that Christ's human soul continued conscious and active during the period between his death and his resurrection; and on the other, that the whole of the souls of those who were disobedient in the days of Noah, and perished by the flood, and perhaps immediately before it, were also conscious at the time of Christ's death, and doubtless were, therefore, during the whole of their intermediate state. And they numbered probably scores, perhaps hundreds, of millions. Vast multitudes, then, of the spirits of the dead, we are expressly taught, exist in consciousness and activity during their intermediate state, and that fact authorizes and obliges us to the conclusion that all other souls are.

Such is Dr. Whately's attempt to show that none of the passages that are usually regarded as directly representing or indicating that the souls of the departed exist in consciousness during their intermediate state, really teach or

imply that that is the fact. If our readers are disappointed in its character; if it falls in learning and logic much below what might be expected from a writer of his rank; if it is felt that it amounts to nothing, either as a critical exposition or argument, and is but a specious expression of superficial and mistaken opinions—it will not be easy, we think, to convict that judgment of essential error.

He now turns to a series of passages which he regards as indicating very clearly that the soul exists in the intermediate state in unconsciousness. The first to which he refers, are those which exhibit the dead as sleeping; and the resurrection as an awaking from sleep. He says:

“In the first place, the style in which the sacred writers usually speak of the deceased, is as of persons who are ‘asleep.’ For instance, in John’s gospel, we read, ‘Our friend Lazarus sleepeth, but I go that I may awake him out of his sleep.’ So, also, Paul speaks of some witnesses of the resurrection of Christ, who were still living at the time he wrote, and some who are fallen asleep; even as in the Acts, the evangelist Luke, speaking of the stoning of Stephen, says, ‘And when he had said this, he fell asleep.’ It may be said, indeed, that sleep does not imply *total insensibility*; but it must be allowed to be strange that the word ‘sleep’ should so often be applied to the condition of the departed, if they are in a state of as lively consciousness and sensibility as before death, and in the actual perception of more unmixed pleasure or pain.”—Pp. 69, 70.

This is an extraordinary argument to come from the pen of one who, like Archbishop Whately, has made language a special subject of study, and should know how to distinguish a metaphor from a literal expression. No one will pretend that sleep and death are identically the same; or that they are essentially the same state of body or mind: They are, in the utmost degree, dissimilar. Sleep appears to be confined to the body, and to consist mainly in its release from the voluntary action on it of the mind, and the suspension of the functions of the senses—and its effects to the mind, which seem to be chiefly its ceasing to supply perceptions of external objects, and leaving it to occupy itself with remembered or imaginary things and occurrences instead of real—appear to be consequences of the sleep of the body, rather than the sleep of the body a consequence of the

state of the mind. But in sleep, though the voluntary functions of the body are mainly suspended, yet the body does not sink into inaction. The involuntary process of breathing, the circulation of the blood, the digestion of food, and all the other actions of the system that are not dependent on the will, go on without interruption; while the mind continues in unimpeded activity, though under the sway of imagination and passion, rather than reason; and remains in vital union with the body, though it suspends, in a great degree, its voluntary agency on it.

But in death the union of the soul and body is absolutely terminated. The soul not only ceases to act on the body, and the body to act on the soul, but the possibility of that mutual action is ended, and there is, in consequence of the departure of the soul, a discontinuance of all the functions of the body. The machine comes to a pause, and all its sensibilities and powers are struck from it, as absolutely as though they had never existed; and the processes that follow are those of dead matter, instead of living, and proceed immediately to the dissolution of the fabric and resolution of its parts into their original elements; while the soul passes to a different scene of existence, where it has new means of perception, derives its knowledge of external objects through different channels, and exerts its activities in a different form. The states of sleep and death are thus dissimilar in the utmost degree. The only resemblance in the states of the mind is, that in each it is active, though its mode of existence and activity is altogether different; and the only resemblance of the states of the body is in the *appearance* merely, which the inactivity, the silence, and the repose of the body immediately after death—while it is within the observation of men—bears to its partial inactivity, insensibility to external things, and repose in calm and peaceful sleep. As, then, death is not literally a sleep, and, therefore, is not called so because of its real nature; it is called a sleep simply because of the resemblance in appearance which the body immediately after death presents to the body when asleep; and is called so accordingly, by a metaphor, the principle of which is, that the name that literally denotes one thing, it transfers to another, which, though essentially unlike, in some respects resembles that for which the word properly

stands; as when man is called a lion; passion, a tempest; and swooning, death. And it is on this external resemblance of the dead to the sleeping alone, that the use of the word in that manner is founded. It is not called a sleep, because of any resemblance of the state of the soul, for the soul is not perceptible—and its condition after death is not a matter of observation. It is not called a sleep on the ground of any resemblance of the real internal states of the body in death and sleep—as those states are wholly unlike. The whole resemblance which the term sleep is meant to express, is one that is open to observation, and that naturally strikes the beholder with a deep impression; and that is the *appearance* simply which it presents immediately after the spirit has passed, to its appearance when locked in the insensibility, silence, and repose of a calm slumber. And this use of the term was not peculiar to the Jews of the apostolic age. It had been common to the Hebrews for centuries. In the narrative of the death of the monarchs of Israel and Judah, the usual formula is, "And he *sleep*d with his fathers, and was buried with his fathers in the city of David."

This naming of death, sleep, from the resemblance of the appearance of the body in death to its appearance when slumbering, does not indicate, therefore, that the soul is in a state of slumber or unconsciousness. It has no reference whatever to the soul, and can with no more propriety be alleged as proving or implying that it is in a state of insensibility in its intermediate life, than it can that any other existence, intelligent or unintelligent, is in that condition. That this office of the word, which is as clear from the laws of the metaphor as any point can be in the usage of language, should have wholly escaped Dr. Whately's notice, is truly surprising, and bespeaks a very superficial acquaintance with the functions of the metaphor. The Psalmist, addressing God, says: "Arise, O Lord, in thine anger, lift up thyself because of the rage of thine enemies: and *awake* for me to the judgment that thou hast commanded." "Awake, why sleepest thou, O Lord? Arise, cast us not off for ever." "O Lord God of hosts, the God of Israel, awake to visit all the heathen." Does Dr. Whately regard the verb "*awake*" as indicating that God was literally asleep—that he had

sunk into absolute unconsciousness, and that all the actions of his infinite nature had come to a pause? Doubtless not. Yet why, if his interpretation of the verb sleep is legitimate? If the application of that verb to those who die, because their bodies assume in death an appearance that resembles their appearance in sleep, proves or implies, as he maintains, that their souls sink into a state of slumber or unconsciousness, why does not the application of that verb, and the verb awake to God, prove or imply that he also was in a state of inaction and unconsciousness? Dr. Whately would probably say, that it is inconsistent with the nature of God to suppose him to be unconscious; that those verbs were applied to him simply to indicate that there was something in his not exerting the particular acts which the Psalmist desired him to put forth, that in some respect resembled the inactivity, inattention, or unconsciousness of a human being when asleep; that they are used by a metaphor, therefore, on the ground of that resemblance; and that accordingly they denote nothing but what is consistent with his perfect consciousness and activity in the government of his works. Most certainly it is so; yet it is no more certain or clear that they are used by that figure when applied thus to God, than it is that the verb sleep is used by a metaphor, when applied to the dead, because of the resemblance they present in *appearance* to the bodies of persons who are asleep. This use of the word is founded on a resemblance, and a resemblance of course that is perceptible by spectators; and, therefore, a resemblance that is presented by the bodies of the dead, not by their souls, as their souls are not perceptible; and consequently it is a mere resemblance of the *appearance* of their bodies in inactivity, silence, and unconsciousness, to that of persons who are locked in a calm sleep; for that is the only relation in which the bodies of the dead present a resemblance to the bodies of sleepers.

When Isaiah, addressing the dead, says, "Awake, and sing, ye that dwell in the dust;" and Daniel predicts that "Many of the sleepers in the dust shall awake—some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt," does Dr. Whately hold that those who are to arise, are to awake from a real corporeal sleep, identically the same as the ordinary sleep of persons in life? Undoubtedly

not; as that would imply not only that their bodies existed in a state of perfect organization before awaking, but also in actual life, and the performance of the involuntary functions which always go on during natural sleep;—which is contrary to fact. The awaking, then, is not to be a literal awaking from sleep; it is to be only a metaphorical awaking, therefore, or a change that bears some resemblance to the awaking of an organized and living body from a natural sleep. And so the falling asleep of those who die, does not denote a literal falling into a natural corporeal sleep, as that would imply not only the continued union of the soul to the body, and the continued organization of the body, but its continued life also, and performance of the various processes of breathing, of the circulation of the blood, of digestion, of secretion, and other functions which go on in sleep, as uninterruptedly as in waking;—which is contrary to fact.

As the dead are thus said to sleep, merely because immediately after death, their appearance, in respect to calmness and repose, is like that of persons in sleep, that metaphorical use of the word does not furnish any ground for the conclusion that the souls of the dead are also in a state of insensibility and unconsciousness; nor is its appropriation to the bodies of the dead at all inconsistent with the supposition or fact that their souls are in a state of consciousness, activity, and the enjoyment of happiness or the endurance of misery.

That the term, however, is used in this manner to denote the appearance of the body immediately after death, while under the observation of the living, or is employed with any reference to the body, Dr. Whately questions and disbelieves. He says:—

“I have heard it said that the sacred writers, in this employment of the word ‘sleep,’ and also the authors of our burial service, who adopted it from them, meant the ‘sleep of the body;’ but I never could learn what is meant by that expression, ‘sleep of the body,’ for the words convey to me no distinct sense. We understand what is meant by a man or any other living creature being asleep; but we never speak of a stone, or a clod of earth, or a piece of bone, or any other *inanimate* substance, sleeping; and to speak so, would appear quite unmeaning. Now, a dead carcass is (as far as regards the present question) nothing more than a clod of earth. If, indeed, a

man's body at his death remained, though inanimate, yet sound, entire, and uncorrupt, and so continued in a torpid state, ready for the soul to re-animate it—even as some seeds may be kept in a dry state for many years, and will be ready to vegetate as soon as exposed to moisture and warmth—then, indeed, by a very bold figure of speech the body might be said to be asleep, even as we might figuratively speak of the seed as asleep. But we know that all this is very far from the fact; that the body decays, and is dissolved into its elements, and that the particles of which it is composed often go to make parts of vegetables and of other animals. Now, to speak of a carcass thus decayed, decomposed (as the chemists call it), and dispersed in all directions, as *asleep*, seems to me a use of language which destroys the purpose for which language was designed, namely, to convey a distinct meaning.”—P. 71.

He thus maintains that the term is not applied to the body at all, and cannot be in any intelligible sense, but is designed exclusively to denote the state of the mind. But with how little consideration he advanced this opinion is seen from the fact that the Scriptures most clearly exhibit the body, which is buried in the dust and in the grave, as that which it represents as sleeping. Thus, in narrating the death and burial of persons, the constant representation is, that that which slept was that which was buried, as in the instances of David, Solomon, and others. “So David slept with his fathers, and was buried in the city of David.” “And Solomon slept with his fathers, and was buried in the city of David his father.” “And Rehoboam slept with his fathers, and was buried with his fathers in the city of David.” “And Asa slept with his fathers, and was buried with his fathers in the city of David his father.” That which slept in these instances, was undoubtedly that which died, and was buried in the sepulchre; and that was the body, and the body alone. Dr. Whately surely will not maintain that it was the soul that died and was buried, and that the record has an exclusive relation to that. It is not the doctrine of the Scriptures that the soul is buried in the sepulchre, and remains there. Their language in regard to death is—“Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.” Stephen, accordingly, prayed as he was about to fall asleep—“Lord Jesus, receive my spirit.” And Paul represented that on dying, he should be, not in the grave

with his body, but with the Lord, which was far better than to remain in life here. And it was the common faith of the Hebrews, that the soul at death, instead of remaining with the body, passes into Hades, a world of departed spirits, where it is to remain till the resurrection. Nor can Dr. Whately claim that it was the soul that is said to have slept, not the body; and that it was the body, in distinction from that which slept, that is said to have been buried. That would be wholly arbitrary, and in contradiction to the sense of the language. It was not the invisible, but the visible man; and that is, the body that slept, and the identical man that was buried. The souls of David, Solomon, Rehoboam, and the kings that followed, were not perceptible by the spectators who witnessed their decease, or gazed at their bodies immediately after death. They only knew from their bodies ceasing from all the functions of life, and sinking into a silence and insensibility like that of sleep, that their souls had departed. It is against the specific representation of the Scriptures also; as that of which the sleep is predicated is that which is buried in the dust, not the soul which has passed into the invisible world. Thus, Isaiah apostrophizes the dead as dwelling in the dust—"Thy dead shall live; my dead bodies shall arise. Awake, and sing, ye that dwell in dust," xxvi. 19. And Daniel predicts—"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake—some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt," xii. 2. That which is said to sleep is indisputably, therefore, that which is buried in the dust, and is the body accordingly, and the body alone.

The Archbishop thus wholly fails in this branch of his argument. He not only adduces no proof that the soul is unconscious in its intermediate state, but the passages to which he refers, and others in which the dead are exhibited as sleeping, are directly against that notion, and decisively disprove it.

He next alleges, in support of his views, the consideration that the apostles do not expressly announce it as one of the great doctrines of the gospel, that the souls of believers are conscious and happy in their intermediate state. He says:—

"It does not appear that the sacred writers were commissioned to

make known to their converts the conscious and happy state (supposing there is such a state) of their departed friends. The apostle Paul, for instance, in comforting the Thessalonians concerning their deceased brethren, does not make any mention of their being, *at that time*, actually in a state of enjoyment; but alludes only to the joyful *resurrection* which awaited them: 'I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as the rest who have no hope; for if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also who sleep, will God, through Jesus, bring with him: for this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we who are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent (that is, precede) those who are asleep; for the Lord himself will descend from heaven, and the dead in Christ shall rise first.'

"Now, this was, to be sure, a very consolatory prospect respecting their departed friends; *but if he had known, and had been authorized to reveal*, that these very persons were, *at that very time*, actually admitted to a state of happiness, one cannot but suppose he would have mentioned this as an additional consolation, and one more immediately striking; instead of which he makes no mention of any such intermediate state of happiness, but merely speaks of a *hope*, as of something *future*, respecting the departed ('Sorrow not as the rest who have no hope'), the hope, namely, of a glorious resurrection to them that sleep."—Pp. 72–73.

Dr. Whately appears to have been but very imperfectly aware, either of the ground which he occupies in this passage, or of the nature of the misapprehension into which the Thessalonians had been betrayed, which it was the apostle's aim to correct. He proceeds in it on the assumption, that it was not a matter of general knowledge and conviction among the Christians at Thessalonica, and elsewhere, in that age, that the souls of believers are conscious and happy in their intermediate state. He, however, not only has no evidence of what he thus takes for granted, but it is against the fact, as we have already shown. Let it be admitted that it was held that believers are in a condition of enjoyment in their intermediate state, and it will be seen that no mention of that state by the apostle was necessary in order to give consolation to the Thessalonians respecting it; especially, if it was not in reference to it that they mourned for their deceased friends. And that it was not, is clear from the pas-

sage, which exhibits their anxiety as relating, not to the intermediate state of their departed friends, but to their resurrection. They appear to have mourned for those who had died, under the apprehension that they were not to share in the resurrection to a glorious life which believers were to enjoy at Christ's coming; and it would seem from the apostle's second epistle to them (which it is generally held was written very soon, possibly in a month or two, after the first), in which the passage in question occurs—that it was from an apprehension that Christ had already come, and thence that their friends, from their not having risen, were not his true disciples, and therefore were not to be raised to glory. Paul says to them, "We entreat you, brethren, respecting the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and our gathering unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind (that is, thrown into doubt) nor troubled, neither by spirit nor by word, nor by letter, as from us, as that the day of the Lord *has arrived*. Let not any one deceive you in any way, for that day cannot come except an apostasy first take place, and the man of sin be revealed." It was because they had been led by false teachers, who claimed to have a letter or word from Paul to verify their statement, or else the testimony of the prophetic Spirit—to suppose that the day of the Lord *is come*, had actually arrived; and thence as their friends remained in the grave, that they were not, in reality, his disciples; or, if the verb be taken as simply denoting that the day of the Lord was instant, impending, immediately to arrive, it would then seem that they had been falsely led to believe that their friends who had recently died, were not the disciples of Christ,—under the impression, probably, that had they been his true disciples, they would not have been removed from life just at the hour that he was to appear to give his people redemption from death, but must have been mistaken in their faith and hope, and perished. Whether it was this or the other impression that led them to despair of their friends, it is manifest from each epistle, that it was a despair of their resurrection to a glorious life, and a resurrection which they thought either should already have taken place, or was immediately at hand—that was the cause of their grief. The fact, therefore, that Paul made no allusion to their consciousness and happiness while in their disembodied state, is no

proof that he and the Thessalonians were ignorant that the souls of believers are in a state of consciousness and enjoyment during their intermediate existence. The apostle gave them precisely the information that was requisite to correct the error into which they had been betrayed, and relieve them from the sorrow which that error had occasioned. He reminded them first, that as they believed that Christ himself died, and had arisen, so also "those who sleep God will, through Christ, bring with him," . . . which seems to imply, as several other passages do—Zech. xiv., Rev. xix., that Christ will have raised his saints in glory and taken them to the skies, before he comes visibly to judge his enemies; for otherwise, how can he bring those who sleep—that is, their bodies,—with him, on his descent from heaven? He then describes the resurrection itself, and announces that the dead saints are to be raised before the living are changed: "For this we say to you by the word of the Lord, that we the living, who survive at the coming of the Lord, shall not precede them who sleep; for the Lord himself shall, in the twinkling of an eye, descend from heaven, with the voice of the archangel and with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ shall rise first. Afterwards, we, the living, who remain, shall be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and so shall we ever be with the Lord." He thus taught them first, that all those who sleep in Christ shall be raised from the dead as he was, and shall, after having been raised, come with him from heaven when he comes to take vengeance on his enemies, and judge the world; and next, that at the resurrection of the holy dead, Christ, instead of approaching slowly, so that he may be discerned at a great distance, will descend from heaven instantly; and that the holy dead will be raised before—perhaps a considerable time before—the living saints will be changed. As these were thus precisely the considerations that were adapted to correct the misapprehensions, and remove the grief, of the Thessalonians,—that the apostle made no allusion to the consciousness and enjoyment of the redeemed in their disembodied life, is no proof whatever, that he and the Thessalonians were not aware that that is their condition in that state.

Dr. W. alleges the fact that Paul, in announcing the future judgment of men, does not mention the condition of

the dead in their intermediate state, as a proof that he knew nothing of the existence of the dead in happiness or misery anterior to that day, when they are to receive their final awards.

“Nor does the Apostle’s language of threatening or exhortation differ in this respect from that of consolation. When his purpose is to rouse and alarm men, he still points to the same object. Paul’s language to the idolaters at Athens (Acts xvii. 31), is that ‘God hath appointed a day in the which *he will judge the world* in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained.’ Why did he not, it may be asked, instead of confining himself to the mention of the day of judgment, notice also the nearer reward and punishment, which should immediately succeed each man’s death, if such a doctrine were part of the revelation intrusted to him !”—P. 73.

This is a specimen of the specious way in which Dr. Whately employs mere negative considerations, assumptions, conjectures, and inquiries, as though they were proofs, so as to bewilder the incautious reader, and lead him to the impression that the shadow that has been thrown over his faith, has been cast by a genuine and legitimate argument. No weapon more fatal to the whole series of the truths of the gospel can be put into the hands of an artful sceptic, than that which Dr. W. here employs. For he proceeds on the assumption that every “doctrine that is a part of the revelation intrusted” to Paul, must have been mentioned by him in his address to “the idolaters at Athens;” and it is from that postulate that he infers—from the fact that nothing was said by Paul of rewards and punishments in the intermediate state—that he had no knowledge or belief that retribution begins in that state. But that, if legitimate, will prove with equal effect, that he had no knowledge of, or authority to teach, any other doctrine that is not mentioned in his speech on that occasion: and, consequently—as no reference is made by him to them—that the doctrines of Christ’s death and expiation, of renovation by the Spirit, and of justification by faith, are not doctrines of revelation; and so of many others. It will prove, indeed, that the endless existence of men in happiness or misery, after the judgment, is not a doctrine of the Scriptures; for no allusion is made by the apostle to that subject. And does not that omission

prove as decisively that there is to be no such retributive existence after the judgment, as the omission of the retributions that precede the judgment, proves that there are no such intermediate retributions? By this mode of treating the question, the Archbishop would thus not only expunge from revelation many of its most important doctrines, but would strike that also from existence for which he in a measure—so far as the redeemed are concerned—contends—that there is to be a conscious, active, and retributive existence after the judgment.

He builds a like argument on the fact that Christ, in his confutation of the Sadducees, made no allusion to the consciousness of the dead in their intermediate state.

“Again, it is worth remarking that in our Lord’s answer to the Sadducees, he alludes not to any separate state of consciousness, but to the *resurrection*. That Jehovah is called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, he adduces as a proof that the dead are *raised*! If there had been any thought in his mind, or in that of his hearers, of an actual state of conscious existence of the departed, I can hardly think, either that he would have used, or that his hearers would have admitted, such an argument *for a resurrection*. For they might have replied, ‘It is true, God is not the God of the dead, but of the living; and this does seem some indication that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were, and are, *living* in a state of separation from the body; but it does not follow that they are *hereafter* to obtain a *resurrection*.’ But his words seem plainly to show that the only question was, whether this present life be the whole of our existence, or whether there is to be a resurrection.”—P. 74.

Undoubtedly the question was whether there was to be a resurrection, and an existence after it, or not; and the answer is marked by that perfect comprehension of the false belief and arts of his adversaries, and that beauty of adaptation to confute and thwart them, which distinguish all Christ’s replies, and like a lightning-shaft flashing on a landscape in the darkness of night, and revealing all its objects to the eye, carried resistless conviction to his unprejudiced hearers. For the reason that the Sadducees denied the resurrection, we learn from Acts xxiii. 6–8, was that they denied that the soul itself existed after death; and maintained that the whole being perished in that catastrophe. Paul, while addressing

the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, said: "Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And on his saying that, there was a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and the multitude was divided. For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit; but the Pharisees acknowledge both." It is apparent from this that the denial by the Sadducees of a resurrection resulted necessarily from their denial of the existence of the soul after death. If the soul perishes along with the body, and death is, as they held, an absolute annihilation of the being, then there can be no resurrection. Existence again, were it possible, would be a new creation; not a raising up of what had been before. The most effectual way, therefore, of confuting their denial of the resurrection, was to show from the writings of Moses, which they admitted to be divine, that the souls of the dead were not annihilated, but continued in existence and consciousness. That Christ accordingly did, by referring to the revelation which God made of himself to Moses at the bush, when he declared himself to be the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; and adding as a truth which no one would deny, that God is not a God of dead persons, non-existences, but of living; and that all live to him; which is a specific averment of that which the Sadducees denied; that the souls of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and others, were not, as they maintained, annihilated, but were living, and therefore conscious. And that answer was regarded by the hearers as confuting the doctrine of the Sadducees respecting the non-resurrection of the dead, because it overthrew the ground on which they founded that doctrine. Christ's response, therefore, instead of having no allusion to an intermediate state, is a direct assertion that the souls of the dead are living and conscious—as life is a state of consciousness; and, in place of corroborating, overthrows the doctrine Dr. Whately alleges it to sustain.

He presents an argument from the day of judgment that, if somewhat more specious, is equally unsound.

"All these allusions to one particular *day* (evidently the time of the general resurrection at the end of the world), are such as seem to

imply that it is *then* that every man's condition will be finally fixed. Now it is, indeed, very conceivable that the souls of men in a separate state should remain in a happy or unhappy condition till the end of the world, and should then, at the resurrection, be reunited to bodies, and enter on a *different kind* of enjoyment, or of suffering; this, I say, is in itself very conceivable; but it is hard to conceive how, supposing *that* to be the case, the day of *Judgment*, at the time of the resurrection, should be spoken of as it is in Scripture: since each man would (in the case just supposed), not only *know* his final condition, but *actually enter upon* his reward or punishment *before* the resurrection, immediately on his death; so that the *judgment* of the *last day* would be, in fact, forestalled. It seems strange that a man should *first* undergo his sentence, and afterwards be brought to trial; should *first* enter upon his reward or punishment, and *then* (perhaps many centuries after) be tried—and then judged and acquitted or condemned.”—Pp. 75, 76.

In this, and much more which he adds of the same cast, he proceeds on the assumption that “the most essential character of” the “judgment” is to be “the *ascertaining* of each man's doom;” and that it is to each one, therefore, to be unknown and uncertain before. That the judgment has any other aim; that it has an infinitely higher purpose; that it is mainly designed to make manifest to the universe at large, as well as to men, the perfect righteousness, wisdom, and benignity of all God's ways towards the race, and show that he has baffled all the attempts of his enemies to impeach his character, overturn his government, or thwart him in the great ends for which he made and rules his creatures, and thereby confirm his holy subjects for ever in their allegiance to him—Dr. Whately has not, it seems, a suspicion. But that that is to be the great object and effect of the judgment at the coming of Christ, and at the end of the thousand years, is indicated in many passages. The Scriptures, in predicting the avenging inflictions with which God was to visit the Israelites and other nations for their offences against him, announce that the object and effect of those judgments was to be to cause them to know that he is Jehovah; that is, to discern and feel that he reigns over them; that he has the power, the knowledge, and the rights which he claims; and that he hates and will punish sin according to the pledges of his word. It is revealed also, in the most impressive man-

ner, that the effect on the spectators of the heavenly world, of his destroying judgments on his enemies, is to impress them with his justice, righteousness, and love, and prompt them to awe and adoration. When the last plagues were about to be poured out in vision on the guilty nations, the hosts of the redeemed in heaven, who were to be spectators of the infliction, stood on the glassy pavement before the throne, and sang the song of Moses, the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb: "Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty, *just and true* are thy ways, thou King of the nations. Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name; for thou only art holy; for all nations shall come and worship before thee; for thy judgments are made manifest." And it is not to be till he has conquered all his enemies, and confuted and confounded all impeachments of his righteousness, and all doubts of his adequacy to his station as the creator and ruler of the universe, that the judgment is to take place: "For he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet." When that great moment arrives, he will bring forth judgment unto victory; that is, to a perfect vindication of himself from all imputations; a full and dazzling demonstration that his ways have been worthy of his infinite attributes and his station, and a complete and eternal overthrow of his foes, and justification of the sentence to endless death, which he will then pronounce on them. It is manifest, therefore, that the judgment is to have objects immeasurably higher than a mere demonstration to the subjects of it that the doom they receive is justly pronounced on them. It is most intimately to concern the glory of God and the wellbeing of the universe. It is to unveil to all the countless orders of intelligent beings the great characteristics of his wondrous dealings with this fallen race, shed a full light on all the mysteries of his justice and of his love, furnish everlasting themes of wonder, joy, adoration, and thanksgiving, and bind them to him in indissoluble bonds of confidence, submission, and love. And in those great ends which are to be answered by the public revision of his administration with all individuals, lies the reason, doubtless, that the judgment of the lost is to be postponed till after the close of the period denoted by the thousand years of Christ's reign, when all the great problems,

that are now in the process of evolution and proof, will be wholly worked out, and verified on a scale suitable to the greatness of the truths and interests that are involved in them. It is obvious that the delay of the judgment is, because ends are to be answered by it, for which a preparation is necessary. It is to take place at the time assigned it, because this world, and the whole of God's kingdom, will then have become prepared for it; and that preparation will lie, doubtless, in the infinite displays that will have been made of God's perfections in his sway over men—his power, his wisdom, his righteousness, his love, his grace, his justice: the vast and measureless demonstrations that will, on the other hand, have been made that men are what he contemplates them in his government; and finally, the full and resistless proof, which will have taken place, that the two great classes of which the race is to consist, are proper subjects of the sentences he will pronounce on them. What sin is in all the forms it can assume in such a world as this, under all the diversities of dispensation, in all the varieties of condition, under all the kinds and degrees of restraint, under all the measures of revealed and acquired knowledge, in individuals, in families, in communities, in nations, in races, will have been shown on a boundless scale. What the obedience is which the renewed render; what proofs they give of a change of heart, a supreme love to God, a true submission to him, and a meetness to be accepted and crowned with immortal life as his children, will be demonstrated in millions and millions of instances, in all the variety of conditions and forms of obedience which a world like this, and beings of natures like ours, admit. The effect of different dispensations, of every species of providential allotment, of every kind of moral discipline, will be fully exemplified. The inefficacy of all means, on the one hand, to conquer and reform the race or individuals without the all-subduing and transforming power of the Holy Spirit, will appear by the most direful demonstrations; and on the other, his power to renew the heart, maintain it in love and faith, and lead it on in perpetually advancing holiness and fidelity even in such a world as this of temptation, trial, and misery, will be shown in the most dazzling light. All these manifestations and proofs of the great truths on which God proceeds in his

government of the world, will have taken place on a stupendous scale before Christ's coming; while during his reign on the earth, the redemption of the race from the dominion of Satan the sway of sin, and its elevation to unspotted holiness and unmixed bliss through a vast tract of ages, will, on the one hand, show the grandeur of Christ's wisdom, power, and love, and his adequacy to give salvation to a lost world; and, on the other, will exemplify, in a vast and glorious manner, the beauty to which our nature may be raised, the spotless righteousness, the pure and lofty bliss, of which we are capable; and the worthiness of the end for which Christ gave himself a ransom for us. These displays, continued through a vast round of ages, will manifestly form an august preparation for the judgment, when the whole of God's administration will be revised, and the conduct of mankind under it; and make that judgment a most momentous epoch in the history of this world and of the universe. Every obedient spirit throughout God's immeasurable realms will have an interest in it, from the light it will reflect on God's perfections and sway, and will thrill with awe, wonder, and adoration; ascriptions of righteousness, wisdom, and grace will resound from every world, and filial love, confidence, and joy reign in every breast through all the ranks and orders of God's holy children. These great aims, however, and effects of the judgment, are not to diminish, but augment its interest, to those who are to be the subjects of it. It will add to the impressiveness and grandeur of the trial of the redeemed, that there is to be a full manifestation of the sin and ruin from which God has ransomed them, and a full display of the wisdom, righteousness, and grace to which they owe their salvation. It will add immeasurably to the significance and awfulness of the trial of the lost, that there will be a full exhibition of the rectitude and grandeur of all God's ways towards them, a disclosure to the eyes of the universe of all their sins against him, and a full realization in every breast throughout all his illimitable realms, that the sentence they receive is such as infinite justice and infinite goodness must pronounce, and such as the wellbeing of the universe requires.

As, then, the judgment is to have far higher ends than a mere "ascertaining of each man's doom;" as it is postponed

to vast multitudes of the race for ages, in order that a preparation may be made for its answering those ends ; and as they are greatly to augment its interest to individuals, and make it a more momentous epoch in their being, than it could otherwise be, it is manifest that neither its postponement to such a day, nor its high interest to them, implies in the least that they cannot exist in consciousness, and in either happiness or misery, in the intermediate period. They no more imply that they exist in unconsciousness in the world into which they pass at death, than they do that they exist in such a condition in this world, after their character has become fixed, either as the children of God by renovation, or as his enemies by impenitence, and the withdrawal from them of the Spirit's awakening and convicting influences. Their consciousness and activity during their intermediate state, are not only compatible with the office which the judgment is to answer to them and the universe, but are probably essential to it. The displays they will have made of their character during their disembodied life, may contribute in a large degree to show that their character is fixed, and make it more clear than it would otherwise be, that the sentence they receive from the lips of the judge is that which befits them, and which their conduct through the immortal existence on which they are then to enter, will verify with fresh and ever augmenting proof at every stage of their progress. Dr. Whately's conclusion, therefore, that there is "no way of reconciling the belief in such a day of judgment, with the belief of an intermediate state of consciousness," is wholly groundless and mistaken.

From this attempt to show that "the notion of the soul, when separated from the body, entering immediately on a state of enjoyment or suffering, which is to last till the resurrection, has at least as strong reasons against it, as for it, in Scripture," he proceeds to state, what he calls "the alternative," "that the soul remains in a state of sleep."

"The only alternative—the only possible supposition, is, that the soul remains in a state of profound sleep—of utter unconsciousness, during the whole interval between its separation from the body by death, and its reunion at the resurrection."—P. 80.

This supposition, however, he does not attempt to prove. He contents himself with an effort to obviate several objections to it. The first is the following:—

“One objection to the reception of this supposition in the minds of many persons, is that it seems as if there were a tedious and dreamy interval of non-existence to be passed, by such as should be supposed to sleep, perhaps for some thousands of years, which might elapse between their death and the end of the world. The imagination represents a wearisome length of time, during which (on this supposition) those that sleep in Christ, would have to wait for his final coming to reward them. We fancy it hard that they should be lost both to the world and themselves—destitute of the enjoyments both of this life and of the next, and continuing for so many ages as if they had never been born.”—Pp. 80, 81.

But what has the question, whether persons regard the thought of existing in unconsciousness in their intermediate state, with this feeling of dread and horror, or whether such a feeling is legitimate or not, to do with the question, whether they are in fact to be smitten during that period, with a loss of their sensibility? Let it be admitted, that the dread with which they recoil from it is the result of imagination; that surely does not prove that they are destined to pass the time of their separation from the body in such a state of unconsciousness. Were Dr. W. to prove, therefore, that such an objection to his doctrine is felt, and is groundless, it would contribute nothing towards a demonstration that the doctrine is true.

But he is mistaken, very manifestly, in respect to the reason that we instinctively recoil from the thought of such a deprivation of our proper nature as thinking and active beings, and reduction to a state that is suitable only to dead matter. It is not from the notion that such a state would, as he represents, be one of weariness, dreariness, or tediousness, that the mind shrinks from it; for how could there be weariness, how could there be a sense of deprivation and desolateness, from the long delay of returning sensibility, when there was no consciousness that it was in such a state that the soul was existing? But the reason that the mind recoils from such a suspension of all its functions—such an extinction of its powers—is, that consciousness and activity

are its natural modes of existence ; the only modes of which it has any knowledge or conception ; and the modes alone in which it can have enjoyment, which is the object of its instinctive and supreme desire. The desire of happiness ; the wish to enjoy the gratifications in some form of which our natures are capable ; to find delight in God, our fellow creatures, in the objects of nature or art around us, or in ourselves ; to taste the pleasures of the intellect, the affections, or the senses ; to engage in agreeable occupation, to place ourselves under grateful excitement, to augment our means of enjoyment, to make ourselves objects of interest and love to others, to experience the exhilaration of success, to feel the raptures of hope, and look forward to a future existence of safety, of respect, and of bliss, is the natural, the irresistible, the inextinguishable desire of the mind. And it is because a state of unconsciousness would be an interception from all those employments and enjoyments which the soul desires, and its nature demands, as its good, that it shrinks from it with dread, not as an imaginary, but as a real and immeasurable, evil. It shudders at the thought of such a blank existence after death, for the same reasons, and with the same horror, that it would recoil from the thought of it in this life. Were Dr. Whately assured that his decease is to be postponed to a date as distant from his birth, as Methusaleh's was from his, but that during the last seven or eight hundred years of the period he is to be struck with insensibility, and pass without an act, without a sensation, without an emotion, without a thought, he would look forward to it with dismay and horror ; and not because he imagined it would be a weary existence, but because he would have no consciousness at all ; because all the happiness of which he is capable, and he desires, would be denied him ; all the pursuits for which he is formed cut off ; all the ends of his being lost ; because he would be branded in the sight of the world with the greatest possible ignominy, by being treated as though he were a non-intelligence ; and because he would be made a monument, as it were, in the sight of the universe, of his worthlessness and nothingness.

It is not from false notions, then, or morbid imaginations of that state, that the mind shrinks from it ; but from its

seeing that it would be the loss of all that is the object of its desire, and degrade it from the rank of an intelligent being to that of senseless and worthless matter. And this consideration makes it wholly incredible that the spirits of the dead are consigned to such a state: First, because it is in total contradiction to our intelligent nature. It implies a complete suspension of all the constitutional functions of our being, the influences under which we naturally act, and the laws by which we are governed; and the superinduction, in fact, on our minds, of an entirely different nature. But such a change is incredible. We know of nothing in the world, either of mind or matter, that is analogous to it. Whatever the changes are which matter undergoes, either of place or combination with other kinds of matter, relations, or the influences that act on it, its essential nature remains the same; it continues under the same physical forces, and is governed by the same laws. And whatever changes the mind also undergoes in place, in the influences that act on it, in knowledge, opinions, affections, volitions, enjoyment, or suffering, it remains essentially the same in nature; has the same susceptibilities, the same capacities, continues to act from motives; to love and to hate, to desire and to fear, and to find joy or feel misery. The supposition, therefore, that the whole of this which comprises all that we really know or can conceive of our minds, should be swept from existence, and an absolute blank succeed in its place, is the greatest possible contradiction to the nature of our souls, and cannot easily be believed, we think, by any one who seriously considers what it really is. Why is it not as solecistical and absurd as it were to hold that matter is hereafter to exist without any of its known properties,—dimensions, solidity, cohesion, divisibility, gravity, mobility, or any other attribute by which it affects our senses? Dr. Whately, we apprehend, has never discerned the real import of the doctrine he endeavors to maintain: he has employed himself through his whole discussion in propounding a proposition as self-subversive and as preposterous, as he would had he undertaken to prove that the mind may have two wholly dissimilar incompatible natures at the same time; or that a thing may exist, and yet not exist, at the same identical moment.

Next: It is equally incompatible, we think, with the

Divine perfections. Why should God consign the whole race, age after age, to such inaction and unconsciousness during their intermediate state? As it cannot be supposed that such a loss of activity and sensibility are the natural consequence of death, if they are smitten with it, it must be by a direct and arbitrary act of omnipotence. Why then should God strike them with such an annihilating force? What motive can be conceived, unless it be that he is unable to exercise a government over them that will redound to his glory? But that would imply his own imperfection. He can sustain them as easily in an active, as in an inactive state. He can place them in conditions in which they may as easily acquire and communicate knowledge as in the present life. He can unfold to them a theatre of activity in which they will display their affections towards him and one another, as variously and as fully as in this world. He can subject them to law, and manifest his approval or disapprobation of them, as clearly as in this world: and their activity in such a state may effect ends in his government over other orders of his creatures, as well as his present administration. Why, then, should he not? Can any reason be conceived that is suitable to his perfections and station? Would it not imply that he could not pursue a course towards them that would subserve any good ends and redound to his glory? And would not that imply that he is unequal to his station? Would it not be a triumph to Satan? Would it not show that Satan, in leading the race to revolt, had baffled the Almighty? That he had placed him and vast multitudes of his creatures in such relations to each other, that God could not exercise a government over them that would bear inspection by his other subjects; and that he was obliged, therefore, to change their very nature from intelligent to unconscious existences in order to escape the discredit of revealing his inadequacy to reign over them? And would not that be to overthrow his whole government—to show all orders of his creatures that he has not the wisdom and power and goodness that are requisite to the wise and holy government of fallen creatures; and, therefore, that he is not entitled to that perfect confidence, veneration, and love, which he demands, and which are requisite to justify them in paying him that homage which would be due to an all-

perfect being? Such, undoubtedly, would be the impression it would make. The supposition, therefore, that he consigns mankind to such an existence in unconsciousness, and places them thereby out of the sphere of a moral government, is infinitely derogatory to him and incredible. It cannot be true, because it is contradictory to his perfections, and would force his whole empire into revolt, and overturn his throne. How singular that Dr. Whately appears not to have cast a solitary glance in this direction! He seems to be as unaware of the bearing of his theory on the Divine nature as it is on ours; on the great end for which God reigns, as on those for which we exist.

And thirdly, It implies that some of the most essential beliefs and hopes in which the people of God live and die, and by which they are supported in their last hours, are wholly delusive, and their religion itself a cheat.

That the children of God generally believe that they are to be conscious and happy in their intermediate state; that that belief and the supports it yields, has a most important place in their religious experience; that it is usually one of the leading thoughts and expectations in their dying hours, and in a large measure the source of the lofty joys and exulting anticipations which distinguish their triumph over the king of terrors; that it has been the faith and hope, especially, of the martyrs who have laid down their lives for the sake of Christ,—is known to all who are aware what the thoughts and expectations are which, more than any others, occupy the pious in their approaches to the grave, make that approach calm and serene, and often raise them to exultation and rapture, as they find themselves advancing through the dark passage of death, and entering the portals of the invisible world. This is the persuasion that usually has the fullest possession of the minds of the pious in their last moments; it is in the light of this expectation that they experience the highest forms of peace and joy, and breathe out their last accents of love, adoration, and trust. But according to Dr. Whately's theory, this highest and most triumphant form that faith, hope, and joy, ever assume, and that bears the most indubitable marks of being the immediate work of the divine Spirit, is all a sheer delusion. The great share of the children of God—and especially the most

eminently pious, the most adequately prepared for death, and those whom he seems most indubitably to recognise as his children, and sustain by the aids of his Spirit—have died under beliefs and expectations of happiness as baseless and deceptive as the dreams of the devotees of false Gods; their religion has been, in a large measure, an error; and one of the first discoveries with which they will be overwhelmed on awakening from death, will be, the stupendous misapprehension into which they had fallen here of the divine purposes; the amazing delusion under which they had surrendered up their spirits to God! But that the faith and hope in which the righteous die, is such a wretched deception, no one can believe, we think, who has witnessed their happy deaths, and knows himself what it is to cherish a like trust and hope. It were to throw doubt over the whole of their religious experience. It were to impeach the wisdom and fidelity of God; for it is inconsistent with his perfections, as well as their character as his children, to suppose that the highest forms of their affections towards him, and their most assured and exulting hopes, should rest on a false foundation, and prove an illusory dream, an empty pageant. Why is it that the Archbishop took no notice of these objections to his theory, which are far more important than that to which he refers, and show decisively, from the detraction which it involves of God's perfections, and impeachment of the reliableness of the highest exercises of Christian trust and hope, not only that it is not, but that it cannot, be true?

He next attempts to meet the objections to the supposed existence of the departed in such a state of unconsciousness, that are presented by Christ's promise to the malefactor, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise;" and by Paul's representation that on his departure from the body he should be with Christ, and should be in a happier condition than in this life. And he attempts to escape the obvious confutation of his theory, which that and other similar passages present, by the pretext, that inasmuch as the souls of believers, if unconscious, would have no *knowledge* of the lapse of time, the period passed in insensibility *would* be *no* time to them; but, practically, the moment of their awaking would be the moment that immediately followed their death.

"The long and dreary interval between death and the day of judgment (supposing the intermediate state to be a profound sleep) does not exist at all, except in the imagination. To the party concerned there is *no* interval whatever ; but to each person (according to this supposition) the moment of his closing his eyes in death, will be instantly succeeded by the sound of the last trumpet, which shall summon the dead, even though ages shall have intervened. And in this sense, the faithful Christian may be, *practically*, in paradise the day he dies. The promise made to the penitent thief, and the Apostle Paul's wish 'to depart and be with Christ,' which he said was 'far better,' than to remain any longer in this troublesome world, would each be fulfilled to all practical purposes, provided each shall have found himself in a state of happiness in the presence of his Lord, the very instant (according to his own perception) after having breathed his last in this world."—Pp. 83, 84.

One of the most striking facts in the course of a large class of writers in their speculations on religious subjects, is the seeming unconsciousness with which they indulge suppositions, and make assumptions to sustain their theories, that are not only groundless, but that involve the greatest impeachment of God's rectitude and wisdom. This is an instance of it. The principle on which Dr. Whately proceeds is, that no falsification of his word by God, no deception he may be supposed to practise on his children, is of any consideration, if they are but unaware of it during its progress ! That it would have been a total falsification of Christ's word to the believing malefactor, if he had not been admitted to paradise with him on the day of his death, no one can fail to see. "This day" was a specific, definite time, in contradistinction from all other days, and was the day of the crucifixion, which terminated at sunset. An admission of the thief to paradise at any other time would not have been a fulfilment of the promise that he should be with him there *that* day, any more than the promise to bestow any other gift in this world or the next on a specified day, would be literally verified by bestowing it at some other time. If one of Archbishop Whately's deacons, rectors, or bishops, entered into a specific engagement to pay him a thousand pounds on a specified day in the year 1856, would he consider the non-fulfilment of that promise on the day no violation of it ? Would a postponement through five, ten, fifteen years,

be no deviation from the contract? Would a payment of the sum to him, or his heirs, at a distance of twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years, be a truthful and exact compliance with the covenant? Would not a postponement and refusal of the payment through one year be as real and absolute a violation of the engagement, as a refusal and delay of it through a hundred or a thousand years? And would not the reality of that violation be wholly independent of the question whether Archbishop Whately, in the meantime, was cognisant of the non-fulfilment of the bargain or not? There surely is no room for doubt on the subject. Archbishop Whately's dying in the meantime, and passing to another world, so that he would know nothing of the non-payment of the money, would not prevent the non-payment from being a breach of the engagement. And so if Christ did not admit the believing malefactor to paradise with him on the day of the crucifixion, if he has not been admitted there to the present time, it is as absolute a falsification of his word as it will be if he is not admitted there millions of ages hence; as it will be, indeed, if he is never admitted there. If a non-fulfilment of the promise for eighteen hundred years is no violation of it, why will its non-fulfilment through any other period be? If millions of ages may pass without any infraction of his word, why may not hundreds and thousands of millions? Why may not ages without end?

The pretext, then, that it would be no violation of the promise to exclude the penitent malefactor from paradise till the resurrection, inasmuch as he would have no consciousness of the postponement, is wholly mistaken. The non-fulfilment and falsification of the promise would be the same whether he were aware of it or not. Besides, on the supposition that he remained ignorant of it till the resurrection, he would then become apprised of it; and its effect would be as fatal, as though he had been aware of it at an earlier period. The expedient by which Dr. Whately endeavors to reconcile the promise to the thief with his theory, is derogatory to God, therefore, in the utmost degree, and wholly inadmissible. No more decisive proof of the utter error of his notion of an unconscious intermediate state can be imagined, than that it makes the vindication of God to

depend on a quibble, which would be considered wholly treacherous and dishonorable in transactions between men.

He is equally unsuccessful in his attempt to reconcile the desire of Paul to depart and be with Christ, with his theory that on departing, in place of being with Christ, he sank into a state of unconsciousness. The apostle states in the passage, 2 Cor. iv. 16-18, v. 1-9, what the considerations were by which he and other believers were sustained in cheerfulness and hope under the burdens of life; and represents that they lay in the glorious rewards that awaited them in the future world; that it was on them that their eyes were fixed; and that the first among them was that, on dying, they were to be received into a mansion prepared for them in heaven, and that they accordingly desired to be admitted to that abode; yet that they did not simply desire a release from the body and transference to that heavenly world, as comprising the full salvation for which they hoped; but they desired rather, or still more ardently, a transformation of their mortal bodies into immortal, such as the saints are to experience whom Christ is to raise, or change at his coming. And God himself, he asserts, had inspired them with those desires and hopes; and, therefore, he adds, they were always full of courage, though knowing that while in the body they were absent from the Lord; and wishing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord.

"Therefore, though our outward man decays, the inward is renewed day by day. For our transient, light affliction works for us an exceeding, exceeding eternal weight of glory; our eyes being directed—not to the things that are seen, but to the things that are not seen; for the things that are seen are temporary, but the things that are not seen are eternal. For we know that if our earthly tent-dwelling should be dissolved, we have an edifice of God, a habitation not made with hands, eternal in the heavens [not a body—but a mansion]. And truly in this we groan, desiring to be clothed with our heavenly habitation [that is, to be admitted to that dwelling], inasmuch as being clothed [with that] we shall not be found naked. We groan indeed while in this tent, being burdened; not because we wish to be unclothed [simply; that is, to be disembodied], but to be clothed

upon [by a resurrection or transfiguration], so that the mortal shall be swallowed up of life. And he who formed us to this very [desire and hope] is God, and he has given us the pledge of the Spirit. Therefore, we are full of confidence [courage, cheerfulness] always, even knowing that while at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, not by sight; yet we are of good cheer, and desirous rather to be absent from the body, and at home with the Lord. Wherefore we endeavor, whether present or absent, to be approved by him."

The apostle thus represents that among the glorious rewards, the prospect of which gave them courage and joy, the first was that on dying they were to have a mansion of God in heaven. That that mansion or abode was not a body—the glorious shape to which they are to be reunited at the coming of Christ—but a residence, a celestial dwelling, is seen from his exhibiting it as already existing, and eternal in the heavens—not slumbering in ruin in the dust of the earth. It was not the identical tent-dwelling—the mortal body death was to dissolve—changed into another form by a resurrection or transfiguration: but it was a residence, a paradise of beauty, a world of glory, in which they were to dwell during their intermediate existence. And he states that under their sufferings in their present bodies they desired to be put in possession of that heavenly habitation; and then, to guard his readers from inferring that admission to that disembodied life was all that they desired, he adds, that their desire was not simply to be freed from the bodies in which they were then groaning; but that they at the same time had a still more earnest desire of that new and glorious body they were to receive at Christ's coming, when this mortal is to be swallowed up of life by a resurrection or change to immortal. And these desires and assurances, he avers, were breathed into them directly by God; and that under their sustaining influence they were full of courage and cheerfulness, even while they continued in the body, though sensible that they were absent from the Lord; and full of assurance also, and a still more fervent desire to be absent from the body and present with the Lord. Here is thus a specific and clear representation that believers, on dying, enter immediately on the glory on which their eyes

are here fixed; that that glory is at first a residence in a heavenly abode, where they enjoy the presence of Christ; and that their knowledge and expectation of that existence lead them to desire to be freed from their present bodies, in order that they may enter that happy world;—while at the same time that disembodied life in heaven is distinguished from the new-bodied existence on which they are at length to enter, when this mortal is to be swallowed up in life by a resurrection, or transformation to a spiritual, glorious, and immortal form, at Christ's coming. And this representation is repeated by the apostle, in respect to himself, in his epistle to the Philippians, i. 21-24, where he says that "to him to live is Christ"—that is, is to enjoy and glorify him; but to die would be a gain in that respect; that is, death would introduce him to a state, in which he should enjoy Christ in a far higher measure than he could in this world; that he was, therefore, uncertain which he should choose—to die, or to live: for he was held in suspense between the two,—having a desire to depart and be with Christ; for that would be much better, as far as his personal happiness was concerned,—and yet knowing that to remain in the body was more needful to the Philippians," he was inclined also to that. He thus represents that his departure from the body would be immediately followed by an admission to Christ's presence, and enjoyment of him in a far higher measure than in this life; and that the prospect of that happiness inspired him with so fervent a desire to die, that he was only contented to remain by the consideration that his labors were still needful to the church.

Dr. Whately has thus wholly missed the meaning of these passages, and offers the most absurd and revolting contradiction in the pretext that they are consistent with the supposition that Paul had no knowledge or belief of a conscious and happy existence in the intermediate state, but expected to sink, at death, into insensibility; and neither enjoy the presence of Christ, nor know anything of the progress of his kingdom, through a vast tract of ages.

Such is the issue of his endeavor to prove that the souls of the departed are lost in insensibility during the period between death and the resurrection. Instead of being supported by the Scriptures, or reconcilable with them, his doc-

trine is at every point in the most open antagonism to their teachings. They show us that the immortality of the soul, its consciousness in its intermediate state, and happiness or misery, the resurrection of the body, and a final judgment, were made known to the children of God, and men generally, in the early ages; were held by Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; were the faith of the Hebrew people at the institution of the law; were believed, recognised, and taught by the prophets of the Old Testament; and were proclaimed afresh in an open and emphatic form by Christ and the apostles; and that the faith that they were at death to enter on a happy existence in the presence of Christ, was eminently the faith that supported and cheered the believers of that, as it has of every subsequent age, under the sufferings and sorrows of life.

And this doctrine is approved by reason, and indicated by the divine perfections. There is nothing within the sphere of our experience that implies or suggests that the soul must sink into insensibility on its separation from the body. So far from it, all our knowledge of ourselves would lead us to infer that it must naturally continue conscious and active. Intimate as the union of the mind is to the body, we know that the latter is but the instrument by which it acts, and is acted on by objects without; and that in its purely intellectual activity it is seemingly independent of the body. Nor can we see any reason why God should consign the souls of the race to insensibility, and thereby place them out of their relations to him as intelligent and accountable subjects, through a vast round of ages—or for any period whatever. Instead, it seems in the grossest contradiction to his perfections, and the ends for which they are created and upheld. That he cannot exercise a government over them in their disembodied state, and make it subservient to the great objects for which he reigns over his moral creatures, as easily and as perfectly as he can rule them in their bodied life, either before death, or after their resurrection, no one will pretend. What reason then can be imagined that he should not? How can it be shown, indeed, that his wisdom, his goodness, and his justice do not positively require it? What ground is there for supposing that it is not as inconsistent with his perfections, and the ends for which he reigns,

that he should strike them from their sphere as intelligences, and lock them in insensibility through a long series of ages, as it would be to consign any other world of moral agents to such a senseless destiny?

Is it not to be believed also, that the consciousness of the dead in their intermediate state, and the exercise of a government over them, suited to their character and condition, are essential in order to their preparation for the allotments he is finally to assign them? Is it not probable that the progress the redeemed will thereby make in the knowledge of God, of the work of redemption, of themselves, of the universe of intelligent creatures, and of the great scheme of the divine administration over our race, through the ages that are to follow the first resurrection, is indispensable to fit them for the lofty offices they are to fill in Christ's kingdom after their resurrection? Is it not requisite also, probably, to the just understanding by the universe at large, of his dispensations towards those whom he saves, that he should continue to manifest his love towards them during their intermediate state, and reign over them as his children? What could appear more unsuitable to his relations to them, and irreconcilable with the love with which Christ gave himself a ransom for them, than that on their death he should consign them to oblivion, and not show them a token of favor, nor employ any means to advance them in wisdom and love, through a long series of ages? Would not such a procedure seem to proclaim to other orders of beings who witnessed it, that they had not that place in Christ's love which his death appeared to bespeak; that they were not found worth the infinite price that had been paid for their redemption? But he does not expose his creatures thus to a misconception of himself; and this great measure of his sway will, when we reach a full understanding of its reasons and effects, be found as much marked by wisdom and love, and as essential to the great ends he is pursuing, as any other measure of his administration. Were heaven opened to us, as it was to the apostle in Patmos, we should undoubtedly find that the redeemed exist there in the intimate relations to God and the Lamb, in which the living creatures and elders, and the multitude on the glassy sea, who are victorious over the wild beast, are exhibited in the

visions of the Apocalypse; that they are raised to a beauty of wisdom, a fervor of love, and a comprehension of the dispensations and purposes of God towards the race on the earth, befitting those who dwell in the immediate presence of the Redeemer; and that they are prepared by their residence and service there, for the offices of kings and priests, with which, on their resurrection, they are to be invested in his kingdom on the earth.

This element of the common faith of the church, that the soul is conscious in its intermediate life, and either enjoying the light of the divine presence and favor, or in a state of suffering, is not then, as Archbishop Whately would have us believe, a mere figment of the imagination, with no support from the divine word; but is clearly and copiously taught in the Scriptures, and is one of the most impressive, most glorious, and most consoling of their doctrines, and has been the support of God's people in all ages, amidst the sufferings and sorrows of life, and in the agonies and terrors of death.

We shall resume the review of Dr. Whately's work in the next number of the Journal.

ART. VI.—LITERARY AND CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. A VIEW OF THE SCRIPTURE REVELATIONS, respecting Good and Evil Angels, by Richard Whately, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1856.

THE author treats in these Lectures of the good and evil angels whose existence is revealed to us in the Scriptures, of the reasons that we are made acquainted with their existence and agencies, of the difference of the demoniacs of the New Testament from evil angels, of the temptation of Christ by Satan, and of the false and superstitious notions that are entertained by many of the agency of that malignant being. They were designed originally for an unlettered congregation, and are employed in a considerable measure in showing how little we know, rather than how much, and in exposing and guarding against gross and superstitious errors,

especially such as lie in the direction of Romanism, rather than in clearly and impressively delineating the place which the agency of those spiritual beings holds in the administration God is now exercising over the world. They are written in the author's usual simple style, and with such point as to excite the wish that he had given the subject the thorough and comprehensive discussion to which it is entitled. It is an excellent feature of his work, that he maintains in the most emphatic manner, that the Bible is to be taken as our guide on the theme, and its teachings received in their plain and natural import.

2. **ONE WORD MORE ; An Appeal to the Reasoning and Thoughtful among Unbelievers.** By John Neal. Second Edition. New York : M. W. Dodd. 1856.

THE principal topics discussed by the author, are miracles, faith, a change of heart, prayer, and universalism. They are treated with a reference to the unsanctified, who are perplexed in a measure by doubts, or misled by false views, and are written with much originality and pith, are evangelical, abound with striking illustrations drawn from the common affairs of life, and in many passages rise to a glow and strength that cannot fail to interest and impress the reader.

3. **ARMINIAN INCONSISTENCIES AND ERRORS :** in which it is shown that all the Distinctive Doctrines of the Presbyterian Confession of Faith are taught by Standard Writers of the Methodist Episcopal Church. By the Rev. Henry Brown. Philadelphia : W. S. & A. Martien. 1856.

THE title of this volume sufficiently states its object. Its chapters were originally published in a series of essays in the *Watchman and Observer*, Richmond, Virginia, and they are marked by a candor, acuteness of discrimination, and force of reasoning, that cannot fail to make them highly useful to readers of both parties.

4. **THE BRITISH PERIODICALS :** Republished by L. Scott & Co.

THE Quarterlies for January present their usual variety of agreeable and instructive articles. One of the most important is a review in the London of volumes from two clergymen of the Church of England, in which they occupy the lowest ground of the modern

German materialistic atheism, or deification of nature, as the only cause and the only existence. The transition to idealistic pantheism on the one hand, or materialistic naturalism on the other, is seemingly inevitable from the doctrine of Kant, in which these monstrous systems had their origin—that there is no external universe, but that the mind is the cause of all the apparent perceptions of external objects that take place in it. None but a dreamy intellect can long yield its faith to a system that offers so gross a contradiction to its consciousness. The metaphysics of that school are giving birth, accordingly, to the same fruits in Great Britain and this country, which sprang from them in such profusion in Germany. A brood of sceptics, of disbelievers in revelation, of atheists, of materialists, of mere deifiers of man, of pantheists, have been nurturing in the seats of learning, and have entered the sacred office, who, under the natural impulse of their new sentiments, are gradually unfolding and propagating them, gathering a train of adherents, and preparing the way for the exhibition of the true character of their doctrines by the deadly influence they exert on the principles and morals of those who embrace them. There are tasteful articles in the *London* also on Table-Talk, Landscape Gardening, the Zoological Gardens, and Reformatory Schools.

The article in the *Edinburgh* on the Use of Torture in India, presents a terrible picture of the tyranny with which the British Government crushes the helpless victims of its cupidity in the East. The pretext of the East India Company that they were wholly ignorant of the systematic outrages which have been perpetrated by their officials for thirty years, will command the assent of no person of sense; as it does not, indeed, of the reviewer. How could the infliction of the most brutal tortures in the very presence of the government, and by its officials, for a long series of years, and resulting in many cases in the death of the sufferers, escape the knowledge of the parties under whose administration it has taken place, and whose insatiable and remorseless exactions it was employed to enforce? The articles on Himalayan Journals, Sir R. McClure's Discovery of the North West Passage, and several other subjects, are highly instructive and entertaining.

The Westminster's View of Contemporary Literature is unusually rich and attractive. Of the other topics, the House of Savoy, and Lions and Lion Hunting, are especially entertaining. The article on the War with Russia, like those of the *London* and *Edinburgh*, was written before the steps were taken that have resulted in the conference of the powers that is now in progress, and contemplates a continuance of the contest.

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